But take, for example, the notion that "If a choice were not a true reflection of these antecedents then it could not validly be called our choice." I'm not sure the truth of this is evident. When an agent faces more than one option, is there always only one alternative that could constitute a "true reflection" of that agent's nature? If so, why? This merits its own demonstration.
I cant see where I have said there is only one alternative that reflects our choice so I am not really sure of your point.
Yes, there might be any number of (even contradictory) alternatives that would reflect my nature. There are a great many more that would not reflect my nature. A choice that was not caused by me would not be guaranteed to land in the former set. And if it did happen to fall into the former set it would be by accident rather than intention and so even if it did reflect my nature could not really be called my choice.
On the other hand a choice that was determined only by my nature would by definition fall into the former set.
And even if some real world considerations prevented this from always occurring the same could be said of indeterminist free will.
Also, per the classic idea of voluntarity, ...
Before you start appealing to the classic idea of voluntary you must first show that indeterminist free will meets the definition. A fundamentally unpredictable event must be by definition fundamentally uncontrollable. We normally associate behaviour over which we have no control as
involuntary.
...the possibility that the antecedents (beliefs, attitudes, etc.) themselves may include prior free choices is difficult to ignore. A person of virtuous habit, for example, may routinely act virtuously in a not-strictly-free fashion based on his ingrained habits (although I can think of no way to show that this is always the case). Yet how can we rule out that such habits did not descend from an unconstrained choice?
Here there is another unjustified assumption. Why would an unpredictable event be necessarily less constrained than a predictable one? Is it not possible that unpredictability involves constraints of its own? I could certainly make a good case that the underlying order of the universe is a less onerous constraint than unpredictability.
Certainly our nature is determined in large part by our previous choices. If our choices happened to us by accident then we got our nature by accident.
In addition, there's no doubt that there's something counterintuitive about the notion that human choices that do not follow inevitably from one's nature (as you've defined it) cannot be free choices. Can one not consider that choices that go against one's nature are the free choices. The leopard cannot change his spots, as the saying goes; yet it has commonly been observed that human beings are not leopards, and are theoretically able to act against their natures (even if, in practice, they generally don't) - and that this is the quintessence of free will. Whether this is actually true of human beings or leopards, however, is beside my last point here, which is to note that there are some plausible objections to the premise that a choice that does not reflect one's "nature" is ipso facto not a free choice.
But is it plausible that such a change could really come from literally nothing? Or more likely that such a change would reflect some hitherto hidden or dormant aspect of their nature?
If a lifelong vegetarian starts to munch a BLT do we happily assume that their previous attitude to bacon was one of unmitigated disgust? Or do we suspect that they might have secretly salivated just a little at the smell of bacon, even when eating their seaweed and brown rice?
Is the mad, bad and dangerous biker, who one day dinks a teddy bear to the park for childrens charity, acting contrary to his nature, or just showing an unfamiliar aspect of his nature?
On the other hand if we suspect that an alteration in behaviour is genuinely contrary to their nature then we automatically suspect that something other than free will is at work. If your sober and sensible retired bank manager uncle starts putting up barbed wire round his home and wrapping silver foil round his head you would not just think "ah, free will". You would encourage him to consult a doctor.
So if our choices depend ultimately on some indeterminate event rather than our own nature then they cannot be called 'our' choices. They are are the choices of that indeterminate event - whatever it is.