We discussed this sometime around the time I posted the simulation example, but I'm too lazy to look through the thread to find it. I know that ceo_esq and zaayrdragon discussed the possibility of having foreknowledge of free events with an instantiated timeline. I remember a comment on your part (at least I think it was you) comparing the instantiation of a timeline as recording a video, and then God's viewing of the timeline timelessly as viewing the pre-recorded video (ceo_esq pointed out some flaws in the analogy, but agreed to some similarities if I remember correctly).
I was in fact comparing your programming example to a recording of a video, not comparing the instantiation of a timeline as recording a video. As you recall ceo_esq earlier had said that he could not follow programming analogies.
Just as in the simulation example, the entire timeline is instantiated at the beginning of the universe. When instantiated, events may occur freely. Afterwards, God can view the timeline anywhere he wants and has complete foreknowledge of all events, including those that are free.
This is different from what you have claimed in your previous post (with my emphasis):
but we've already discussed that this definition is inadequate to express the possibility of free choices occurring before the timeline is instantiated (i.e. timelessly).
Even if the entire timeline were instantiated at the beginning of the universe (whatever that means) that does not allow free choices to occur
before the timeline is instantiated. Since choices can be contingent on time or about time then time cannot be unbound from free will, so this objection must be dismissed.
I've substantiated the statement many times. You complained that I repeated myself, so I won't do it again unless you insist.
No, you have repeated the assertion many times. No substantiation. For example you asserted that I have assumed that G can make a false statement true. I have asked where you believe this assumption occurs, you have not answered that. In fact my proof rests on the assumption that G
can't make a false statement true.
You have asserted that the statement in 8 is
self-contradictory, I have asked you to demonstrate this (note that if a statement is contradicted by something else it does not mean the statement is
self-contradictory.
No, I have demonstrated in detail that the premise implies that G can insert any true statement into the world. If G knows what the choice actually is then the statement is by definition true. If the statement is not true the G does not know what the choice is.
Now I can take care of your objection about the definition of free will by substituting the definition you provided earlier - this does not affect the argument:
Bri said:
If an agent (however it is defined) "could have done otherwise" and was the "ultimate source" of its action, it can be said to have acted of its own free will.
Of course I can't disprove the existance of a square circle unless I define it.
But you think that it is nevertheless reasonable to ask that I can disprove free will without it being defined?
If I define it as ceo_esq did earlier in the thread (essentially the same as your definition I believe without the "unless" clause in it) then it can be disproved (it cannot logically exist). If I define it as you did with the "unless" clause, all points but four remain undefined, so a "square circle" can be a square, a circle, an octagon, or other shapes with the same four points equadistant from the center. However, I don't think that's what you meant by "square circle" nor what most people would think of when they hear that term.
I don't mean anything by a "square circle". It was not a term I introduced. I only pointed out that if I were allowed the latitude in definition that you allow yourself then a square circle can indeed be defined.
Of course that is true. I have defined it at least four times now, and I shall not repeat myself unless you insist.
A simple technical point. A meaningless statement can never be termed "true". Not even if it contains the word "possible". Meaning is a prerequisite for truth. Or do you think that there is such a thing as a "meaningless true statement"? If so then why object to a square circle.
If you insist on the definition used in your proof, then you may have proven that God cannot have foreknowledge of free events.
I did not insist. In fact I invited you to suggest the definition that I should be using. I have in any case used one of your earlier definitions.
There are of course other less restrictive definitions for which that conclusion could not be made.
And there are other less restrictive definitions for circle.
Either way, the conclusion you made in your proof (that an omniscient God cannot participate in a world that contains free will) is simply incorrect using the defintions of free will and omniscience that you used.
But you have yet to demonstrate this. We have taken care of the definition of free will by using yours. I have demonstrated that the premises imply the ability for G to insert any true statement into the world. I have demonstrated the statement is self-consistent. I have demonstrated that the statement is true (or G does not know what the choice is).
I thought you said it wasn't your definition. Shame on you!
(Hangs head in shame).
I could define free will as something which is a) coherent, b) involves a voluntary action and c) the choice is not deterministic, and d) results in the existance of a square circle. Sure, it would have all the properties that I described, but would also be un-necessarily restrictive.
I only asked for a,b and c, you can keep the square circle. Is asking for a definition to be coherent restrictive? Is asking for a free will action to be voluntary restrictive. Are you saying that there might be such a thing as involuntary free will? So that leaves non-determinism. But isn't that the whole point?
At the risk of repeating myself, I already pointed out that the definition you used contains certain restrictions that many wouldn't view as necessary of free will.
Apart from the "restrictions" of coherence, voluntarism and non-determinism I have assumed that a choice in a temporal universe occurs in the context of time.
However, I will sidestep this objection by using your definition quoted earlier.
Sure, if someone believed that free will must be as you defined it and that God must also have foreknowledge of free events, your proof might very well show that belief to be incorrect. I don't personally know anyone who holds that belief though.
I did not define that God
must have anything. I defined G as simply knowing every true proposition and believing none that was false. There is a true proposition about a(A,t) so G must know it.
But you do know someone that believes that God
might have foreknowledge of free events.
Just as in the simulation example, the entire timeline is instantiated at the beginning of the universe. When instantiated, events may occur freely. Afterwards, God can view the timeline anywhere he wants and has complete foreknowledge of all events, including those that are free.
My argument was in response to this idea from you and ceo_esq, to show that if this was the case then God could not participate in the universe. It seems pretty intuitive to me. If God's very first observation of the universe implies that every single free choice has already been irrevocably made then it does not appear to leave much room for God's participation. In fact if God can make a change in such a universe it implies that his original observation of that universe was not fallible.
I actually thought the point was pretty intuitive once you understood that the events in the universe do not just follow from each other, they are contingent on previous events.
But since I was asked for deductive arguments for this I provided 3. I never insisted that God
must have anything, I only responded to claims that were made by you and ceo_esq.
Also you have earlier pointed me to a page full of people, some of whom believe that God must have foreknowledge of free events.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-will-foreknowledge/
So if you are somehow implying that this idea of God having foreknowledge of free events is just a straw man I have invented for the sake of proving the arguement you are on very shaky ground since I am only responding to claims made by you and ceo_esq.