There is No God (And You Know It)

I don't see how you interpret "random" as "free". Random events are still beyond your control. Even if they affect your decisions, you're still powerless. Only by beign the SOURCE of your own decisions, which seems impossible, could you have true free will.



Because they are unrelated.

I can equate them cause neither one follows a pre-determined script. Yes, if a totally random event is used as an input to a choice I hhave to make, I still have to react to it; but that's not the basis of my argument.

What I'm saying is, if the universe allows for TR (totally random) events, then not everything is determinstic, is it? If not everything is deterministic, then FW is possible. Your argument hinges on the universe being totally deterministic. There cannot be TR events. In a universe the allows for TR events, then FW must be possible.
 
What I'm saying is, if the universe allows for TR (totally random) events, then not everything is determinstic, is it? If not everything is deterministic, then FW is possible. Your argument hinges on the universe being totally deterministic. There cannot be TR events. In a universe the allows for TR events, then FW must be possible.

Okay, I get it.

However, free will is a third, completely different thing (I, of course, speak of a particular definition of free will, not a subjective POV one.) Free will is, by definition I believe, non-random and yet not deterministic. I simply do not see how this is possible.
 
In other words, you're going with 'practical free will'. Good - a step in the right direction.

I've never disputed practical free will. The problem I have with using the term without heavy logical qualification is that it then gets misused and misinterpreted.

I am not convinced, yet, that we have agreed on this all along - if Bri etc...'s free will was just this practical one then there would be no reason why they couldn't have just said so earlier.
 
I completely agree that practical free will as you describe is perhaps more likely than libertarian free will to be reality. However, if you are saying that it is a fact that libertarian free will (something other than strict causation or randomness) can be ruled out as a possibility (is impossible) then the burden would be on you to prove it.

However, if you admit that it's possible that libertarian free will exists then you have truly joined the other side of the argument.

-Bri

And there's my point confirmed. Bri believes that an event can either be caused, uncaused (random) or neither caused nor uncaused. This is what the free will argument has been really about all along (although sidetracked at times). IMO Bri's position is a logical contradiction and defeats itself.

Bri will now say that random and uncaused are not the same thing.
 
Bri believes that an event can either be caused, uncaused (random) or neither caused nor uncaused.

No, I believe that it is not impossible that an event can either be entirely caused, random, or free (neither caused nor random).

By "caused" I mean something that is entirely determined by prior causes which are themselves entirely caused. By "random" I mean that it either has no prior causes and is random, or has at least one prior cause that is random. By "free" I mean that it either has no prior causes and is free, or has at least one prior cause that is free.

This is what the free will argument has been really about all along (although sidetracked at times). IMO Bri's position is a logical contradiction and defeats itself.

Bri will now say that random and uncaused are not the same thing.

Correct. It is only a logical contradiction if you define "uncaused" and "random" to mean the same thing as you did above.

Let me give you a simple example (it's a poor example, but it might help). Imagine a thing that would produce truly uncaused random numbers (67, 36, 22, 74, ...). According to quantum theory, such a thing is not beyond the realm of possibility. Now, imagine instead that this thing produces uncaused pairs of random numbers (67, 67, 36, 36, 22, 22, 74, 74, ...) In this case, half of the time you would be able to predict the outcome and half of the time you wouldn't. This would not be considered random since it is at least partially predictable, nor would it be caused. I'm not saying that such a thing exists or that it would be free will if it did exist, but it does illustrate how something might be uncaused and non-random.

-Bri
 
Argument 1 (semi-formalisation of my safe example):
  1. An omniscient being G participates in a universe in which at least one agent has free will (Assumption)
  2. G can make a true statement (s) about the world in the world (T Def 4, Arg 1)
  3. A true statement made about the world in the world exists at a specific time (t) (Hyp logically possible from Arg 1)
  4. A statement at time t can be about an action at time t1 where t1 > t (T Def 4)
  5. Let A be a free agent (Hyp from 1)
  6. Let a(A,t) be an action performed by free agent A at time t. (Hyp from 1)
  7. Let a1 and a2 be the possible actions for A at time t (Hyp from Def 1)
  8. A true statement s by G exists at time t and says that a(A,t1) == a1 (Hyp logically possible from 2,3,4)
  9. The probability given t<t1 that a(A,t1) == a1 is 1 (Ded Def 4, Arg 1,8)
  10. The probability given t<t1 that a(A,t1) == a1 is not 1 (Ded Def 1, Arg 5,6)
  11. We reject the hypothesis (RAA 1,9,10)

OK, I think I see the problem here (although again it might be possible that I'm not understanding the proof). I believe that you are claiming that the mere possibility of God being able to place such a statement into the world would create an illogical outcome.

