There is No God (And You Know It)

Can I classify your objections as follows:

I think there may only be two objections since the second two are actually the same (or at least related).

1. The proof applies to a specific, not necessarily general definition of omniscience

Yes insofar as some would consider a being who is capable of knowing everything but chooses to be ignorant of our choices to still be omniscient. Such a being would not have any foreknowledge of free choices, yet might still be considered omniscient by a definition different from the one you chose.

2. Even if the hypotheses 2 through 8 were logically possible they would not represent actions the being was obliged to do
3. The proof only covers events directly affected by the prediction.

Unless I am misunderstanding, these two are related. Your premise is that God actually has to insert a statement about the future into the current timeline before the event in question (as shown by line 2 of your proof, specifically the use of the term "statement" and the phrase "in the world"). Otherwise, if no statement is inserted into the world and only exists as knowledge in God's "mind," then this knowledge lies entirely outside of the timeline and has no affect on the agent's free choice. Lines 3, 4, and 8 all assume that the statement exists "at time t" which would not be true of timeless knowledge. In other words, your entire proof makes the assumption that God must interact with the world in a very specific way (inserting a statement predicting the result of a choice into the world), but if God doesn't choose to interact with the world in that way then there is nothing to prevent the free choice in question. Likewise any event that is not affected by such a statement could still be free even if your proof is completely accurate. God could potentially interact with the world in another way that doesn't affect the choice, and still retain perfect foreknowledge of that choice, contrary to your conclusion that "an omniscient being cannot participate in a universe that contains free will."

1. Yes, the proof refers to the definition stated. But I could amend the definition to change "knows" to "is capable of knowing" and point out that "true" also implies "knowable" and the proof would still be valid and the definition would be compatible with any definition we have discussed or referred to here. I think that it would cover just about every definition. Please specify if I am mistaken.

Using the definition that God doesn't have to possess foreknowledge of the results of free choices in order to be omniscient makes the proof moot. Of course, you're allowed to define omniscience any way you want, I'm just pointing out that many theists don't believe that God knows the results of free choices, yet still may believe God to be omniscient since he could know if he chose to (even if such knowledge would rob us of free will). If you still believe your proof to be valid even if God cannot make predictions as assumed by your proof (line 4), you'll have to post the new version, because I don't see it.

2. I would have to say then that deductive formalism cuts both ways. I only have to show that my premises are logically possible in the terms of my premises, hypotheses, definitions or the axioms of logic. However this is a worthy objection and deserves a longer answer so I will get back to you.

I was only pointing out that your conclusion doesn't follow from the proof. It is possible that God could choose not to insert such statements into the world, thus preserving free will. This would mean that even if your proof were true, your conclusion does not follow (it would still be possible for an omniscient being to interact with a world that contains free will).

3. But the statement could be about any free will event. There is no action you could take for which there could not be a chronologically prior true proposition - that is what makes it universal.

Right, but again God could simply avoid inserting such statements into the world, thereby not allowing any free choices to be affected by such statements.

Practically every Christian in the world believes he does. However this is irrelevant - the contradiction is caused by the possibility that he can rather than any real action he might take. The fact that I choose not to predict the behaviour of a pseudo random number generator does not make it a real random number generator. The fact that I could makes this impossible.

My point here is that not many Christians (or anyone else) believe that God actually inserts statements about your future choices into the world, so the proof is moot even if true. Your proof relies on God actually inserting a statement into the world so that it exists at time t. If God cannot do this, not many Christians would find that partcularly worrisome since not many of them feel that God regularly does this. Other sorts of interactions with the world don't apply to your proof (it only concerns statements specifically predicting those events which exist in the timeline), even if these other interactions affect the agent's future. For example, if God places a wall in front of an agent's path, the agent may still freely choose to go left or right. This might restrict the choice (you might even say it replaces one choice with another), but the resulting choice is still free.

No - it only depends on the knowledge existing in a being capable of interacting with the universe. That makes it logically possible that the statement could exist within the agent's timeline.

