There is No God (And You Know It)

Heck, I am free not to go to work today which, I would very much rather not do. However, I am also free to suffer the consequences of being out of work. Now, could it be that this stems from the fact that the folks at work have a collective will which is greater than mine? It's certainly the way I look at it anyway. It's just a matter of who has more energy (of which the will is derived) and the resources to back them up.

The notion that your choice is determined and therefore not free does not require that you make the choice in isolation of external considerations. Causation does not have to be simple (A causes B), as you suggest yourself, there may be many interdependant and interacting causes that actually result in an event (If X = 1 A causes B else A causes C and Y). Your statement above provides us with a real world example of this interdependency and interaction - thanks.
 
ceo_esq
However, neuroscience has not been able to show that mental state is entirely equivalent to brain state. We do not know whether even total neuroscientific knowledge could supply a complete account of the properties of conscious experience, and a number of arguments have been raised to the effect that it probably can't. Consult the Stanford article on the philosophy of neuroscience for an overview.
Nice red herring, but that is all it is, misdirection. The article states human understanding is inadequate but postulates a future understanding. On omniscient entity would have that understanding.

Ossai
 
Nice red herring, but that is all it is, misdirection. The article states human understanding is inadequate but postulates a future understanding. On omniscient entity would have that understanding.

The article also suggests the possibility that no amount of understanding of brain function could account for the properties of consciousness. It would be one thing if we already knew enough about consciousness and brain activity to know that they were identical, even if we didn't yet have the science to know the exact correlation between brain state and mental state. But we just don't know whether there is more to consciousness than brain activity. And whether there is or not, the laws of logic do not require them to be the same thing.

Actually, you are really engaging in question-begging, since the assumption that human mental state is equivalent to physical brain state basically constitutes a judgment that the former is, from a human perspective, deterministic.


Belz... said:
Then it's not random, is it ?

What does observation - whether by me or by a timeless being - have to do with randomness?
 
What does observation - whether by me or by a timeless being - have to do with randomness?

It doesn't. Bri said:

"The notion of predicting something involves an assumption of time. A timeless being should be able to "predict" any event -- including a random one -- by simply observing it."

If one can "predict" a random event, then it's not random. By definition, a random event is unpredictable. I'm referring to the random as in quantum fluctuation, not random as in lottery picks.
 
It doesn't. Bri said:

"The notion of predicting something involves an assumption of time. A timeless being should be able to "predict" any event -- including a random one -- by simply observing it."

If one can "predict" a random event, then it's not random. By definition, a random event is unpredictable. I'm referring to the random as in quantum fluctuation, not random as in lottery picks.

Ah. I see. I think the reason Bri placed quotation marks around the word "predict" was that he did not mean it in the most conventional sense of deduction from antecedents and causal laws. You are right that a random event cannot be absolutely predicted in this sense. However, there is no logical reason why God would not still always know the outcome of a random event in our future through direct observation, since (as I think you agreed) direct observation at any time is not inconsistent with randomness.
 
Ah. I see. I think the reason Bri placed quotation marks around the word "predict" was that he did not mean it in the most conventional sense of deduction from antecedents and causal laws. You are right that a random event cannot be absolutely predicted in this sense. However, there is no logical reason why God would not still always know the outcome of a random event in our future through direct observation, since (as I think you agreed) direct observation at any time is not inconsistent with randomness.
Nevertheless if it is not deterministic it is at any rate determined when God observes it. God observers the big bang, the little whimper and all events in between equally. God's first view of the universe is as a fait accompli - he can do nothing about anything that happens in it.

A timeless being viewing the universe is no different, from a practical point of view, to someone viewing the past.

If God participates in the universe (other than setting initial conditions) then either God is not omnisicient or the universe is deterministic. If God is omnisicient or we have free will then God cannot participate in the universe.

If there is a God he must be something along the lines that Iacchus has been pushing lately.
 
However, there is no logical reason why God would not still always know the outcome of a random event in our future through direct observation, since (as I think you agreed) direct observation at any time is not inconsistent with randomness.

I'm not sure I understand. If God can see our future (thought for him, time would be meaningless,) then the events he is seeing cannot be truly random. Unless there's something I didn't understand about your post. Please advise.
 