If I were to say that indeed God does not have the power to place such a prediction within the world, then the proof falls apart. Specifically, line 2 (particularly the "in the world" part) doesn't necessarily follow from your definitions of "omniscience" and "participates in" (as implied by line 1). Remember, "participates in" doesn't mean that the participator (God) must be able to do anything in the world, only that he must be able to do something in the world that is measurable. God could still participate in the world in some other way, but simply doesn't have the power to actually insert predictions of future events into the world even though he has full (timeless) knowledge of them. Such a God would therefore be omniscient and be able to participate in a world containing free will, thus disproving your conclusion.

Upon further inspection, what we have here is the "square circle" paradox already discussed. You are presuming that a God who could potentially create a logically contradictory situation cannot exist (whether or not he actually does create such a contradiction). "Ah, but if he cannot potentially create a logical contradiction, then he wouldn't be omnipotent," you'll say (and then change your conclusion to read "an omniscient and omnipotent being cannot participate in a universe that contains free will"). We have previously discussed the possibility that the argument itself is illogical. Instead of "Can God create a boulder bigger than he can lift?" you're asking "Can God make an infallabe statement about a future that can differ from the statement in question?"

-Bri
 
No, I believe that it is not impossible that an event can either be entirely caused, random, or free (neither caused nor random).

By "caused" I mean something that is entirely determined by prior causes which are themselves entirely caused.

Ok.

By "random" I mean that it either has no prior causes and is random, or has at least one prior cause that is random.

Ok.

By "free" I mean that it either has no prior causes and is free, or has at least one prior cause that is free.

So, by 'free' you mean it is uncaused ('no prior causes') and is 'free'. Which is different from the standard uncaused how? We have asked you this question before of course. Also, as I have pointed out before your argument is circular - by 'free' you 'mean ... that it is free'. In case it is not obvious - I am quoting you directly there.

Let me give you a simple example (it's a poor example, but it might help). Imagine a thing that would produce truly uncaused random numbers (67, 36, 22, 74, ...). Now, imagine instead that this thing produces uncaused pairs of random numbers (67, 67, 36, 36, 22, 22, 74, 74, ...) In this case, half of the time you would be able to predict the outcome and half of the time you wouldn't. This would not be considered random since it is at least partially predictable, nor would it be caused.

Sorry - but if this thing is 'producing' pairs of numbers then they could hardly be said to be uncaused. If we can gaurantee that the numbers come in pairs then we can logically assume that there is a cause for that - otherwise its just correlation and the next pair of numbers might not match.

I'm not saying that such a thing exists or that it would be free will if it did exist, but it does illustrate how something might be uncaused and non-random.

No it doesn't.
 
OK, I think I see the problem here (although again it might be possible that I'm not understanding the proof). I believe that you are claiming that the mere possibility of God being able to place such a statement into the world would create an illogical outcome.
Yes.
If I were to say that indeed God does not have the power to place such a prediction within the world, then the proof falls apart.
Yes.
Specifically, line 2 (particularly the "in the world" part) doesn't necessarily follow from your definitions of "omniscience" and "participates in" (as implied by line 1). Remember, "participates in" doesn't mean that the participator (God) must be able to do anything in the world, only that he must be able to do something in the world that is measurable.
I did not think proposition 2 would be controversial since disallowing it pretty much wipes out 99% of definitions of God.

But I would point out that by the nature of information, God only needs to be able to make one type of measurable change in order to insert any information that he has into the world. Whether he does so or not would then be a matter of choice.

If he can cause a point mutation in the junk DNA of a Bufis Marinara then he could insert the statement. If he has the ability to alter the properties of a human neuron (or to inspire knowledge in a human) then he could insert the statement. If he could insert a wall he could put graffitti on the wall.

And if he can insert the information 'June 05' into the world he can equally insert 'June 06', the difference between them is simply a configuration.