You haven't proven that any other types of interaction would necessarily prevent free will. Certainly, foreknowledge by itself doesn't prevent free will according to your proof as Ossai implied. If you claim that your proof shows what Ossai claims it shows, then you'll need to reformulate lines 2, 3, 4, 8, and everything based on those lines (which pretty much includes your entire proof aside from line 1). My point to Ossai is that your proof assumed that the statement exists in the world at time t. Even if your claim is now that you can reformulate the proof so that it doesn't rely on this assumption, Ossai's accusation of a straw man is unfounded since I was simply stating what was assumed in the proof.

The agent mentioned in the proof could be any one of the free agents existing in the universe and for any choice they make. What is true for one is also true for all.

I understand that. Ossai implied that I was utilizing the straw man fallacy by stating that your proof allows more than one free agent. I was pointing out that Ossai's accusation was unfounded since you yourself indicated that more than one free agent could exist. I was simply pointing out that if another agent were to make a choice for which no statement existed in the world, that choice could still be unaffected and free. In other words, God interacting in the world such that choice "A" would be affected would not necessarily affect choice "B."

-Bri
 
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So in order for this objection to stand you would have to show how a statement about an event could alter that event.

Instead, please reforumate your proof so that God does not to insert a statement into the world. Show that despite God not inserting any statement into the world, the free choice would still not be free simply by God's having timeless knowledge of it. Several lines of your proof specifically assume that the statement exists in the world and at time t. If the knowledge doesn't exist in the world and it is timeless, then your proof doesn't work.

-Bri
 
Of course, you're allowed to define omniscience any way you want, I'm just pointing out that many theists don't believe that God knows the results of free choices, yet still may believe God to be omniscient since he could know if he chose to (even if such knowledge would rob us of free will).
My proof is still valid under these circumstances because it only assumes that he could. Even if God never peeks at all, as long as he is able to then it is a valid hypothesis in a proof because each step is logically possible and the deductions are valid.

Again, if I never choose to find out how a pseudo random number generator works that does not make it a real random number generator. It is logically impossible for it to be a real random number generator as long as I am capable of predicting it's behaviour, even if I never do.
If you still believe your proof to be valid even if God cannot make predictions as assumed by your proof (line 4), you'll have to post the new version, because I don't see it.
If you mean that the definition includes that God cannot make predictions about the result of a free will event, not even by timelessly viewing the future, then no, it does not cover this definition. Can you post this or give me examples of anyone that has proposed it? There is no such thing as a deductive proof that covers every definition, even ones that are unstated.
I was only pointing out that your conclusion doesn't follow from the proof. It is possible that God could choose not to insert such statements into the world, thus preserving free will.
And again I have to ask, how does making a statement about a choice affect whether that choice is free or not?

But I have shown every step in detail from premise to conclusion - you asked for deduction, you got it, now show me where my argument is wrong.
Right, but again God could simply avoid inserting such statements into the world, thereby not allowing any free choices to be affected by such statements.
Again, how does free choice stop being a free choice if someone makes a statement about it?
My point here is that not many Christians (or anyone else) believe that God actually inserts statements about your future choices into the world, so the proof is moot even if true.
Again my proof is valid even if God does not actually insert such statements. Just as Turing's halting theorem proof is still valid even if nobody actually attempts to write this code. That is entirely beside the point.
Your proof relies on God actually inserting a statement into the world so that it exists at time t
No, yet again it relies on God being capable of inserting such a statement. Just as Turing's halting theorem proof does not rely on somebody attempting to write a halting algorithm just of this being a logical possibility according to the premise.
If God cannot do this, not many Christians would find that partcularly worrisome since not many of them feel that God regularly does this.
All that my proof requires is that God can do something. I think that quite a lot of Christians would find it just a little worrisome if God could do nothing in the world.
All sorts of interactions with the world don't apply to your proof (it only concerns statements specifically predicting those events which exist in the timeline), even if these other interactions affect the agent's future. For example, if God places a wall in front of an agent's path, the agent may still freely choose to go left or right. This might restrict the choice (you might even say it replaces one choice with another), but the resulting choice is still free.
You mean that God might be able to insert a wall, but not put writing on the wall?

