There is No God (And You Know It)

Free will is the ability of a conscious agent to make a decision or take an action without any influence or causation, partial or whole, from heredity, environment, circumstance, or history/memory, conscious or unconscious. I reject that part of the definition that states "could have made a different choice, given the exact same circumstances" because it is purely speculative; there is ABSOLUTELY no way to know if this is true or not. In short, if that which we consider to be 'free will' (or, as I like to call it, 'practical free will') is a piece of a chain of causation, it is not free at all, but determined by TLOP. Only if a decision is uncaused (which, in principle, means violating TLOP) can it be considered truly 'free'.
 
How is it non-falsifiable ? When did you ever see an event that was random ? And I mean random as in it's impossible to know the causes because the event is, at least in part, uncaused. Not random as in, we simply don't know the exact factors.

It's non-falafiable because it's impossible to test. How do we setup any test to show that there is or isn't free will? Other than birthing a baby and raising it in a sterile environment...

And we aren't talking about events here, we're talking about choices/actions, eh? We aren't talking about a metorite "deciding" to hit the Arizona desert over Chicago, we're talking about you choosing to respond to me or not.

Before Lorentz, most people thought that the weather was random, and to a certain degree people still do. At what level of complexity do we say that we cannot possibly know all the inputs to the system?

And remember, I'm NOT arguing that free will "exists" (whatever that means). I really don't know, and, to a large extent, I don't really care. It sure SEEMS like I have free will. That I choose to do things based on my prior experience (and probably some genetic disposition). Is this really free will or am I just fooling myself and it's all "really" deterministic? I don't know. In the big picture, do it really matter? I don't really think so.

I will say this, tho, if you reject free will, then you can never, ever say that you "examine the evidence and decide upon the facts" because it was perdetermined that your opinion would be such-and-so. You can't claim to have an "open mind" because there would be no such thing.
 
Bri and ceo_esq say it is uncaused which seems to suggest it came from nowhere.

Ok, so where does it come from? What proof is there? The only things I can think of are our genetic code and our life experiences to date. These are going to influence our minds and could be seen to "predispose" us to a certain course of action. If that is what is meant by having no free will, then, ok, we don't have free will, but I'd ask if it's not possible for us to go against this, just that it's harder to do so.

I rather think that a fundamentally unpredictable, fully controllable event is falisifiable.

Well, a fundamentally unpredicatble event by definition couldn't be fully controllable, eh? Or was that your point?
 
It's non-falafiable because it's impossible to test. How do we setup any test to show that there is or isn't free will? Other than birthing a baby and raising it in a sterile environment...

I was talking about events, not free will.

And we aren't talking about events here, we're talking about choices/actions, eh? We aren't talking about a metorite "deciding" to hit the Arizona desert over Chicago, we're talking about you choosing to respond to me or not.

Not much choice there, either. I usually answer someone who adresses me, and whether I choose to answer or not can be traced to the corresponding factors. If you knew all the factors involved, you'd know exactly what I was about to do. There is no "other" element, there.

And remember, I'm NOT arguing that free will "exists" (whatever that means). I really don't know, and, to a large extent, I don't really care. It sure SEEMS like I have free will. That I choose to do things based on my prior experience (and probably some genetic disposition). Is this really free will or am I just fooling myself and it's all "really" deterministic? I don't know. In the big picture, do it really matter? I don't really think so.

In the big picture, it matters in the sense that things would be quite different were we to really have "free" will. However, from our perspective, it doesn't change a thing, so it doesn't matter. Of course, it matters to the discussion because we're trying to establish whether or not it does exist.

I will say this, tho, if you reject free will, then you can never, ever say that you "examine the evidence and decide upon the facts" because it was perdetermined that your opinion would be such-and-so. You can't claim to have an "open mind" because there would be no such thing.

That's not completely true. Decisions are still made, but they are completely dependent upon the various factors. Cause and effect, and all.
 
In the big picture, it matters in the sense that things would be quite different were we to really have "free" will. However, from our perspective, it doesn't change a thing, so it doesn't matter. Of course, it matters to the discussion because we're trying to establish whether or not it does exist.
Well, if you were twenty feet away from getting run over and crushed by a bus, would you "behave" as if you had free will and attempt to jump out of the way? Or, do you believe there would be no consequences if you didn't? The choice is entirely yours. Even if you merely "choose" to behave as if you did.
 
