There is No God (And You Know It)

I would go 1 step further than ZD to argue that free will is not even possible under dualism. As ZD has pointed out the defintion that you have given us recently is effectively a dualist position although I do not think it is a very good defintion to be honest (there was a better one somewhere, maybe it was not Bri that posted it).

Before we get back to me distilling the proof:

Simply stated, when one has acted of one's own free will, one could have done otherwise, and one was the ultimate source of the action. In order to be the ultimate source of one's action, some condition necessary for the action must originate within oneself (rather than externally).

- Do you mean one could have done otherwise under exactly the same circumstances?

- The blatantly begging question is - what caused the 'condition necessary... within oneself'?

- And following on from that - what do you mean by 'oneself' as opposed to 'externally' and why do you draw a distinction between the 2 anyway?
 
I apologize if I mischaracterized what you said. What I should have said is that I won't comment on this until you provide proof of your claim that by my definition, free will "cannot exist under any version of idealism or dualism which includes an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent deity."

-Bri

Much better.

See, I'm not saying dualism can't include an omnimax deity; rather, an omnimax deity, as demonstrated earlier in this thread, precludes there being anything capable of making choice independently of God, thus preventing any such choice from being 'free'.

Of course, we have a much more interesting situation if we consider the 'Body of God' theory - that the universe is made within God, and that all men have within them God as well - causing 'free choice' to both be caused by God and caused by something internal to self, unaffected by 'external' forces. But, in this case, even the individual person becomes a mere illusion - see Gazerism for specific details.
 
- Do you mean one could have done otherwise under exactly the same circumstances?

Yes.

- The blatantly begging question is - what caused the 'condition necessary... within oneself'?

It is uncaused.

- And following on from that - what do you mean by 'oneself' as opposed to 'externally' and why do you draw a distinction between the 2 anyway?

I don't make such a distinction. I said that the action must originate within oneself rather than externally. In other words, "within oneself" means "not externally." I should think it fairly obvious that there is a distinction between "within oneself" and "externally."

-Bri
 
See, I'm not saying dualism can't include an omnimax deity; rather, an omnimax deity, as demonstrated earlier in this thread, precludes there being anything capable of making choice independently of God, thus preventing any such choice from being 'free'.

Again, unless you can prove this I won't comment. I've not seen anything that would demonstrate your conclusion.

-Bri
 
I don't make such a distinction. I said that the action must originate within oneself rather than externally. In other words, "within oneself" means "not externally." I should think it fairly obvious that there is a distinction between "within oneself" and "externally."

Is it ? What do you mean by "within oneself" ? Within the body ? The brain ?
 
But take, for example, the notion that "If a choice were not a true reflection of these antecedents then it could not validly be called our choice." I'm not sure the truth of this is evident. When an agent faces more than one option, is there always only one alternative that could constitute a "true reflection" of that agent's nature? If so, why? This merits its own demonstration.
I cant see where I have said there is only one alternative that reflects our choice so I am not really sure of your point.

Yes, there might be any number of (even contradictory) alternatives that would reflect my nature. There are a great many more that would not reflect my nature. A choice that was not caused by me would not be guaranteed to land in the former set. And if it did happen to fall into the former set it would be by accident rather than intention and so even if it did reflect my nature could not really be called my choice.

On the other hand a choice that was determined only by my nature would by definition fall into the former set.

And even if some real world considerations prevented this from always occurring the same could be said of indeterminist free will.
Also, per the classic idea of voluntarity, ...
Before you start appealing to the classic idea of voluntary you must first show that indeterminist free will meets the definition. A fundamentally unpredictable event must be by definition fundamentally uncontrollable. We normally associate behaviour over which we have no control as involuntary.
...the possibility that the antecedents (beliefs, attitudes, etc.) themselves may include prior free choices is difficult to ignore. A person of virtuous habit, for example, may routinely act virtuously in a not-strictly-free fashion based on his ingrained habits (although I can think of no way to show that this is always the case). Yet how can we rule out that such habits did not descend from an unconstrained choice?
Here there is another unjustified assumption. Why would an unpredictable event be necessarily less constrained than a predictable one? Is it not possible that unpredictability involves constraints of its own? I could certainly make a good case that the underlying order of the universe is a less onerous constraint than unpredictability.