Yet again - by the well established rules of logic my proof does not depend of God actually doing any of these things, just the fact that he would be capable.
You haven't proven that any other types of interaction would necessarily prevent free will, even if your proof is irrefutable. Certainly, foreknowledge by itself doesn't prevent free will according to your proof as Ossai implied. If you claim that your proof shows what Ossai claims it shows, then you'll need to reformulate lines 2, 3, 4, 8, and everything based on those lines (which pretty much includes your entire proof aside from line 1). My point to Ossai is that your proof assumed that the statement exists in the world at time t. Even if your claim is now that you can reformulate the proof so that it doesn't rely on this assumption, Ossai's accusation of a straw man is unfounded since I was simply stating what was assumed in the proof.
I don't need to reformulate anything. All that was assumed in the proof was that the knowledge existed in a being capable of some interaction with the world.

My proof does not depend on the statement existing, it depends on the logical possibility of the statement existing. If something is logically possible then I can validly include it as a hypothesis. It matters not one whit whether this event ever happened in real life or not.

So if God can do something. If there is just one thing in the world that he can do, then he can also insert that statement. What is stopping him? That is all that is required for the proof to be valid.
I understand that. Ossai was implying that I was utilizing the straw man fallacy by stating that more than one free agent could exist in the world. I was pointing out that Ossai's accusation was unfounded since you yourself indicated that more than one free agent could exist.
I think that it is well understood that in a reductio ad absurdum form of proof the assumption exists in order to generate the contradiction, if a contradiction follows then the premise is invalid. So you cannot say that I am indicating that more than one free agent could exist when this is stated in the very hypothesis that has been rejected at the end of the argument. It is pretty clear that what applies to one applies to all. If one free agent cannot have free will then neither can the others.
Instead, please reforumate your proof so that God does not to insert a statement into the world. Show that despite God not inserting any statement into the world, the free choice would still not be free simply by God's having timeless knowledge of it. Several lines of your proof specifically assume that the statement exists in the world and at time t. If the knowledge doesn't exist in the world and it is timeless, then your proof doesn't work.
So you are not required to justify your assertion that a free choice would stop being free if a statement existed about it. But I am required to reformulate my argument to take into account your unjustified assertion? You ask for deductive arguments, now you want to rewrite the rules of deduction.

I don't need to reformulate anything - my proof works fine even if God never inserts such a statement in the world. It is valid even if God does nothing at all in the world. It is valid just so long as God is capable of inserting such a statement.
 
I've just skimmed through 27 pages of this drek - I thought I'd need some help getting to sleep tonight.

What a ****ing waste of time.

Theists are soooo boring.

There is no god. This is my working hypothesis. There is no evidence to the contrary. What theists regard as evidence of a god is mere garbage.

Some of you silly people have tried to use wordplay, logic, programming, and formalism to support your inane belief in the supernatural.

Please don't - you haven't got a clue and you may hurt yourselves.

We live in beautiful, fascinating, and (at least partly) comprehensible universe. Why some people waste their lives on discussions like this rather than exploring this world and learning about it is beyond me.

Philosophy can be interesting. This drivel is not.
 
You and Ossai throw out the term "straw man" more than a parrot in a scarecrow factory. It doesn't seem like either of you actually understand the term.

When someone says something like: "Atheists hate God, but God loves atheists nonetheless," That is a strawman. Atheists don't hate God because they don't believe in him. The point is, strawmen are when you throw an argument at someone based on an alledged position of that someone, when in fact they do not hold that position.

By the way, I didn't mention any strawman. I mentionned the much more reliable BRICK man because he said "adding more straw". Haven't you seen The Ten Commandments ?
 
