My point there was that if there is theoretically more than one alternative that would be consonant with our "nature", then our "nature" does not entirely dictate our choice.
So between these alternatives there would be no distinction? If no distinction then the choice would be random in any case. If there were a distinction might this distinction relate to our nature? If I choose between two alternatives I would like to think that the choice I made said something about me.
You are constantly put scare quotes around nature as though a person's character, ideals, beliefs, attitude, intelligence, memories, talents, emotions and desires were some trifling irrelevancy. I regard these as defining who we are. How do you define the self, if not by these things? So why the scare quotes?
Because just calling something free will does not make it so. Any more than Honest John the car dealer is guaranteed to be honest or economic rationalism is guaranteed to be rational.
And to which definition (that of voluntary or that of free will) are you referring?
Any definition of voluntary that involved having some sort of control over our actions and our definition of free will where an act of will is fundamentally unpredictable.
I don't see why this should be the case, unless we are begging the question and have already ruled out the possibility that we retain control over at least some of our own choices.
Not begging the question at all. I am saying that if I have
controlled my choice then I have
determined my choice. This appears to me to be a tautology. I cannot see the case where I cannot control the outcome of a process without also determining the outcome of the process.
Perhaps we need to consider further the employed definitions of unpredictable and uncontrollable.
I agree, this is absolutely key to the case of whether free will can exist. So say I have a black box with a single button and a single led digit display.
The box is built such that pressing the button returns a number from 0 - 9 but it is unpredictable which number will display. Now I say to you "give me a number, I will press the button and that number will display on the display".
Now can it be true that I am able to make good on that guarantee and that the box really is unpredictable? That would simply be a contradiction. If I am able to control the box then it cannot be unpredictable.
As you know, the sense in which I have been using predictable, a predictable event is completely constrained, because it is purely a result of a fixed function (the totality of all existing causal laws) applied to fixed values (antecedent circumstances).
And by "all causal laws" you presumably mean whatever order underpins our existence and makes it possible.
If unpredictability involves its own constraints, they could logically be equally constraining as those involved in predictability, or they could be less constraining. As far as I can ascertain, what I wrote does not depend on the assumption you allege that I've made (that an unpredictable choice is necessarily less constrained than a predictable one). I asked how we can rule out the possibility that such choices are (at least) relatively unconstrained compared to predictable ones.
Well let's first take the example of absolute unpredictability - ie absolute disorder. In that case existence itself would be impossible, never mind thinking and making choices. I would certainly regard this as a greater constraint than total predictability, where I at least get to exist.
The order that we observe might be completely predictable, or maybe it is only somewhat predictabe. But it must be the predictability of it that provides us with the opportunity to think and choose rather than the unpredictability. So predictability does have some positive consequences for freedom.
As previously indicated, predictability is in my view a total constraint.
And control is not a total constraint? It seems to me that we control a process precisely by constraining the outcomes
I am not certain how one would go about making a case that unpredictability is a more onerous constraint that that; it seems logically impossible.
If I formed the intention to say "yes" and some unpredictable component had changed this and chosen instead to say "no" then I would regard this as a greater constraint on my freedom than if my mind had predictably allowed me to put my original intention into practice. And this would be true even if "yes" had been the dumb response it still wouldn't have been
my choice. So here is an example where unpredictability would be a greater constraint on freedom than predictability.
But as I said your very ability to choose at all depends entirely on the fact that your mind exists in the context of a dependable underlying order. If it existed in the context of an underlying disorder or an undependable underlying order then you would not be able to act at all, never mind act freely.
To me it seems pretty obvious that if a choice is made possible only by an underlying order then it must also be ultimately subject to that order. But to say that a process could be free from the constraints of the very thing that made it possible in the first place seems to be having your cake and eating it too.
I will provisionally admit the logical possibility that an equally constraining set of circumstances characterizes both predictability and unpredictability, but considering that we know little if anything about the nature of any unpredictable events (much less all of them) I think it would be highly problematic to argue this persuasively.
We know all that we need to know about them. They are unpredictable. My case is that unpredictability implies uncontrollability. If I cannot predict the outcome of a process, how can I control it?
I agree, so far as that goes. But does this not simply remove the difficulty to another level? How can we ascertain that we got our nature by accident?
We don't need to - since that is the premise - that a choice is an undetermined, unpredictable event.
I am speculating - and only speculating - that such a change could come from the will of a free agent. If you are proceeding, even unconsciously, from the assumption that free will cannot exist, then of course it's going to seem as though I'm speculating that the change could come from literally nothing.
On the contrary I am proceeding entirely on the premise I have from you and Bri, that an act of will is an
uncaused event. An uncaused event is an event that has no cause. In other words it comes from nothing.
In fact, it might well be more likely that such a change would reflect some hitherto hidden or dormant aspect of the subject's nature. But we are discussing logical possibilities here, and likelihoods and probabilities are irrelevant in that context.
You appeared to be assuming that a "leopard changes his spots" type of change in behaviour would be a choice against the previous nature. I was only pointing out the logical possibility that this was not the case.
Are you speaking from experience? You big softie.
Not I, but it is a regular event in Sydney.
Seriously, though, who knows for sure? It could be an act done in obedience to a pre-existing but unfamiliar nature. It could be an act done contrary to his nature in the sense you earlier defined "nature" (except to the logically possible extent that his nature always includes the possibility of choices that depend in part upon free will). It could be an act done in obedience to a new nature that nonetheless did not "happen to him by accident".
If the act was done in disobedience to a new nature then the new nature must have preceded the act. So where then did this new nature come from? What event precipitated the new to replace the old?
You are right about this. I would suspect the same thing. But I could not deduce it logically.
You don't need to deduce it logically for the sake of this debate, it is inherent in the premise that a free will event is an uncaused event. An mental event may be caused by extraneous physical circumstance, like a chemical imbalance. Or it could be completely uncaused. From my point of view these have in common the characteristic that
I did not cause them so they do not reflect my nature.
If you could agree that a choice motivated by a physical brain disfunction could not be my choice, why is a choice motivated by no cause at all my choice?
And if that indeterminate phenomenon were the will? I'm not satisfied that it is, of course, but I cannot exclude the logical possibility, and if it were true, I would have no objection to calling such choices "ours".
And I would have no objection in calling the moon "mine", but it would not make it so. If it were true that this indeterminate phenomenon were the will on what basis would you call it ours? We did not cause it to happen, it did not result from our desires, our emotions or our intellect. It was not even the result of any irrational belief or prejudice of ours. It was uncaused. It (or at least some of it) came from nothing.