There is No God (And You Know It)

I'll not repeat myself again to you - nor will I repeat the work of the others here who have basically refined what you, yourself, have provided - proving, at least to a few of us, that free will is an incoherent concept, on an absolute/ideal level.

You claim that the proof is right here in black and white, and so clear that I am being willfully ignorant by not seeing it! Yet at the same time you cannot point out exactly what this proof is. Since it's so obvious, by all means please produce it!

Meanwhile, you'll have to forgive me for considering thousands of years of philosophical discussion to be far more compelling evidence against your opinion than anything you have managed to articulate thus far.

-Bri
 
Are you able to justify this assertion? If my brain is based on the underlying order of the universe, then how is that order somehow external to me?

It seems to me that it is integrally part of me.

I have no idea what you're talking about.

-Bri
 
If your agent is a human being, in a materialistic world "internal" would generally mean the physical body including the brain. If dualism is true, a human agent would likely include both the physical and non-physical parts that make up the whole person.

If an agent (however it is defined) "could have done otherwise" and was the "ultimate source" of its action, it can be said to have acted of its own free will.

-Bri
and
Simply stated, when one has acted of one's own free will, one could have done otherwise, and one was the ultimate source of the action. In order to be the ultimate source of one's action, some condition necessary for the action must originate within oneself (rather than externally).
3 major problems with this:

1. If a person has a device inserted into their brain that disrupts their brain activity using a true random information source then by your definition they would have free will. After all the device is internal to them so the action originated from within the person. And as it is random they "could have done otherwise".

2. And again, how do you know an immaterial entity has boundaries? Must immaterial entities have analogous properties to material entities?

3. Of course if a decision is uncaused then the person is not the "ultimate source" of his actions. The ultimate source is an uncaused event. How can a person be the ultimate source of an event that by definition has no ultimate source?
 
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You claim that the proof is right here in black and white, and so clear that I am being willfully ignorant by not seeing it! Yet at the same time you cannot point out exactly what this proof is. Since it's so obvious, by all means please produce it!

Meanwhile, you'll have to forgive me for considering thousands of years of philosophical discussion to be far more compelling evidence against your opinion than anything you have managed to articulate thus far.

-Bri


It's been produced. You don't see it. You choose the 'route of authority' (thousands of years of philosophical discussion). Not my problem. As far as I'm concerned, nothing will convince you, because you've chosen to close your mind. End of discussion, with you, until you can come up with something better than vapor-consistancy arguments about 'uncaused causes' and 'ghosts in the machine'.
 
If your agent is a human being, in a materialistic world "internal" would generally mean the physical body including the brain. If dualism is true, a human agent would likely include both the physical and non-physical parts that make up the whole person.

Still, even if that were true, I don't see how "internal" factors such as hormones are any different from external factors such as a slap in the face. Both can make you irritable, and your "free will" has nothing to do with it.
 
It's been produced. You don't see it. You choose the 'route of authority' (thousands of years of philosophical discussion). Not my problem. As far as I'm concerned, nothing will convince you, because you've chosen to close your mind. End of discussion, with you, until you can come up with something better than vapor-consistancy arguments about 'uncaused causes' and 'ghosts in the machine'.

Call me closed-minded if you like, but had I claimed that this thread (especially your posts) proved beyond any doubt that not only does an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God exist, but free will exists also, despite thousands of years of philosophical discussion about the matter to the contrary, and if you don't see it then you're just purposely being ignorant, I would think you might demand that I actually consolidate and articulate the proof.

Maybe not though, given your recent posts.

-Bri
 
Still, even if that were true, I don't see how "internal" factors such as hormones are any different from external factors such as a slap in the face. Both can make you irritable, and your "free will" has nothing to do with it.

Yes, you get irritable from the hormones and the slap, but what action you then take (or not take) is a choice that can be said to flow from your "free will".

Also, who says that the slap HAS to make you irritable in the first place?
 
Yes, you get irritable from the hormones and the slap, but what action you then take (or not take) is a choice that can be said to flow from your "free will".