Certainly our nature is determined in large part by our previous choices. If our choices happened to us by accident then we got our nature by accident.
In addition, there's no doubt that there's something counterintuitive about the notion that human choices that do not follow inevitably from one's nature (as you've defined it) cannot be free choices. Can one not consider that choices that go against one's nature are the free choices. The leopard cannot change his spots, as the saying goes; yet it has commonly been observed that human beings are not leopards, and are theoretically able to act against their natures (even if, in practice, they generally don't) - and that this is the quintessence of free will. Whether this is actually true of human beings or leopards, however, is beside my last point here, which is to note that there are some plausible objections to the premise that a choice that does not reflect one's "nature" is ipso facto not a free choice.
But is it plausible that such a change could really come from literally nothing? Or more likely that such a change would reflect some hitherto hidden or dormant aspect of their nature?

If a lifelong vegetarian starts to munch a BLT do we happily assume that their previous attitude to bacon was one of unmitigated disgust? Or do we suspect that they might have secretly salivated just a little at the smell of bacon, even when eating their seaweed and brown rice?

Is the mad, bad and dangerous biker, who one day dinks a teddy bear to the park for childrens charity, acting contrary to his nature, or just showing an unfamiliar aspect of his nature?

On the other hand if we suspect that an alteration in behaviour is genuinely contrary to their nature then we automatically suspect that something other than free will is at work. If your sober and sensible retired bank manager uncle starts putting up barbed wire round his home and wrapping silver foil round his head you would not just think "ah, free will". You would encourage him to consult a doctor.

So if our choices depend ultimately on some indeterminate event rather than our own nature then they cannot be called 'our' choices. They are are the choices of that indeterminate event - whatever it is.
 
Again, unless you can prove this I won't comment. I've not seen anything that would demonstrate your conclusion.

-Bri
So there exists an event that an omnimax deity is incapable of controlling, and yet you are able to control it?
 
ok - good

It is uncaused.
ok - good

I don't make such a distinction. I said that the action must originate within oneself rather than externally. In other words, "within oneself" means "not externally." I should think it fairly obvious that there is a distinction between "within oneself" and "externally.
-Bri

Not so good - meaning what exactly? Why should things be less caused 'internally' than 'externally'. Its surely only a case of where you define the boundaries of your system?

Your problem is that you conceive of the world and of yourself with yourself being 'internal' and therefore somehow not subject to normal rules of logic - why is that - maybe the definition of 'free will' is that it is free of logic. :)
 
ok - good

It is uncaused.
ok - good

I don't make such a distinction. I said that the action must originate within oneself rather than externally. In other words, "within oneself" means "not externally." I should think it fairly obvious that there is a distinction between "within oneself" and "externally.
-Bri

Not so good - meaning what exactly? Why should things be less caused 'internally' than 'externally'. Its surely only a case of where you define the boundaries of your system?

Your problem is that you conceive of the world and of yourself with yourself being 'internal' and therefore somehow not subject to normal rules of logic - why is that - maybe the definition of 'free will' is that it is free of logic. :)
 
ok - good

It is uncaused.
ok - good

I don't make such a distinction. I said that the action must originate within oneself rather than externally. In other words, "within oneself" means "not externally." I should think it fairly obvious that there is a distinction between "within oneself" and "externally.
-Bri

Not so good - meaning what exactly? Why should things be less caused 'internally' than 'externally'. Its surely only a case of where you define the boundaries of your system?

Your problem is that you conceive of the world and of yourself with yourself being 'internal' and therefore somehow not subject to normal rules of logic - why is that - maybe the definition of 'free will' is that it is free of logic. :)
 
ok - good

It is uncaused.
ok - good

I don't make such a distinction. I said that the action must originate within oneself rather than externally. In other words, "within oneself" means "not externally." I should think it fairly obvious that there is a distinction between "within oneself" and "externally.
-Bri

Not so good - meaning what exactly? Why should things be less caused 'internally' than 'externally'. Its surely only a case of where you define the boundaries of your system?

