Nick might correct me if I’m interpreting him wrong, but I think it’s possible to clarify the argument by exchanging “subjectivity” or “self” with a color (blue, if you like). Thus, even though there would be two examples, there would only be a distinction in terms of numbers, not in terms of color. They would both be blue, without a distinction. Hence there would be the same “subjectivity” or “self”, regardless of there being two of them (“subjectivity” or “self” meaning the same thing as the color blue in this case).
I.e., you could not only be created in one of them (the original vs the copy); you would be created in both of them. “I” do not have a body; “I” is created in the body.
It sounds like a contradiction at first glance (how can “I” be two?). But then again, materialism tells us that “I” is ultimately only a process like any other (not a substantive or an owner). If the processes are identical, they are the same, even when talking from a subjective point of view; they create the same subjectivity and the same sense of self, only in different places. The places are different, but the “I” is the same.
The distinction is only numerical (thus abstract), not subjective (phenomenal).