So tell us why we are wrong.
Why you are wrong when you say what, precisely? I'm not saying anyone who says that free will exists (or that it does not exist) is incorrect. Perhaps more to the point, I am not saying that anyone who insists that free will
cannot possibly exist (or that it
must exist) is incorrect. However, since, so far as I am aware, I have not been presented with a discrete and cogent deductive argument for the impossibility of free will, I am not in a position to assent to the proposition that the impossibility of free will has been shown.
Robin said:
There has been more than one argument I will try to distill the ones that I put.
1. Common experience. If you ask a person "why did you do that?" they will not find a "because" answer unacceptable. They might say, "because I felt like it", or "because in my experience that was the best thing to do" or "because I used my common sense". So in normal experience it is common think of a choice as having a cause. Moreover we think of choice as being in control, and non-determinism no more compatible with that idea than determinism.
A few comments here. First of all, the premises and conclusion of this argument are not entirely clear to me. Second, if the conclusion is that libertarian free will does not exist or, perhaps, cannot possibly exist, doesn't it go without saying that this kind of inductive argument cannot ensure such conclusion?
Robin said:
2. Logic. The antecedents for any choice are mental entities such as our values, beliefs, attitudes, skills, intelligence, knowledge, experience, emotions, desires and so on. This could briefly be called our nature. If a choice were not a true reflection of these antecedents then it could not validly be called our choice. So to the extent that a choice is determined, or caused by it's antecedents it is our choice - a reflection of our nature. To the extent that a choice is undetermined or uncaused (whether this is randomness or some other form of acausality) by any antecedent it is not a reflection of our nature and therefore not our choice.
Okay, the premises and conclusion are somewhat clearer here (although it would no doubt be useful to identify and number them in the traditional form of an inductive proof). But take, for example, the notion that "If a choice were not a true reflection of these antecedents then it could not validly be called our choice." I'm not sure the truth of this is evident. When an agent faces more than one option, is there always only one alternative that could constitute a "true reflection" of that agent's nature? If so, why? This merits its own demonstration.
Also, per the classic idea of voluntarity, the possibility that the antecedents (beliefs, attitudes, etc.) themselves may include prior free choices is difficult to ignore. A person of virtuous habit, for example, may routinely act virtuously in a not-strictly-free fashion based on his ingrained habits (although I can think of no way to show that this is always the case). Yet how can we rule out that such habits did not descend from an unconstrained choice?
In addition, there's no doubt that there's something counterintuitive about the notion that human choices that do not follow inevitably from one's nature (as you've defined it) cannot be free choices. Can one not consider that choices that go against one's nature are the free choices. The leopard cannot change his spots, as the saying goes; yet it has commonly been observed that human beings are not leopards, and are theoretically able to act against their natures (even if, in practice, they generally don't) - and that this is the
quintessence of free will. Whether this is actually true of human beings or leopards, however, is beside my last point here, which is to note that there are some plausible objections to the premise that a choice that does not reflect one's "nature" is
ipso facto not a free choice.