Sorry, boy. I already know of at least ONE honest politician.
To that I say habeus corpus

I didn't say particles were totally random. I said that totally random events could happen that can affect particles. But either way, it doesn't mean your choice is a choice. Think about it: if your "choice" is brought about by random chance, how much of a choice is it ?

I'm sorry, but I don't see how this defines free will. From where I stand, free will is the ability to make choices that are not merely the result of chance or purely physical factors. I.E. free will is a supernatural claim, because no mechanism exists to allow anything beyond these two sources (random or determined.)


My point was that if you allow for totally random events, then you have to allow for FW. You've already sown the seeds of destruction to determinism. The only way to have a deterministic universe is if everything is causal. There can be no random events.

Also, look that the definition that I'm using. The inputs limit the number of possible outcomes. Ok, there is a touch of determinism in my definiton. The Free Will part comes in once the person decides from the limited set of possible choices. I'm not denying that the outputs follow the inputs, just that it's a non-linear relationship.

So, I ask you, why does FW NECESSARILY have to be a supernatural claim? If randomness is allowed, then why can't it's bigger cousin FW be allowed?
 
Bri
You want me to apologize for you calling me a liar? OK, I'm sorry you called me a liar. All better now?
No, I want you to admit you lied. I pointed it out ,at least twice, as well as Robin.

You are still doing the same thing you’ve continually done since the beginning of this thread. You limit omniscience in order to allow freewill. Case in point.
Yes insofar as some would consider a being who is capable of knowing everything but chooses to be ignorant of our choices to still be omniscient.
Goes again the basic definition of omniscience.
Such a being would not have any foreknowledge of free choices, yet might still be considered omniscient by a definition different from the one you chose.
What, a definition you would make up on the spot?

Otherwise, if no statement is inserted into the world and only exists as knowledge in God's "mind," then this knowledge lies entirely outside of the timeline and has no affect on the agent's free choice.
Why are you assuming that if the information is outside the agent’s timeline, it has no effect on the agent’s freewill?

Lines 3, 4, and 8 all assume that the statement exists "at time t" which would not be true of timeless knowledge.
Timeless knowledge would be assumed to exist at all times, not just time t.

God could potentially interact with the world in another way that doesn't affect the choice, and still retain perfect foreknowledge of that choice, contrary to your conclusion that "an omniscient being cannot participate in a universe that contains free will."
Missing the point again. If god has the knowledge and interacts within the agent’s timeline, then the knowledge is within the timeline. You’re skipping that part. If god leaves the knowledge outside the timeline, then god is no longer omniscient.

Do you see the circle you keep treading?

Using the definition that God doesn't have to possess foreknowledge of the results of free choices in order to be omniscient makes the proof moot.
What definition would that be, the one you made up?

Ossai
 
My proof is still valid under these circumstances because it only assumes that he could. Even if God never peeks at all, as long as he is able to then it is a valid hypothesis in a proof because each step is logically possible and the deductions are valid.

After reading (and re-reading) your comments, I think our miscommunication lies in your understanding/definition of the word "timeless" (you don't define it in your definitions section). Timeless doesn't mean "existing at all times" but rather it means "existing at no time" or in other words completely outside of and unrestricted by the timeline. Yes, a being who is timeless can view the entire timeline "simultaneously" (an inaccurate word since this word implies time), but this knowledge cannot be said to exist "at a specific time." Therefore, in order for the prediction to exist "at time t" it would have to be a statement inserted into the physical world rather than just God's knowledge (which would exist outside of time itself).

In the simulation example, the programmer's knowledge never affects the simulation in any way. The only thing that would affect the simulated world is if something is changed, inserted, or deleted from the simulation. You cannot say that the programmer's knowledge that the agent will turn left at time t "exists at a time prior to t" with any real meaning because in fact it doesn't exist in the timeline or in the simulated world at all (even though it does exist). Only if a statement predicting the event were inserted into the simulated world so that it actually exists in the world at a time prior to t could it possibly affect the timeline or the world.

I'll let you comment on that before responding to the rest of your post because your comments seem to hinge on this issue.

