Life or no-life after death - Is it an Objective reality?

Simple question Nick.
You create an exact copy of the original but the original continues to be alive.
So you have an original and a copy that is 100% identical.
Which is "you"?
Which would you prefer to live?
 
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Perhaps, this time, someone can answer this:

If you copy someone but keep the original, will the original feel and experience what the copy feels and experiences ? I assume you'll say "no". If no, then if the original ceases to be, his experiencing stops. Sure, the copy carries on, so to everybody else all is the same. But the original is gone, and has stopped experiencing. If I'm the original, I don't want that to happen: the knowledge that an exact copy of me will endure is no comfort for oblivion.

So far NO ONE has ever adressed that.

If there was an exact copy, how would you know which is the original and which is the copy, so you would know which one is the "you" that doesn't want to die?

Everything about "you" at the moment that the copy was made, would be duplicated.

After that, both would experience separate lives, but each would equally feel that it was the original.

Let's say your name is John Smith. What if you woke up from surgery and someone said to you, "We made a copy of John Smith while he was unconscious in case he died on the operating table. He didn't die, but you're the copy, so now we'll dispose of you." And sure enough, there's someone else who looks just like you lying on the next table.

You'd feel just like "you" because you'd have all your memories up to the moment the anaesthetic started.

How could you prove to the doctors that they'd made a mix-up and you were actually "you," not the copy?

I think people aren't really groking what "copy" in this sense means.
 
If there was an exact copy, how would you know which is the original and which is the copy, so you would know which one is the "you" that doesn't want to die?

Everything about "you" at the moment that the copy was made, would be duplicated.

After that, both would experience separate lives, but each would equally feel that it was the original.

Let's say your name is John Smith. What if you woke up from surgery and someone said to you, "We made a copy of John Smith while he was unconscious in case he died on the operating table. He didn't die, but you're the copy, so now we'll dispose of you." And sure enough, there's someone else who looks just like you lying on the next table.

You'd feel just like "you" because you'd have all your memories up to the moment the anaesthetic started.

How could you prove to the doctors that they'd made a mix-up and you were actually "you," not the copy?

I think people aren't really groking what "copy" in this sense means.


There is no way to prove that you are "you" and not a copy.

That is why this is simply a frame problem. Looked at from the outside, both are identical at the time the copy is made, so from the outside it doesn't matter which is 'sacrificed'.

But from the "inside" it matters completely since each subject is the only one capable of experiencing his or her experiences. And all value derives from the individual's emotions. We each value our particular life, whether or not there is an exact copy of us standing over there.

The way one answers this question depends on which frame of reference one uses to approach it.
 
Yes, but meaning only emerges through the story; and what matters evolutionarily is the survival of the individual since the genes can't do it on their own. They reporduce by means of reproducing the entire individual. Hence the strong feeling of not wanting to die and the equally strong feeling that we are all integrated selves.

The fact that this is just a story doesn't help anyone except in terms of thinking about what is going on in the brain.

Life decisions are not made at the level of individual neurons or neural systems. Life decisions concern the individual.

I agree entirely. However, this doesn't change the fact that both self and experience emerge simultaneously from ancilliary processing. They are not innate to sensory consciousness. And they are not what they appear to be, which is the crux of it here for me.

Yes, nature endows us with a strong sense of self. Sensory processing is created according to the needs of self and interpreted as relating to self. But it is not itself "self-ish". Yes, grasping the mettle of self and of experience allows us to mature as beings. Identification is good. But it is not what it seems to be and this leaps straight to the foreground when you consider Parfit's famous thought experiment.

Nick
 
Simple question Nick.
You create an exact copy of the original but the original continues to be alive.
So you have an original and a copy that is 100% identical.
Which is "you"?
Which would you prefer to live?

For me these kinds of moralist dilemmas have nothing to do with the basic scenario and are more an attempt to avoid looking inside. They always come up when Parfit's Teletransporter scenario is discussed. The "guts" of Parfit's TE for me is to ask myself to justify my fear of pushing the button. What rationally am I losing? It seems obvious "My god, you fool, I'm going to die, isn't it obvious etc" but then "OK, so what, as a materialist do I believe is really being lost? State it." This is the crux for me and the various "oh but what if there's a mistake and then the guard has to come in and kill you, or there are now 2 yous etc etc" are just a sideshow to avoid the crux. That's my take.

Nick
 
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If there was an exact copy, how would you know which is the original and which is the copy, so you would know which one is the "you" that doesn't want to die?

Everything about "you" at the moment that the copy was made, would be duplicated.

After that, both would experience separate lives, but each would equally feel that it was the original.

