There is No God (And You Know It)

Not at all. I would find that prospect absolutely appealing, believe me. I don't see that here, however.

That was not really an appeal to authority, at least of the fallacious variety - as it would be if I had, say, argued that because some authority believes that free will exists (or at least that its non-existence cannot be established), that it is so. Hodgy's assertion about what has been accomplished here simply seems dubious to me in a probabilistic sense - and I am basing this largely on what I've seen here, not merely what I've seen elsewhere.

So tell us why we are wrong.
 
Great. I'm open to correction. Would somebody please distill the argument?
There has been more than one argument I will try to distill the ones that I put.

1. Common experience. If you ask a person "why did you do that?" they will not find a "because" answer unacceptable. They might say, "because I felt like it", or "because in my experience that was the best thing to do" or "because I used my common sense". So in normal experience it is common think of a choice as having a cause. Moreover we think of choice as being in control, and non-determinism no more compatible with that idea than determinism.

2. Logic. The antecedents for any choice are mental entities such as our values, beliefs, attitudes, skills, intelligence, knowledge, experience, emotions, desires and so on. This could briefly be called our nature. If a choice were not a true reflection of these antecedents then it could not validly be called our choice. So to the extent that a choice is determined, or caused by it's antecedents it is our choice - a reflection of our nature. To the extent that a choice is undetermined or uncaused (whether this is randomness or some other form of acausality) by any antecedent it is not a reflection of our nature and therefore not our choice.

So if we have free will then it is deterministic. If free will is non deterministic then it is not our free will. In other words free could only mean free from external control, not free from the necessity of the underlying order.

The remaining question is what determines our nature? could be treated similarly. If any part of our nature is undetermined by anything then it would just be a nature we acquired by accident and could not therefore be called our nature.

Now I would be interested, not only in where I have gone wrong, but in a similar justification of how free will could be non-deterministic
 
There has been more than one argument I will try to distill the ones that I put.

1. Common experience. If you ask a person "why did you do that?" they will not find a "because" answer unacceptable. They might say, "because I felt like it", or "because in my experience that was the best thing to do" or "because I used my common sense". So in normal experience it is common think of a choice as having a cause. Moreover we think of choice as being in control, and non-determinism no more compatible with that idea than determinism.

2. Logic. The antecedents for any choice are mental entities such as our values, beliefs, attitudes, skills, intelligence, knowledge, experience, emotions, desires and so on. This could briefly be called our nature. If a choice were not a true reflection of these antecedents then it could not validly be called our choice. So to the extent that a choice is determined, or caused by it's antecedents it is our choice - a reflection of our nature. To the extent that a choice is undetermined or uncaused (whether this is randomness or some other form of acausality) by any antecedent it is not a reflection of our nature and therefore not our choice.

So if we have free will then it is deterministic. If free will is non deterministic then it is not our free will. In other words free could only mean free from external control, not free from the necessity of the underlying order.

The remaining question is what determines our nature? could be treated similarly. If any part of our nature is undetermined by anything then it would just be a nature we acquired by accident and could not therefore be called our nature.

Now I would be interested, not only in where I have gone wrong, but in a similar justification of how free will could be non-deterministic

Eloquently and succintly stated - objections...?
 
So tell us why we are wrong.

Why you are wrong when you say what, precisely? I'm not saying anyone who says that free will exists (or that it does not exist) is incorrect. Perhaps more to the point, I am not saying that anyone who insists that free will cannot possibly exist (or that it must exist) is incorrect. However, since, so far as I am aware, I have not been presented with a discrete and cogent deductive argument for the impossibility of free will, I am not in a position to assent to the proposition that the impossibility of free will has been shown.

Robin said:
There has been more than one argument I will try to distill the ones that I put.

