Can I classify your objections as follows:
I think there may only be two objections since the second two are actually the same (or at least related).
1. The proof applies to a specific, not necessarily general definition of omniscience
Yes insofar as some would consider a being who is capable of knowing everything but chooses to be ignorant of our choices to still be omniscient. Such a being would not have any foreknowledge of free choices, yet might still be considered omniscient by a definition different from the one you chose.
2. Even if the hypotheses 2 through 8 were logically possible they would not represent actions the being was obliged to do
3. The proof only covers events directly affected by the prediction.
Unless I am misunderstanding, these two are related. Your premise is that God actually has to insert a statement about the future into the current timeline before the event in question (as shown by line 2 of your proof, specifically the use of the term "statement" and the phrase "in the world"). Otherwise, if no statement is inserted into the world and only exists as knowledge in God's "mind," then this knowledge lies entirely outside of the timeline and has no affect on the agent's free choice. Lines 3, 4, and 8 all assume that the statement exists "at time t" which would not be true of timeless knowledge. In other words, your entire proof makes the assumption that God must interact with the world in a very specific way (inserting a statement predicting the result of a choice into the world), but if God doesn't choose to interact with the world in that way then there is nothing to prevent the free choice in question. Likewise any event that is not affected by such a statement could still be free even if your proof is completely accurate. God could potentially interact with the world in another way that doesn't affect the choice, and still retain perfect foreknowledge of that choice, contrary to your conclusion that "an omniscient being cannot participate in a universe that contains free will."
1. Yes, the proof refers to the definition stated. But I could amend the definition to change "knows" to "is capable of knowing" and point out that "true" also implies "knowable" and the proof would still be valid and the definition would be compatible with any definition we have discussed or referred to here. I think that it would cover just about every definition. Please specify if I am mistaken.
Using the definition that God doesn't have to possess foreknowledge of the results of free choices in order to be omniscient makes the proof moot. Of course, you're allowed to define omniscience any way you want, I'm just pointing out that many theists don't believe that God knows the results of free choices, yet still may believe God to be omniscient since he could know if he chose to (even if such knowledge would rob us of free will). If you still believe your proof to be valid even if God cannot make predictions as assumed by your proof (line 4), you'll have to post the new version, because I don't see it.
2. I would have to say then that deductive formalism cuts both ways. I only have to show that my premises are logically possible in the terms of my premises, hypotheses, definitions or the axioms of logic. However this is a worthy objection and deserves a longer answer so I will get back to you.
I was only pointing out that your conclusion doesn't follow from the proof. It is possible that God could choose not to insert such statements into the world, thus preserving free will. This would mean that even if your proof were true, your conclusion does not follow (it would still be possible for an omniscient being to interact with a world that contains free will).
3. But the statement could be about any free will event. There is no action you could take for which there could not be a chronologically prior true proposition - that is what makes it universal.
Right, but again God could simply avoid inserting such statements into the world, thereby not allowing any free choices to be affected by such statements.
Practically every Christian in the world believes he does. However this is irrelevant - the contradiction is caused by the possibility that he can rather than any real action he might take. The fact that I choose not to predict the behaviour of a pseudo random number generator does not make it a real random number generator. The fact that I could makes this impossible.
My point here is that not many Christians (or anyone else) believe that God actually inserts statements about your future choices into the world, so the proof is moot even if true. Your proof relies on God actually inserting a statement into the world so that it exists at time t. If God cannot do this, not many Christians would find that partcularly worrisome since not many of them feel that God regularly does this. Other sorts of interactions with the world don't apply to your proof (it only concerns statements specifically predicting those events which exist in the timeline), even if these other interactions affect the agent's future. For example, if God places a wall in front of an agent's path, the agent may still freely choose to go left or right. This might restrict the choice (you might even say it replaces one choice with another), but the resulting choice is still free.
No - it only depends on the knowledge existing in a being capable of interacting with the universe. That makes it logically possible that the statement could exist within the agent's timeline.
You haven't proven that any other types of interaction would necessarily prevent free will. Certainly, foreknowledge by itself doesn't prevent free will according to your proof as Ossai implied. If you claim that your proof shows what Ossai claims it shows, then you'll need to reformulate lines 2, 3, 4, 8, and everything based on those lines (which pretty much includes your entire proof aside from line 1). My point to Ossai is that your proof assumed that the statement exists in the world at time t. Even if your claim is now that you can reformulate the proof so that it doesn't rely on this assumption, Ossai's accusation of a straw man is unfounded since I was simply stating what was assumed in the proof.
The agent mentioned in the proof could be any one of the free agents existing in the universe and for any choice they make. What is true for one is also true for all.
I understand that. Ossai implied that I was utilizing the straw man fallacy by stating that your proof allows more than one free agent. I was pointing out that Ossai's accusation was unfounded since you yourself indicated that more than one free agent could exist. I was simply pointing out that if another agent were to make a choice for which no statement existed in the world, that choice could still be unaffected and free. In other words, God interacting in the world such that choice "A" would be affected would not necessarily affect choice "B."
-Bri
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