-Bri
 
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When someone says something like: "Atheists hate God, but God loves atheists nonetheless," That is a strawman. Atheists don't hate God because they don't believe in him. The point is, strawmen are when you throw an argument at someone based on an alledged position of that someone, when in fact they do not hold that position.

No, that's not a strawman actually. Ossai posted an accurate definition of it, although I don't think he read it when he posted it. Even so, I never made such a statement, especially not about atheists!

I may have been mistaken in my facts (I'm not perfect) in which case I would expect to be corrected, but I have not used a straw man argument.

By the way, I didn't mention any strawman. I mentionned the much more reliable BRICK man because he said "adding more straw". Haven't you seen The Ten Commandments ?

I have not seen The Ten Commandments. I assumed that you were backing up Ossai's statement (it still sounds as though you were). If I misunderstood, then I apologize.

-Bri
 
Bri
No, I want you to admit you lied. I pointed it out ,at least twice, as well as Robin.

Actually, Robin has pointed out when he felt that I was mistaken, but I don't recall him saying that I lied. There is a difference, and if you don't know that then you shouldn't be using the word. Furthermore, you claimed that I lied about my own example, which Robin eventually understood and apparently you didn't (and still don't).

You are still doing the same thing you’ve continually done since the beginning of this thread. You limit omniscience in order to allow freewill. Case in point.

[alternate definition of omniscience removed]

Goes again the basic definition of omniscience.
What, a definition you would make up on the spot?

Ossai, I made two completely separate points in my post. Robin understood that. One of my points was that there are multiple definitions of omniscience, some of which aren't covered by Robin's proof. That you would say that I'm lying because I was pointing out an alternate definition of omniscience is absolutely astounding! My other point (a problem with Robin's conclusion) had nothing whatsoever to do with this alternate definition.

Why are you assuming that if the information is outside the agent’s timeline, it has no effect on the agent’s freewill?

I'm not. Robin's proof doesn't pertain to anything outside of the agent's timeline and specifically assumes that the statement exists within the timeline at a specific time before the event occurs. If you wish to show that information outside of the agent's timeline could affect the agent's free will, you'd have to use a different proof.

Timeless knowledge would be assumed to exist at all times, not just time t.

No, it would exist at no time (completely outside of the timeline).

Missing the point again. If god has the knowledge and interacts within the agent’s timeline, then the knowledge is within the timeline. You’re skipping that part. If god leaves the knowledge outside the timeline, then god is no longer omniscient.

You would have to prove that God cannot interact with the world without causing his knowledge to enter the timeline (whatever that would mean). In the programmer example, the programmer can interact with the world (add walls to the world, for example) without his knowledge of future events ever entering or affecting the world at all.

Do you see the circle you keep treading?

Afraid not, no. Please be more specific.

What definition would that be, the one you made up?

I didn't make up the defintion, but yes I was referring to the one I posted. Again, I was simply pointing out alternate definitions of omniscience, but I'm perfectly willing to accept the one Robin is using for the purposes of this proof. My point concerning the conclusion of the proof was using Robin's definition, not the alternate one I posted.

-Bri
 
I've just skimmed through 27 pages of this drek - I thought I'd need some help getting to sleep tonight.

What a ****ing waste of time.

Theists are soooo boring.

As far as I know, nobody claiming to be theists have posted to this thread, so your boredom is obviously due to other more personal issues.

There is no god. This is my working hypothesis. There is no evidence to the contrary. What theists regard as evidence of a god is mere garbage.

Nobody has particularly disagreed with any of those statements. Of course, the opposite statements are also true (there is no evidence to indicate that the existance of a god is impossible).

Some of you silly people have tried to use wordplay, logic, programming, and formalism to support your inane belief in the supernatural.

Who exactly are you referring to as "you silly people?" Nearly all of the logic and formalism posted has been to prove the impossibility of the existance of a god. Are you sure you read this thread?

Please don't - you haven't got a clue and you may hurt yourselves.