I'm not sure I understand. If God can see our future (thought for him, time would be meaningless,) then the events he is seeing cannot be truly random. Unless there's something I didn't understand about your post. Please advise.
Nope, that looks like Calvinist predestinarianism. The future must be concrete if any deity can know all of it. So sit back, relax, and enjoy the ride because you can't do anything God didn't want you to do.
 
Nope, that looks like Calvinist predestinarianism. The future must be concrete if any deity can know all of it. So sit back, relax, and enjoy the ride because you can't do anything God didn't want you to do.

Is that relevant, or are you beign sarcastic ? If it's the former, all I'm saying is that omniscience and pure randomness seem irreconcilable to me.
 
I'm not sure I understand. If God can see our future (thought for him, time would be meaningless,) then the events he is seeing cannot be truly random. Unless there's something I didn't understand about your post. Please advise.
No, ceo_esq is right - if God is outside of time and can see all of time it does not mean that everything is deterministic - it is (roughly) analogous to viewing a tape of something that happened yesterday.

We can observe what is happening and (on subsequent viewings) "predict" what will happen next but that does not mean that the events were deterministic.

If there was some entity that could stand outside of time and see all of time as a single object it could see events at any time. But that would not mean that no non-deterministic events occurred.

So the entity would not be predicting non-deterministic events but merely observing the results of them.

None of this is impossible as such.

However, as I have said earlier, once it starts to interact with the temporal world then this knowledge causes all sorts of contradictions and paradoxes.
 
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A timeless being viewing the universe is no different, from a practical point of view, to someone viewing the past.

I've quoted this first because I'm going to refer back to it. In the following remarks, my references to "foreknowing" and "foreknowledge" allude to the "timeless viewing" scenario, rather than the "prediction" scenario (as we have previously distinguished the two in this thread).

Nevertheless if it is not deterministic it is at any rate determined when God observes it.
Yet if God observes a phenomenon it in a manner somewhat akin to how we view the past, God's observation of it does not affect whether such phenomenon was deterministic, nor how it was determined. The example of our own pasts tells us that there is nothing logically inconsistent between a phenomenon's being determined and such phenomenon's being partially caused by free agency. There is an obvious contrast between deterministic and merely determined.

Philosopher William Lane Craig (whose theological views, naturally, I do not share), points out something interesting in this regard (source):

Utilizing the medieval distinction between the senses ... consider the proposition

2. A future event can fail to occur.

In sensu diviso, (2) means

3. Possibly, an event, which is future, will fail to occur

and is true if the event is contingent. But taken in sensu composito, (2) means

4. Possibly, an event which is future will fail to occur,

which is necessarily false. Thus, what is at issue with regard to the misleading notion of "altering the future" is whether one has the power to prevent a future event in sensu diviso. One can prevent the event, but were one to do so, then the event would not be future. To say that one cannot prevent a future event in sensu composito is merely to assert that one cannot bring it about that the event both will and will not occur - hardly a restriction on human freedom!

...

Consider

8. An event foreknown by God can fail to occur.

In sensu composito, this means

9. Possibly, an event which is foreknown by God will fail to occur,

which is self-contradictory. But in sensu diviso, (8) means

10. Possibly, an event, which is foreknown by God, will fail to occur,

which may be true. Thus, my ability to prevent the event is not the ability the bring about the self-contradictory state of affairs that God foreknew the event and the event does not occur. It is the power to prevent the event, which is foreknown by God, and were I to do so, it would not have been foreknown by Him.

...

[Philosopher William] Hasker would reply that it is not within my power under the circumstances to act differently now. But the fallacy in in this reply may be seen by means of a second distinction, closely related to the first, which the medievals discerned, that between necessitas consequentiae and necessitas consequentis or the necessity of a hypothetical inference versus the necessity of the consequent of the hypothetical. Thus the proposition

11. If God foreknew Peter would sin, then Peter cannot refrain from sinning,

properly understood, means

12. Necessarily, if God foreknew Peter would sin, then Peter does not refrain from sinning.

Hasker is misled by (11) into asserting a necessitas consequentis which he interprets as a abridgement of Peter's personal power. But what is impossible is not Peter's refraining from sin, but the composite state of affairs of God's foreknowledge of Peter's sin and Peter's refraining. That is to say, the proposition

13. Peter can refrain from the sin which God foreknew he would commit

is false in sensu composito, but true in sensu diviso.


