I am not sure this is the normal sense. The normal sense is that we are controlled by the laws of nature. To say that the laws of nature are external to the self would seem to be making a dualist assumption.
I was inspired to consult Routledge (under "Determinism and Indeterminism") on this point, and my findings were ambiguous: "Since the rise of modern science in the seventeenth century, [the doctrine of determinism] has been commonly understood as the 'law of universal causation', that every event has a cause; or as the predictability, in principle, of all of the future, given full knowledge of the present." In the second part of the passage, the dictionary seems to agree with me that that the
traditional sense of determinism denotes predictability in essentially the sense I've been using it - which was really my sole point when I made my earlier response. However, in the same breath the dictionary equates this with the notion that every event has a cause, and I don't agree that the two concepts are equivalent. I've argued the possibility that, assuming every event has a cause, not all causes are necessarily
deterministic ones (in the "predictability" sense), and thus a hypothetically free choice could be "caused" or "determined" by the will, without giving rise to a predictable (deterministic) result.
That would not work in the scenario I described. If you say '6' and I percieve '3' in the future I am not in a position to guarantee you your '6'. We might be able to foretell the outcome of an unpredictable event by perceiving the future, but we still couldn't control it.
Scratch what I said earlier; for some reason I misread your hypothetical. If it's
me taking the guess and
you trying to make good on the guarantee, I don't think it can be done within the terms of the scenario.
I accept the definition, but it still says that no amount of knowledge of the operation and circumstances of the box would allow you to control it. Even a direct perception of the future does not allow you to control it. Not predictable (in your sense) implies not controllable. Not even by an atemporal omnimax.
Okay so far, I think. Again, scratch my earlier response to the hypothetical.
If we can control the box then it is predictable.
Not necessarily, at least in any objective sense: Let's say
you have sole direct control over the box and, each day, you can make it flash whatever number you decide. Is it necessarily possible for me to predict (even if I had full knowledge of TLOP, etc.) what number the box will flash tomorrow? Indeed, if
you make a good faith prediction about what number the box will flash tomorrow, will it necessarily be correct?
I was merely generalising the definition to account for the possibility of dualism and idealism. We can reliably know that whatever domain the mind exists in - physical, spiritual, whatever - it must exist in the context of sufficient predictable order to make thinking and choosing possible in the first place.
Yes, however much would be sufficient in that case. At a bare minimum, this order would be comprised of the rules of logic.
If your definition of free will includes not constrained even by the order that made it possible in the first place then you must see that this is a logical impossibility. You would be talking four-sided triangles. The result would be the same for dualism, idealism or any other ism you could care to mention.
Okay, I can see that it is impossible to will a logical contradiction. On the other hand, I really don't know what is the minimum order that makes free will possible. I somehow doubt that it has anything to do with physical laws; for example, hypothesizing a world in which no physical universe exists but at least one free-willed spirit exists does not appear to lead to a contradiction.
But if you allow that freedom might exist even under the constraints of the underlying order then freedom might equally exist in a mind that was made entirely of electro-chemical activity inside the brain.
I suppose a mind that was purely physical might possibly possess free will in a universe in which physical laws were at least partly non-deterministic. It hurts my head to think about the specifics, though. My gut feeling is that any free will that human beings have depends in part on the truth of the dualist thesis.