There is No God (And You Know It)

Agreed. Unfortunately, that has nothing at all to do with what I said (and the same can be said for a free event -- if it's caused then it's not really free).

Unfortunately, it was you who posited the random number generator to make a point. The fact that your analogy is logically impossible doesn't bode well for the rest of your argument.

A true random number generator (one that is itself not entirely caused) can certainly cause something that would then not be entirely caused (i.e. determined).

But you have already agreed that there can logically be no such thing as a random number generator. If it generates the numbers, they are not random.

How do you know? How do you know that things that are truly random (as predicted by quantum theory) won't "break down" at any time and show a pattern?

I see no reason to bring quantum theory into this discussion. If our premise is that a given set of events are truely random then any pattern they appear to show is incidental and purely in the eye of the beholder - otherwise they would not be truely random. You seem to be suggesting that random events might suddenly become unrandom after the fact - I don't quite get what you're on about but that seems to be the gist of it.

My point exactly. Hence if we can predict it part of the time with complete certainty, it isn't truly random, but also not entirely caused because it isn't even theoretically predictable all of the time.

The point is - we can't predict it. We are just making guesses that turn out to be correct. If they are random they will not have a predetermined pattern whereas your pairs of numbers are to an extent determined (your second number can be described as being caused by your first, for want of any other causal agent). Without something causal the second number would not be obliged to be the same as the first and any incidence of such would be coincidence.


Only if you define "caused" and "random" to mean the same thing.

I think you mean 'uncaused' and 'random'. They are pretty much analogous.

Actually, it doesn't help you to show the impossibility of free will, which is what we're discussing here.

I gave up trying to disprove your free will because its not well-defined enough to disprove. Your defintions beg too many questions. Instead I described how there could be such a thing as free will (the practical free will described elsewhere in this thread) and challenged you (or whoever) to either agree with that constrained definition or propose what else free will could be.

And as I've said, I'm not making an argument, I'm simply refuting yours.

I don't understand your distinction but - fine.

Likewise, you cannot prove that "flimmery" doesn't exist as you've defined it.

Exactly - its pointless trying to disprove flimmery and its pointless trying to disprove your free will. Until we get some substance behind your concept there is really nothing to disprove.
 
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Unfortunately, it was you who posited the random number generator to make a point. The fact that your analogy is logically impossible doesn't bode well for the rest of your argument.

That fact that your response had nothing to do with the illustration I posted makes it far more likely that you misunderstood. You'll also need to prove your claim that it is impossible for something uncaused to produce pairs of random numbers similar to the way that current scientific theory believes it possible for something uncaused to produce random numbers.

But you have already agreed that there can logically be no such thing as a random number generator. If it generates the numbers, they are not random.

I don't recally agreeing that there can be no such thing as a random number generator. I believe I said that quantum theory posits that such a thing is possible. I would seriously doubt that accepted science would do so if it were logically impossible.

I see no reason to bring quantum theory into this discussion. If our premise is that a given set of events are truely random then any pattern they appear to show is incidental and purely in the eye of the beholder - otherwise they would not be truely random. You seem to be suggesting that random events might suddenly become unrandom after the fact - I don't quite get what you're on about but that seems to be the gist of it.

You suggested that the pairs of random numbers in my illustration would suddenly become unrandom. I was simply asking why you don't suggest the same about random numbers.

The point is - we can't predict it. We are just making guesses that turn out to be correct. If they are random they will not have a predetermined pattern whereas your pairs of numbers are to an extent determined (your second number can be described as being caused by your first, for want of any other causal agent). Without something causal the second number would not be obliged to be the same as the first and any incidence of such would be coincidence.

Thank you for pointing out that the pairs of numbers are neither causal nor random. That was my point. It seems that you "got" it after all, but perhaps don't want to admit it.

I think you mean 'uncaused' and 'random'. They are pretty much analagous.

I did mean "uncaused" and no they are not the same. Of course, "pretty much analagous" also doesn't mean the same, so are you saying that they are "pretty much analagous" or are you saying that they are exactly the same? If not exactly the same, what are the differences?

I gave up trying to disprove your free will because its not well-defined enough to disprove. Your defintions beg too many questions.

Then define it however you want and try to disprove your definition.

Instead I described how there could be such a thing as free will (the practical free will described elsewhere in this thread) and challenged you (or whoever) to either agree with that constrained definition or propose what else free will could be.

I agree that practical free will is possible. I also don't believe that libertarian free will is impossible. The difference is that one provides the illusion of making choices without actually having the ability to actually make choices.

