The copy will feel the same. So where's the problem?
Nick
Assuming some instinct for 'self'-preservation, a materially identical copy will still be functionally distinct from the original: it will value its own life more than the original's (just as the original will value its own life more than the copy's).
Say we create Nick228, a materially identical copy of Nick 227, and express its values as functions; then necessarily:
for Nick228: life(Nick228) > life(Nick227);
for Nick227: life(Nick227) > life(Nick228).
That is, "Nick227" as an input yields a different output for each than "Nick228", so they are functionally distinct.
We might try to get around this by engineering you to be indifferent to your self-preservation, I suppose, so that for Nick227 or Nick228: life(Nick227) = life(Nick228); however, we still get a difference in reference when we request input for either Nick's behavior functions; that is, for Nick227: decision(Nick227) := (reason[Nick227], emotion[Nick227], memory[Nick227], instinct[Nick227], etc[Nick227]), and the same for the copy; the system id, the source of the input to the various functions which input to the decision function, has changed, even if we assume the content of the input is identical.
If we label the copy "Nick227", so that it is functionally identical to the original, then neither is able to distinguish between itself and the other Nick227, and we get some very strange behavior: either is as likely to sample its double's inputs for decision-making as its own (Nick227 taps Nick227 on the shoulder and asks, "hey, how anxious am I to go for a swim?") We then run up against the limits of language: are there enough words to precisely communicate rational, emotional, mnemonic, instinctive, 'etc' content between Nicks. In this absurd case, it seems that even though materially and functionally equivalent, the two Nick227's will be behaviorally different (as soon as one is randomized to access an internal input and the other has to request an approximate communication of that same internal input; indeed, just in the asking, the second has already diverged from the first).
... So, technically speaking, the thing that is lost is the local expression of values that constitutes a large part of "who I am" despite the fact that an identical set of the same values will appear over there. That new person 'over there' will be identical to me for all intents and purposes, but it still won't be me because "I" cannot feel what "that other I" feels, even if it is exactly the same thing.
More or less what I'm trying to say above, except maybe not for all "intents and purposes" (certainly not for all inputs and functions). The fact that each "I" has a different reference, labels a different thing, makes them behaviorally distinct, unique beings, so something is lost when one is replaced by the other.
Anyway, all that's a long-winded, kludgy way to get around whatever technical issues subjectivity and its normal descriptions are thought to present for "materialism".
