Life or no-life after death - Is it an Objective reality?

When you use the term "my brain" or "my body", to whom do you refer? If Belz is the owner of Belz's body and Belz's brain then where is this owner? It is a virtual reference point, nothing more. It has no physical existence. But the illusion of it existing serves to help the mass of different modules that comprise our body and brain to function together.
I refer to the process.
Are you claiming a process does not exist?
Neither of which have any physical existence. Are two non-existing virtual points different? I don't think so.
A process exist.
 
Each brain will create its own self.
Okay.
If thinking stops but sensory consciousness remains there is no longer any "me that experiences." But you're not dead.
Nope. The process is lost and therefore "the self" is dead.
I consider vegetative or very brain damaged people dead.
 
:rolleyes: I really have no love for philosophical nonsense.

What you dismiss as philosophical nonsense is the whole point. What would make the original feel he was the original and not the copy? What would make the copy feel he was the copy? How could anyone tell just by examining them? If there's no difference, there's no difference.

If you get into a teleporter, and the teleporter half-fails, creating a duplicate without destroying you, do you share the copy's thoughts and feelings ? And, if not, why do you seem to assume that the copy really is the same person ?

At the instant the copy was made, they're the identical person. That's the definition of "copy." From that point on, their experiences diverge, just like everyone constantly changes based on their experiences from any instant in time, onward.

A year later, the original is no more the same person he was a year ago, than the copy is. If you disagree with that, then we have a fundamental disagreement about the definition of the "same."

Now assume the teleporter worked. Again, the copy is not the same object. Sure enough, from the perspective of everybody except the original, nothing has changed. But, specifically from the POV of the original, everything has changed, since it has ceased to exist.

Yet this happens to everyone every day, and they don't seem to feel that it destroys their self, as long as they seem physically somewhat similar to what they were before and have the same memories, which the copy would. In fact, people even cope with physical changes or minor memory loss with a sense of self intact, up to a point.

Let's say you had a choice:

The teleporter could function and produce a perfect copy of "you" (after destroying the original "you"), with all your memories in tact

Or the teleporter could malfunction and instead of making a copy of you and destroying the original, it would keep the original "you" alive, but wipe out all your memories, replace them with someone else's and make "you" look entirely different, different gender, different race, etc.

Which would seem closer to the death of what was "you"? Which would you prefer?
 
When you use the term "my brain" or "my body", to whom do you refer? If Belz is the owner of Belz's body and Belz's brain then where is this owner? It is a virtual reference point, nothing more. It has no physical existence. But the illusion of it existing serves to help the mass of different modules that comprise our body and brain to function together.

You speak of this as though it was entirely non-existent. Whence does this illusion come from if not some reality ?

Neither of which have any physical existence. Are two non-existing virtual points different? I don't think so.

Superman and Batman are different, and yet non existent. :D

I see you STILL haven't adressed the malfunctioning teleporter scenario. What is it about that scenario that is so frightening to you ?
 
I refer to the process.
Are you claiming a process does not exist?
A process exist.

Process exists for sure. But with the self that experiences the process surrounds a virtual centre, creating the sense of it existing.

Thinking is the process that establishes the sense of mental self. It seems as though there is someone who hears the thoughts and that this person is Nick. This is all very well and fine. But when this becomes one stage extended into "I am experiencing the computer monitor" then now all we have in reality are thoughts. There is no I that is actually experiencing. It is just a useful story. Thus, when you push the Teleport button, it for sure seems as though this experiencing I is going to die, but in actuality it does not exist anyway!

Nick
 
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Nope. The process is lost and therefore "the self" is dead.
I consider vegetative or very brain damaged people dead.

You would consider someone dead if they have full sensory consciousness, bodily sensations, feelings, and disidentified thoughts? Such a person has no sense of an experiencing self.

Nick
 
Yes, PRECISELY. So if the original dies, his "self" dissapears. "My" illusion of self dissapears. From my POV, I no longer exist.

The point is that this experiencing selfhood is only constructed in the moment anyway. Yet it appears to be persisting. It appears as though there is a self that experiences, and that it has been the same self experiencing since birth. But the reality, according to materialism, is that only the sense of this experiencing self actually exists and even this is anyway utterly transitory.