We live in beautiful, fascinating, and (at least partly) comprehensible universe. Why some people waste their lives on discussions like this rather than exploring this world and learning about it is beyond me.

Why someone who holds this view would waste his or her time reading through 27 pages of "drek" (couldn't you tell it was drek after the first 10?) rather than exploring the world and learning about it is beyond me.

Philosophy can be interesting. This drivel is not.

Your comments were less than interesting, but thanks for posting them anyway!

-Bri
 
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As far as I know, nobody claiming to be theists have posted to this thread, so your boredom is obviously due to other more personal issues.



Nobody has particularly disagreed with any of those statements. Of course, the opposite statements are also true (there is no evidence to indicate that the existance of a god is impossible).



Who exactly are you referring to as "you silly people?" Nearly all of the logic and formalism posted has been to prove the impossibility of the existance of a god. Are you sure you read this thread?



Why someone who holds this view would waste his or her time reading through 27 pages of "drek" (couldn't you tell it was drek after the first 10?) rather than exploring the world and learning about it is beyond me.



Your comments were less than interesting, but thanks for posting them anyway!

-Bri
Bri,
I'll give him this, the arguments DO get a bit...um..dense at times. That was part of the problem when I started getting involved. THis issue is so...nebulous(?) that it's hard to describe, hard to argue and even harder to be a spectator of.

For example, there are times that I think you and I are both arguing for FW, and others where you seem to be totally agin' it. Bringing math into a totally philosophical argument doens't really help either.

Of course, it would have been nice if he'd stated it in a more entertaining fashion tho.
 
Bri,
I'll give him this, the arguments DO get a bit...um..dense at times. That was part of the problem when I started getting involved. THis issue is so...nebulous(?) that it's hard to describe, hard to argue and even harder to be a spectator of.

Yes, in his defense, that is absolutely true. However, I don't think his entire point was that it was difficult to follow the thread as a newcomer (at least he made several statements inconsistent with that point).

For example, there are times that I think you and I are both arguing for FW, and others where you seem to be totally agin' it. Bringing math into a totally philosophical argument doens't really help either.

This is further muddied by the distinction between libertarian and non-libertarian free will. The latter is sometimes called the "illusion of free will" or "practical free will" which might allow us to have a basis for ethics, but isn't free will in the usual sense of our being able to actually make our own choices. Many (maybe most) theists believe in libertarian free will (the "real thing") and therefore the argument against it is tangentially related to arguments against God. Furthermore, it would presumably be easier to prove that libertarian free will cannot exist alongside certain properties commonly attributed to God than to prove that one or the other cannot exist independently.

For the purposes of our discussion, we have been using "free will" to mean "libertarian free will" unless specifically stated otherwise.

So, to answer your question of whether I have been arguing for or against free will: Put it this way, I don't think the possibility of libertarian free will has been eliminated. If one wishes to claim that they can disprove libertarian free will (as some have claimed) then it would be up to them to prove that it cannot exist. It is a fact that no irrefutable proof has been provided in several thousands of years of discussion of the topic, and so far I haven't seen an irrefutable proof on this thread either. It's possible that someone has posted one or that the proof exists within several posts but hasn't been articulated, but I'm skeptical in that regard.

Does free will actually exist? Maybe it does, and maybe it doesn't. That's my point. Others are claiming that it absolutely cannot, and I have simply asked them to prove it. While formal proofs are often difficult to understand, (ceo_esq and Robin are much better at parsing them than I am) they are less subject to ambiguities of language than a description of such a proof.

Of course, it would have been nice if he'd stated it in a more entertaining fashion tho.

Yeah, boring posts are so...boring! Ironically, he was complaining about how boring the thread was while adding to the boredom!

-Bri
 
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My point was that if you allow for totally random events, then you have to allow for FW. You've already sown the seeds of destruction to determinism. The only way to have a deterministic universe is if everything is causal. There can be no random events.

