Life or no-life after death - Is it an Objective reality?

(shakes crystal ball)

I knew this was going to happen... I just KNEW it...

This has turned into another one of those consciousness threads. Oh, yes it has. It was inevitable. Like zombies, they just keep coming back.


You're conscious that this is your first post this month(?) that hasn't mentioned a certain bad boy ex-bishop (retd) whose name almost rhymes with Shawn Jellybean Kong? :scarper:--> this way to Maia's ignore list ;)
 
You're conscious that this is your first post this month(?) that hasn't mentioned a certain bad boy ex-bishop (retd) whose name almost rhymes with Shawn Jellybean Kong? :scarper:--> this way to Maia's ignore list ;)

Oh no it isn't. If you head on over to the "which afterlife would appeal to you" thread... I had fun with Photoshop and Chapter 35 today. No JSS involved.

I like the smilie. If I just start typing in random words and surround them with ::, will mysterious smilies start popping up? Will they gain consciousness? Will they all have weird hair, which seems to be a prerequisite for philosophers these days? :santa claus:

:flibbertigibet:

:easter bunny:

I'm not sure if that worked...
 
I don't see how the teleporter scenario relates to the "hard problem" nonsense.

They are both basically about subjectivity. The HP defendant cannot accept that the richness of the world they believe they are experiencing can be created by the brain. The Teleporter idea pushes the materialist to really drop subjectivity as a special phenomenom.

And what you see is that there are a lot of materialists who refute the HP, yet who also say they wouldn't push the teleport button. These guys are happy to apply scientific investigation to the world they perceive outside, but far less willing to do the same to what they consider to be themselves.

I like my "illusion of self"

That "I" is the illusion of self.

Nick
 
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Oh no it isn't. If you head on over to the "which afterlife would appeal to you" thread... I had fun with Photoshop and Chapter 35 today. No JSS involved.

I like the smilie. If I just start typing in random words and surround them with ::, will mysterious smilies start popping up? Will they gain consciousness? Will they all have weird hair, which seems to be a prerequisite for philosophers these days? :santa claus:

:flibbertigibet:

:easter bunny:

I'm not sure if that worked...



:santa4:

.
:troll
.....
:bunpan

(thus far we have covered 3 inevitabilities in R&P: i) all threads, given sufficient posts, become consciousness threads; ii) Maia, unless she's sufficiently diverted by Photoshop, must mention JSSpong; iii) blobru, whether he's been sufficiently medicated or not, will insist on cluttering up your screen with random smilies of dubious relevance to whatever the heck he's yammering on about. Next up: yrreg, atheism, & penises... :odie:)
 
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I love how my theoretical discussion of Angels is an 'insult to intelligence!', but Gene Roddenberry's imaginary 'matter transporter' is not an insult.

Can't wait to see the justification as to why I'm wrong.
 
I love how my theoretical discussion of Angels is an 'insult to intelligence!', but Gene Roddenberry's imaginary 'matter transporter' is not an insult.

Can't wait to see the justification as to why I'm wrong.

They deny because they haven't made a connection to the father yet.
They have never experienced any evidence for God being real.
Science will lose it's value for them when they are on their death beds, that's how seared their hearts are.
Anything to do with spiritualism will be an insult to their intelligence.
 
I love how my theoretical discussion of Angels is an 'insult to intelligence!', but Gene Roddenberry's imaginary 'matter transporter' is not an insult.

Can't wait to see the justification as to why I'm wrong.

I'm not sure I understand what you meant to say about angels. Could you please clarify? I think you might have a point I agree with here.
 
I love how my theoretical discussion of Angels is an 'insult to intelligence!', but Gene Roddenberry's imaginary 'matter transporter' is not an insult.

Can't wait to see the justification as to why I'm wrong.

Angels are a notion which many skeptics find unlikely.

The Star Trek Transporter was the inspiration for an enduring thought experiment created by philosopher Derek Parfit in the 1980s.

It is not so much that you are wrong, rather that you are failing IMO to appreciate the context differences.

