OK there is an objection that my first proof in that the hypotheses refer to actions that God
could have taken and that if he did not then we would still have free will.
Bri said:
A fully omniscient God could still have knowledge of all future events (free or otherwise) and interact with the world in any number of ways, but simply choose not to insert a prediction of an event into the world in order to allow that event to be free.
The implication then is that it is the intervention of inserting the statement that has robbed us of our free will in this case and does not mean that we could not have free will without this intervention.
This seems reasonable because after all for every free will event there is something that could rob us of that free will without logically negating the possibility of free will.
Informally my response is that God did not interfere with the agent in any way, merely made a statement about some action the agent was observed to make.
Formally we could consider the case where God in the argument is replaced by Dr Mabuse's Neural Disruptor which can force particular choices on people.
First just a note on my notation. When I use a==b I mean the equivalence predicate where neither a nor b is altered, but a boolean value is returned.
Assigning a value to a term would be done by a=b, in which case the value of a is replaced by b.
So if the argument was evaluated with Dr Mabuses device replacing the omnicient being then statement 8 would have the equivalence predicate replaced by an assignment operator, so instead of:
a(A,t1) == a1 (Hyp)
we would have
a(A,t1) = a1 (Hyp)
In other words instead of comparing it is assigning. So statement 10 is no longer a reasonable deduction since the free will has been explicitly overriden by statement 8 in this case. The value of a(A,t
1) has been explicitly altered. So there is no contradiction in this case.
In my original argument free will was never overridden and so 10 remains a valid deduction and the contradiction remains.
So the logical possibility of God making the statement in the world causes the contradiction. The logical possiblity of Dr Mabuse altering our choice does not cause the same contradiction.
So in order for this objection to stand you would have to show how a statement about an event could alter that event.
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Quick note, I have seen an error in arg 1, line 9 it refers to the wrong line number. It should be:
The probability given t<t1 that a(A,t1) == a1 is 1 (Ded Def 4, Arg 1,8)