I don't see how you interpret "random" as "free". Random events are still beyond your control. Even if they affect your decisions, you're still powerless. Only by beign the SOURCE of your own decisions, which seems impossible, could you have true free will.

So, I ask you, why does FW NECESSARILY have to be a supernatural claim? If randomness is allowed, then why can't it's bigger cousin FW be allowed?

Because they are unrelated.
 
No, that's not a strawman actually.

What's a strawman, then ? If not misrepresenting the opposite opinion, then what ?

I have not seen The Ten Commandments. I assumed that you were backing up Ossai's statement (it still sounds as though you were). If I misunderstood, then I apologize.

Actually I had not read your discussion in this part of the thread. I just saw his post and decided it was ripe time for me to get absurd.
 
After reading (and re-reading) your comments, I think our miscommunication lies in your understanding/definition of the word "timeless" (you don't define it in your definitions section).
The first argument (which we are discussing) does not have anything in it at all about timelessness, so why should it have a definition? The definitions it is using are all stated clearly. The omniscient being can produce the statement in any way he likes.
Timeless doesn't mean "existing at all times" but rather it means "existing at no time" or in other words completely outside of and unrestricted by the timeline. Yes, a being who is timeless can view the entire timeline "simultaneously" (an inaccurate word since this word implies time), but this knowledge cannot be said to exist "at a specific time." Therefore, in order for the prediction to exist "at time t" it would have to be a statement inserted into the physical world rather than just God's knowledge (which would exist outside of time itself).
This is just the point that I have been making for umpteen pages. I am glad you have finally got it.

But you are still missing the point about the argument. Our miscommunication has nothing to do with the nature of timelessness. It has to do with your understanding of the nature of a deductive argument.

It is not that God does insert the statement that causes the contradiction. It is the fact that he can.

I have said this so many times I can't see how you don't get it. If you don't agree then fine, tell me why. But don't just ignore the point.

There is nothing about the statement itself that is preventing free will. God does not interact with the agent in any way.

God cannot avoid the contradiction by simply not inserting the statement.

Any more than you can make a pseudo random number generator into a real random number generator by not predicting its operation.

Now I have shown in detail each step from premise to conclusion and included all the definitions used. Show me where my argument is wrong.
 
What's a strawman, then ? If not misrepresenting the opposite opinion, then what ?

It is not simply misrepresenting the opposite opinion. Ossai posted a correct definition here.

Actually I had not read your discussion in this part of the thread. I just saw his post and decided it was ripe time for me to get absurd.

OK, well then all is forgiven (if there is anything to forgive). It sounded as though you were agreeing with him.

-Bri
 
Robin's proof doesn't pertain to anything outside of the agent's timeline and specifically assumes that the statement exists within the timeline at a specific time before the event occurs.
You see? This is what we call your argument straw man.

How many times have I corrected you on this? At least three times prior to the post I am quoting.

Could it be that you missed them all? And yet here again you are restating it. Disagree with me if you like, but if so state your reasons.

But don't just repeat your original assertion as though I had never commented on it.

My assumptions are clearly labelled and this is not one of them

The proof depends only on the possibility of the statement existing in the timeline. That God might decide not to do so is absolutely irrelevant to the argument.
If you wish to show that information outside of the agent's timeline could affect the agent's free will, you'd have to use a different proof.
No, you would use this proof. As long as the knowledge exists in a being capable of interacting with the timeline then the information can affect the timeline. That is what my proof demonstrates.
You would have to prove that God cannot interact with the world without causing his knowledge to enter the timeline (whatever that would mean).
Nonsense, as I have endlessly pointed out, the statement itself does not rob the agent of the free will.

You are still peddling this absurd notion that I might have free will, then suddenly a piece of paper appears somewhere in the world and suddenly I do not.

But as I have pointed out the deduction is valid without any interaction between God and the free agent.

God does not somehow switch off free will by inserting the statement.

The contradiction arises completely from the premise and the definitions of omniscience and free will.
My point concerning the conclusion of the proof was using Robin's definition, not the alternate one I posted.
I think you will find that the definition of omniscience I am using was posted by ceo_esq. I have already pointed out the proof is compatible with one of the other definitions you have posted earlier.

