Life or no-life after death - Is it an Objective reality?

But they're not identical. The transporting person has a set of experiences that lead up to a certain point and then cease. The transported man has a set of experiences that go up to that same point, and then continue.

From a physical point of view they would be identical. To make it two, you have to apply an outside perspective. But from a personal perspective nothing but a change in scenery would have happened. The continuation of experiences would not make a difference to the process of subjective identity.

The big problem here is some form of philosophical equivocation. On one hand, we want to treat the two (original and copy) as distinct beings. On the other hand, some want to treat them as identical. Pick one and stick with it.

Seems that way. The problem seems to relate to our tendency to mix 1st and 3rd person perspectives all the time?
 
Belz… said:
Well, it's time for that question again: what is the teleporter malfunctions, doesn't destroy the original body, and we end up with TWO Belzes ? Am I at two places at once ? Do I see and feel what both bodies see and feel ?

I believe you (“I”) would be created in both bodies (as two identical physical processes). Precisely in the same way as two engines alike would create combustion alike (combustion here being analogous to subjectivity). That is, if we consider subjectivity to be a physical process without any inherent specialness.

Everything that the bodies do would be the same, including the creation of a process called “I” (or “you”, “seeing” and “feeling”).

Nick said:
Selfhood is not a persisting property. It emerges from other conscious processing in the moment. It might very much seem as though life is happening to someone, but in terms of brain function this is simply not the case.
Belz… said:
That is a claim, not a fact.

How could selfhood be a persisting property if it’s ultimately a physical process? I mean, surely selfhood disappears when the engine (body) is turned off. Should the body somehow later be tuned on again, selfhood would reappear. At least that’s my interpretation of a strict material/physical inference. Why does the number of bodies make a difference if it’s all physical and happening in physical systems alike?
 
So it's your opinion that stepping into the teleporter will teleport my consciousness as well ?

It's my opinion that your statement above demonstrates that actually you are still upholding the HPC. There is no "my consciousness" in physical reality. Selfhood ("my") is just an aspect of consciousness.

Well, it's time for that question again: what is the teleporter malfunctions, doesn't destroy the original body, and we end up with TWO Belzes ? Am I at two places at once ? Do I see and feel what both bodies see and feel ?

Again, your question betrays your true alliances, Belz. You're lucky the Materialist Inquisition isn't in town or you would be roasting merrily by now! In strict physical terms there is not a self which is experiencing, and so all your question demonstrates is that you still worship Sgr Chalmers. Will you not finally admit your heresy? Recant, there is still time!

Nick
 
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Since when did materialism deny consciousness?

It doesn't. It denies a persisting self. Thus the statement "my consciousness" is not viable, in physical terms. It's just a colloquialism. There is not in actuality a self which experiences. For me, that's a genuine materialist perspective.

Nick
 
I'm honestly curious, here.

Are you saying that, as a materialist, I have no way of distinguishing my experiences, from the experiences of another?
 
I'm honestly curious, here.

Are you saying that, as a materialist, I have no way of distinguishing my experiences, from the experiences of another?

I'm saying that, as an materialist, there is not in reality a self which experiences. Mental selfhood emerges from aspects of conscious processing, namely thinking, and purports to be a constant recipient of experience. But it is actually just a fleeting, emergent construct.

Nick
 
Belz1 can distinguish: he's no longer alive.

So... dead people are conscious now?

That is a claim, not a fact.

It is a position consistent with materialism, and viable from what we understand about the brain.

It, it isn't. Stop claiming that.

But you are demonstrating it repeatedly. On the one hand you claim there is no HPC, on the other you repeatedly make statements which confirm that you still believe that there is some self experiencing a subjective state.

Nick
 
It's my opinion that your statement above demonstrates that actually you are still upholding the HPC. There is no "my consciousness" in physical reality. Selfhood ("my") is just an aspect of consciousness.

Nick, asserting that consciousness exists is not the same thing as supporting the HPC. You don't seem to be aware of that.

Again, your question betrays your true alliances, Belz.

Spoken like a true theist. "You don't REALLY not believe."

Your utter refusal to adress my question shows how affraid you are of the answer. I can only surmise that you know that you are incorrect, then, like everybody who's ever been asked that question.
 
So... dead people are conscious now?

No and that's precisely the point. Do you intentionally misread my posts ? If so then please say so, that I may avoid you in the forseeable future.

It is a position consistent with materialism, and viable from what we understand about the brain.

Perhaps. But it doesn't change the fact that, illusion or not, the specific consciousness that is Belz1 no longer exists after Belz1 is destroyed by the machine. Belz2 has an identical consciousness, but no the same; if only because its coordinates are entirely different. The very fact that the malfunctioning teleporter scenario doesn't lead to a SHARED consciousness shows that.

But you are demonstrating it repeatedly.

No, that is YOUR interpretation of my position, which ignores the things I am actually saying. Stop that.
 
Nick, asserting that consciousness exists is not the same thing as supporting the HPC. You don't seem to be aware of that.

It is not directly to do with consciousness. It is about whether a persisting self exists. Under materialism it does not.


Your utter refusal to adress my question shows how affraid you are of the answer. I can only surmise that you know that you are incorrect, then, like everybody who's ever been asked that question.