Nick
 
...the universe then becomes what it was destined to be, which is the RESURRECTION OF ZEUS with the lower body of Jesus fused at the spine with Kali the Destroyer, and this shall be the hermaphrodite empress of the ultra moment !

Yea, I'm cool with that.
 
Process exists for sure. But with the self that experiences the process surrounds a virtual centre, creating the sense of it existing.
Nope, unless you consider soccer/my Norton anti-virus scanning engine(or any other process), the process that surrounds kicking a ball with some rules/or scanning computer programs(or any processes), creating a sense of it existing.
Thinking is the process that establishes the sense of mental self. It seems as though there is someone who hears the thoughts and that this person is Nick. This is all very well and fine. But when this becomes one stage extended into "I am experiencing the computer monitor" then now all we have in reality are thoughts. There is no I that is actually experiencing. It is just a useful story. Thus, when you push the Teleport button, it for sure seems as though this experiencing I is going to die, but in actuality it does not exist anyway!
Nope. As I've stated already. The process is the self and I consider this actually existing.
Just because of it is a virtual illusion does not negate the existence of the process which is the illusion of the I itself. That's the equivalent of claiming that any self-monitoring computer program does not exist because it does not exist as a specific "thing" but as a process in the the computer's CPU.

You would consider someone dead if they have full sensory consciousness, bodily sensations, feelings, and disidentified thoughts? Such a person has no sense of an experiencing self.
Did you just move the goal post again?
Please restate your ORIGINAL claim.
 
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Yea, I'm cool with that.

More and more I am as well. Which is why I continue to keep the wall in the basement wet with the blood of my neighborhood's dogs, cats, raccoons, possums, and skunks. Never weasels or squirrels though, never.
Once the wall is dry, the things from beyond the sphere will reach inside of our universe and destroy the destiny of the ultra moment.
 
The point is that this experiencing selfhood is only constructed in the moment anyway. Yet it appears to be persisting. It appears as though there is a self that experiences, and that it has been the same self experiencing since birth. But the reality, according to materialism, is that only the sense of this experiencing self actually exists and even this is anyway utterly transitory.

That I can agree to. However the is a semi-continuity of consciousness, in the sense that the state of the organism producing it only changes slightly from one moment to the next. Exterminating the organism, whether or not you create a copy, exterminates that consciousness as well. It doesn't magically transfer to the copy.
 
The copy will feel the same. So where's the problem?

Nick

Assuming some instinct for 'self'-preservation, a materially identical copy will still be functionally distinct from the original: it will value its own life more than the original's (just as the original will value its own life more than the copy's).

Say we create Nick228, a materially identical copy of Nick 227, and express its values as functions; then necessarily:

for Nick228: life(Nick228) > life(Nick227);
for Nick227: life(Nick227) > life(Nick228).

That is, "Nick227" as an input yields a different output for each than "Nick228", so they are functionally distinct.

We might try to get around this by engineering you to be indifferent to your self-preservation, I suppose, so that for Nick227 or Nick228: life(Nick227) = life(Nick228); however, we still get a difference in reference when we request input for either Nick's behavior functions; that is, for Nick227: decision(Nick227) := (reason[Nick227], emotion[Nick227], memory[Nick227], instinct[Nick227], etc[Nick227]), and the same for the copy; the system id, the source of the input to the various functions which input to the decision function, has changed, even if we assume the content of the input is identical.

If we label the copy "Nick227", so that it is functionally identical to the original, then neither is able to distinguish between itself and the other Nick227, and we get some very strange behavior: either is as likely to sample its double's inputs for decision-making as its own (Nick227 taps Nick227 on the shoulder and asks, "hey, how anxious am I to go for a swim?") We then run up against the limits of language: are there enough words to precisely communicate rational, emotional, mnemonic, instinctive, 'etc' content between Nicks. In this absurd case, it seems that even though materially and functionally equivalent, the two Nick227's will be behaviorally different (as soon as one is randomized to access an internal input and the other has to request an approximate communication of that same internal input; indeed, just in the asking, the second has already diverged from the first).

... So, technically speaking, the thing that is lost is the local expression of values that constitutes a large part of "who I am" despite the fact that an identical set of the same values will appear over there. That new person 'over there' will be identical to me for all intents and purposes, but it still won't be me because "I" cannot feel what "that other I" feels, even if it is exactly the same thing.