The ability to make any kind of empirically measurable change implies the ability to insert any type of information at all, so I would say that this statement as well as 3 and 4 are logically possible consequences of the definitions and the premise since there is no possible interaction with the world that would not also allow any type of information to be inserted.
Upon further inspection, what we have here is the "square circle" paradox already discussed.
A square circle is a plane figure comprising of exactly four straight cyclically connected equal length sides with right angles between each side and all points on the figure are equidistant from a single point except where this causes a contradiction.
You are presuming that a God who could potentially create a logically contradictory situation cannot exist...
I hope we are all presuming that.
... (whether or not he actually does create such a contradiction). "Ah, but if he cannot potentially create a logical contradiction, then he wouldn't be omnipotent," you'll say ...
I would say nothing of the sort.
...(and then change your conclusion to read "an omniscient and omnipotent being cannot participate in a universe that contains free will"). We have previously discussed the possibility that the argument itself is illogical. Instead of "Can God create a boulder bigger than he can lift?" you're asking "Can God make an infallabe statement about a future that can differ from the statement in question?"
I am not asking that because definition 4 says that God cannot make an infallible statement in time about a future that can differ from the statement in question.

But if someone says to me "God has property A and property B" where A="can make an absolutely unbreakable object" and B="can break any object", and I pointed out the contradiction then why would that make me the illogical one?

It doesn't, it means that the proposer has to clarify the position. Do they mean property A="God can make an object unbreakable except by a being capable of breaking any object"? Or does it mean B="can break any breakable object"?

I am merely pointing out the contradiction with what I understand to be the definitions and premise that others are using.
 
So, by 'free' you mean it is uncaused ('no prior causes') and is 'free'. Which is different from the standard uncaused how?

I have no idea what you mean by "standard uncaused." Something which is uncaused is uncaused. A free choice would be uncaused. A random event would also be uncaused.

We have asked you this question before of course. Also, as I have pointed out before your argument is circular - by 'free' you 'mean ... that it is free'. In case it is not obvious - I am quoting you directly there.

That wasn't an argument at all. I was simply indicating that something can be considered free without being entirely uncaused as long as one or more of its causes is free, the same way something can be random without being entirely uncaused, as long as one or more of its causes are random.

Sorry - but if this thing is 'producing' pairs of numbers then they could hardly be said to be uncaused.

I didn't say the numbers were uncaused. I said that the thing causing the random numbers is uncaused. Anything that has no cause is uncaused, regardless of what it causes. Something that produces random numbers is uncaused as long as it has no cause. Something that produces pairs of random numbers would also be uncaused as long as it has no cause.

If we can gaurantee that the numbers come in pairs then we can logically assume that there is a cause for that - otherwise its just correlation and the next pair of numbers might not match.

You cannot logically make the assumption that such a thing must be caused. Why would you assume that something must be caused if it comes in pairs? Why wouldn't you assume that something must be caused if it's random?

No it doesn't.

It was simply an illustration to show what something that is non-random and uncaused might entail. Unfortunately, it was not a perfect illustration as I admitted, and I'm sorry you still don't understand.

-Bri
 
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I did not think proposition 2 would be controversial since disallowing it pretty much wipes out 99% of definitions of God.

Even if it does wipe out some definitions of God, it also proves that your conclusion doesn't follow your premise, which is what I was trying to point out.

Perhaps God simply doesn't have the power to create logical contradictions, and therefore cannot insert an infallable statement into the world that predicts a free event. I don't really see that as being a problem for most theists since I don't think anyone has ever experienced God doing this. Of course, since this is a "square circle" thing, it is possible that God simply isn't limited by logic, and it is also possible that your premise itself is illogical.

But I would point out that by the nature of information, God only needs to be able to make one type of measurable change in order to insert any information that he has into the world. Whether he does so or not would then be a matter of choice.

God could make any number of changes to the world without being able to do something that is logically self-contradictory. The very thing that you're demanding that God must be able to create is self-contradictory, just like a square circle. We've already discussed this at length, so I don't intend on rehashing old arguments unless you insist on it.

God could, of course, insert an infallible prediction of any event that he chose into the world as long as he forced the outcome of the event so that it is no longer free, and God could also choose not to insert any prediction into the world at all and leave the event free.

If he can cause a point mutation in the junk DNA of a Bufis Marinara then he could insert the statement. If he has the ability to alter the properties of a human neuron (or to inspire knowledge in a human) then he could insert the statement. If he could insert a wall he could put graffitti on the wall.

