If Gods knowledge of all time informs his choices about an action at a particular point in time then it becomes a prediction.
No. Prediction, in the sense I have been using the term, means calculation on the basis of (1) all causal laws and (2) all circumstances in the universe, solely as (1) and (2) exist on the timeline at a given point prior to the point at which the predicted event exists. I do not consider God's knowledge of the future through direct cognition to be either an antecedent or a causal law in this sense (or based on an antecedent or a causal law); therefore, it is never, strictly speaking, a prediction.
Robin said:
So at God's first observation of anything in the universe the entire universe is determined at that point, so God cannot change it.
I don't see any
logical problem with God "instantaneously" perceiving a timeline in which he is nonetheless an actor, albeit that it's a bit of a mind-bender from a purely human perspective. I have been searching the literature for a workable proof of such a problem, and find none.
zaayrdragon said:
For that matter, if you could prove that such a thing [as free will] does or can exist, then you will have also accomplished something that no philosopher has ever been able to accomplish.
No one has to prove that free will exists. I think we must assume that free will
can exist (that is, it exists in at least one logically possible universe), since it does not appear to present any
internal contradictions. The question we have been disputing regards not the possibility of free will
per se, but the
compossibility of free will and the God of classical theism (divine omniscience in particular).
I think it is impossible to prove, deductively or otherwise, the actual existence of free will. I am strongly inclined to believe that it is impossible to prove the actual existence of an omniscient agent. But we do not need to do any of those things in order to consider the question of whether both could hypothetically exist at the same time.
zaayrdragon said:
Since our current set of observations includes caused events, both deterministic and apparently random, the most logical inferrence is that all events are caused, either deterministically or randomly.
Yet it is virtually universally acknowledged that our set of observations also includes events that are neither
apparently deterministic nor
apparently random! I can't recall reading a single thinker on the subject, in any discipline, who ever denied that some human actions are
apparently free (even if he disputed that they were
actually free).