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Well, if you were twenty feet away from getting run over and crushed by a bus, would you "behave" as if had free will and attempt to jump out of the way? Or, do you believe there would be no consequences if you didn't? The choice is entirely yours. Even if you merely "choose" to behave as if you did.

Whether or not you did would not entail free will. The survival instinct is a bad example of free will, wouldn't you say ?
 
In the big picture, it matters in the sense that things would be quite different were we to really have "free" will. However, from our perspective, it doesn't change a thing, so it doesn't matter. Of course, it matters to the discussion because we're trying to establish whether or not it does exist.

How? How would anythig be different if we could proove that we had "free" will, or "free will" or even free "will"? Nothing, from our POV would change. We'd still "make decisions" based on an accumulated set of inputs.

To your final point here, my argument is that it's a non-senseical discussion. We cannot proove it one way or another, so any other argument based upon it is invalid.
 
Well, that's part of the question, isn't it ? If free will isn't random and uncaused, and it isn't merely dependent upon physical factors, then what is it ?
I don't know, does God have free will? If He doesn't, then I would say we're ◊◊◊◊ out of luck.
 
Whether or not you did would not entail free will. The survival instinct is a bad example of free will, wouldn't you say ?
So, do you "choose" to behave as if you have free will? Yes or no? The "choice" is entirely yours.
 
Free will would have to be an uncaused event, or else it would not be free will. If you don't agree even to that part of the definition of free will, it's no wonder you can't understand how free will is incompatible with an omniscient deity.

First of all, it's not clear to me that free will, if it exists, is an event at all. It is a property. An act of free will - that is, an instance of the exercise of the hypothetical faculty of free will - is of course an event, but, as I suggested, it's simply shorthand for "an act the proximate cause of which is the actor's free will". We might similarly speak of an act of passion, or an act of instinct - the very formulation indicates the presumed or hypothetical cause. Defining an act of free will as a wholly uncaused event is arguably self-contradictory.
 
How? How would anythig be different if we could proove that we had "free" will, or "free will" or even free "will"? Nothing, from our POV would change. We'd still "make decisions" based on an accumulated set of inputs.

The reason it matters is because if we defy logic to accept this self-contradictory notion we present a chink in the armour of reason - If free will can be the caused yet uncaused, decisive yet disordered thing described by its proponents in this thread then pretty much anything goes - Gods, Magic and the fairies at the bottom of my garden.

You cannot effectively defend rationality if you accept that the irrational is possible.

To your final point here, my argument is that it's a non-senseical discussion. We cannot proove it one way or another, so any other argument based upon it is invalid.

I think we can and have. There are numerous workarounds that 'allow' free will to exist but they are invariably definitions of 'free will' along the lines of 'practical free will' or 'the illusion of free will'. Nobody is arguing that we do not feel like we have free will.
 
You cannot effectively defend rationality if you accept that the irrational is possible.
Yes, but why would you "choose" to defend anything? Simply because it's rational? Where is the rationale in that? ;)
 
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Free will is the ability of a conscious agent to make a decision or take an action without any influence or causation, partial or whole, from heredity, environment, circumstance, or history/memory, conscious or unconscious.

If this is the definition of free will that you're using, then I agree with those who claim that it is likely impossible.

However, almost nobody would agree with this defintion, particularly the words "any influence" and "partial" which are usually not considered to be conditions of free will. Decisions and actions are undoubtedly influenced by many of the items you listed, but that doesn't preclude them from being free. Most definitions would require only that the decisions/actions not be entirely caused by heredity, environment, circumstance, history/memory, etc. to be free.

-Bri
 
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If this is the definition of free will that you're using, then I agree with those who claim that it is likely impossible.

However, almost nobody would agree with this defintion, particularly the words "any influence" and "partial" which are usually not considered to be conditions of free will. Decisions and actions are undoubtedly influenced by many of the items you listed, but that doesn't preclude them from being free. Most definitions would require only that the decisions/actions not be entirely caused by heredity, environment, circumstance, history/memory, etc. to be free.

-Bri

Yet, in order to prove conclusively that a decision was made via free will, you would have to remove all of these factors systematically, and still see if any decision was possible. Unless and until we can do that, there is no reason to consider any choice, act, or decision to be 'free' in the absolute sense.