I don't understand your distinction but - fine.

The distinction is that you were attempting to prove something but so far your proof has made the assumption that uncaused and random are the same thing and therefore said that nothing else uncaused is possible because of that definition. If you wish to show libertarian free will to be impossible, then provide proof rather than just defining two things to be the same thing. Otherwise, admit that libertarian free will is possible and move on.

Exactly - its pointless trying to disprove flimmery and its pointless trying to disprove your free will. Until we get some substance behind your concept there is really nothing to disprove.

Well, then I guess that's pretty much my point. If we can't disprove free will or flimmery, then it is possible that one or both are reality.

-Bri
 
This is like watching a bad play poorly performed that never ever ends.

It ends when you stop reading it. Apparently you find something worthwhile or you wouldn't be reading it, or perhaps you have less of a life than those who are actually contributing to the thread. Either way, you are only annoying yourself by reading and annoying others by posting. The obvious solution would be to stop doing both.

-Bri
 
It ends when you stop reading it. Apparently you find something worthwhile or you wouldn't be reading it, or perhaps you have less of a life than those who are actually contributing to the thread. Either way, you are only annoying yourself by reading and annoying others by posting. The obvious solution would be to stop doing both.

-Bri

That, however, is a very good point.
 
Any definition of God that would be wiped out would be one involving a God that can do the illogical within the laws of logic. I doubt anyone would have a problem wiping out such a self-contradictory definition.
Recall that the proposition we were discussing was question was:
"God can make a true statement about the world in the world"
Disallow this statement and you disallow all Christian, Jewish and Islamic beliefs.
If you want God to do the illogical, then it would obviously result in something illogical.
And as I am getting tired of repeating, I do not want God to do anything illogical. I did not make up the definitions or the premise.
Personally, I vote for (4) because you are defining "free will" so that the premise logically contradicts itself, and then insisting that God must fit into this illogical definition, but then if he does you claim that God is illogical and therefore cannot exist.[/quote]
My definition of free will is pretty much a standard definition for free will. But if you object to definition 1 please provide a new definition.

But I've already pointed out - they are not my definitions
Again, unless I'm completely misunderstanding the proof, you have only shown that God cannot insert a specific type of information into the world (particularly a type of information that you have defined in a self-contradictory way). Your proof absolutely depends on this specific self-contradictory action being performed.
*Sigh* No. This must be up to about 10 times you have repeated this furphy and I have corrected you. It depends on the possibility of this action being taken.
True enough, God cannot logically insert an infallibly true statement reading "This statement is false" into the world, but you haven't shown that God's insertion of the statement "Peace out!" into the world would create any logical contradiction or preclude free will in any way. If you're claiming that God cannot do anything at all to the world which has free will, you'll have to develop a different proof (one that contains no logical self-contradictions).
A reductio ad absurdum with no contradiction? I'd like to see that. You would wipe out 60% of maths.
No, I assure you, it is only those who attempt to disprove the existance of God logically who demand that God must be able to do the logically impossible within the confines of logic. The contradiction is within the question, not the answer.
So my definitions 1,4 and Proposition 1 of my proof are only asserted by those who wish to disprove God?

Interesting
 
Recall that the proposition we were discussing was question was:
"God can make a true statement about the world in the world"
Disallow this statement and you disallow all Christian, Jewish and Islamic beliefs.

Oh, but I'm not disallowing that line (which is line 2). Only a statement about a future event (such as in lines 3 and 4) creates the self-contradiction necessary for your proof, therefore most other statements such as "The sky is blue" or "I don't care what John will do next" or "Go Indiana Pacers!" don't result in logically self-contradictory situtations, and invalidate your proof entirely. I have no problem with the notion that God simply does not possess the ability to insert a statement of prediction about a future free event (as you've defined it) into the world. Again, I don't really think that Christian, Jewish, or Islamic beliefs really necessitate God being able to do the logically impossible without violating the laws of logic.

And as I am getting tired of repeating, I do not want God to do anything illogical. I did not make up the definitions or the premise.

Your proof concludes that if this logically impossible thing (to predict that which you have defined as unpredictable) cannot be done within the confines of logic, an omniscient God cannot interact with the world at all if free will exists. Of course, this is simply incorrect because if we assume that God actually does not possess the power to make such a statement, but can interact with the world some other way, your proof falls apart entirely.

You now claim that this limits the definition of God so that it would no longer be valid for Christians, Jews, or Muslims. Of course, that is hogwash since none of these religions require God to be able to do the logically impossible within the confines of logic. Even if a Christian, Jew, or Muslim did believe that God could do the logically impossible, it would be absurd to require that he be able to do it within the confines of our system of logic!