And if he was so powerful he could make a rock bigger than he could lift. As we've already discussed, God doesn't have to be able to do the logically impossible. You're demanding that God be able to do something that is logically self-contradictory, then saying that the mere possibility of him doing it (whether he actually does it or not) proves that he cannot exist because it would create a logical contradiction. We've already discussed these sorts of arguments at length. The problem is that the argument itself is self-contradictory and therefore invalid.

-Bri
 
There is no god.

Opinion, not fact. Not that I necessarily disagree with your opinion, but my agreement of disagreement would also be opinion.

There is no evidence of a god.

It is false that there is no evidence of a god, but true that there is no evidence that the existance of a god is impossible.

There is no requirement for a god.

You got me there. I have no idea what you mean by this.

-Bri
 
Even if it does wipe out some definitions of God, it also proves that your conclusion doesn't follow your premise, which is what I was trying to point out.
Well those "some" definitions include all Christian, Jewish and Islamic beliefs. If God cannot make a true statement in the world about the world then none of those beliefs have any validity whatsoever.

In any case I have demonstrated that it does follow from the premise. If God cannot insert information then he cannot do anything at all.
Perhaps God simply doesn't have the power to create logical contradictions, and therefore cannot insert an infallable statement into the world that predicts a free event. I don't really see that as being a problem for most theists since I don't think anyone has ever experienced God doing this.
You might want to discuss that with a Christian theologist before being quite sure. For example Psalm 22 is pretty universally believed to contain an infallible prediction of the free will behaviour of Christ's executioners. And there is also that whole "Revelations" thing.
Of course, since this is a "square circle" thing, it is possible that God simply isn't limited by logic, and it is also possible that your premise itself is illogical.
Yes, in fact my argument proves that the premise is illogical. That is how reductio ad absurdum works. My premise (in line 1) is "An omniscient being participates in a universe in which there is at least one free agent" then it means that it is illogical that an omniscient being can participate in a universe in which there is at least one free agent.
God could make any number of changes to the world without being able to do something that is logically self-contradictory.
He can do anything that does not involve making any emprically measureable change to the world. I'm not sure how much that leaves.
The very thing that you're demanding that God must be able to create is self-contradictory, just like a square circle.
I don't see where I have demanded anything whatsoever. I have merely taken a some definitions (not mine) and an assumption (not mine) and shown that it leads to a logical contradiction. How does this involve making a demand of God?

And as I have already shown you can easily create a definition for a square circle if you are allowed to include the clause "...unless it involves any contradiction".
God could, of course, insert an infallible prediction of any event that he chose into the world as long as he forced the outcome of the event so that it is no longer free, and God could also choose not to insert any prediction into the world at all and leave the event free.
But as I have already pointed out making a statement about an event could not in itself alter that event - so choosing or not choosing to insert it would not alter the logical contradiction which arises from the possibility not the fact.
And if he was so powerful he could make a rock bigger than he could lift.
Well put it this way round then - if God can't insert the statement he can't force a point mutation in the junk DNA of a Bufo Marinara. If God can't insert the statement he can't alter the propery of a human neuron, or inspire knowledge in a human mind. If God can't put the grafitti on the wall then he can't create the wall. What do you think that he can organise the construction and will be prevented from doing the decoration?

Do you think of 'logic' as this force that steps in and prevents things happening? Do you think that God could insert "June 05" into the world, but not insert "June 06"? That in attempting to change a '5' to a '6' he would suddenly find his power draining away?

No, if God can do anything at all he can insert information. If he can represent a "1" and a "0" in any way whatsoever then he can insert any information at all into the world. If he can't make an alteration that can represent a "1" and a "0" then how can he do anything at all? The hypothesis follows from the premise and the definitions.
As we've already discussed, God doesn't have to be able to do the logically impossible.
And a halting algorithm does not have to be able to do the logically impossible. But if a logically possible consequence of the definition of a halting algorithm is that it should be able to do something that leads to a contradiction then the halting algorithm cannot exist. Whether or not it does that contradictory thing. The fact that the definition implies the possibility makes a halting algorithm impossible.
You're demanding that God be able to do something that is logically self-contradictory, then saying that the mere possibility of him doing it (whether he actually does it or not) proves that he cannot exist because it would create a logical contradiction.
It is not I that demand that God do this contradictory thing. It is anybody who insists that an omniscient being is capable of participating in a universe that contains free will that demand this. I am pointing out the contradiction, nothing else.
 
How do you know?
The exact same way that I know that there is no easter bunny.

