There is No God (And You Know It)

I said to forget it for a moment, not indefinitely. In fact, I addressed the issue in further detail later in my post as you probably noticed since you commented on it. My point here is that your proof is invalid regardless of whether there is a contradiction in the terms or not. The allegation that your definitions are inadequate and self-contradictory only come into play when discussing whether God being unable to perform logically self-contradictory acts results in an unsatisfactory definition of God.
I have reread your posts and do not see where you have addressed any of this. Here are things I am talking about:

1. You stated that the statement in line 8 is self-contradictory. Can you show how this is so.
2. You stated that at least one of the definitions is self-contradictory. Can you identify the definition(s) you are referring to, show how it is contradictory and provide your own better definition for this concept
3. You stated that at least one of my definitions was inadequate. Can you identify the definition you are referring to, show how it is inadequate and provide your own better definition for this concept.

and from this post add:

4. You stated that I have assumed that G can make something true. Can you show me where I have made this assumption.

Basically I have demonstrated that G is able to insert a true statement into the world. I did not say he could insert a false statement into the world and make it true, or anything even remotely like that.

We are not dealing with a false statement. We are dealing with a true statement. We have a position where G is observing a(A,t) and sees that the actual choice was a1. So how, then can the statement "a(A,t) == a1 be anything other than true? G cannot truthfully say that there is a possibility a(A,t)!=a1 if he is directly and infallibly observing the evidence that it cannot. If this statement is anything other than true it implies that G's observation was invalid.

So it is a true statement if G's observation of the event is infallible.. I have demonstrated that G can insert any true statement into the world if he can do anything at all.

So far you have made these assertions. They should be substantiated or dismissed.

My objection is that it may be impossible for God to insert a true statement predicting a free event because a statement inserted into the world predicting a free event by your own definition isn't always true.
If free will is true then it is not necessarily true. If G is observing the event itself directly and infallibly then it is necessarily true. That is the heart of the argument. Both things cannot be true at the same time.

So does your objection rest upon the idea that G can directly and infallibly observe the event itself? Or on the idea that he can form the truth of his observation into a proposition and insert it into the world? Or that once inserted into the world it will cease to be true? But if it is not true in the world, is there any possible circumstance that will ever contradict it?
I did ask that you repost it for ceo_esq, but I wasn't meaning to imply that I was an expert at such proofs by any means.
That's OK, neither am I.
 
Robin
Welcome to the joys of battling a afflicted mind, Bri. The waffling between points, the inconsistencies, the unsubstantiated proclamations of misdeeds on your part, the inability to follow logic, the roving goalpost. Oh the memories – all bad.

When the little liar apologies I may rejoin the fray, but given past performance I deem it unlikely.

Ossai
 
I have reread your posts and do not see where you have addressed any of this. Here are things I am talking about:

1. You stated that the statement in line 8 is self-contradictory. Can you show how this is so.

Yes. What I meant was that line 8 contradicts your definition of "free will." If I implied otherwise, then I apologize. You define "free will" by stating that at any time in the timeline before t both a1 and a2 must be possible. You then state in line 8 that it is logically possible that an omniscient God can insert a true statement into the world at time before t predicting that the free choice will result in a1. In fact, it it logically impossible that such a true prediction can be inserted into the world according to your definition. It's no wonder that assuming that God must be able to do this will result in a contradiction in your proof; however, there is no reason to assume that God must be able to do this, and there are other ways that God could participate in the world that wouldn't require a logical contradiction.

2. You stated that at least one of the definitions is self-contradictory. Can you identify the definition(s) you are referring to, show how it is contradictory and provide your own better definition for this concept

It is the line in the proof and the definition that contradict. The self-contradiction in the proof was that of an infallibly true statement that can logically be inserted into the world predicting a future free event as you defined it.

No, I cannot think of a better definition for free will that would suit your needs. Something along the lines of "the freedom to make actual choices that are not random and not determined by prior causes" is the best I can come up with.

3. You stated that at least one of my definitions was inadequate. Can you identify the definition you are referring to, show how it is inadequate and provide your own better definition for this concept.