My definition of free will is pretty much a standard definition for free will. But if you object to definition 1 please provide a new definition.

I really have no problem with the definition (except that few theists would use it). I only have a problem with the proof itself. The conclusion is based on an assumption that God can insert a true but self-contradictory statement into the logical world, which God simply cannot do (because there simply is no such thing). But your proof doesn't consider other non-contradictory statements that God can insert, or other types of non-contradictory participation God can do.

Bri said:
Again, unless I'm completely misunderstanding the proof, you have only shown that God cannot insert a specific type of information into the world (particularly a type of information that you have defined in a self-contradictory way). Your proof absolutely depends on this specific self-contradictory action being performed.
*Sigh* No. This must be up to about 10 times you have repeated this furphy and I have corrected you. It depends on the possibility of this action being taken.

My fault for using ambiguous language. By "cannot," I meant just that he cannot have the ability to do it. I did not mean "must not" actually do it. I am fairly sure that I understand this particular point now, although I may be misunderstanding something else in the proof.

A reductio ad absurdum with no contradiction? I'd like to see that. You would wipe out 60% of maths.

Oh, I really don't have a problem with the proof except that it is based on an assumption that God must have the ability to do the logically impossible, which as we've already discussed is the square circle argument. The contradition in a reductio ad absurdum is generally in the conclusion, not the premise. Regardless, your proof is absolutely wrong, because if we simply admit that God is not able to do what your proof assumes he must be able to do, the proof falls apart.

So my definitions 1,4 and Proposition 1 of my proof are only asserted by those who wish to disprove God?

I don't recall saying that. I said that the only people who believe that a usable definition of God must involve God being able to perform logically self-contradictory acts within the laws of logic are those trying to disprove God. Others who actually believe in the existance of God seldom care whether God can perform logically self-contradictory acts within the laws of logic and don't consider it a necessary condition for omnipotence or omniscience.

-Bri
 
Nice try, Robin, but your arrow fell short.

I'm not a good actor, that's true. About writing plays, we'll see, although I do write.

But what we're really talking about are attempts at sharp thinking and the creation of solid proofs. That's what I do most of my spare time, and I'm good at it. I create algorithms for challenging problems and write and prove theorems about their complexity.

Putting it simply, I develop proofs about the properties of real things that matter (i.e. algorithms) and not imaginary things that are of no consequence (i.e. god).

You're giving the concepts of "reason" and "proof" a bad name.

And that's why I periodically chime in.
 
Nice try, Robin, but your arrow fell short.

I'm not a good actor, that's true. About writing plays, we'll see, although I do write.

But what we're really talking about are attempts at sharp thinking and the creation of solid proofs. That's what I do most of my spare time, and I'm good at it. I create algorithms for challenging problems and write and prove theorems about their complexity.

Putting it simply, I develop proofs about the properties of real things that matter (i.e. algorithms) and not imaginary things that are of no consequence (i.e. god).

You're giving the concepts of "reason" and "proof" a bad name.

And that's why I periodically chime in.

Hmmm - ok we may be amateurs when it comes to mathematically proving things but each to his own. I have to think pretty damned sharply in my line of work as I am sure many contributors to this thread do.

The forum is not a maths text book, for most contributors its probably some sort of hobby. The mrs is watching some ◊◊◊◊ on the telly so I'll go and have an argument on the JREF, on alternate days I'll go down the pub instead.
 
The more I think about it, the more I realize that I really just don't care.

Have at it. Knock yourselves out.

I'll keep my nose out of this thread.
 
Nice try, Robin, but your arrow fell short.
Or more likely went straight through one of the existing holes.
I'm not a good actor, that's true. About writing plays, we'll see, although I do write.

But what we're really talking about are attempts at sharp thinking and the creation of solid proofs. That's what I do most of my spare time, and I'm good at it. I create algorithms for challenging problems and write and prove theorems about their complexity.

Putting it simply, I develop proofs about the properties of real things that matter (i.e. algorithms) and not imaginary things that are of no consequence (i.e. god).
Well that is a claim. Just about anybody can create algorithms for challenging problems and write and prove theorems about their complexity. The question is are they any good? Frankly I am not seeing evidence of a mind that could do that.

For example earlier I challenged you to say why the statement you made about your own hypothesis was different from the equivalent theist statement you dodged the answer.

In another thread you made a series of "I believe" statements. When I asked you for an example, evidence or reasoning for just one of them you did not answer. How is that different from a religious belief?