Currently nobody knows of any evidence for God. There might be some but as yet uncovered.
Yes. When you find it, show it to me.

Is everything that exists required?
A great question for the philosophers, but quite irrelevant to my assertion that no god is required to explain anything in this world.
 
The exact same way that I know that there is no easter bunny.
Good. How do you know there is no Easter Bunny?
Yes. When you find it, show it to me.
Not really looking I'm afraid
A great question for the philosophers, but quite irrelevant to my assertion that no god is required to explain anything in this world.
But what is the point of your assertion in the first place? Why would the fact that God is not required to explain anything in the world be relevant here? Do you explain anything in the world? Do you exist?
 
I have no idea what you mean by "standard uncaused." Something which is uncaused is uncaused. A free choice would be uncaused.

And therefore random.

I didn't say the numbers were uncaused. I said that the thing causing the random numbers is uncaused.

Ok.

Anything that has no cause is uncaused, regardless of what it causes.

Agreed.

Something that produces random numbers is uncaused as long as it has no cause.

If something is producing the numbers then they are not truely random. They may have the appearance of being random to a casual observer but they are in fact determined by the nature of the machine that is producing them. If our observer could know all the factors at play in the machine he would be able to predict the sequence and then the numbers would not even appear to be random.

You want your random number generator to cause uncaused things - a logical contradiction.

You cannot logically make the assumption that such a thing must be caused. Why would you assume that something must be caused if it comes in pairs?

Because otherwise it would just be correlation - the apparent sequence would be an accident and could break down at any time. We would not be able to predict that given number 5 the next number will be also 5.

Why wouldn't you assume that something must be caused if it's random?

Because its a contradiction.

Anyway, none of this beating about the bush really helps you to show that there is a possibility of free will beyond practical free will. Your argument that free will could be an uncaused non-random event is like me saying that flimmery may exist as an uncaused, non-random, non-free-will event. It is meaningless.
 
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Bri
Let me give you a simple example (it's a poor example, but it might help). Imagine a thing that would produce truly uncaused random numbers (67, 36, 22, 74, ...). According to quantum theory, such a thing is not beyond the realm of possibility. Now, imagine instead that this thing produces uncaused pairs of random numbers (67, 67, 36, 36, 22, 22, 74, 74, ...) In this case, half of the time you would be able to predict the outcome and half of the time you wouldn't.
You’re right, it is a poor example. The generator produces a pattern, being able to recognize it doesn’t mean that you are predicting the second half of it.

God could still participate in the world in some other way, but simply doesn't have the power to actually insert predictions of future events into the world even though he has full (timeless) knowledge of them. Such a God would therefore be omniscient and be able to participate in a world containing free will, thus disproving your conclusion.
You’re missing the point. Look back at step 3 in Robin’s proof and modify A true statement made about the world to Knowledge of the world.

Ossai
 
Well those "some" definitions include all Christian, Jewish and Islamic beliefs. If God cannot make a true statement in the world about the world then none of those beliefs have any validity whatsoever.

Any definition of God that would be wiped out would be one involving a God that can do the illogical within the laws of logic. I doubt anyone would have a problem wiping out such a self-contradictory definition. If you want God to do the illogical, then it would obviously result in something illogical. If God can do the illogical, then he is outside of logic and logic cannot be used to prove or disprove his existance. We've already discussed that at length.

There are three possibilities: 1) no, God cannot do something that is logically self-contradictory, 2) yes, God is beyond logic and can do things that are logically self-contradictory but since we are bound by logic we cannot hope to understand them logically, 3) God could change the laws of logic to make the logically impossible logically possible (in which case your proof would no longer hold) or 4) the premise is meaningless because it is logically self-contradictory.

Personally, I vote for (4) because you are defining "free will" so that the premise logically contradicts itself, and then insisting that God must fit into this illogical definition, but then if he does you claim that God is illogical and therefore cannot exist.

In any case I have demonstrated that it does follow from the premise. If God cannot insert information then he cannot do anything at all.

Again, unless I'm completely misunderstanding the proof, you have only shown that God cannot insert a specific type of information into the world (particularly a type of information that you have defined in a self-contradictory way). Your proof absolutely depends on this specific self-contradictory action being performed. True enough, God cannot logically insert an infallibly true statement reading "This statement is false" into the world, but you haven't shown that God's insertion of the statement "Peace out!" into the world would create any logical contradiction or preclude free will in any way. If you're claiming that God cannot do anything at all to the world which has free will, you'll have to develop a different proof (one that contains no logical self-contradictions).