1. Common experience. If you ask a person "why did you do that?" they will not find a "because" answer unacceptable. They might say, "because I felt like it", or "because in my experience that was the best thing to do" or "because I used my common sense". So in normal experience it is common think of a choice as having a cause. Moreover we think of choice as being in control, and non-determinism no more compatible with that idea than determinism.

A few comments here. First of all, the premises and conclusion of this argument are not entirely clear to me. Second, if the conclusion is that libertarian free will does not exist or, perhaps, cannot possibly exist, doesn't it go without saying that this kind of inductive argument cannot ensure such conclusion?

Robin said:
2. Logic. The antecedents for any choice are mental entities such as our values, beliefs, attitudes, skills, intelligence, knowledge, experience, emotions, desires and so on. This could briefly be called our nature. If a choice were not a true reflection of these antecedents then it could not validly be called our choice. So to the extent that a choice is determined, or caused by it's antecedents it is our choice - a reflection of our nature. To the extent that a choice is undetermined or uncaused (whether this is randomness or some other form of acausality) by any antecedent it is not a reflection of our nature and therefore not our choice.

Okay, the premises and conclusion are somewhat clearer here (although it would no doubt be useful to identify and number them in the traditional form of an inductive proof). But take, for example, the notion that "If a choice were not a true reflection of these antecedents then it could not validly be called our choice." I'm not sure the truth of this is evident. When an agent faces more than one option, is there always only one alternative that could constitute a "true reflection" of that agent's nature? If so, why? This merits its own demonstration.

Also, per the classic idea of voluntarity, the possibility that the antecedents (beliefs, attitudes, etc.) themselves may include prior free choices is difficult to ignore. A person of virtuous habit, for example, may routinely act virtuously in a not-strictly-free fashion based on his ingrained habits (although I can think of no way to show that this is always the case). Yet how can we rule out that such habits did not descend from an unconstrained choice?

In addition, there's no doubt that there's something counterintuitive about the notion that human choices that do not follow inevitably from one's nature (as you've defined it) cannot be free choices. Can one not consider that choices that go against one's nature are the free choices. The leopard cannot change his spots, as the saying goes; yet it has commonly been observed that human beings are not leopards, and are theoretically able to act against their natures (even if, in practice, they generally don't) - and that this is the quintessence of free will. Whether this is actually true of human beings or leopards, however, is beside my last point here, which is to note that there are some plausible objections to the premise that a choice that does not reflect one's "nature" is ipso facto not a free choice.
 
Why you are wrong when you say what, precisely? I'm not saying anyone who says that free will exists (or that it does not exist) is incorrect. Perhaps more to the point, I am not saying that anyone who insists that free will cannot possibly exist (or that it must exist) is incorrect. However, since, so far as I am aware, I have not been presented with a discrete and cogent deductive argument for the impossibility of free will, I am not in a position to assent to the proposition that the impossibility of free will has been shown.
Since the 'libertarian' argument attempts to stake out the common experience as support for their side, I was showing that the common experience is more in line with the determinist position.
Okay, the premises and conclusion are somewhat clearer here (although it would no doubt be useful to identify and number them in the traditional form of an inductive proof).
Longer response to come, but I should point out here that there is no such thing as an inductive proof (unless you are talking about mathematical induction which would of course not apply here)

Are you talking about a deductive proof?
 
The ambiguity is all yours. The sentences differ in the tense of the verb clause and the fact that they use the tense-appropriate conjunction.

Robin, you didn't answer my question: Are you a native speaker of English?

In English, the same word is often used in different contexts. I imagine this is also true in other languages. Consider the following:

Whether or not God does exist:


A1. God does exist: It is certain that God exists.
A2. God might exist: It is possible that God exists.
A3. God does not exist: It is impossible that God exists.
​

Whether or not God can (logically) exist:


B1. God can exist: It is possible for God to exist.
B2. God may exist: It may be possible for God to exist.
B3. God cannot exist: It is impossible for God to exist.
​

The statements A1, A3, B1, and B3 are perhaps positive statements that require some evidence. However, statements A2 and B2 -- the only statements I have claimed as fact -- do not bear the burden of proof. If you misunderstood and thought I was making another claim, then I apologize for not being more clear.