My reasoning is pretty hastily put together and imperfect in some places, but if it is unsound in any way please point out just one example.

You have never actually stated even one thing that is fundamentally wrong with any of the arguments I have put.

If you are as smart as you claim to be you should be able to. It should at be at least as easy as failed whatever it is you think you are actually doing here.

Chime in by all means, but don't chime in and say "I'm smart, you're all dumb" without at least giving some fundamental demonstration of said intelligence.
 
Bri said:
I only have a problem with the proof itself. The conclusion is based on an assumption that God can insert a true but self-contradictory statement into the logical world, which God simply cannot do (because there simply is no such thing).
I agree that there can be no such thing as a true but self-contradictory statement. Please show me the part in the proof where I have assumed this because I can't find it.

Say John turns left at t. G knows that John turns left at t. So the statement "John turns left at t" is completely self-consistent. And it is true. There is no possible circumstance that it cannot be true.

So in the argument it has already been stated that there are two possibilities for a(A,t) : a1 and a2. They are possibilities following the definition of free will

Given that a(A,t) cannot be both then how is the statement a(A,t) == a1 self-contradictory?

Again I have to say that having asked for a deductive argument, the least you can do is to address it as such. I have asked for specifics. If my proof is wrong then say where it is wrong.
So...I guess you are going to go there after all. A square circle always involves a contradiction, but you leave that possibility undefined in your definition.
No, it doesn't always involve a contradiction. There are four points on the figure that don't involve a contradiction. So if the "as long is it does not involve a contradiction" is an allowable part of a definition then my definition is perfectly valid.
The contradition in a reductio ad absurdum is generally in the conclusion, not the premise.
No, in RAA the contradiction is in the premise. The argument and conclusion merely clarifies the contradiction. For example the premise "There is a smallest rational number greater than zero" is a contradictory premise. "There is an algorithm that given a description of any program and its initial input, will determine whether the program, when executed on this input, ever halts (completes). " is a contradictory statement.

There is no contradiction in the conclusion of an RAA. The contradiction is always in the premise, the conclusion merely demonstrates that there is a contradiction.
Regardless, your proof is absolutely wrong, because if we simply admit that God is not able to do what your proof assumes he must be able to do, the proof falls apart.
My assumption (clearly labelled) is that an omniscient being participates in a universe that contains at least one free again. If we admit that God cannot do this it does not mean that the proof falls apart. It means that the proof is valid.

If we simply admit that there is no smallest rational number greater than zero then the proof that there is no smallest rational number greater than zero does not fall apart.
But your proof doesn't consider other non-contradictory statements that God can insert, or other types of non-contradictory participation God can do.
It does not need to, any more than the proof about rational numbers need to consider rationals larger than the hypothesised smallest rational. Turing's halting proof does not need to consider machines where the halting behaviour can be determined.
 
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I agree that there can be no such thing as a true but self-contradictory statement. Please show me the part in the proof where I have assumed this because I can't find it.

Forget for a moment any self-contradictions or inadequacies of definitions.

You make the assumption in line 8 that it is possible for an omniscient God to insert a particular statement about a future choice into the world at time t. It may very well be impossible (entirely beyond his powers) for him to insert such a statement into the world at time t. Therefore, line 9 which depends on line 8 is false, as is line 11 (your conclusion) which depends on line 9.

The proof is simply invalid and fails to prove its conclusion because it makes an assumption in line 8 that isn't proven. Line 2 (upon which line 8 depends) is unsubstantiated because you cannot prove that even if a God participates in the world in some way, that God must necessarily be able to participate in the world by inserting statements into the world. Even if God can insert statements into the world, there is nothing to say that he can insert infallibly true statements into the world. Even if God can insert true statements into the world, there is nothing that indicates that he has the power to insert any true statement into the world. Even if he can insert any true statement into the world, there is nothing to indicate that a statement about a future free choice could possibly be true when inserted into the world (in fact, you show just the opposite in your proof). In any of these cases, God simply does not have the ability to do as you assume he can do in line 8.

No, it doesn't always involve a contradiction. There are four points on the figure that don't involve a contradiction. So if the "as long is it does not involve a contradiction" is an allowable part of a definition then my definition is perfectly valid.

