I have reread your posts and do not see where you have addressed any of this. Here are things I am talking about:
1. You stated that the statement in line 8 is self-contradictory. Can you show how this is so.
Yes. What I meant was that line 8 contradicts your definition of "free will." If I implied otherwise, then I apologize. You define "free will" by stating that at any time in the timeline before t both a1 and a2 must be possible. You then state in line 8 that it is logically possible that an omniscient God can insert a true statement into the world at time before t predicting that the free choice will result in a1. In fact, it it logically
impossible that such a true prediction can be inserted into the world according to your definition. It's no wonder that assuming that God must be able to do this will result in a contradiction in your proof; however, there is no reason to assume that God must be able to do this, and there are other ways that God could participate in the world that wouldn't require a logical contradiction.
2. You stated that at least one of the definitions is self-contradictory. Can you identify the definition(s) you are referring to, show how it is contradictory and provide your own better definition for this concept
It is the line in the proof and the definition that contradict. The self-contradiction in the proof was that of an infallibly true statement that can logically be inserted into the world predicting a future free event as you defined it.
No, I cannot think of a better definition for free will that would suit your needs. Something along the lines of "the freedom to make actual choices that are not random and not determined by prior causes" is the best I can come up with.
3. You stated that at least one of my definitions was inadequate. Can you identify the definition you are referring to, show how it is inadequate and provide your own better definition for this concept.
I consider your definition of "free will" to be inadequate since it does not allow for the programmer scenario I described earlier. Essentially, it precludes the free choice from occurring as the timeline is instantiated, and rather requires that the choice be made within the timeline, at time t. My programmer scenario doesn't make such an assumption, which allows the programmer to observe future events that are the result of free will. Your proof would also "disprove" the programmer scenario, which is actually programmable (aside from not having a "true" free will or random function).
4. You stated that I have assumed that G can make something true. Can you show me where I have made this assumption.
What I meant is that you assume that God can insert a
true statement predicting a future free event. Whether or not God can insert a statement (not necessarily a true one) predicting a future free event is a separate issue from whether or not that statement is necessarily true. God doesn't control the truth of the statement, logic does. It is quite possible that God can insert the statement into the world, but the statement won't be true (however, note that this still counts as participation in the world according to your definition).
No, I don't have a better suggestion for a definition of "free will" other than the one mentioned above. However, using your own definition your proof makes assumptions that are unsubstantiated.
Basically I have demonstrated that G is able to insert a true statement into the world. I did not say he could insert a false statement into the world and make it true, or anything even remotely like that.
You have either failed to demonstrate that God is able to insert an infallibly true statement predicting future free events into the world, or you implied that God must be able to make such a prediction true.
We are not dealing with a false statement. We are dealing with a true statement. We have a position where G is observing a(A,t) and sees that the actual choice was a1. So how, then can the statement "a(A,t) == a1 be anything other than true? G cannot truthfully say that there is a possibility a(A,t)!=a1 if he is directly and infallibly observing the evidence that it cannot. If this statement is anything other than true it implies that G's observation was invalid.
So it is a true statement if G's observation of the event is infallible.. I have demonstrated that G can insert any true statement into the world if he can do anything at all.
So far you have made these assertions. They should be substantiated or dismissed.
You are correct, this issue needs to be addressed. By your definition of free will, the agent must be able to change the future after the statement is inserted. Therefore, it is impossible for the statement to be infallibly true. In fact, your definition of free will seems to preclude God from being able to predict
or observe a free event since your definition makes the assumption that the free choice must actually occur at time t within the timeline rather than occurring at the instantiation of the timeline.
I'll admit that you have shown a logical contradiction between your definition of free will and infallible foreknowledge (either predicted or observed). Your definition necessitates that the future be undefined, unpredictable, and unobservable. Of course, it has been pointed out that free will and infallible foreknowledge are possible if the free choice occurs at the instantiation of a static timeline, which shows a difficiency in your definition.
It is also highly questionable as to whether omniscience requires such foreknowledge by your definition. Your definition of omniscience requires that God know all that is true, and an undefined future event wouldn't qualify since it is neither true nor false. God could have complete knowledge of every
possible outcome of a free choice even though he wouldn't know which one is the "real" outcome until the choice is actually made at time t.
We've already noted other definitions of omniscience requiring only that God knows all that is knowable or is
able to know all that is knowable without actually having to acquire such knowledge. The latter could be accomplished by God's choice of whether to allow an event to be free or not (if he chose, he could force an event to be unfree, thus allowing himself to know the results in advance).
If free will is true then it is not necessarily true. If G is observing the event itself directly and infallibly then it is necessarily true. That is the heart of the argument. Both things cannot be true at the same time.
I agree, but that is only because of your definition of free will, which doesn't take into account the possibility of free choices being made when the timeline is substantiated. We had already discussed that this would be necessary in order for God to have infallible foreknowledge of the future (unless you buy into the concept of "middle knowledge"). By your definition, God simply doesn't have foreknowledge of the results of free events, although could have knowledge of all possible outcomes. God also has the
ability to have complete foreknowledge of any event if he so chose by forcing the event to no longer be free.
So does your objection rest upon the idea that G can directly and infallibly observe the event itself? Or on the idea that he can form the truth of his observation into a proposition and insert it into the world? Or that once inserted into the world it will cease to be true? But if it is not true in the world, is there any possible circumstance that will ever contradict it?
Now that I've thought about it more, my objection is that by your definition of free will, God cannot directly and infallibly observe the future free event, and therefore cannot confirm the truth of any prediction of such an event inserted into the world. Your definition precludes the possibility of an already-established timeline and requires that the results of free choices be undefined until they become the past. Of course, all of this hinges on your choice of definition and may not necessarily be the case as we have previously discussed.
Just to let you know, I have not been disingenuous in this discussion. I am by no means an expert in these sorts of proofs, so I've undoubtedly been mistaken on more than one occasion.
-Bri