I consider your definition of "free will" to be inadequate since it does not allow for the programmer scenario I described earlier. Essentially, it precludes the free choice from occurring as the timeline is instantiated, and rather requires that the choice be made within the timeline, at time t. My programmer scenario doesn't make such an assumption, which allows the programmer to observe future events that are the result of free will. Your proof would also "disprove" the programmer scenario, which is actually programmable (aside from not having a "true" free will or random function).

4. You stated that I have assumed that G can make something true. Can you show me where I have made this assumption.

What I meant is that you assume that God can insert a true statement predicting a future free event. Whether or not God can insert a statement (not necessarily a true one) predicting a future free event is a separate issue from whether or not that statement is necessarily true. God doesn't control the truth of the statement, logic does. It is quite possible that God can insert the statement into the world, but the statement won't be true (however, note that this still counts as participation in the world according to your definition).

No, I don't have a better suggestion for a definition of "free will" other than the one mentioned above. However, using your own definition your proof makes assumptions that are unsubstantiated.

Basically I have demonstrated that G is able to insert a true statement into the world. I did not say he could insert a false statement into the world and make it true, or anything even remotely like that.

You have either failed to demonstrate that God is able to insert an infallibly true statement predicting future free events into the world, or you implied that God must be able to make such a prediction true.

We are not dealing with a false statement. We are dealing with a true statement. We have a position where G is observing a(A,t) and sees that the actual choice was a1. So how, then can the statement "a(A,t) == a1 be anything other than true? G cannot truthfully say that there is a possibility a(A,t)!=a1 if he is directly and infallibly observing the evidence that it cannot. If this statement is anything other than true it implies that G's observation was invalid.

So it is a true statement if G's observation of the event is infallible.. I have demonstrated that G can insert any true statement into the world if he can do anything at all.

So far you have made these assertions. They should be substantiated or dismissed.

You are correct, this issue needs to be addressed. By your definition of free will, the agent must be able to change the future after the statement is inserted. Therefore, it is impossible for the statement to be infallibly true. In fact, your definition of free will seems to preclude God from being able to predict or observe a free event since your definition makes the assumption that the free choice must actually occur at time t within the timeline rather than occurring at the instantiation of the timeline.

I'll admit that you have shown a logical contradiction between your definition of free will and infallible foreknowledge (either predicted or observed). Your definition necessitates that the future be undefined, unpredictable, and unobservable. Of course, it has been pointed out that free will and infallible foreknowledge are possible if the free choice occurs at the instantiation of a static timeline, which shows a difficiency in your definition.

It is also highly questionable as to whether omniscience requires such foreknowledge by your definition. Your definition of omniscience requires that God know all that is true, and an undefined future event wouldn't qualify since it is neither true nor false. God could have complete knowledge of every possible outcome of a free choice even though he wouldn't know which one is the "real" outcome until the choice is actually made at time t.

We've already noted other definitions of omniscience requiring only that God knows all that is knowable or is able to know all that is knowable without actually having to acquire such knowledge. The latter could be accomplished by God's choice of whether to allow an event to be free or not (if he chose, he could force an event to be unfree, thus allowing himself to know the results in advance).

If free will is true then it is not necessarily true. If G is observing the event itself directly and infallibly then it is necessarily true. That is the heart of the argument. Both things cannot be true at the same time.

I agree, but that is only because of your definition of free will, which doesn't take into account the possibility of free choices being made when the timeline is substantiated. We had already discussed that this would be necessary in order for God to have infallible foreknowledge of the future (unless you buy into the concept of "middle knowledge"). By your definition, God simply doesn't have foreknowledge of the results of free events, although could have knowledge of all possible outcomes. God also has the ability to have complete foreknowledge of any event if he so chose by forcing the event to no longer be free.

So does your objection rest upon the idea that G can directly and infallibly observe the event itself? Or on the idea that he can form the truth of his observation into a proposition and insert it into the world? Or that once inserted into the world it will cease to be true? But if it is not true in the world, is there any possible circumstance that will ever contradict it?

Now that I've thought about it more, my objection is that by your definition of free will, God cannot directly and infallibly observe the future free event, and therefore cannot confirm the truth of any prediction of such an event inserted into the world. Your definition precludes the possibility of an already-established timeline and requires that the results of free choices be undefined until they become the past. Of course, all of this hinges on your choice of definition and may not necessarily be the case as we have previously discussed.