Let's say your name is John Smith. What if you woke up from surgery and someone said to you, "We made a copy of John Smith while he was unconscious in case he died on the operating table. He didn't die, but you're the copy, so now we'll dispose of you." And sure enough, there's someone else who looks just like you lying on the next table.

You'd feel just like "you" because you'd have all your memories up to the moment the anaesthetic started.

How could you prove to the doctors that they'd made a mix-up and you were actually "you," not the copy?

I think people aren't really groking what "copy" in this sense means.

That's all irrelevant. All these arguments are made from the COPY's perspective. I'm talking about the original, who has CEASED to exist and NO LONGER experiences. That is a fact: the original is dead and his consciousness, however you define it, has been terminated.

I don't want to be terminated.
 
But from the "inside" it matters completely since each subject is the only one capable of experiencing his or her experiences...

...appears to be "experiencing his or her experiences." Because the self is not actual, in material terms, but is merely a virtual reference point, it is not actually having any experiences. The brain, as a whole, exists. And the brain, as a whole, will be recreated. The notion that something is being lost is simply created by a lack of awareness. It appears that there "is someone" seeing the computer screen. It appears that there "is someone" hearing the thoughts, but in material terms there simply is not. It's an illusion.

Nick
 
...appears to be "experiencing his or her experiences." Because the self is not actual, in material terms, but is merely a virtual reference point, it is not actually having any experiences. The brain, as a whole, exists. And the brain, as a whole, will be recreated. The notion that something is being lost is simply created by a lack of awareness. It appears that there "is someone" seeing the computer screen. It appears that there "is someone" hearing the thoughts, but in material terms there simply is not. It's an illusion.

Nick


Unfortunately we are stuck with the language we inherited, but, yes.
 
That's all irrelevant. All these arguments are made from the COPY's perspective. I'm talking about the original, who has CEASED to exist and NO LONGER experiences. That is a fact: the original is dead and his consciousness, however you define it, has been terminated.

Neither the copy nor the original are actually experiencing. Not in the sense they believe they are. In material terms there is not a self. It is simply a virtual reference point created by the mind. The brain is the self. Or the whole body is the self, whatever. And these things will be recreated.

Nick
 
That's all irrelevant. All these arguments are made from the COPY's perspective. I'm talking about the original, who has CEASED to exist and NO LONGER experiences. That is a fact: the original is dead and his consciousness, however you define it, has been terminated.

I don't want to be terminated.

Why do you assume that my operating-room scenario is from the copy's perspective? How do you know there wasn't really a mix-up, and it's being told from the original's perspective?
 
Neither the copy nor the original are actually experiencing. Not in the sense they believe they are. In material terms there is not a self. It is simply a virtual reference point created by the mind. The brain is the self. Or the whole body is the self, whatever. And these things will be recreated.

Nick
Sounds good so far.
 
Neither the copy nor the original are actually experiencing.

That's interesting. So what's all these things I think I'm experiencing, and why do you think we need another word for it ?

In material terms there is not a self. It is simply a virtual reference point created by the mind. The brain is the self. Or the whole body is the self, whatever. And these things will be recreated.

Granted. However the COPY has a different "self", although it is identical, it is a distinct object. Since you do not share the copy's mind (a point which you, unsurprisingly, have not adressed), you are not the same "self" and therefore, when the original dies, _you_ die. The copy may be identical, but it is a distinct object which you are not.
 
Why do you assume that my operating-room scenario is from the copy's perspective? How do you know there wasn't really a mix-up, and it's being told from the original's perspective?

:rolleyes: I really have no love for philosophical nonsense.

Answer this:

If you get into a teleporter, and the teleporter half-fails, creating a duplicate without destroying you, do you share the copy's thoughts and feelings ? And, if not, why do you seem to assume that the copy really is the same person ?

Now assume the teleporter worked. Again, the copy is not the same object. Sure enough, from the perspective of everybody except the original, nothing has changed. But, specifically from the POV of the original, everything has changed, since it has ceased to exist.
 
That's interesting. So what's all these things I think I'm experiencing, and why do you think we need another word for it ?

It is not so much a matter of needing another word for it. It is simply that in reality there is not a self that experiences. This self that experiences exists through inner dialogue - thinking. There is thinking, and from thinking the appearance of a self who is experiencing emerges.

Granted. However the COPY has a different "self", although it is identical, it is a distinct object

Now it gets a little complex because the term "self" covers a variety of phenomena on a variety a levels. The copy has a different body, for sure, and self can mean body. But the self that experiences is not the body. Neither is it the brain. The self that experiences is, as we've said, just this virtual reference point, created by the mind. It emerges from ancilliary processing and it is not what it seems. As paximperium gave earlier as an analogy, it's a bit like the book and what's written in the book.