You implied that there was some other definition that was incompatible with my proof but you did not actually post it. If this definition involves God not being able to predict a free will event even by timelessly viewing the future you are correct that it is not compatible with my proof.

But you never made this clear. My proof is compatible with any definition that has been discussed in this topic. It is compatible with the way most theologists define omniscience.

Please post this alternate definition.
 
The first argument (which we are discussing) does not have anything in it at all about timelessness, so why should it have a definition? The definitions it is using are all stated clearly. The omniscient being can produce the statement in any way he likes.

You can't have it both ways, Robin. Either your proof pertains to timeless knowledge, or it only pertains to a statement inserted into the world. Since it specifies the latter, I assumed the latter. Your proof says nothing about the former. So if God chose to not insert a statement into the world, your proof doesn't pertain at all.

Bri said:
Timeless doesn't mean "existing at all times" but rather it means "existing at no time" or in other words completely outside of and unrestricted by the timeline. Yes, a being who is timeless can view the entire timeline "simultaneously" (an inaccurate word since this word implies time), but this knowledge cannot be said to exist "at a specific time." Therefore, in order for the prediction to exist "at time t" it would have to be a statement inserted into the physical world rather than just God's knowledge (which would exist outside of time itself).
This is just the point that I have been making for umpteen pages. I am glad you have finally got it.

OK, great. Then please don't claim that your proof pertains to anything other than a statement inserted into the world unless you plan to post a new version of the proof. God could choose not to insert such a statement into the world, in which case it cannot exist "at time t" and therefore your proof wouldn't pertain at all since it assumes that the statement exists "at time t."

But you are still missing the point about the argument. Our miscommunication has nothing to do with the nature of timelessness. It has to do with your understanding of the nature of a deductive argument.

It is not that God does insert the statement that causes the contradiction. It is the fact that he can.

Your proof entirely and completely depends on the assumption that God has actually inserted such a statement into the world! Line 3 states explicitly "A true statement made about the world in the world exists at a specific time (t)." If you are claiming to have a proof that doesn't depend on the existance of such a statement, then please post a new proof that doesn't specify the existance of such a statement!

There is nothing about the statement itself that is preventing free will. God does not interact with the agent in any way.

God cannot avoid the contradiction by simply not inserting the statement.

Then why does your proof rely on God inserting the statement into the world? If it doesn't rely on the existance of such a statement in the world, then please post a new version in which God doesn't insert the statement into the world. As stated above, the statement cannot be said to exist at time t unless it is inserted into the world. Your proof not only states repeatedly (in at least four separate lines) that the statement exists in the world at time t, but completely relies on it. If the knowledge can exist timelessly outside of the world (i.e. the statement is not inserted into the world at time t), then let's see a proof that doesn't rely on it existing in the world at time t!

Any more than you can make a pseudo random number generator into a real random number generator by not predicting its operation.

I have no idea what this analogy means or how it has anything to do with your argument. Your proof specifically states that God inserts a statement into the world. If it's not necessary to the proof, then rewrite the proof so that it doesn't include this assumption.

Now I have shown in detail each step from premise to conclusion and included all the definitions used. Show me where my argument is wrong.

Your conclusion doesn't follow from the proof for reasons I've already provided. If God doesn't actually insert the statement into the world, your proof doesn't work at all. If he does insert the statement and even if this insertion of a prediction about choice "A" prevents choice "A" from being free, other choices can still be free. Your proof also fails to address any other types of interactions with the world by God that wouldn't affect free will.

-Bri
 
Bri said:
Robin's proof doesn't pertain to anything outside of the agent's timeline and specifically assumes that the statement exists within the timeline at a specific time before the event occurs.

...

My assumptions are clearly labelled and this is not one of them

Then what the heck does the following mean?

Robin said:
3. A true statement made about the world in the world exists at a specific time (t)

-Bri
 

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