Belz, your question is invalid under materialism. For me, it just demonstrates that you don't actually understand a materialist perspective on consciousness. You asked...

Belz said:
what is the teleporter malfunctions, doesn't destroy the original body, and we end up with TWO Belzes ? Am I at two places at once ? Do I see and feel what both bodies see and feel ?

Under materialism there is not an "I" which sees and feels. It is illusory.

In the above scenario there will be two Belzes, each will have it's own sense of self. Each Belz brain will construct its own illusory sense of being someone who sees and feels.

Nick
 
It is not directly to do with consciousness. It is about whether a persisting self exists. Under materialism it does not.

So you keep claiming.

Belz, your question is invalid under materialism.

Who cares ? Materialism, Shmaterialism.

For me, it just demonstrates that you don't actually understand a materialist perspective on consciousness.

Again, don't care.

Under materialism there is not an "I" which sees and feels. It is illusory.

That's BS. Materialism doesn't deny the existence of a process that produces what we call consciousness, and doesn't deny that each consciousness is distinct from the others.

In the above scenario there will be two Belzes, each will have it's own sense of self. Each Belz brain will construct its own illusory sense of being someone who sees and feels.

And therefore the destruction of Belz1 results in precisely the same end as if Belz2 had not been created.
 
That's BS. Materialism doesn't deny the existence of a process that produces what we call consciousness, and doesn't deny that each consciousness is distinct from the others.
Basically. All Nick has done with claim by fiat that a process, which we call consciousness, is an illusion and therefore does not exist.
 
This is an example of the dishonest rhetorics that people like Nick use:

For sure there's a desire not to die. It's scary. But materialist logic dictates that the fear is invalid, because nothing is lost if you are replaced by the copy. Can you state what you believe would be lost?

Nick

The original.

This is what concerns you? Not that you would die? Nick



You didn't ask Paximperium "what concerns him". You asked him to state what he believes would be lost, which he answered.

Dishonesty is the main ingredient for Sophistry.
 
So you keep claiming.

Who cares ? Materialism, Shmaterialism.

Again, don't care.

Why not just put your hands over your eyes and refuse to look? That would at least be more honest.

That's BS. Materialism doesn't deny the existence of a process that produces what we call consciousness, and doesn't deny that each consciousness is distinct from the others.

No, it doesn't. That's correct. But it does deny that there is a self which experiences this consciousness. Therefore the question you keep asking is invalid under materialism.

You seem to think that if the teletransporter malfunctioned and we ended up with 2 Belzes that somehow "you" would be receiving inputs from two separate sensory systems. But this cannot happen according to materialism, because the whole notion of there being a self which could do such a thing is illusory.

Nick
 
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Basically. All Nick has done with claim by fiat that a process, which we call consciousness, is an illusion and therefore does not exist.

No. I am not saying that at all. Consciousness emerges from brain activity. Selfhood, the kind of self which appears to experience, emerges from aspects of this consciousness and is not what it appears to be. This means that, under materialism, you cannot believe that something subjective would be lost if you push the teleport button. The subjectivity, given identical location, is identical - original to copy. Absolutely nothing, subjectively, is lost.

As writers like Blackmore and Parfit have pointed out, if you uphold materialist views on consciousness you must push the teleport button. If you don't then you're creating a logical inconsistency. You're effectively saying that materialism applies to the world outside... but not to you!

Nick
 
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This is an example of the dishonest rhetorics that people like Nick use:

You didn't ask Paximperium "what concerns him". You asked him to state what he believes would be lost, which he answered.

Dishonesty is the main ingredient for Sophistry.

Well, I think dishonesty is a bit strong. He answered a question, fair enough, but I felt he was avoiding the issue. Perhaps I was wrong. I can't fully recall now.

I'm losing the will to live.

Well, maybe it comforts you to realise that there isn't really a you that is living!

All I'm doing here is trying to clear out a few of the pseudo-materialist memeplexes that so infest the JREF. I mean the kind of nonsensical positions some people take really demonstrate just how little they actually understand about materialism.

Nick
 
Well, I think dishonesty is a bit strong. He answered a question, fair enough, but I felt he was avoiding the issue. Perhaps I was wrong. I can't fully recall now.

Nick

Fair enough. On a more polite tone: There is no contradiction. Materialism accepts that there are feelings and that they are irrational. Therefore, a materialist can be as sure as hell that his copy will be exactly as him, but he still accepts he has feelings and doesn't want to die. No contradiction: Feelings are real and they're not precisely rational. This statement is supported by materialism in the same way that the "copies" hypothesis is accepted.

Now, that aside, if we were actually talking about a hypothetical scenario in which, for some reason, lets say I had to save my mother's life and the only way to do that was accept letting some people kill me, who were reminding me that "It's ok, because your copy will have the exact same memories", then it would still be very hard for me, emotionally, to cope with letting them kill me (and I would hope it would be at least a fast, painless way), but I would be more inclined to do so, because there was a very powerful and critical cause behind it (To save my mother's life).

But to do that out of merely proving that I believe in materialism? I don't feel the need to do something I don't want to do (kill myself) to prove a point. If that means some people want to believe that that means I don't believe in materialism, I think I can live with that. But I do wanna live.
 
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