Nick
 
They deny because they haven't made a connection to the father yet.
They have never experienced any evidence for God being real.
Science will lose it's value for them when they are on their death beds, that's how seared their hearts are.
Anything to do with spiritualism will be an insult to their intelligence.

Actually materialism points to something far deeper than God.

Someone who believes in connecting to "the father" is still demonstrably locked in the illusion of separation. They believe that there really is a personal mental self and that this self has somehow become "disconnnected" from some form of "source" - God, the Father, Brahman, whatever. Thus, they imagine, what is needed is to reconnect this so-called personal self to its source.

But, if you truly grasp the mettle of materialism then it points you directly the true nature of the self and thus beyond this whole notion of connection and disconnection.

Nick
 
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Hey Nick:
Could you try to summarize what the arguments are because I've actually lost track of the argument?..I find myself arguing just because I like to argue.
 
Hey Nick:
Could you try to summarize what the arguments are because I've actually lost track of the argument?..I find myself arguing just because I like to argue.

Sure, I find it creates a certain feeling in the body. Can get quite addictive! But my point was that a lot of people profess materialism yet say they would not push the teleport button. For me this indicates that despite their professed belief they still imagine somehow that materialism doesn't apply to them (ie their inner world of "self")!

Personally, I'm fine to travel as long as I get to kind of fade out of one place and fade into the next, like in the TV series. At least that way it look continuous from the outside. I know it's bs but I'm only human.

Nick
 
The Teleporter idea pushes the materialist to really drop subjectivity as a special phenomenom.

I never said it was special. I claimed it was distinct from an identical subjectivity.

And what you see is that there are a lot of materialists who refute the HP, yet who also say they wouldn't push the teleport button.

There is no contradiction there.

That "I" is the illusion of self.

It likes itself, then. Sounds REAL to me.
 
I never said it was special. I claimed it was distinct from an identical subjectivity.

What's creates the confusion around subjectivity, for HPC upholders or Teleport refusers, is that it invariably includes the notion of an experiencing or observing self. This simply does not exist. Once this illusory experiencing self is understood for what it is then subjectivity loses it's quality of being some kind of special thing.

If Belz was replaced with Belz2 the subjectivity would be identical, assuming #2 could occupy the same space as #1. Subjectively there would be no difference. The hardware that is creating the subjectivity would have changed but the subjective state itself would be identical. To believe otherwise is actually to uphold the HPC.


There is no contradiction there.

There's a complete contradiction. If you refute the HPC then logically you shouldn't have a problem with pushing the Teleport button. Otherwise you are talking the talk but not walking the walk.

Nick
 
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What's creates the confusion around subjectivity, for HPC upholders or Teleport refusers, is that it invariably includes the notion of an experiencing or observing self. This simply does not exist. Once this illusory experiencing self is understood for what it is then subjectivity loses it's quality of being some kind of special thing.

AGAIN, I never said it was special.

If Belz was replaced with Belz2 the subjectivity would be identical, assuming #2 could occupy the same space as #1. Subjectively there would be no difference. The hardware that is creating the subjectivity would have changed but the subjective state itself would be identical. To believe otherwise is actually to uphold the HPC.

No, it isn't HPC. It's simple logic. Yes, the thing would be identical: but DISTINCT. There is no apparent continuity of "self" between the two subjects, like there is with the single subject. The original ceases to exist, and so does its sense of self, illusory or not. Why is that so hard to understand ?

There's a complete contradiction. If you refute the HPC then logically you shouldn't have a problem with pushing the Teleport button. Otherwise you are talking the talk but not walking the walk.

I think you're slightly confused. In your quest to make consciousness un-special, you seem to have forgotten that it exists.
 
No, it isn't HPC. It's simple logic. Yes, the thing would be identical: but DISTINCT. There is no apparent continuity of "self" between the two subjects, like there is with the single subject.