How so ? Any decision you take afterward is also based on a number of factors, internal or not, but it isn't made by some extra-spatial consciousness.
 
How so ? Any decision you take afterward is also based on a number of factors, internal or not, but it isn't made by some extra-spatial consciousness.

Who says that "free will" comes from anywhere but yourself?

I dunno, I have a hard time with discussions like these cause I can see both sides. I can understand the desire to have "free will" so that life doesn't seem like it was all pre-scripted and meaningless; and conversly I can see that any choice that we make is determined by the summation of all our parts (both Nature and Nurture).

Of course, I was raised Methodist (read: Deterministic) and changed to Presbyrterian (read: Free Will) in early high school...so, there might be a reason I'm not sold either direction. ;)

I guess, for me at least, it comes down to this: it just doesn't matter. Neither side is falsifyable, is it? Does it harm anyone to think one or the other? No. So who the f cares?
 
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I cant see where I have said there is only one alternative that reflects our choice so I am not really sure of your point.

My point there was that if there is theoretically more than one alternative that would be consonant with our "nature", then our "nature" does not entirely dictate our choice.


Before you start appealing to the classic idea of voluntary you must first show that indeterminist free will meets the definition.

Er... why, exactly? And to which definition (that of voluntary or that of free will) are you referring?


A fundamentally unpredictable event must be by definition fundamentally uncontrollable.

I don't see why this should be the case, unless we are begging the question and have already ruled out the possibility that we retain control over at least some of our own choices. Perhaps we need to consider further the employed definitions of unpredictable and uncontrollable.


We normally associate behaviour over which we have no control as involuntary.

True enough.


Here there is another unjustified assumption. Why would an unpredictable event be necessarily less constrained than a predictable one? Is it not possible that unpredictability involves constraints of its own? I could certainly make a good case that the underlying order of the universe is a less onerous constraint than unpredictability.

As you know, the sense in which I have been using predictable, a predictable event is completely constrained, because it is purely a result of a fixed function (the totality of all existing causal laws) applied to fixed values (antecedent circumstances). If unpredictability involves its own constraints, they could logically be equally constraining as those involved in predictability, or they could be less constraining. As far as I can ascertain, what I wrote does not depend on the assumption you allege that I've made (that an unpredictable choice is necessarily less constrained than a predictable one). I asked how we can rule out the possibility that such choices are (at least) relatively unconstrained compared to predictable ones.

As previously indicated, predictability is in my view a total constraint. I am not certain how one would go about making a case that unpredictability is a more onerous constraint that that; it seems logically impossible. I will provisionally admit the logical possibility that an equally constraining set of circumstances characterizes both predictability and unpredictability, but considering that we know little if anything about the nature of any unpredictable events (much less all of them) I think it would be highly problematic to argue this persuasively.


Certainly our nature is determined in large part by our previous choices. If our choices happened to us by accident then we got our nature by accident.

I agree, so far as that goes. But does this not simply remove the difficulty to another level? How can we ascertain that we got our nature by accident?


But is it plausible that such a change could really come from literally nothing? Or more likely that such a change would reflect some hitherto hidden or dormant aspect of their nature?

I am speculating - and only speculating - that such a change could come from the will of a free agent. If you are proceeding, even unconsciously, from the assumption that free will cannot exist, then of course it's going to seem as though I'm speculating that the change could come from literally nothing.

In fact, it might well be more likely that such a change would reflect some hitherto hidden or dormant aspect of the subject's nature. But we are discussing logical possibilities here, and likelihoods and probabilities are irrelevant in that context.


Is the mad, bad and dangerous biker, who one day dinks a teddy bear to the park for childrens charity, acting contrary to his nature, or just showing an unfamiliar aspect of his nature?

Are you speaking from experience? You big softie. Seriously, though, who knows for sure? It could be an act done in obedience to a pre-existing but unfamiliar nature. It could be an act done contrary to his nature in the sense you earlier defined "nature" (except to the logically possible extent that his nature always includes the possibility of choices that depend in part upon free will). It could be an act done in obedience to a new nature that nonetheless did not "happen to him by accident".

