Forget for a moment any self-contradictions or inadequacies of definitions.
So when I ask you to substantiate an allegation you say "forget it, lets move on to something else"?
No, let's not forget it - let's get the requested substantiation first. Tell me exactly what is self-contradictory. Tell me which definitions are inadequate - do you mean ceo_esq's definition for omnipotence? Please supply a more adequate definition.
Please do not make these allegations again until you are prepared to back them up.
And when asked to back them up don't just say "Forget it" an move on.
You make the assumption in line 8 that it is possible for an omniscient God to insert a particular statement about a future choice into the world at time t.
No, P8 is merely a consequence of P2, P3 and P4 (as stated in the argument), so you should address those lines and say which is not a consequence of the premise and definitions.
It may very well be impossible (entirely beyond his powers) for him to insert such a statement into the world at time t.
But we have already established:
1. God knows the outcome of the action
2. God can make a true statement about the world in the world
3. Such a statement, if made, would not be self-contradictory
4. The statement, if made, would be true
If you disagree with the above please state which.
Therefore, line 9 which depends on line 8 is false, as is line 11 (your conclusion) which depends on line 9.
and line 8 depends on lines 2,3 and 4 which say that he can do exactly that. So if you are going to say a line is 'false' then please deal with those.
The proof is simply invalid and fails to prove its conclusion because it makes an assumption in line 8 that isn't proven. Line 2 (upon which line 8 depends) is unsubstantiated because you cannot prove that even if a God participates in the world in some way, that God must necessarily be able to participate in the world by inserting statements into the world.
Why do you always repeat previous points rather than addressing the answers I have already given.
The ability to do, or refrain from doing, just one thing allows you to insert any information at all into the world. So if God cannot put information into the world then God cannot do just one thing - any thing.
A statement is information, so the ability to insert information into the world implies the ability to make a statement in the world.
There is no empirical distinction between a true a false or a trivial statement. So if God can insert one he can insert any.
Even if God can insert statements into the world, there is nothing to say that he can insert infallibly true statements into the world.
You mean he might be able to insert false ones, but not true ones? And if it were true and God knew it to be so then it would be infallibly true.
Even if God can insert true statements into the world, there is nothing that indicates that he has the power to insert any true statement into the world.
But the difference between them is simply a configuration. If God can insert "01100110" then why can't he insert "01100101"?
Even if he can insert any true statement into the world, there is nothing to indicate that a statement about a future free choice could possibly be true when inserted into the world (in fact, you show just the opposite in your proof).
If the statement says "John turns left at t" and John does in fact turn left at t and God knows infallibly that John turns left at t then the statement is true. There is no circumstance at all in which the statement will be contradicted by the facts.
Of course any meaningful concept of a square circle always involves a logical contradiction! By placing an "unless" clause in your definition, you've left all points but four undefined.
Exactly! Precisely my point. Why did you think I put the definition in the first place? The fact that there are some point that don't cause a contradiction does not mean the definition is valid so long as there are points that do.
The fact that there are some actions by God that don't cause a contradiction would not make the definition valid as long as there are logically possible actions that do.
You've created a definition of four points, which doesn't adequately define a square circle at all (just as my definition of "frog" is left with a frog being an animal, which although true is an inadequate definition). A square circle is a logical contradiction, and such a shape simply cannot exist within our system of logic.
Precisely.
If you insist that an omnipotent God must be able to create a square circle (or to create a rock larger than he can lift), then would you really assume that he would be able to do so without changing logic?
No I wouldn't. If you insist that an omniscient God can participate in a universe that contained free will then would you really assume that he would be able to do so without changing logic?
To make such an assumption is to ask an illogical question, for which we cannot expect a logical answer. We've already discussed this at length previously in this thread.
I agree that it is illogical for an omniscient God to participate in a world that contains free will. I did not make the claim that he could.
The contradiction your proof is trying to clarify is not the same as the contradiction of terms you're using to do so. You're using one contradiction to clarify another. The contradiction the proof is trying to clarify is that an omniscient God cannot participate in a world with free will. To do so, you assume that such participation necessarily includes the ability to insert an infallibly true prediction about a future choice which you've defined as unpredictable. You might just have well assumed that God's participation necessarily includes the ability to insert an infallibly true statement reading "This statement is false."
False equivalence. "This statement is false" is self-contradictory and therefore could never be true. The statement in P8 is self-consistent and therefore could be true. And if you assume that God can observe the action itself then it is true.
Here's a similar "proof" that an omnipotent being cannot exist, using similar contradictions:
Well if you are saying this proof is equivalent to mine then one of my definitions must be self-contradictory.
Please substantiate this by pointing out which one of my definitions is self-contradictory and providing a more suitable defintion.
Therefore, the conclusion of the proof is incorrect unless you can also prove that God cannot insert a statement reading "Go Colts!" into a world with a free agent.
All you are doing is pointing out the points on the square that might be consistent with the definition of a circle.
If God can say "Go Colts!" Could God swap to letters and say "Go Clots!"?
Or change a letter and say "Ho Clots!"
Or change another letter and say "Hi Clots!"
Or add a punctuation mark and say "Hi, Clots!"
And at some point in this process there will be some swap, change, insertion or deletion that might transform this into a true statement about a future free will event. At this point God would be unable to alter a single character in the statement.
For example God can say without any contradiction to free will:
"John, turn left at time t"
but not:
"John turns left at time t"
So God cannot remove a comma and add and 's'?