Of course any meaningful concept of a square circle always involves a logical contradiction! By placing an "unless" clause in your definition, you've left all points but four undefined. You've created a definition of four points, which doesn't adequately define a square circle at all (just as my definition of "frog" is left with a frog being an animal, which although true is an inadequate definition). A square circle is a logical contradiction, and such a shape simply cannot exist within our system of logic. If you insist that an omnipotent God must be able to create a square circle (or to create a rock larger than he can lift), then would you really assume that he would be able to do so without changing logic? To make such an assumption is to ask an illogical question, for which we cannot expect a logical answer. We've already discussed this at length previously in this thread.

No, in RAA the contradiction is in the premise. The argument and conclusion merely clarifies the contradiction.

The contradiction your proof is trying to clarify is not the same as the contradiction of terms you're using to do so. You're using one contradiction to clarify another. The contradiction the proof is trying to clarify is that an omniscient God cannot participate in a world with free will. To do so, you assume that such participation necessarily includes the ability to insert an infallibly true prediction about a future choice which you've defined as unpredictable. You might just have well assumed that God's participation necessarily includes the ability to insert an infallibly true statement reading "This statement is false." Or the ability to insert a square circle into the world without violating or changing logic.

Here's a similar "proof" that an omnipotent being cannot exist, using similar contradictions:

Definitions:

  1. omnipotence: the ability to do anything.
  2. square circle: a shape that cannot logically exist.

Proof:

  1. An omnipotent being exists. (assumption)
  2. An omnipotent being can do anything. (def 1)
  3. An omnipotent being can make a square circle. (arg 2)
  4. A square circle cannot exist. (def 2)
  5. The chances that an omnipotent being can make a square circle = 1. (arg 3)
  6. The chances that an omnipotent being can make a square circle != 1. (arg 4)
  7. An omnipotent being cannot exist (arg 5, arg 6).

My assumption (clearly labelled) is that an omniscient being participates in a universe that contains at least one free again. If we admit that God cannot do this it does not mean that the proof falls apart. It means that the proof is valid.

Sure, if your proof demonstrated that God couldn't participates in a universe that contains at least one free agent, the proof would be valid. Of course, that is not the case.

Perhaps God does not have the power to insert the statement your proof assumes must be possible. If an omniscient God does not have the ability to insert such a statement into the world, but can insert a statement reading "Go Colts!" into the world, then an omniscient God can participate in a universe containing at least one free agent. Therefore, the conclusion of the proof is incorrect unless you can also prove that God cannot insert a statement reading "Go Colts!" into a world with a free agent.

-Bri
 
Forget for a moment any self-contradictions or inadequacies of definitions.
So when I ask you to substantiate an allegation you say "forget it, lets move on to something else"?

No, let's not forget it - let's get the requested substantiation first. Tell me exactly what is self-contradictory. Tell me which definitions are inadequate - do you mean ceo_esq's definition for omnipotence? Please supply a more adequate definition.

Please do not make these allegations again until you are prepared to back them up.

And when asked to back them up don't just say "Forget it" an move on.
You make the assumption in line 8 that it is possible for an omniscient God to insert a particular statement about a future choice into the world at time t.
No, P8 is merely a consequence of P2, P3 and P4 (as stated in the argument), so you should address those lines and say which is not a consequence of the premise and definitions.
It may very well be impossible (entirely beyond his powers) for him to insert such a statement into the world at time t.
But we have already established:

1. God knows the outcome of the action
2. God can make a true statement about the world in the world
3. Such a statement, if made, would not be self-contradictory
4. The statement, if made, would be true

If you disagree with the above please state which.
Therefore, line 9 which depends on line 8 is false, as is line 11 (your conclusion) which depends on line 9.
and line 8 depends on lines 2,3 and 4 which say that he can do exactly that. So if you are going to say a line is 'false' then please deal with those.
The proof is simply invalid and fails to prove its conclusion because it makes an assumption in line 8 that isn't proven. Line 2 (upon which line 8 depends) is unsubstantiated because you cannot prove that even if a God participates in the world in some way, that God must necessarily be able to participate in the world by inserting statements into the world.
Why do you always repeat previous points rather than addressing the answers I have already given.

The ability to do, or refrain from doing, just one thing allows you to insert any information at all into the world. So if God cannot put information into the world then God cannot do just one thing - any thing.

A statement is information, so the ability to insert information into the world implies the ability to make a statement in the world.