On the other hand if we suspect that an alteration in behaviour is genuinely contrary to their nature then we automatically suspect that something other than free will is at work. If your sober and sensible retired bank manager uncle starts putting up barbed wire round his home and wrapping silver foil round his head you would not just think "ah, free will". You would encourage him to consult a doctor.

You are right about this. I would suspect the same thing. But I could not deduce it logically.


So if our choices depend ultimately on some indeterminate event rather than our own nature then they cannot be called 'our' choices. They are are the choices of that indeterminate event - whatever it is.

And if that indeterminate phenomenon were the will? I'm not satisfied that it is, of course, but I cannot exclude the logical possibility, and if it were true, I would have no objection to calling such choices "ours".
 
Here we go again...

This concept isn't all that difficult to understand. You can define the boundaries of your "agent" as you like, but with determinism everything is caused by something external to it so it wouldn't really matter.

I do not draw any distinction between 'external' and 'internal' - it is entirely irrelevant. Despite apparently accepting this, you continue to use the terms (and therefore draw the distinction) - make your mind up.

If your agent is a human being, in a materialistic world "internal" would generally mean the physical body including the brain. If dualism is true, a human agent would likely include both the physical and non-physical parts that make up the whole person.

So, for the sake of argument, let us suppose that dualism is true.

If an agent (however it is defined) "could have done otherwise" and was the "ultimate source" of its action, it can be said to have acted of its own free will.

What you are missing here is that an agent is a composite thing - you are confusing the agent itself (will) with the events that describe the agent's history (choices). Either that, or you understand our point but are arguing on semantic terms.

Either way, the way you pick and choose your points and keep looping back the argument suggests a mischevious and deliberate tactic. If I am right then you are only fooling yourself.

I want to post a proof here - but to do so I need a tight, sound definition of free will - the one we are currently debating is neither.
 
I guess, for me at least, it comes down to this: it just doesn't matter. Neither side is falsifyable, is it? Does it harm anyone to think one or the other? No. So who the f cares?

How is it non-falsifiable ? When did you ever see an event that was random ? And I mean random as in it's impossible to know the causes because the event is, at least in part, uncaused. Not random as in, we simply don't know the exact factors.
 
My point there was that if there is theoretically more than one alternative that would be consonant with our "nature", then our "nature" does not entirely dictate our choice.
So between these alternatives there would be no distinction? If no distinction then the choice would be random in any case. If there were a distinction might this distinction relate to our nature? If I choose between two alternatives I would like to think that the choice I made said something about me.

You are constantly put scare quotes around nature as though a person's character, ideals, beliefs, attitude, intelligence, memories, talents, emotions and desires were some trifling irrelevancy. I regard these as defining who we are. How do you define the self, if not by these things? So why the scare quotes?
Er... why, exactly?
Because just calling something free will does not make it so. Any more than Honest John the car dealer is guaranteed to be honest or economic rationalism is guaranteed to be rational.
And to which definition (that of voluntary or that of free will) are you referring?
Any definition of voluntary that involved having some sort of control over our actions and our definition of free will where an act of will is fundamentally unpredictable.
I don't see why this should be the case, unless we are begging the question and have already ruled out the possibility that we retain control over at least some of our own choices.
Not begging the question at all. I am saying that if I have controlled my choice then I have determined my choice. This appears to me to be a tautology. I cannot see the case where I cannot control the outcome of a process without also determining the outcome of the process.
Perhaps we need to consider further the employed definitions of unpredictable and uncontrollable.
I agree, this is absolutely key to the case of whether free will can exist. So say I have a black box with a single button and a single led digit display.

The box is built such that pressing the button returns a number from 0 - 9 but it is unpredictable which number will display. Now I say to you "give me a number, I will press the button and that number will display on the display".