Since you do not share the copy's mind (a point which you, unsurprisingly, have not adressed),

"You" emerges from mental activity. There is not a "you" that owns the mind. The mind creates this "you", this sense of a virtual user or owner.

you are not the same "self" and therefore, when the original dies, _you_ die.

Something which does not exist in the first place cannot really die.

Nick
 
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...

Something which does not exist in the first place cannot really die.

Nick

Those sacks of flesh walking around--thinking they exist--actually exist.

They feel strongly, in particular, about certain other sacks of flesh that also exist.

When another sack of flesh that one feels strongly about stops talking and walking around forever, and gets stinky and has to be buried or incinerated, the aforementioned sacks of flesh who were associated with him/her are often sad. And rightfully so. That sack of flesh has ceased to exist. Really.

My kid would miss me if I were dead. There would be one less person to look after him, who knows his jokes and sense of humor. One less ally. One less person to pick him up from camp. One less person who he knows he can trust. One less person who shares subtle affinities with him because of genetic similiarites and a shared past together.

Death happens. Death is real. All the silly juggling of words you wish to engage in can't change that.
 
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It is not so much a matter of needing another word for it. It is simply that in reality there is not a self that experiences. This self that experiences exists through inner dialogue - thinking. There is thinking, and from thinking the appearance of a self who is experiencing emerges.

Again, you're redefining words for no reason. "Self" means the person (meatbag, human, etc.) processing the information from the "outside" world. Each person has such processes, which we call experiences. Therefore I experience. My copy experiences, too. But since I am not the same object as he, I do not share his experiences. Ergo, when I die, my experiences cease.

Now it gets a little complex because the term "self" covers a variety of phenomena on a variety a levels. The copy has a different body, for sure, and self can mean body. But the self that experiences is not the body. Neither is it the brain. The self that experiences is, as we've said, just this virtual reference point, created by the mind. It emerges from ancilliary processing and it is not what it seems. As paximperium gave earlier as an analogy, it's a bit like the book and what's written in the book.

But each copy will have a different reference point. And you STILL haven't adressed my malfunctioning teleporter analogy. Is it some kind of taboo I haven't heard about ?

"You" emerges from mental activity. There is not a "you" that owns the mind. The mind creates this "you", this sense of a virtual user or owner.

Okay, what ?

Something which does not exist in the first place cannot really die.

I exist. Hell, even solipsists agree to that.
 
Those sacks of flesh walking around--thinking they exist--actually exist.

The word "self" has different attibutions. In one usage it can refer to the body. And in the Teleporter scenario of the course one body will cease to be. No doubt about it.

But when we we talk about a "self that is experiencing" we are referring to the sense of self that the mind creates in order to help it to function - it's "me." It is not that there really exists, in material terms, a "me that experiences", rather that this is a useful illusion created by the mind. You cannot kill this "me that experiences" for the simple reason that it does not exist. This is covered these days by a multitude of writers, amongst them Dennett, Hofstadter, and plenty more.

Nick
 
The word "self" has different attibutions. In one usage it can refer to the body. And in the Teleporter scenario of the course one body will cease to be. No doubt about it.
And what about the two exact copy scenario? Which is the "self"?
But when we we talk about a "self that is experiencing" we are referring to the sense of self that the mind creates in order to help it to function - it's "me." It is not that there really exists, in material terms, a "me that experiences", rather that this is a useful illusion created by the mind. You cannot kill this "me that experiences" for the simple reason that it does not exist. This is covered these days by a multitude of writers, amongst them Dennett, Hofstadter, and plenty more.
No. The destruction of the "me that experience" is death. Unless you're redefining death.
 
Again, you're redefining words for no reason. "Self" means the person (meatbag, human, etc.) processing the information from the "outside" world. Each person has such processes, which we call experiences.

When you use the term "my brain" or "my body", to whom do you refer? If Belz is the owner of Belz's body and Belz's brain then where is this owner? It is a virtual reference point, nothing more. It has no physical existence. But the illusion of it existing serves to help the mass of different modules that comprise our body and brain to function together.

But each copy will have a different reference point.

Neither of which have any physical existence. Are two non-existing virtual points different? I don't think so.

And you STILL haven't adressed my malfunctioning teleporter analogy. Is it some kind of taboo I haven't heard about ?

See reply to paximperium earlier.

Nick

ps why not have a crack at likely the definitive work on the subject - Dennett and Hofstadter's "The Mind's I"? It could help.
 
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And what about the two exact copy scenario? Which is the "self"?

Each brain will create its own self.

No. The destruction of the "me that experience" is death. Unless you're redefining death.

If thinking stops but sensory consciousness remains there is no longer any "me that experiences." But you're not dead.

Nick
 

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