More or less what I'm trying to say above, except maybe not for all "intents and purposes" (certainly not for all inputs and functions). The fact that each "I" has a different reference, labels a different thing, makes them behaviorally distinct, unique beings, so something is lost when one is replaced by the other.

Anyway, all that's a long-winded, kludgy way to get around whatever technical issues subjectivity and its normal descriptions are thought to present for "materialism". :relieved:
 
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That I can agree to. However the is a semi-continuity of consciousness, in the sense that the state of the organism producing it only changes slightly from one moment to the next. Exterminating the organism, whether or not you create a copy, exterminates that consciousness as well. It doesn't magically transfer to the copy.

No, for sure, it doesn't magically transfer. New neurons, configured the same, create a copy. But the core of the Teleporter argument is the same as the core of the so-called Hard Problem**. Because it appears that there is someone that experiences, it seems that something tangible must be lost when Body1 is replaced by Body2.

Body1 believes itself to be a self experiencing a world and that if the button is pushed then this experiencing self will die. But of course there is actually not an experiencing self in the first place, so it cannot die. It is illusory. Just a very convincing illusion!

This is no doubt why, when the Enterprise crew teleported to a planet, they seemed to fade out of the deck and fade in to the new location. Rather than Mr Scott sending copies off and then shooting the originals with his phaser! Viewers accepted teleportation as a nifty idea, because of how it was presented.

Nick

** - Of course, the Teletransporter scenario (as Parfit originally titled it) hits nearer to home than Chalmers' Hard Problem, which is why many people who refute the Hard Problem still struggle with the Teletransporter. The latter is much more in your face.
 
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Nope, unless you consider soccer/my Norton anti-virus scanning engine(or any other process), the process that surrounds kicking a ball with some rules/or scanning computer programs(or any processes), creating a sense of it existing.

I don't see these as related examples. I don't think you need to look at analogies really, because the original is very simple here. Mental selfhood (the self that experiences) is created by thinking. Thinking creates the sense of someone that is doing the thinking. Agreed? No problem. But as I've already mentioned, when this is then extended into a "someone that is experiencing" we have moved onto a purely conceptual level. Brains do not experience. They process. Nothing in the brain is experiencing. Agreed? Yet, we say that the self experiences. All that is actually happening is that thinking is constructing a story about an experiencing self - an I - and its interactions with what is going on around "it."

There is not actually an experiencing self, merely a story about one. And this will of course be replicated.


Nope. As I've stated already. The process is the self and I consider this actually existing.
Just because of it is a virtual illusion does not negate the existence of the process which is the illusion of the I itself. That's the equivalent of claiming that any self-monitoring computer program does not exist because it does not exist as a specific "thing" but as a process in the the computer's CPU.

Only if you say that the program is experiencing.


Did you just move the goal post again?
Please restate your ORIGINAL claim.

Well, it should be further up the page.

Nick
 
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But the core of the Teleporter argument is the same as the core of the so-called Hard Problem**. Because it appears that there is someone that experiences, it seems that something tangible must be lost when Body1 is replaced by Body2.

I don't see how the teleporter scenario relates to the "hard problem" nonsense. If you make a copy of an apple it's still a distinct object, and if the appels happen to be self-aware, the original's awareness ceases to function when you kill that apple.

Body1 believes itself to be a self experiencing a world and that if the button is pushed then this experiencing self will die. But of course there is actually not an experiencing self in the first place, so it cannot die. It is illusory. Just a very convincing illusion!

That changes nothing. That particular illusion ceases to function. I like my "illusion of self", whatever you call it.
 
More and more I am as well. Which is why I continue to keep the wall in the basement wet with the blood of my neighborhood's dogs, cats, raccoons, possums, and skunks. Never weasels or squirrels though, never.
Once the wall is dry, the things from beyond the sphere will reach inside of our universe and destroy the destiny of the ultra moment.

Hey, that's no more retarded then say, Christianity. :cool:
 
(shakes crystal ball)

I knew this was going to happen... I just KNEW it...

This has turned into another one of those consciousness threads. Oh, yes it has. It was inevitable. Like zombies, they just keep coming back.
 
It's than, not then.
But hey, I wouldn't want to interrupt the flow of your accusations of retardation. ;)

Zoinks. :covereyes

nothing kills a condescending attitude quicker *than* being proven retarded.
 

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