That's OK, neither am I.

Just to let you know, I have not been disingenuous in this discussion. I am by no means an expert in these sorts of proofs, so I've undoubtedly been mistaken on more than one occasion.

-Bri
 
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When the little liar apologies I may rejoin the fray, but given past performance I deem it unlikely.

You mean if I don't apologize for being fallible, you'll shut up? Then I'll definitely not apologize!

Somehow I doubt you'll make good on your end of the bargain though.

-Bri
 
Bri,

You have said "your definition" several times in the thread. You surely cannot claim that you have never read one of the several times that I have pointed out that it is not my definition.

It is not my definition. It is a pretty standard definition, but I pretty much thought it was also your definition. There are two concepts 1. voluntary, 2. "could have done otherwise". Is that not how you defined it?

If I am mistaken, please just state what you understand to be a reasonable definition of free will.

What my definition essentially says is "free will is not deterministic". If my argument is correct then it says that the participation of an omniscient being in a universe implies that all events in that universe are deterministic (because the argument would equally apply to random events).
 
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You have said "your definition" several times in the thread. You surely cannot claim that you have never read one of the several times that I have pointed out that it is not my definition.

By "your definition" I mean a definition you used in the proof you posted. Saying "that definition you used in the proof you posted" takes too long, so I may slip up and say "your definition" again in the future although I will try to refrain from doing so.

It is not my definition. It is a pretty standard definition, but I pretty much thought it was also your definition. There are two concepts 1. voluntary, 2. "could have done otherwise". Is that not how you defined it?

I've seen the definition used before, but we've already discussed that this definition is inadequate to express the possibility of free choices occurring before the timeline is instantiated (i.e. timelessly). I'm sure that there are many other definitions that also meet the criteria you mentioned, but that doesn't mean that disproving any of those definitions would preclude any other from being true.

That said, using the definition you chose to use in your proof, your proof still makes assumptions that are unsubstantiated.

If I am mistaken, please just state what you understand to be a reasonable definition of free will.

I already did (freedom to make actual choices that are not random and not determined by prior causes), but of course there are others as well. If you want to disprove free will, you'd have to disprove all of them, which as I already stated is likely not possible.

What my definition essentially says is "free will is not deterministic".

True, the free events described in your post would be non-deterministic. But the definition you are using also has other requirements, specifically that at any time in the timeline before the free event occurs, it must be possible for more than one outcome to occur. Of course, that requirement isn't necessary for other definitions of free will, specifically those in which the free choice occurs timelessly (before the timeline is instantiated).

If my argument is correct then it says that the participation of an omniscient being in a universe implies that all events in that universe are deterministic (because the argument would equally apply to random events).

Your argument may show that using a certain definition of free will, foreknowledge of free events is logically impossible. But that doesn't mean that the events cannot be free nor that they cannot exist if God is omniscient (the definition of omniscience you used doesn't require God to be able to know things that are logically impossible to know). God could still have complete knowledge of every possibility and could control whether he has complete knowledge of any future event by causing that event to no longer be free.

-Bri
 
I've seen the definition used before, but we've already discussed that this definition is inadequate to express the possibility of free choices occurring before the timeline is instantiated (i.e. timelessly).
I am sure I would have remembered discussing that.

How does it work? If you freely choose to look at your watch are the hands missing? Or is there a message saying "Sorry the timeline has not been instantiated yet, please try later?

The proof does not work with incoherent definitions, sure.
That said, using the definition you chose to use in your proof, your proof still makes assumptions that are unsubstantiated.
The only thing unsubstantiated is this statement.
If you want to disprove free will, you'd have to disprove all of them, which as I already stated is likely not possible.
Could you disprove the existence of a square circle given these parameters? You have to provide a proof that it can't exist then I can supply any definition of 'circle' to refute your proof.

But if you say "It is possible that free will exists" and you have no definition whatsoever in mind then the sentence is simply devoid of meaning. It means exactly "It is possible that xlkdj woidj exists".
True, the free events described in your post would be non-deterministic. But the definition you are using also has other requirements, specifically that at any time in the timeline before the free event occurs, it must be possible for more than one outcome to occur. Of course, that requirement isn't necessary for other definitions of free will, specifically those in which the free choice occurs timelessly (before the timeline is instantiated).
Or any definition which says that free will is a cocktail containing absinthe and lime juice.