Relative free will, on the other hand, is good enough for me. (Totally different thing, you know)
 
Fair enough, but not in the normal sense of determinism, which generally denotes determination completely (if perhaps indirectly) by factors external to the self.
I am not sure this is the normal sense. The normal sense is that we are controlled by the laws of nature. To say that the laws of nature are external to the self would seem to be making a dualist assumption. If we were natural beings then the laws of nature would be integral to the self.
I would say that yes, it is logically possible for you to make good on that guarantee if your knowledge of the outcome was not deduced from all antecedents plus causal laws (which is the sense in which I earlier defined a prediction) but from, say, a direct perception of the outcome at a future point in time (perhaps in the manner of the timeless deity we discussed earlier).
That would not work in the scenario I described. If you say '6' and I percieve '3' in the future I am not in a position to guarantee you your '6'. We might be able to foretell the outcome of an unpredictable event by perceiving the future, but we still couldn't control it.
To qualify as a prediction as I've defined it, your knowledge of the outcome in this instance would have to be based solely on an exhaustive awareness of how the black box works and the circumstances of its actuation - probably impossible according to the terms of the hypothetical.
I accept the definition, but it still says that no amount of knowledge of the operation and circumstances of the box would allow you to control it. Even a direct perception of the future does not allow you to control it. Not predictable (in your sense) implies not controllable. Not even by an atemporal omnimax.

If we can control the box then it is predictable. We don't need to posit some exhaustive knowledge of the workings and circumstances of actuation of the box to know this. We only need to apply the contrapositive to the previous result. If not predictable implies not controllable then controllable implies predictable.
I had in mind something akin to all laws of physics and logic operating upon the natural universe, but perhaps that could defensibly be described as at least a significant part of the "order [that] underpins our existence and makes it possible."
I was merely generalising the definition to account for the possibility of dualism and idealism. We can reliably know that whatever domain the mind exists in - physical, spiritual, whatever - it must exist in the context of sufficient predictable order to make thinking and choosing possible in the first place.

If your definition of free will includes not constrained even by the order that made it possible in the first place then you must see that this is a logical impossibility. You would be talking four-sided triangles. The result would be the same for dualism, idealism or any other ism you could care to mention.

But if you allow that freedom might exist even under the constraints of the underlying order then freedom might equally exist in a mind that was made entirely of electro-chemical activity inside the brain.

So it is irrelevant whether the underlying order is the laws of physics or the laws of something else.
I agree that at least some degree of predictability has positive consequences for freedom. Total predictability leaves no room for freedom, however.
At least some degree of unpredictability might also have positive consequences for freedom. But if I am correct about the previous result and if control is the important component of freedom then it is the predictability that is important for free will and not unpredictability.
Again, usually we think of being in control and being constrained as opposites. The relevant question is not whether outcomes are constrained by our choices, but whether our choices are entirely a function of contraints placed upon us.
But what if our choices are ultimately a function of the underlying order that made them possible in the first place? It is glass-half-full glass-half-empty stuff. If you think of this underlying order as some external set of laws imposed on us then it sounds like fatalism. But if you think of it as integrally part of who we are - the very principle that allows us to perceive, think, act, choose then it is the very thing that allows free will (free that is, from control external to us).

After all it seems arbitrary that if our environment controls us we call it determinism, but if we control our environment we call it non-determinism.
I don't recall setting forth the premise that an act of will is an uncaused event. To me, an "act of will" denotes an act the causes of which include the actor's will, or perhaps an act the proximate cause of which is the actor's will.
I don't recall you setting forth that premise either, I apologise for the misrepresentation. It was unintentional.
 
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If this is the definition of free will that you're using, then I agree with those who claim that it is likely impossible.

However, almost nobody would agree with this defintion, particularly the words "any influence" and "partial" which are usually not considered to be conditions of free will. Decisions and actions are undoubtedly influenced by many of the items you listed, but that doesn't preclude them from being free. Most definitions would require only that the decisions/actions not be entirely caused by heredity, environment, circumstance, history/memory, etc. to be free.

-Bri
On the other hand decisions/action that are entirely caused by heredity, environment, circumstance, history/memory and the ability to reason would be considered free will under most definitions.
 

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