What seems most interesting in all this to me is the philosophical insight that what is impossible is not a given event's failing to occur, but the composite state of affairs of a timeless being's perceiving the event's occurrence and it's failing to occur. My understanding of the meaning of determinism, which appears to me to be a customary one, is that in a fully deterministic universe where Peter lacks any free will, a proposition like (13) would be false both in sensu composito and in sensu diviso. Likewise, all that logic requires in order for Peter to be described as having free will is that (13) be true in senso diviso - and I see no logical way to deduce its falsity in senso diviso from the fact of God's foreknowledge.


Robin said:
God observers the big bang, the little whimper and all events in between equally. God's first view of the universe is as a fait accompli - he can do nothing about anything that happens in it.

Yet my past is a fait accompli to me, and I participated in it. Short of a really compelling deductive proof, I'm not about to rule out the possibility that a timeless being's view of a timeline can include his own participation in it (timelessly, of course).


If God participates in the universe (other than setting initial conditions) then either God is not omnisicient or the universe is deterministic. If God is omnisicient or we have free will then God cannot participate in the universe.

If there is a God he must be something along the lines that Iacchus has been pushing lately.

Frankly, I do not understand nor have I closely followed Iacchus' elaboration of his conception of God. However, it does not strike me as having attracted the widespread interest in the philosophical literature that I would expect it to have if it were really the only logical way to reconcile omniscience, free will and immanence.

Belz... said:
I'm not sure I understand. If God can see our future (thought for him, time would be meaningless,) then the events he is seeing cannot be truly random.

What part of the definition of randomness excludes it? I can observe random events in the past. Does the observation change the randomness?

Consider this hypothetical: God does not exist; the universe does contain randomness. At some point in our future, a consciousness comes into being who can perceive all events along the timeline (but, for the sake of argument, has no other relevant powers or influence). Query: thereafter, does the universe contain random events?
 
Yet if God observes a phenomenon it in a manner somewhat akin to how we view the past, God's observation of it does not affect whether such phenomenon was deterministic, nor how it was determined. The example of our own pasts tells us that there is nothing logically inconsistent between a phenomenon's being determined and such phenomenon's being partially caused by free agency. There is an obvious contrast between deterministic and merely determined.

There's an error in this paragraph - actually, I should correctly say an assumption.

"The example of our own pasts... being partially caused by free agency..."

The assumption being, that we know our own past was partially caused via free will, and obviously there was no inconsistancy in our past... But we have yet to establish that free will exists AT ALL - so to look back on our own past, the best we can say is that it happened as it happened, and since we don't KNOW that free will exists, that we have absolutely no evidence that choices in our past were made via free will.

Yet you've slipped the bit in there as if it were a given - as if, looking back at our own choices, that it is axiomatic that some choices were made via free will - and this, clearly, is not evidential. What is evidential is that one of your primary assumptions is that free will exists, and that you are building upon THAT assumption - as such, it is easy to see where you would be having so much trouble understanding the idea of an omniscient, timeless God being incompatible with free will. But the idea of absolute free will has no more evidence for it than does the idea of an omniscient and timeless God - perhaps, even less.

As for all that quoted comma gymnastics, I have no idea what that's supposed to prove - except that it, too, appears (to me) to illustrate some very serious weaknesses in any free will concepts. That, and the writer seems to have some very serious misconceptions about temporal awareness of a truly timeless entity.
 
There's an error in this paragraph - actually, I should correctly say an assumption.

"The example of our own pasts... being partially caused by free agency..."

The assumption being, that we know our own past was partially caused via free will, and obviously there was no inconsistancy in our past... But we have yet to establish that free will exists AT ALL - so to look back on our own past, the best we can say is that it happened as it happened, and since we don't KNOW that free will exists, that we have absolutely no evidence that choices in our past were made via free will.

Perhaps I phrased that misleadingly. My argument does not require that our pasts were partially caused by free will, and it certainly does not require me to establish that free will exists. In the example you cited, I was suggesting the logical compatibility of a phenomenon's being determined and of it's being at least partially caused by free will. Obviously, an argument in favor of a logical compatibility of two things does not depend on whether either of them exists. My point was that assuming, purely hypothetically, that events in our past were partially caused by free will does not force us to conclude that past events are not determined. That is not an assertion in favor of the existence of free will.
were partially caused
 