But my definition includes any definition of free will that is a) coherent, b) involves a voluntary action and c) the choice is not deterministic.

There may be other properties that free will could have but they are not relevant to the proof.
 
Bri
You mean if I don't apologize for being fallible, you'll shut up? Then I'll definitely not apologize!

Somehow I doubt you'll make good on your end of the bargain though.
I said I wouldn’t rejoin the fray. I didn’t say I’d stop pointing out your inconsistencies, errors and lies.
 
Bri
In fact lets look at some examples shall we:
I've seen the definition used before, but we've already discussed that this definition is inadequate to express the possibility of free choices occurring before the timeline is instantiated (i.e. timelessly).
Hand waving and another ad hoc excuse.

I already did (freedom to make actual choices that are not random and not determined by prior causes),
You’ve already been called on this one numerous times. How can an action be non-random and not caused?

And now an attempt to obfuscate the issue.
but of course there are others as well. If you want to disprove free will, you'd have to disprove all of them, which as I already stated is likely not possible.

Of course, that requirement isn't necessary for other definitions of free will, specifically those in which the free choice occurs timelessly (before the timeline is instantiated).
How can the agent choose before the agent even exists?

But that doesn't mean that the events cannot be free nor that they cannot exist if God is omniscient (the definition of omniscience you used doesn't require God to be able to know things that are logically impossible to know).
Oh look, you’re even contradicting yourself in the same post.

You’ve got a jumbled inane declaration with nothing substantial and when someone points out your illogic you declare “That’s now what I meant, I really meant…” and then you head off on another tangent.

My initial assessment stands. You are incapable of admitting fault and when one is pointed out you lie as an attempt to cover you’re initial error. They’ve grown so big I don’t think you’ll ever manage to dig your way out, at least not in this thread.

Ossai
 
I am sure I would have remembered discussing that.

We discussed this sometime around the time I posted the simulation example, but I'm too lazy to look through the thread to find it. I know that ceo_esq and zaayrdragon discussed the possibility of having foreknowledge of free events with an instantiated timeline. I remember a comment on your part (at least I think it was you) comparing the instantiation of a timeline as recording a video, and then God's viewing of the timeline timelessly as viewing the pre-recorded video (ceo_esq pointed out some flaws in the analogy, but agreed to some similarities if I remember correctly).

How does it work? If you freely choose to look at your watch are the hands missing? Or is there a message saying "Sorry the timeline has not been instantiated yet, please try later?

Just as in the simulation example, the entire timeline is instantiated at the beginning of the universe. When instantiated, events may occur freely. Afterwards, God can view the timeline anywhere he wants and has complete foreknowledge of all events, including those that are free.

The only thing unsubstantiated is this statement.

I've substantiated the statement many times. You complained that I repeated myself, so I won't do it again unless you insist.

Could you disprove the existence of a square circle given these parameters? You have to provide a proof that it can't exist then I can supply any definition of 'circle' to refute your proof.

Of course I can't disprove the existance of a square circle unless I define it. If I define it as ceo_esq did earlier in the thread (essentially the same as your definition I believe without the "unless" clause in it) then it can be disproved (it cannot logically exist). If I define it as you did with the "unless" clause, all points but four remain undefined, so a "square circle" can be a square, a circle, an octagon, or other shapes with the same four points equadistant from the center. However, I don't think that's what you meant by "square circle" nor what most people would think of when they hear that term. If that is what you meant, then no its existance cannot be disproven (and in fact its existance can be proven if you can prove that a square, circle, or octagon exists).

But if you say "It is possible that free will exists" and you have no definition whatsoever in mind then the sentence is simply devoid of meaning. It means exactly "It is possible that xlkdj woidj exists".

Of course that is true. I have defined it at least four times now, and I shall not repeat myself unless you insist. If you insist on the definition used in your proof, then you may have proven that God cannot have foreknowledge of free events. There are of course other less restrictive definitions for which that conclusion could not be made. Either way, the conclusion you made in your proof (that an omniscient God cannot participate in a world that contains free will) is simply incorrect using the defintions of free will and omniscience that you used.