There is no empirical distinction between a true a false or a trivial statement. So if God can insert one he can insert any.
Even if God can insert statements into the world, there is nothing to say that he can insert infallibly true statements into the world.
You mean he might be able to insert false ones, but not true ones? And if it were true and God knew it to be so then it would be infallibly true.
Even if God can insert true statements into the world, there is nothing that indicates that he has the power to insert any true statement into the world.
But the difference between them is simply a configuration. If God can insert "01100110" then why can't he insert "01100101"?
Even if he can insert any true statement into the world, there is nothing to indicate that a statement about a future free choice could possibly be true when inserted into the world (in fact, you show just the opposite in your proof).
If the statement says "John turns left at t" and John does in fact turn left at t and God knows infallibly that John turns left at t then the statement is true. There is no circumstance at all in which the statement will be contradicted by the facts.
Of course any meaningful concept of a square circle always involves a logical contradiction! By placing an "unless" clause in your definition, you've left all points but four undefined.
Exactly! Precisely my point. Why did you think I put the definition in the first place? The fact that there are some point that don't cause a contradiction does not mean the definition is valid so long as there are points that do.

The fact that there are some actions by God that don't cause a contradiction would not make the definition valid as long as there are logically possible actions that do.
You've created a definition of four points, which doesn't adequately define a square circle at all (just as my definition of "frog" is left with a frog being an animal, which although true is an inadequate definition). A square circle is a logical contradiction, and such a shape simply cannot exist within our system of logic.
Precisely.
If you insist that an omnipotent God must be able to create a square circle (or to create a rock larger than he can lift), then would you really assume that he would be able to do so without changing logic?
No I wouldn't. If you insist that an omniscient God can participate in a universe that contained free will then would you really assume that he would be able to do so without changing logic?
To make such an assumption is to ask an illogical question, for which we cannot expect a logical answer. We've already discussed this at length previously in this thread.
I agree that it is illogical for an omniscient God to participate in a world that contains free will. I did not make the claim that he could.
The contradiction your proof is trying to clarify is not the same as the contradiction of terms you're using to do so. You're using one contradiction to clarify another. The contradiction the proof is trying to clarify is that an omniscient God cannot participate in a world with free will. To do so, you assume that such participation necessarily includes the ability to insert an infallibly true prediction about a future choice which you've defined as unpredictable. You might just have well assumed that God's participation necessarily includes the ability to insert an infallibly true statement reading "This statement is false."
False equivalence. "This statement is false" is self-contradictory and therefore could never be true. The statement in P8 is self-consistent and therefore could be true. And if you assume that God can observe the action itself then it is true.
Here's a similar "proof" that an omnipotent being cannot exist, using similar contradictions:
Well if you are saying this proof is equivalent to mine then one of my definitions must be self-contradictory.

Please substantiate this by pointing out which one of my definitions is self-contradictory and providing a more suitable defintion.
Therefore, the conclusion of the proof is incorrect unless you can also prove that God cannot insert a statement reading "Go Colts!" into a world with a free agent.
All you are doing is pointing out the points on the square that might be consistent with the definition of a circle.

If God can say "Go Colts!" Could God swap to letters and say "Go Clots!"?

Or change a letter and say "Ho Clots!"
Or change another letter and say "Hi Clots!"
Or add a punctuation mark and say "Hi, Clots!"

And at some point in this process there will be some swap, change, insertion or deletion that might transform this into a true statement about a future free will event. At this point God would be unable to alter a single character in the statement.

For example God can say without any contradiction to free will:

"John, turn left at time t"

but not:

"John turns left at time t"

So God cannot remove a comma and add and 's'?
 
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Bri,

It seems that your objection now rests on inadequate or contradictory definitions and that P2, 3 and 4 do not follow from the definitions and premise.

OK here are the steps to show that 2, 3 and 4 follow from definition of participates in and the initial assumption:

1. X can make one type of change in U (T Def "participates in")
2. X can refrain from making one type of change in U (Ded 1, Def of omnipotence)
3. X can represent a binary value (Ded 1,2)
4. Any natural number can be represented by a combination of binary values (Can be independently proved)
5. X can express any natural number in U Ded 3,4
6. Any true proposition can be expressed using natural numbers (Can be independently proved)
7. X can express any true proposition in U (Ded 5,6)

It should be obvious that what the true statement is about does not affect the above argument.

It should also be obvious that P8 follows from 2,3 and 4 in the original arguement.

In fact you were yourself arguing earlier that some agent outside of the timeline could insert an infallible prediction about a free will event into the timeline.

In order for me to address self-contradictory or inadequate definitions you will have to get back to me to specify which one of my definitions was self-contradictory or inadequate and supply fresh definitions. Also you need to justify your claim that the statement s in P8 is self-contradictory.

As I say, if you ask for deductive argument you must address it as such.