The first implies the second. It would not be possible that X exists unless it were possible for X to exist.

IF one could prove B3, then one would have also proven A3. Likewise, if one could prove A1 then one would have also proven B1. In other words, B3 implies A3 and A1 implies B1.

Or are you saying that you are using "possible" in it's colloquial sense of "It is possible I will go to the shops this afternoon"?

That's not a colloquial use of the term at all. The statement is true unless it is impossible for you to go to the shops this afternoon (perhaps the shops are closed for a holiday, or perhaps you are in prison). If someone called you a liar for making such a statement, they should have evidence that it would be impossible.

Is is not reasonable to assume that in a discussion of this nature the word 'possible' is used in the sense 'logically possible'?

All of the above uses of the term "possible" mean "logically possible." I think you may be confusing the logical possibility that God's existance matches reality with the logical possibility of God's existance. The discussion consisted of both, so it's easy to see how you confused the two. However, the subject of the thread claims A3, for which B3, if proven, would be evidence.

Either way, would you then agree that the following statements are all false?

As I stated above, the statement "Free will might exist: It is possible that free will exists" and "Free will may exist: It may be possible for free will to exist" do not bear the burden of proof. The following statements might bear the burden of proof (which is why I never claimed them to be fact):


Free will does exist: It is certain that free will exists.
Free will does not exist: It is impossible that free will exists.

Free will can exist: It is possible for free will to exist.
Free will cannot exist: It is impossible for free will to exist.
​

This is the last I'll comment on semantics of the English language unless you insist on continuing.

-Bri
 
IT seems as if you are bothered by the idea that a bunch of armchair philosophers might have adequately done something that your adored authority figures have not. Frankly, your appeal to authority is noted, and your opinion subsequently graded on that note.

I, for one, would be delighted if a bunch of armchair philosophers had done something that thousands of years of philosophy hasn't produced. Unfortunately, you'll have to forgive me for remaining skeptical. Please submit your proof to a reputable peer-reviewed scientific or philosophy journal. Put your money where your mouth is and prove your claim.

Although I don't think there is any one point within this thread where a formal proof of the non-existence of free will has been stated, I think that, overall, this thread contains all the necessary elements of that proof.

Put it together for us, zaayr, and submit it. I don't think anything that has been stated thus far is any more than a rehash of what philosophers have been discussing for thousands of years. Prove me wrong.

Certainly, the overall gist of this thread is that free-will is nothing more than a convenient illusion, UNLESS we subscribe to a form of interactive dualism - which is fraught with its own metaphysical problems - or immaterial idealism, in either case, that is atheistic in nature.

Perhaps, but that's a big IF you've added there! In essence, you're agreeing that it is possible, which means that you don't have the proof you claim. The subject of the thread is about proof that there is no God, not about showing that it is possible that there is no God (nobody on this thread has disagreed with that possibility).

-Bri
 
Bri, do you have a reading comprehension disability? I know what the thread was about - I'm not arguing about whether or not God can exist. I'm arguing that free will can ONLY exist under the conditions listed above. It's a derail, but is about the only thing we have resolved, in this thread. Free will and God are incompatible, and the proof lies buried in the umpteen pages of this thread.

For my own part, I really don't care. As long as practical free will exists, I'm happy. And since this proof came not from me, but from others, it would be idea-theft if I were to package it and submit it. Let others do their own work, and leave me out of it.

But when CEO-ESQ scoffs at the idea that some armchair-philosophers might have done something that thousands of years of professional philosophers might not have done, I think it's incumbent upon him to prove that this hasn't happened.