Your problem is that you conceive of the world and of yourself with yourself being 'internal' and therefore somehow not subject to normal rules of logic - why is that - maybe the definition of 'free will' is that it is free of logic. :)
 
Is it ? What do you mean by "within oneself" ? Within the body ? The brain ?

Belz - he doesn't know, that's his problem. I really want someone to give us a good, tight definition of free will here and I think, using the arguments presented on this thread it could be logically refuted. Problem is, getting something that makes some sort of sense in the first place.

As I am sure you have noticed.
 
Again, unless you can prove this I won't comment. I've not seen anything that would demonstrate your conclusion.

-Bri

I suggest reading this thread. After you've completed that 'Hooked on Phonics' set, that is.

:D

(Just pulling your chain...)
 
So there exists an event that an omnimax deity is incapable of controlling, and yet you are able to control it?

Seems like that's what he's saying.

Oh, wait - I know. God is capable of controlling it, but chooses not to. (LAME!)
 
Not so good - meaning what exactly? Why should things be less caused 'internally' than 'externally'. Its surely only a case of where you define the boundaries of your system?

This concept isn't all that difficult to understand. You can define the boundaries of your "agent" as you like, but with determinism everything is caused by something external to it so it wouldn't really matter.

If your agent is a human being, in a materialistic world "internal" would generally mean the physical body including the brain. If dualism is true, a human agent would likely include both the physical and non-physical parts that make up the whole person.

If an agent (however it is defined) "could have done otherwise" and was the "ultimate source" of its action, it can be said to have acted of its own free will.

-Bri
 
Seems like that's what he's saying.

Oh, wait - I know. God is capable of controlling it, but chooses not to. (LAME!)

If God wanted human beings to have free will, it seems reasonable that he would have to relinquish control over their actions.

What I find lame is that you actually believe that somehow inserting the word "LAME" in all caps into your response substitutes for proof that such a scenario is impossible.

-Bri
 
I suggest reading this thread. After you've completed that 'Hooked on Phonics' set, that is.

:D

Forgive me for not considering this an acceptable proof, but keep working on it! You're so close! Perhaps another smiley face would do it! :D

-Bri
 
This concept isn't all that difficult to understand. You can define the boundaries of your "agent" as you like, but with determinism everything is caused by something external to it so it wouldn't really matter.
Are you able to justify this assertion? If my brain is based on the underlying order of the universe, then how is that order somehow external to me?

It seems to me that it is integrally part of me.
If your agent is a human being, in a materialistic world "internal" would generally mean the physical body including the brain. If dualism is true, a human agent would likely include both the physical and non-physical parts that make up the whole person.
And the non-physical parts are somehow able to function perfectly well with no underlying order? Or is is more plausible that any non-physical parts would have an underlying order of their own?
If an agent (however it is defined) "could have done otherwise" and was the "ultimate source" of its action, it can be said to have acted of its own free will.
And yet nobody has been able to explain exactly why this is more likely under a non-physical context than a physical context. In other words what difference does dualism make to the argument? Basically none.
 
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Forgive me for not considering this an acceptable proof, but keep working on it! You're so close! Perhaps another smiley face would do it! :D

-Bri

:bgrin:

heh

The proof has been offered, again and again. You refuse to see it. This is called 'willful ignorance'.

I'll not repeat myself again to you - nor will I repeat the work of the others here who have basically refined what you, yourself, have provided - proving, at least to a few of us, that free will is an incoherent concept, on an absolute/ideal level.

But, then, few things really are, you know? Ideals, absolutes - these things really don't exist. Who was it - Plato who suggested that the world is just a shadow of ideals? Or am I mixing my philosophers? But whoever it was - was dead wrong. And is now just dead.
 

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