Now can it be true that I am able to make good on that guarantee and that the box really is unpredictable? That would simply be a contradiction. If I am able to control the box then it cannot be unpredictable.
As you know, the sense in which I have been using predictable, a predictable event is completely constrained, because it is purely a result of a fixed function (the totality of all existing causal laws) applied to fixed values (antecedent circumstances).
And by "all causal laws" you presumably mean whatever order underpins our existence and makes it possible.
If unpredictability involves its own constraints, they could logically be equally constraining as those involved in predictability, or they could be less constraining. As far as I can ascertain, what I wrote does not depend on the assumption you allege that I've made (that an unpredictable choice is necessarily less constrained than a predictable one). I asked how we can rule out the possibility that such choices are (at least) relatively unconstrained compared to predictable ones.
Well let's first take the example of absolute unpredictability - ie absolute disorder. In that case existence itself would be impossible, never mind thinking and making choices. I would certainly regard this as a greater constraint than total predictability, where I at least get to exist.

The order that we observe might be completely predictable, or maybe it is only somewhat predictabe. But it must be the predictability of it that provides us with the opportunity to think and choose rather than the unpredictability. So predictability does have some positive consequences for freedom.
As previously indicated, predictability is in my view a total constraint.
And control is not a total constraint? It seems to me that we control a process precisely by constraining the outcomes
I am not certain how one would go about making a case that unpredictability is a more onerous constraint that that; it seems logically impossible.
If I formed the intention to say "yes" and some unpredictable component had changed this and chosen instead to say "no" then I would regard this as a greater constraint on my freedom than if my mind had predictably allowed me to put my original intention into practice. And this would be true even if "yes" had been the dumb response it still wouldn't have been my choice. So here is an example where unpredictability would be a greater constraint on freedom than predictability.

But as I said your very ability to choose at all depends entirely on the fact that your mind exists in the context of a dependable underlying order. If it existed in the context of an underlying disorder or an undependable underlying order then you would not be able to act at all, never mind act freely.

To me it seems pretty obvious that if a choice is made possible only by an underlying order then it must also be ultimately subject to that order. But to say that a process could be free from the constraints of the very thing that made it possible in the first place seems to be having your cake and eating it too.
I will provisionally admit the logical possibility that an equally constraining set of circumstances characterizes both predictability and unpredictability, but considering that we know little if anything about the nature of any unpredictable events (much less all of them) I think it would be highly problematic to argue this persuasively.
We know all that we need to know about them. They are unpredictable. My case is that unpredictability implies uncontrollability. If I cannot predict the outcome of a process, how can I control it?
I agree, so far as that goes. But does this not simply remove the difficulty to another level? How can we ascertain that we got our nature by accident?
We don't need to - since that is the premise - that a choice is an undetermined, unpredictable event.
I am speculating - and only speculating - that such a change could come from the will of a free agent. If you are proceeding, even unconsciously, from the assumption that free will cannot exist, then of course it's going to seem as though I'm speculating that the change could come from literally nothing.
On the contrary I am proceeding entirely on the premise I have from you and Bri, that an act of will is an uncaused event. An uncaused event is an event that has no cause. In other words it comes from nothing.
In fact, it might well be more likely that such a change would reflect some hitherto hidden or dormant aspect of the subject's nature. But we are discussing logical possibilities here, and likelihoods and probabilities are irrelevant in that context.
You appeared to be assuming that a "leopard changes his spots" type of change in behaviour would be a choice against the previous nature. I was only pointing out the logical possibility that this was not the case.
Are you speaking from experience? You big softie.
Not I, but it is a regular event in Sydney.
Seriously, though, who knows for sure? It could be an act done in obedience to a pre-existing but unfamiliar nature. It could be an act done contrary to his nature in the sense you earlier defined "nature" (except to the logically possible extent that his nature always includes the possibility of choices that depend in part upon free will). It could be an act done in obedience to a new nature that nonetheless did not "happen to him by accident".
If the act was done in disobedience to a new nature then the new nature must have preceded the act. So where then did this new nature come from? What event precipitated the new to replace the old?
You are right about this. I would suspect the same thing. But I could not deduce it logically.
You don't need to deduce it logically for the sake of this debate, it is inherent in the premise that a free will event is an uncaused event. An mental event may be caused by extraneous physical circumstance, like a chemical imbalance. Or it could be completely uncaused. From my point of view these have in common the characteristic that I did not cause them so they do not reflect my nature.

