A timeless being viewing the universe is no different, from a practical point of view, to someone viewing the past.
I've quoted this first because I'm going to refer back to it. In the following remarks, my references to "foreknowing" and "foreknowledge" allude to the "timeless viewing" scenario, rather than the "prediction" scenario (as we have previously distinguished the two in this thread).
Nevertheless if it is not deterministic it is at any rate determined when God observes it.
Yet if God observes a phenomenon it in a manner somewhat akin to how we view the past, God's observation of it does not affect whether such phenomenon was deterministic, nor how it was determined. The example of our own pasts tells us that there is nothing logically inconsistent between a phenomenon's being
determined and such phenomenon's being partially caused by free agency. There is an obvious contrast between
deterministic and merely
determined.
Philosopher William Lane Craig (whose theological views, naturally, I do not share), points out something interesting in this regard (
source):
Utilizing the medieval distinction between the senses ... consider the proposition
2. A future event can fail to occur.
In sensu diviso, (2) means
3. Possibly, an event, which is future, will fail to occur
and is true if the event is contingent. But taken in sensu composito, (2) means
4. Possibly, an event which is future will fail to occur,
which is necessarily false. Thus, what is at issue with regard to the misleading notion of "altering the future" is whether one has the power to prevent a future event in sensu diviso. One can prevent the event, but were one to do so, then the event would not be future. To say that one cannot prevent a future event in sensu composito is merely to assert that one cannot bring it about that the event both will and will not occur - hardly a restriction on human freedom!
...
Consider
8. An event foreknown by God can fail to occur.
In sensu composito, this means
9. Possibly, an event which is foreknown by God will fail to occur,
which is self-contradictory. But in sensu diviso, (8) means
10. Possibly, an event, which is foreknown by God, will fail to occur,
which may be true. Thus, my ability to prevent the event is not the ability the bring about the self-contradictory state of affairs that God foreknew the event and the event does not occur. It is the power to prevent the event, which is foreknown by God, and were I to do so, it would not have been foreknown by Him.
...
[Philosopher William] Hasker would reply that it is not within my power under the circumstances to act differently now. But the fallacy in in this reply may be seen by means of a second distinction, closely related to the first, which the medievals discerned, that between necessitas consequentiae and necessitas consequentis or the necessity of a hypothetical inference versus the necessity of the consequent of the hypothetical. Thus the proposition
11. If God foreknew Peter would sin, then Peter cannot refrain from sinning,
properly understood, means
12. Necessarily, if God foreknew Peter would sin, then Peter does not refrain from sinning.
Hasker is misled by (11) into asserting a necessitas consequentis which he interprets as a abridgement of Peter's personal power. But what is impossible is not Peter's refraining from sin, but the composite state of affairs of God's foreknowledge of Peter's sin and Peter's refraining. That is to say, the proposition
13. Peter can refrain from the sin which God foreknew he would commit
is false in sensu composito, but true in sensu diviso.
What seems most interesting in all this to me is the philosophical insight that what is impossible is not a given event's failing to occur, but the composite state of affairs of a timeless being's perceiving the event's occurrence and it's failing to occur. My understanding of the meaning of determinism, which appears to me to be a customary one, is that in a fully deterministic universe where Peter lacks any free will, a proposition like (13) would be false both
in sensu composito and
in sensu diviso. Likewise, all that logic requires in order for Peter to be described as having free will is that (13) be true
in senso diviso - and I see no logical way to deduce its falsity
in senso diviso from the fact of God's foreknowledge.
Robin said:
God observers the big bang, the little whimper and all events in between equally. God's first view of the universe is as a fait accompli - he can do nothing about anything that happens in it.
Yet my past is a
fait accompli to me, and I participated in it. Short of a really compelling deductive proof, I'm not about to rule out the possibility that a timeless being's view of a timeline can include his own participation in it (timelessly, of course).
If God participates in the universe (other than setting initial conditions) then either God is not omnisicient or the universe is deterministic. If God is omnisicient or we have free will then God cannot participate in the universe.
If there is a God he must be something along the lines that Iacchus has been pushing lately.
Frankly, I do not understand nor have I closely followed Iacchus' elaboration of his conception of God. However, it does not strike me as having attracted the widespread interest in the philosophical literature that I would expect it to have if it were really the only logical way to reconcile omniscience, free will and immanence.
Belz... said:
I'm not sure I understand. If God can see our future (thought for him, time would be meaningless,) then the events he is seeing cannot be truly random.
What part of the definition of randomness excludes it? I can observe random events in the past. Does the observation change the randomness?
Consider this hypothetical: God does not exist; the universe does contain randomness. At some point in our future, a consciousness comes into being who can perceive all events along the timeline (but, for the sake of argument, has no other relevant powers or influence). Query: thereafter, does the universe contain random events?