Belz...
Fiend God
Free will has to have a basis for what it wants though.
Then it's not free, Iacchus.
Free will has to have a basis for what it wants though.
Free will would have to be an uncaused event, or else it would not be free will.
How is it non-falsifiable ? When did you ever see an event that was random ? And I mean random as in it's impossible to know the causes because the event is, at least in part, uncaused. Not random as in, we simply don't know the exact factors.
Bri and ceo_esq say it is uncaused which seems to suggest it came from nowhere.
I rather think that a fundamentally unpredictable, fully controllable event is falisifiable.
It's non-falafiable because it's impossible to test. How do we setup any test to show that there is or isn't free will? Other than birthing a baby and raising it in a sterile environment...
And we aren't talking about events here, we're talking about choices/actions, eh? We aren't talking about a metorite "deciding" to hit the Arizona desert over Chicago, we're talking about you choosing to respond to me or not.
And remember, I'm NOT arguing that free will "exists" (whatever that means). I really don't know, and, to a large extent, I don't really care. It sure SEEMS like I have free will. That I choose to do things based on my prior experience (and probably some genetic disposition). Is this really free will or am I just fooling myself and it's all "really" deterministic? I don't know. In the big picture, do it really matter? I don't really think so.
I will say this, tho, if you reject free will, then you can never, ever say that you "examine the evidence and decide upon the facts" because it was perdetermined that your opinion would be such-and-so. You can't claim to have an "open mind" because there would be no such thing.
What would there be to choose, if there was nothing to choose from?Then it's not free, Iacchus.

What would there be to choose, if there was nothing to choose from?
Well, if you were twenty feet away from getting run over and crushed by a bus, would you "behave" as if you had free will and attempt to jump out of the way? Or, do you believe there would be no consequences if you didn't? The choice is entirely yours. Even if you merely "choose" to behave as if you did.In the big picture, it matters in the sense that things would be quite different were we to really have "free" will. However, from our perspective, it doesn't change a thing, so it doesn't matter. Of course, it matters to the discussion because we're trying to establish whether or not it does exist.
Well, if you were twenty feet away from getting run over and crushed by a bus, would you "behave" as if had free will and attempt to jump out of the way? Or, do you believe there would be no consequences if you didn't? The choice is entirely yours. Even if you merely "choose" to behave as if you did.
In the big picture, it matters in the sense that things would be quite different were we to really have "free" will. However, from our perspective, it doesn't change a thing, so it doesn't matter. Of course, it matters to the discussion because we're trying to establish whether or not it does exist.
I don't know, does God have free will? If He doesn't, then I would say we're ◊◊◊◊ out of luck.Well, that's part of the question, isn't it ? If free will isn't random and uncaused, and it isn't merely dependent upon physical factors, then what is it ?
So, do you "choose" to behave as if you have free will? Yes or no? The "choice" is entirely yours.Whether or not you did would not entail free will. The survival instinct is a bad example of free will, wouldn't you say ?
Free will would have to be an uncaused event, or else it would not be free will. If you don't agree even to that part of the definition of free will, it's no wonder you can't understand how free will is incompatible with an omniscient deity.
How? How would anythig be different if we could proove that we had "free" will, or "free will" or even free "will"? Nothing, from our POV would change. We'd still "make decisions" based on an accumulated set of inputs.
To your final point here, my argument is that it's a non-senseical discussion. We cannot proove it one way or another, so any other argument based upon it is invalid.
Yes, but why would you "choose" to defend anything? Simply because it's rational? Where is the rationale in that?You cannot effectively defend rationality if you accept that the irrational is possible.
Free will is the ability of a conscious agent to make a decision or take an action without any influence or causation, partial or whole, from heredity, environment, circumstance, or history/memory, conscious or unconscious.
If this is the definition of free will that you're using, then I agree with those who claim that it is likely impossible.
However, almost nobody would agree with this defintion, particularly the words "any influence" and "partial" which are usually not considered to be conditions of free will. Decisions and actions are undoubtedly influenced by many of the items you listed, but that doesn't preclude them from being free. Most definitions would require only that the decisions/actions not be entirely caused by heredity, environment, circumstance, history/memory, etc. to be free.
-Bri
I am not sure this is the normal sense. The normal sense is that we are controlled by the laws of nature. To say that the laws of nature are external to the self would seem to be making a dualist assumption. If we were natural beings then the laws of nature would be integral to the self.Fair enough, but not in the normal sense of determinism, which generally denotes determination completely (if perhaps indirectly) by factors external to the self.
That would not work in the scenario I described. If you say '6' and I percieve '3' in the future I am not in a position to guarantee you your '6'. We might be able to foretell the outcome of an unpredictable event by perceiving the future, but we still couldn't control it.I would say that yes, it is logically possible for you to make good on that guarantee if your knowledge of the outcome was not deduced from all antecedents plus causal laws (which is the sense in which I earlier defined a prediction) but from, say, a direct perception of the outcome at a future point in time (perhaps in the manner of the timeless deity we discussed earlier).
I accept the definition, but it still says that no amount of knowledge of the operation and circumstances of the box would allow you to control it. Even a direct perception of the future does not allow you to control it. Not predictable (in your sense) implies not controllable. Not even by an atemporal omnimax.To qualify as a prediction as I've defined it, your knowledge of the outcome in this instance would have to be based solely on an exhaustive awareness of how the black box works and the circumstances of its actuation - probably impossible according to the terms of the hypothetical.
I was merely generalising the definition to account for the possibility of dualism and idealism. We can reliably know that whatever domain the mind exists in - physical, spiritual, whatever - it must exist in the context of sufficient predictable order to make thinking and choosing possible in the first place.I had in mind something akin to all laws of physics and logic operating upon the natural universe, but perhaps that could defensibly be described as at least a significant part of the "order [that] underpins our existence and makes it possible."
At least some degree of unpredictability might also have positive consequences for freedom. But if I am correct about the previous result and if control is the important component of freedom then it is the predictability that is important for free will and not unpredictability.I agree that at least some degree of predictability has positive consequences for freedom. Total predictability leaves no room for freedom, however.
But what if our choices are ultimately a function of the underlying order that made them possible in the first place? It is glass-half-full glass-half-empty stuff. If you think of this underlying order as some external set of laws imposed on us then it sounds like fatalism. But if you think of it as integrally part of who we are - the very principle that allows us to perceive, think, act, choose then it is the very thing that allows free will (free that is, from control external to us).Again, usually we think of being in control and being constrained as opposites. The relevant question is not whether outcomes are constrained by our choices, but whether our choices are entirely a function of contraints placed upon us.
I don't recall you setting forth that premise either, I apologise for the misrepresentation. It was unintentional.I don't recall setting forth the premise that an act of will is an uncaused event. To me, an "act of will" denotes an act the causes of which include the actor's will, or perhaps an act the proximate cause of which is the actor's will.
On the other hand decisions/action that are entirely caused by heredity, environment, circumstance, history/memory and the ability to reason would be considered free will under most definitions.If this is the definition of free will that you're using, then I agree with those who claim that it is likely impossible.
However, almost nobody would agree with this defintion, particularly the words "any influence" and "partial" which are usually not considered to be conditions of free will. Decisions and actions are undoubtedly influenced by many of the items you listed, but that doesn't preclude them from being free. Most definitions would require only that the decisions/actions not be entirely caused by heredity, environment, circumstance, history/memory, etc. to be free.
-Bri