If you could agree that a choice motivated by a physical brain disfunction could not be my choice, why is a choice motivated by no cause at all my choice?
And if that indeterminate phenomenon were the will? I'm not satisfied that it is, of course, but I cannot exclude the logical possibility, and if it were true, I would have no objection to calling such choices "ours".
And I would have no objection in calling the moon "mine", but it would not make it so. If it were true that this indeterminate phenomenon were the will on what basis would you call it ours? We did not cause it to happen, it did not result from our desires, our emotions or our intellect. It was not even the result of any irrational belief or prejudice of ours. It was uncaused. It (or at least some of it) came from nothing.
 
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Who says that "free will" comes from anywhere but yourself?
Bri and ceo_esq say it is uncaused which seems to suggest it came from nowhere.
I guess, for me at least, it comes down to this: it just doesn't matter. Neither side is falsifyable, is it? Does it harm anyone to think one or the other? No. So who the f cares?
I rather think that a fundamentally unpredictable, fully controllable event is falisifiable.
 
So between these alternatives there would be no distinction?

I'm not sure what you mean by "no distinction". If there are multiple alternatives presumably they are distinguishable from one another.


You are constantly put scare quotes around nature as though a person's character, ideals, beliefs, attitude, intelligence, memories, talents, emotions and desires were some trifling irrelevancy.

I wouldn't make too much of it. I regard them as simple quotation marks, not "scare quotes" (whatever those are), and I meant simply to underscore that I am using "nature" in the sense you earlier defined.


I regard these as defining who we are. How do you define the self, if not by these things?

I'm not sure I need to define "the self" unless and until I use the term in a potentially ambiguous way, and I don't think I've used it at all. If I had to, I would probably define it much as you have, except perhaps with the addendum of a the will to whatever unspecified extent the will exists and can be at least theoretically distinguished from the other attributes you listed.


Not begging the question at all. I am saying that if I have controlled my choice then I have determined my choice.

Fair enough, but not in the normal sense of determinism, which generally denotes determination completely (if perhaps indirectly) by factors external to the self. I would assent to your statement if one thinks of determined in a sense akin to caused - which is a notion I'll return to a little bit further on.


This appears to me to be a tautology. I cannot see the case where I cannot control the outcome of a process without also determining the outcome of the process.

Okay.


I agree, this is absolutely key to the case of whether free will can exist. So say I have a black box with a single button and a single led digit display.

The box is built such that pressing the button returns a number from 0 - 9 but it is unpredictable which number will display. Now I say to you "give me a number, I will press the button and that number will display on the display".

Now can it be true that I am able to make good on that guarantee and that the box really is unpredictable? That would simply be a contradiction. If I am able to control the box then it cannot be unpredictable.


I would say that yes, it is logically possible for you to make good on that guarantee if your knowledge of the outcome was not deduced from all antecedents plus causal laws (which is the sense in which I earlier defined a prediction) but from, say, a direct perception of the outcome at a future point in time (perhaps in the manner of the timeless deity we discussed earlier). To qualify as a prediction as I've defined it, your knowledge of the outcome in this instance would have to be based solely on an exhaustive awareness of how the black box works and the circumstances of its actuation - probably impossible according to the terms of the hypothetical.

This might appear to lead to a contradiction because you were arguably predicting the unpredictable, but you would be predicting in one sense of "predict" what was unpredictable in another sense of "predict". So there would be no fundamental contradiction).


by "all causal laws" you presumably mean whatever order underpins our existence and makes it possible.

I had in mind something akin to all laws of physics and logic operating upon the natural universe, but perhaps that could defensibly be described as at least a significant part of the "order [that] underpins our existence and makes it possible."


Well let's first take the example of absolute unpredictability - ie absolute disorder. In that case existence itself would be impossible, never mind thinking and making choices. I would certainly regard this as a greater constraint than total predictability, where I at least get to exist.