Or any definition which says that free will is a cocktail containing absinthe and lime juice.

But my definition includes any definition of free will that is a) coherent, b) involves a voluntary action and c) the choice is not deterministic.

There may be other properties that free will could have but they are not relevant to the proof.

(Bold added by me)

I thought you said it wasn't your definition. Shame on you!

I could define free will as something which is a) coherent, b) involves a voluntary action and c) the choice is not deterministic, and d) results in the existance of a square circle. Sure, it would have all the properties that I described, but would also be un-necessarily restrictive.

At the risk of repeating myself, I already pointed out that the definition you used contains certain restrictions that many wouldn't view as necessary of free will. Sure, if someone believed that free will must be as you defined it and that God must also have foreknowledge of free events, your proof might very well show that belief to be incorrect. I don't personally know anyone who holds that belief though.

-Bri
 
I said I wouldn’t rejoin the fray. I didn’t say I’d stop pointing out your inconsistencies, errors and lies.

Isn't that just rejoining the fray? I mean, you haven't really contributed in any other way. Your posts of late are in response to a discussion I'm having with Robin, and do little more than show that you don't understand it. If Robin felt that I was being disingenuous as you've stated, I doubt he'd have continued the discussion. He certainly hasn't ranted pointlessly as you have. Please just stop posting unless you can actually contribute to the discussion.

Of course, you'll have to do so without an apology from me. I cannot in good faith apologize for making errors since I'm sure I'll likely make many more in my lifetime (I've long ago admitted that logical proofs are not my forte). However, if you can prove that I've made statements that I believed to be untrue with an intent to deceive, as you've implied, then please do so.

Otherwise, please go away.

-Bri
 
Just as in the simulation example, the entire timeline is instantiated at the beginning of the universe. When instantiated, events may occur freely. Afterwards, God can view the timeline anywhere he wants and has complete foreknowledge of all events, including those that are free.

??? How can they be free, then ? Are you claiming that God knows the events in advance, or that, because he exists outside of time, he could experience the entire timeline at once ?
 
It's not a problem having his god being able to look at any event on the timeline. The problem is that he wants the timeline to have events that are unconstrained or 'free' yet created by his god in the first place with his god not being ignorant of any of the subsequent events yet not responsible for them.

No it doesn't work and yes Bri refuses to grasp this.
 
??? How can they be free, then ? Are you claiming that God knows the events in advance, or that, because he exists outside of time, he could experience the entire timeline at once ?

The latter (he could observe the entire timeline at once).

It's not a problem having his god being able to look at any event on the timeline...

(Bold by me)

Your use of the phrase "his god" indicates that you haven't been paying attention.

-Bri
 
Your use of the phrase "his god" indicates that you haven't been paying attention.

No, it's your god, not 'God'. You've presented a god, it is therefore your god.
 
Bri
Isn't that just rejoining the fray?
No, the fray is about omniscience and freewill. I’m offering commentary on your posts.

Please just stop posting unless you can actually contribute to the discussion.
I’m offering information on one of the main participants.

Of course, you'll have to do so without an apology from me. I cannot in good faith apologize for making errors since I'm sure I'll likely make many more in my lifetime (I've long ago admitted that logical proofs are not my forte).
It’s not the fact that you made an error. It’s that you made an error and that lied in an attempt to cover it up, all the while denying it.

Ossai
 
No, it's your god, not 'God'. You've presented a god, it is therefore your god.

I have not presented a god at all. I have simply maintained that there is no evidence that many commonly held notions of gods cannot exist. Does that make all commonly held notions of gods that might exist "my gods?" Please read the thread before making such assumptions.

-Bri
 
I have not presented a god at all. I have simply maintained that there is no evidence that many commonly held notions of gods cannot exist.

You have therefore presented a god: namely a creator that is omniscient, omnipotent and with creations that have free-will.

Does that make all commonly held notions of gods that might exist "my gods?"

It makes the one that you're presenting your god. Since there is no objective god that has been demonstrated it cannot be anything else than your god of your argument.

Please read the thread before making such assumptions.

I have not made an assumption: it is merely a matter-of-fact.
 

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