I do not claim to be a brilliant logician, or even an adequate one. But the validity of the argument does not depend upon the abilities of the proposer - it stands or falls on it's own merits.

I do not even claim that my argument is necessarily valid - it seems so to me. But I have not read any valid criticism of the argument yet.

But then ceo_esq has not responded yet. Hopefully he will.
 
So when I ask you to substantiate an allegation you say "forget it, lets move on to something else"?

I said to forget it for a moment, not indefinitely. In fact, I addressed the issue in further detail later in my post as you probably noticed since you commented on it. My point here is that your proof is invalid regardless of whether there is a contradiction in the terms or not. The allegation that your definitions are inadequate and self-contradictory only come into play when discussing whether God being unable to perform logically self-contradictory acts results in an unsatisfactory definition of God.

No, P8 is merely a consequence of P2, P3 and P4 (as stated in the argument), so you should address those lines and say which is not a consequence of the premise and definitions.

I did. I gave 4 or 5 unsubstantiated assumptions in line 2 upon which line 8 is based.

But we have already established:

1. God knows the outcome of the action
2. God can make a true statement about the world in the world
3. Such a statement, if made, would not be self-contradictory
4. The statement, if made, would be true

If you disagree with the above please state which.

You have not shown (2) to be true at all. How do you know God can do this? Maybe he cannot. You have shown (3) to be false (that no true prediction of a free event can be inserted into the world according to your definition without creating a logical contradiction). If such a statement might be logically false, why would you assume that God could insert such a statement into the world and make it logically true any more than he could insert the infallibly true statement "1 + 1 = 3" into the world? Statement (4) is also not necessarily true since God could certainly insert a tatement into the world that would be false. You assume that God has the ability to control the truthfulness of a statement, when he simply cannot do so without changing logic itself.

Why do you always repeat previous points rather than addressing the answers I have already given.

When you repeat the same points, my resulting comments will also be the same. Rather than simply ignoring yours, I might repeat them in hopes that you'll stop making the same points.

The ability to do, or refrain from doing, just one thing allows you to insert any information at all into the world. So if God cannot put information into the world then God cannot do just one thing - any thing.

A statement is information, so the ability to insert information into the world implies the ability to make a statement in the world.

There is no empirical distinction between a true a false or a trivial statement. So if God can insert one he can insert any.

I doubt it. Not all statements are equal. Sure, if God can place one statement into the world he can probably insert any statement into the world (although this is also not provable). But that doesn't mean that all statements placed into the world must be able to be true within our system of logic. You are assuming that God has the ability to control the logical truthfulness of a statement without changing logic itself. In other words, you're suggesting that God should be able to place obviously false statements such as "1 + 1 = 3" into the world but make them infallibly true without changing logic itself. Likewise, if a statement predicting a future free event would not be infallibly true, why would you assume that God can insert such a statement into the world without changing logic?

You mean he might be able to insert false ones, but not true ones? And if it were true and God knew it to be so then it would be infallibly true.

No, that's not what I meant. I meant that there is no reason to believe that any statement God inserts into the world would be infallibly true. There are infinitely many statements that are not true, and God simply does not have the power to insert them into the world and have them be true within the current system of logic.

But the difference between them is simply a configuration. If God can insert "01100110" then why can't he insert "01100101"?

The question isn't the insertion itself, it's the insertion with the caveat that it has to be infallibly true. Infallibly true untrue statements cannot be inserted into the world, even by God. THAT is where the contradiction in your proof is. Your proof assumes that God must be able to insert any statement into the world and have it be true, even if it's a false statement. If you don't make that (incorrect) assumption, your proof doesn't hold.

Exactly! Precisely my point. Why did you think I put the definition in the first place? The fact that there are some point that don't cause a contradiction does not mean the definition is valid so long as there are points that do.

Ummm...that was my point, not yours. I'm glad we're in agreement though. So how does that help you to prove that God must be able to insert a square circle into the world since the very definition of a square circle is invalid? Likewise, your assumption that God can insert an infallibly true statement predicting an unpredictable event is invalid.

The fact that there are some actions by God that don't cause a contradiction would not make the definition valid as long as there are logically possible actions that do.

Again, that was my point. But if God can interact with the world in any way that doesn't cause the contradiction, your conclusion is false. Your conclusion doesn't specify a type of interaction, but simply states that God cannot participate in the world at all. Surely God can participate in a world with free agents, just not in a way that would create a logical contradiction (such as inserting a true statement that reads "1 + 1 = 3").

No I wouldn't. If you insist that an omniscient God can participate in a universe that contained free will then would you really assume that he would be able to do so without changing logic?