A universe in which all phenomena were absolutely unpredictable would surely constitute a contraint on freedom, yes. It might well be reasonably regarded as inferior to or less preferable than a universe in which all phenomena are absolutely predictable. There would be zero human freedom in each universe, however, so I don't think one can say that the restraints on freedom would be quantitatively greater in one than in the other.


The order that we observe might be completely predictable, or maybe it is only somewhat predictabe. But it must be the predictability of it that provides us with the opportunity to think and choose rather than the unpredictability. So predictability does have some positive consequences for freedom.

I agree that at least some degree of predictability has positive consequences for freedom. Total predictability leaves no room for freedom, however.

And control is not a total constraint? It seems to me that we control a process precisely by constraining the outcomes

Again, usually we think of being in control and being constrained as opposites. The relevant question is not whether outcomes are constrained by our choices, but whether our choices are entirely a function of contraints placed upon us.


If I formed the intention to say "yes" and some unpredictable component had changed this and chosen instead to say "no" then I would regard this as a greater constraint on my freedom than if my mind had predictably allowed me to put my original intention into practice. And this would be true even if "yes" had been the dumb response it still wouldn't have been my choice. So here is an example where unpredictability would be a greater constraint on freedom than predictability.

If you formed the intention to say "yes" freely, and some unpredictable component apart from your own will changed this, then that would certainly be a constraint. If you formed the intention to say "yes" other than freely, then nothing that could happen would constitute an actual restraint on your freedom (of will), although something could certainly happen that would subjectively appear to constitute such a restraint. You might not have been aware of it, but there would not have been any freedom upon which a restraint might potentially operate.


On the contrary I am proceeding entirely on the premise I have from you and Bri, that an act of will is an uncaused event. An uncaused event is an event that has no cause. In other words it comes from nothing.

I don't recall setting forth the premise that an act of will is an uncaused event. To me, an "act of will" denotes an act the causes of which include the actor's will, or perhaps an act the proximate cause of which is the actor's will.


Not I, but it is a regular event in Sydney.

Sydney is a cool place; no one can say otherwise.

You don't need to deduce it logically for the sake of this debate, it is inherent in the premise that a free will event is an uncaused event.

But I object to that premise. I honestly don't remember positing it.


An mental event may be caused by extraneous physical circumstance, like a chemical imbalance. Or it could be completely uncaused.

I'm not sure how closely I hold to the notion of uncaused events. But at any rate, you've left out the possibility that a mental event's causes could include will.

* * * * *

I'll have to cut this short due to a lack of time. I'll revert back to you later, I expect.
 
ceo:

Free will would have to be an uncaused event, or else it would not be free will. If you don't agree even to that part of the definition of free will, it's no wonder you can't understand how free will is incompatible with an omniscient deity.
 
I want to post a proof here - but to do so I need a tight, sound definition of free will - the one we are currently debating is neither.

Perhaps ceo_esq can come up with a better definition that I can.

As with God, there is no one definition of free will that will satisfy everyone. The best we can do is to list common traits that are commonly considered necessary for free will. You may then attempt to prove that one or more of those traits cannot exist, either separately or in combination. You might also attempt to prove that one or more of those traits (or combinations) cannot exist if an omniscient or omnipotent (or whatever) God exists. Of course, none of this would prove the premise of the thread, but it might get you a tiny step closer to proving the problem of evil (since some defenses against it include the notion of free will).

The most common traits of free will seem to involve the ability of an agent to make its own undetermined choices, including the notion of "could have done otherwise" (aka the "principle of alternate possibilities" or the "garden of forked paths") and the notion that the free agent is the "ultimate source" of its actions. There are perhaps other traits that are common to free will as well.

Articles here and here might also give you some additional help. Good luck!

-Bri
 
Bri and ceo_esq say it is uncaused which seems to suggest it came from nowhere.

I don't know about ceo_esq, but I wasn't arguing that free will would have to be uncaused, only that it might be.

However, being uncaused no more suggests it comes from nowhere than the idea of uncaused random events coming from nowhere.

-Bri
 
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