Perhaps I phrased that misleadingly. My argument does not require that our pasts were partially caused by free will, and it certainly does not require me to establish that free will exists. In the example you cited, I was suggesting the logical compatibility of a phenomenon's being determined and of it's being at least partially caused by free will. Obviously, an argument in favor of a logical compatibility of two things does not depend on whether either of them exists. My point was that assuming, purely hypothetically, that events in our past were partially caused by free will does not force us to conclude that past events are not determined. That is not an assertion in favor of the existence of free will.
were partially caused

But unless you are making that assumption, you cannot analyze the logical compatibility of it. It's like saying that, theoretically, a mazpan is completely compatible with your JVC camcorder - without knowing what a mazpan is, whether it exists or not, etc. So I would say that, yes, the logical compatibility issue requires either that a) both things exist, at least in workable theory, or b) that all attributes of both things be known, at least in theory. Since we don't know what potential mechanism free will employs, and since we don't know that free will even exists, the argument falls on lack of information, essentially.

However, CEO, I don't want you to think I'm not grasping your basic point - from the HUMAN point of view, you're right. Past events have been determined, and whether free or not, that would not change. But from a deific point of view, where God is not just observing events, but MAKING events, all events are both determined and deterministic, unless God is affected by time. In other words, to a timeless God, there is no point at which any decision is beng made; all decisions are decided, enacted, and completed simultaneously as part and parcel of creation - in other words, according to the direct will of God. You might argue that we look back at a past that we created - but the thing is, if our universe is deterministic OR deity - created, we did NOT create that past, either.

It's a difficult point of view, but I'm sure we can come to grips with it - eventually.


ETA: Rather than 'partially' the word 'potentially' would have been better, semantically. :D
 
No, ceo_esq is right - if God is outside of time and can see all of time it does not mean that everything is deterministic - it is (roughly) analogous to viewing a tape of something that happened yesterday.

We can observe what is happening and (on subsequent viewings) "predict" what will happen next but that does not mean that the events were deterministic.

If there was some entity that could stand outside of time and see all of time as a single object it could see events at any time. But that would not mean that no non-deterministic events occurred.

So the entity would not be predicting non-deterministic events but merely observing the results of them.

On the contrary - it's just about the most deterministic model imaginable. In order for a being to be 'timeless', time itself must just be a dimension like any other. In other words, all points in time must, from the perspective of the timeless being, coexist.

This is why the timeless being (lets call it God) would see the whole of 'creation' as one complete model, through all dimensions, including time. 'Events' as we perceive them would simply be the edges (in whatever dimension(s)) of forms within / on reality. Time would have no precedence over any other dimension.
 
No, ceo_esq is right - if God is outside of time and can see all of time it does not mean that everything is deterministic - it is (roughly) analogous to viewing a tape of something that happened yesterday.

Okay. But I'd like to point out that your analogy is more akin to living in the future than living outside of time.
 
What part of the definition of randomness excludes it? I can observe random events in the past. Does the observation change the randomness?

Consider this hypothetical: God does not exist; the universe does contain randomness. At some point in our future, a consciousness comes into being who can perceive all events along the timeline (but, for the sake of argument, has no other relevant powers or influence). Query: thereafter, does the universe contain random events?

Hummm. Okay. I'm going to try a scenario of my own. Feel free to point our any error.

Assuming that you live in the future and can look at the past timeline in its entirety. If you travel BACK in time, will the random events turn up the same again ? And if so, how are they random ? If not, when going back in the future, can I say if the past timeline I'm reading is reliable ?
 
Hummm. Okay. I'm going to try a scenario of my own. Feel free to point our any error.

Assuming that you live in the future and can look at the past timeline in its entirety. If you travel BACK in time, will the random events turn up the same again ? And if so, how are they random ? If not, when going back in the future, can I say if the past timeline I'm reading is reliable ?

Exactly - they only have the appearance of being random 'events' to an observer that is obliged to move in one direction through the time dimension. Since no one can prevent the random events (that will happen) from happening they are, for all intents and purposes, determined (you could say that they cause themselves).
 
Exactly - they only have the appearance of being random 'events' to an observer that is obliged to move in one direction through the time dimension. Since no one can prevent the random events (that will happen) from happening they are, for all intents and purposes, determined (you could say that they cause themselves).

Then I submit that either your definition of random is incorrect, or there is no randomness at all.

According to quantum physics, quantum fluctuations are actually random; that is, they depend on NO factors and therefore would not and could not give the same result, would they be repeated. If this is correct, and my example above holds, then no one beign could "observe" time from a timeless vantage point, because it would simply be illogical.
 

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