Yes, of course he can. Show me a proof that demonstrates that an omniscient God cannot place a true statement into a world with free will. If you cannot prove that he cannot, then your conclusion is false, plain and simple.

I agree that it is illogical for an omniscient God to participate in a world that contains free will. I did not make the claim that he could.

I'm not certain what you're agreeing to since I never made this statement. I simply said that your argument is illogical.

False equivalence. "This statement is false" is self-contradictory and therefore could never be true. The statement in P8 is self-consistent and therefore could be true. And if you assume that God can observe the action itself then it is true.

In conjunction, the statements in 2, 3, 4, and 8 are not self-consistent. You are defining free choice to be something that is unpredictable, and then assuming that God must have the ability to insert a true statement predicting it into the world. That's exactly like assuming that God can insert a true statement "1 + 1 = 3" into the world, or that God insert a true statement "This statement is false" into the world. It's simply not possible that it be true, so why must you assume that God can make it true without changing logic? He can't. So your proof doesn't hold since it assumes that he can.

Just because he can't insert an obviously false statement into the world truthfully doesn't mean that he can't insert a true statement into the world truthfully, thereby interacting with the world and proving your conclusion false.

If God can say "Go Colts!" Could God swap to letters and say "Go Clots!"?

Or change a letter and say "Ho Clots!"
Or change another letter and say "Hi Clots!"
Or add a punctuation mark and say "Hi, Clots!"

And at some point in this process there will be some swap, change, insertion or deletion that might transform this into a true statement about a future free will event. At this point God would be unable to alter a single character in the statement.

If you are insisting that the statement be true, then you are correct at some point the statement might become false and it would be impossible for God to make the change and maintain the truthfulness of the statement. So what? There is no reason for the statement to be true in order for God to interact with the world (he could insert a false statement and still interact with the world). Certainly, not every statement can be truthfully inserted into the world, so why do you assume that statements containing predictions of future free events would be able to be truthfully inserted into the world?

-Bri
 
It seems that your objection now rests on inadequate or contradictory definitions and that P2, 3 and 4 do not follow from the definitions and premise.

My objection is that it may be impossible for God to insert a true statement predicting a free event because a statement inserted into the world predicting a free event by your own definition isn't always true.

It should be obvious that what the true statement is about does not affect the above argument.

Of course it does, because your argument assumes that God can insert a true statement predicting an unpredictable event. This is obviously impossible. The insertion of some true statements (particularly those that are always true or neither true nor false) would be possible, but the insertion of true statements that can be false would not be possible.

In fact you were yourself arguing earlier that some agent outside of the timeline could insert an infallible prediction about a free will event into the timeline.

This is a good question, and I'm not sure of the answer. But I do believe that if you substitute the programmer in the scenario for God, your proof will still result in a logical contradiction even though the programmer can in fact insert a true prediction of a free event into the simulated world. I suspect it has something to do with your definition of free will or free choice. Unless I misunderstand it, your definition of free will seems to preclude the programmer scenario by insisting that it must be possible for the agent to do otherwise at any time before the event occurs in the timeline. In the programmer scenario, the free choice is actually made before the timeline is instantiated, and is therefore technically timeless. By your definition, the programmer cannot insert an infallible statement into the world because the free event must be calculated at time t rather than before the timeline is instantiated. Therefore, there would be a chance that the statement could be untrue, precluding the programmer (or God) from having the ability to do as your proof assumes they can do. This is one of the reasons I believe your definition of free will to be inadequate.

That said, if we accept your definition, your proof makes an assumption that is not true -- that God necessarily has the ability to insert a true statement into the world predicting an (unpredictable) free event. If we reject your definition, your proof doesn't work at all.

As I say, if you ask for deductive argument you must address it as such.

I did ask that you repost it for ceo_esq, but I wasn't meaning to imply that I was an expert at such proofs by any means.

I do not claim to be a brilliant logician, or even an adequate one. But the validity of the argument does not depend upon the abilities of the proposer - it stands or falls on it's own merits.

I do not even claim that my argument is necessarily valid - it seems so to me. But I have not read any valid criticism of the argument yet.

But then ceo_esq has not responded yet. Hopefully he will.

Hopefully ceo_esq will respond since he may be able to more formally articulate problems with the proof better than I can (or have).

I've explained my main concern with the proof, which is that it makes an assumption -- namely that an omniscient God necessarily has the ability to insert a true statement into the world predicting a free event. I don't see any reason to believe this to necessarily be true, yet your proof depends on it.

-Bri
 

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