For what it's worth, most of the currently-fashionable pro-Free-will arguments are poorly structured semantic juggling games, at best. Move an argument into a territory fraught with complex technical terms, vague lexicography, and profession-specific concepts, and it's no wonder that 'common man' is stunned by these seemingly intellectual arguments. But get these same philosophers to change their arguments into more commonly accepted parlance, and you'll see most of these arguments' critical flaws more clearly.
 
I know what the thread was about - I'm not arguing about whether or not God can exist. I'm arguing that free will can ONLY exist under the conditions listed above. It's a derail, but is about the only thing we have resolved, in this thread. Free will and God are incompatible, and the proof lies buried in the umpteen pages of this thread.

Forgive me for disagreeing with your opinion, but if you believe that anything has been proven in this thread, you'll have to demonstrate it. Do you actually believe that we are the first people to ever discuss the compatibility of God and free will?

For my own part, I really don't care. As long as practical free will exists, I'm happy. And since this proof came not from me, but from others, it would be idea-theft if I were to package it and submit it. Let others do their own work, and leave me out of it.

So, why don't you package this proof up for us, and simply give credit to whoever was collectively responsible? Just a suggestion, but I would doubt that you're going to convince many people that such a proof exists unless you can actually articulate it.

But when CEO-ESQ scoffs at the idea that some armchair-philosophers might have done something that thousands of years of professional philosophers might not have done, I think it's incumbent upon him to prove that this hasn't happened.

To the contrary, it's incumbent upon you to prove your claim.

-Bri
 
Correction, Bri - it is Hodgy's claim. I'm just backing him up.

:p

"And the 'burden of proof' is shifted once more!"
 
Correction, Bri - it is Hodgy's claim. I'm just backing him up.

I was referring to this one:

Although I don't think there is any one point within this thread where a formal proof of the non-existence of free will has been stated, I think that, overall, this thread contains all the necessary elements of that proof.

And this one:

I'm arguing that free will can ONLY exist under the conditions listed above. It's a derail, but is about the only thing we have resolved, in this thread. Free will and God are incompatible, and the proof lies buried in the umpteen pages of this thread.

Again, I would doubt that you're going to convince many people that such a proof exists unless you can actually articulate it.

"And the 'burden of proof' is shifted once more!"

It is indeed.

-Bri
 
I will try to distill the proof if one of the free will proponents will first furnish me with their definition of free will. I know that someone (I think Bri) provided one before but I could not find it. It was something along the lines of being able to make a different choice given the same set of circumstances.
 
Longer response to come, but I should point out here that there is no such thing as an inductive proof (unless you are talking about mathematical induction which would of course not apply here)

Are you talking about a deductive proof?

Yes. I mistyped.
 
2 a : not determined by anything beyond its own nature or being : choosing or capable of choosing for itself

Ok, good. Clearly there are 2 clauses in this defintion, the 2nd one would be applicable to a chooser but not to a choice (our event).

Which leaves us with your definition of a free event being 'not determined by anything...'. So, your free event is just a plain uncaused event - do you agree? Let's get this point settled before proceeding.

We don't need the word "free" to apply to the event, only to the will (as in "free will"). By this definition, free will would mean will that is not determined by anything beyond its own nature or being and capable of choosing for itself.

So no, I don't think you can ignore the choice aspect, because without choice the definition would apply to anything that is uncaused (including that other thing that we're not supposed to talk about). So the final clause is certainly important.

In other words, there are two key ingredients to freedom as it pertains to free will:


undetermined (a free agent is the "ultimate source" of its own actions)
choice (a free agent "could have done otherwise" when taking action)
​

Perhaps not perfect, but it'll do for now. It also meshes with the definition of free will that I posted previously...

I will try to distill the proof if one of the free will proponents will first furnish me with their definition of free will. I know that someone (I think Bri) provided one before but I could not find it. It was something along the lines of being able to make a different choice given the same set of circumstances.

Here is the description previously posted:

Bri said:
Simply stated, when one has acted of one's own free will, one could have done otherwise, and one was the ultimate source of the action. In order to be the ultimate source of one's action, some condition necessary for the action must originate within oneself (rather than externally).