Yes there is. Because there is not actually a persisting self, merely the sense of there being one, so Belz#2 will believe that he had existed for all the years that Belz#1 actually existed in his place. The subjectivity is identical. There is nothing to distinguish it from Belz#1's subjectivity.

Selfhood is not a persisting property. It emerges from other conscious processing in the moment. It might very much seem as though life is happening to someone, but in terms of brain function this is simply not the case.

Thus, for someone to say that they refute the HPC, but still refuse to push the Teleport button is to create a logical inconsistency.

Nick
 
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Nick might correct me if I’m interpreting him wrong, but I think it’s possible to clarify the argument by exchanging “subjectivity” or “self” with a color (blue, if you like). Thus, even though there would be two examples, there would only be a distinction in terms of numbers, not in terms of color. They would both be blue, without a distinction. Hence there would be the same “subjectivity” or “self”, regardless of there being two of them (“subjectivity” or “self” meaning the same thing as the color blue in this case).

I.e., you could not only be created in one of them (the original vs the copy); you would be created in both of them. “I” do not have a body; “I” is created in the body.

It sounds like a contradiction at first glance (how can “I” be two?). But then again, materialism tells us that “I” is ultimately only a process like any other (not a substantive or an owner). If the processes are identical, they are the same, even when talking from a subjective point of view; they create the same subjectivity and the same sense of self, only in different places. The places are different, but the “I” is the same.

The distinction is only numerical (thus abstract), not subjective (phenomenal).
 
Nick might correct me if I’m interpreting him wrong, but I think it’s possible to clarify the argument by exchanging “subjectivity” or “self” with a color (blue, if you like). Thus, even though there would be two examples, there would only be a distinction in terms of numbers, not in terms of color. They would both be blue, without a distinction. Hence there would be the same “subjectivity” or “self”, regardless of there being two of them (“subjectivity” or “self” meaning the same thing as the color blue in this case).

I.e., you could not only be created in one of them (the original vs the copy); you would be created in both of them. “I” do not have a body; “I” is created in the body.

It sounds like a contradiction at first glance (how can “I” be two?). But then again, materialism tells us that “I” is ultimately only a process like any other (not a substantive or an owner). If the processes are identical, they are the same, even when talking from a subjective point of view; they create the same subjectivity and the same sense of self, only in different places. The places are different, but the “I” is the same.

The distinction is only numerical (thus abstract), not subjective (phenomenal).

Yes, sounds right. Thanks. Nick
 
It sounds like a contradiction at first glance (how can “I” be two?). But then again, materialism tells us that “I” is ultimately only a process like any other (not a substantive or an owner). If the processes are identical, they are the same, even when talking from a subjective point of view; they create the same subjectivity and the same sense of self, only in different places. The places are different, but the “I” is the same.

But they're not identical. The transporting person has a set of experiences that lead up to a certain point and then cease. The transported man has a set of experiences that go up to that same point, and then continue.

The big problem here is some form of philosophical equivocation. On one hand, we want to treat the two (original and copy) as distinct beings. On the other hand, some want to treat them as identical. Pick one and stick with it.
 
Yes there is.

So it's your opinion that stepping into the teleporter will teleport my consciousness as well ?

Well, it's time for that question again: what is the teleporter malfunctions, doesn't destroy the original body, and we end up with TWO Belzes ? Am I at two places at once ? Do I see and feel what both bodies see and feel ?

Let's see if you're honest enough to adress that.

Because there is not actually a persisting self, merely the sense of there being one, so Belz#2 will believe that he had existed for all the years that Belz#1 actually existed in his place. The subjectivity is identical. There is nothing to distinguish it from Belz#1's subjectivity.

Belz1 can distinguish: he's no longer alive.

Selfhood is not a persisting property. It emerges from other conscious processing in the moment. It might very much seem as though life is happening to someone, but in terms of brain function this is simply not the case.

That is a claim, not a fact.

Thus, for someone to say that they refute the HPC, but still refuse to push the Teleport button is to create a logical inconsistency.

It, it isn't. Stop claiming that.
 

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