You might want to discuss that with a Christian theologist before being quite sure. For example Psalm 22 is pretty universally believed to contain an infallible prediction of the free will behaviour of Christ's executioners. And there is also that whole "Revelations" thing.

As I already pointed out, many Christians who believe in predestination don't believe in free will. That passage is taken by some Christians as proof of predestination (and that we don't have free will).

As for those who do believe in free will, they would likely disagree with your definition of free will. Your definition of free will is essentially something that is unpredictable, and yet you're insisting that if God cannot predict it then he cannot exist. Very few religions would have a problem with God not being able to predict something that even he cannot predict (or knowing something that cannot be known, or doing something that cannot be done). The discussion concerning logical self-contradictions (such as whether God can create a rock larger than he can lift) has been discussed thouroughly by Christian theologists, and has already been discussed at length on this thread. You're not really going to bring back the square circle argument again are you?

He can do anything that does not involve making any emprically measureable change to the world. I'm not sure how much that leaves.

Actually, he can logically do anything that you can define in a logically coherent way. Making a rock bigger than he can lift is not logically coherent. Predicting something that you define as unpredictable is not logically coherent. Creating a married bachelor is also logically incoherent, as is creating a true statement reading "This statement is false."

If you believe that your proof holds for all logical actions for God, then please reformulate it to demonstrate that an omniscient God cannot participate in any logical way whatsoever with a world in which free will exists.

And as I have already shown you can easily create a definition for a square circle if you are allowed to include the clause "...unless it involves any contradiction".

So...I guess you are going to go there after all. A square circle always involves a contradiction, but you leave that possibility undefined in your definition. That like defining a frog as a blue animal that can fly -- unless it's not blue or can't fly. True enough, but not much of a definition.

Well put it this way round then - if God can't insert the statement he can't force a point mutation in the junk DNA of a Bufo Marinara. If God can't insert the statement he can't alter the propery of a human neuron, or inspire knowledge in a human mind. If God can't put the grafitti on the wall then he can't create the wall. What do you think that he can organise the construction and will be prevented from doing the decoration?

He can insert a statement, just not a logically self-contradictory statement (at least not while remaining within our laws of logic). He also cannot insert an infallibly true statement reading "This statement is false" within the current laws of logic. You'll have to reformulate your proof if you want the proof to pertain to doing something that is logically possible. You'll also have to show that God cannot do any logically possible thing in a world with free will to prove your conclusion.

It is not I that demand that God do this contradictory thing. It is anybody who insists that an omniscient being is capable of participating in a universe that contains free will that demand this. I am pointing out the contradiction, nothing else.

No, I assure you, it is only those who attempt to disprove the existance of God logically who demand that God must be able to do the logically impossible within the confines of logic. The contradiction is within the question, not the answer.

-Bri
 
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If something is producing the numbers then they are not truely random. They may have the appearance of being random to a casual observer but they are in fact determined by the nature of the machine that is producing them. If our observer could know all the factors at play in the machine he would be able to predict the sequence and then the numbers would not even appear to be random.

Agreed. Unfortunately, that has nothing at all to do with what I said (and the same can be said for a free event -- if it's caused then it's not really free).

You want your random number generator to cause uncaused things - a logical contradiction.

A true random number generator (one that is itself not entirely caused) can certainly cause something that would then not be entirely caused (i.e. determined).

Because otherwise it would just be correlation - the apparent sequence would be an accident and could break down at any time.

How do you know? How do you know that things that are truly random (as predicted by quantum theory) won't "break down" at any time and show a pattern?

We would not be able to predict that given number 5 the next number will be also 5.

My point exactly. Hence if we can predict it part of the time with complete certainty, it isn't truly random, but also not entirely caused because it isn't even theoretically predictable all of the time.

Because its a contradiction.

Only if you define "caused" and "random" to mean the same thing.

Anyway, none of this beating about the bush really helps you to show that there is a possibility of free will beyond practical free will. Your argument that free will could be an uncaused non-random event is like me saying that flimmery may exist as an uncaused, non-random, non-free-will event. It is meaningless.

Actually, it doesn't help you to show the impossibility of free will, which is what we're discussing here. And as I've said, I'm not making an argument, I'm simply refuting yours. Likewise, you cannot prove that "flimmery" doesn't exist as you've defined it.

-Bri
 
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