-Bri
 
Given that definition ("some condition necessary for the action must originate within oneself"), free will is compatible with determinism, and is what I term 'practical free will' - not absolute free will. This doesn't stop the originating condition from being nothing more than an apparently random fluctuation of some sort, or even of being a determined event ultimately caused externally - UNLESS the definition of 'oneself' is an inherently dualist term itself, referring not to 'within the body/brain' but 'within the self'.

In other words, Bri, the definition is either insufficient to define absolute (libertarian) free will, or the definition has a built-in 'ghost in the machine'; either way, it is an unsatisfactory definition.
 
Given that definition ("some condition necessary for the action must originate within oneself"), free will is compatible with determinism, and is what I term 'practical free will' - not absolute free will.

I disagree, and so do most sources that use this definition including the Stanford one.

This doesn't stop the originating condition from being nothing more than an apparently random fluctuation of some sort, or even of being a determined event ultimately caused externally

Actually, "ultimate source" means just the opposite -- that it is not "ultimately caused externally." I think that was pretty clear from the description "in order to be the ultimate source of one's action, some condition necessary for the action must originate within oneself (rather than externally)." The choice aspect of the definition precludes it from being "an apparently random fluctuation of some sort."

UNLESS the definition of 'oneself' is an inherently dualist term itself, referring not to 'within the body/brain' but 'within the self'.

It certainly could be. The term "oneself" certainly wouldn't restrict the source of the action only to the physical self if dualism is true.

In other words, Bri, the definition is either insufficient to define absolute (libertarian) free will, or the definition has a built-in 'ghost in the machine'; either way, it is an unsatisfactory definition.

I disagree that the definition would be "unsatisfactory" even if your assertions were true, zaayr. I've always maintained that the "ghost in the machine" might be the source of free will if it exists (though not the only possible source). So I have no problem even if the definition necessarily implied dualism (which it doesn't). So what's your point exactly?

-Bri
 
My point, exactly, is that by your definition (accepting the correction for ultimately originating within "oneself") 'free will' cannot exist under materialism AT ALL, and also cannot exist under any version of idealism or dualism which includes an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent deity. As such, I have no particular problem with your definition; just understand that your definition makes 'free will' nothing but empty speculation UNTIL you can prove the existence of either the 'ghost' or of this other possible source of free will.

You know, I like you, Bri - at every turn, you end up arguing against the very things you claim to be arguing for!
 
My point, exactly, is that by your definition (accepting the correction for ultimately originating within "oneself") 'free will' cannot exist under materialism AT ALL, and also cannot exist under any version of idealism or dualism which includes an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent deity.

I won't comment on this until you provide proof of your assumption that dualism cannot involve an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent deity.

As such, I have no particular problem with your definition; just understand that your definition makes 'free will' nothing but empty speculation UNTIL you can prove the existence of either the 'ghost' or of this other possible source of free will.

If I claimed that free will existed, it would of course be speculation since I don't know that it exists. If I was claiming it a fact that the "ghost in the machine" was the source of free will then it would be incumbent upon me to prove the existance of the ghost. Of course, I also never claimed that free will exists, nor that it must be caused by the ghost if it does exist. My only claim was that both are possible, which you seem to agree with based on your above comments.

You know, I like you, Bri - at every turn, you end up arguing against the very things you claim to be arguing for!

I like you too, zaayr, despite your repeated misrepresentation of what I'm arguing for!

-Bri
 
Bri said:
I won't comment on this until you provide proof of your assumption that dualism cannot involve an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent deity.
That's not what I said, Bri - re-read it.

I apologize if I mischaracterized what you said. What I should have said is that I won't comment on this until you provide proof of your claim that by my definition, free will "cannot exist under any version of idealism or dualism which includes an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnipresent deity."

-Bri
 
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