There is No God (And You Know It)

Bri
The point was made that an omniscient God must be able to predict the results of the random (or free will) function.
No, you’re backsliding here. On omniscient god knows the outcome of the random (freewill) function. As previously stated, prediction implies a chance of being incorrect. The omniscient god is not incorrect.

That said, most would agree that there is no reason to assume that God couldn't limit his ability to predict a free will function in order to allow free will.
Thereby removing omniscience. And once again illustrating that freewill and omniscience are mutually exclusive.

It was also pointed out that in fact God's knowledge wouldn't be limited at all in this case since he would acquire the same knowledge by observation rather than prediction, just as the programmer in the example does.
That would make god’s knowledge dependant, also negating omniscience – assuming a one run program. Once you run the program again it is a completely deterministic model.

The first run is freewill and no omniscience – god/program does not know the outcome of freewill/random number.
The second run is omniscience and no freewill – god/programmer knows the outcome (because it’s exactly the same), but the agent does not. The agent, at best has the illusion of freewill.

So the "part" to which you refer wasn't disproven (on the contrary, the example clearly showed that a less-than-omniscient human being can have foreknowledge as it relates to the simulated timeline of the free agent), so it certainly wouldn't disprove the whole. The example simply illustrates that free will and foreknowledge are not mutually exclusive.
No, again read the example and specify which run of the program to which you are referring.

1st run – no foreknowledge (meaning non-omniscience). The programmer, after the fact, gains the knowledge.
2nd run – foreknowledge, but no freewill/random function.

You have continually mixed the two. Specify which run.

Ossai
 
Well, I missed out on a number of posts, here.

However, how could God, even if omniscient, predict randomness ? If randomness means that it cannot be predicted in any way, specifically because it is not related to any factor and could be different even in the same circumstances, how could he predict it ?

The notion of predicting something involves an assumption of time. A timeless being should be able to "predict" any event -- including a random one -- by simply observing it.

-Bri
 
That said, most would agree that there is no reason to assume that God couldn't limit his ability to predict a free will function in order to allow free will.

Oh, I see - a bit like when I shut my eyes when the England-Australia match results are shown on the news because I want to see the highlights tomorrow? Only God's entertainment is apparently watching whether his much loved subjects condemn 'themselves' to eternal damnation or not.

It was also pointed out that in fact God's knowledge wouldn't be limited at all in this case since he would acquire the same knowledge by observation rather than prediction, just as the programmer in the example does.

But prior to the observation God cannot be omniscient since being so requires that he knows everything, which, at that point he doesn't (you contend). This also, of course, contradicts your timeless God who should know what he will know in the future as well as what he knew in the past.

So the "part" to which you refer wasn't disproven (on the contrary, the example clearly showed that a less-than-omniscient human being can have foreknowledge as it relates to the simulated timeline of the free agent), so it certainly wouldn't disprove the whole. The example simply illustrates that free will and foreknowledge are not mutually exclusive.

You are missing the point with your programmer analogy. We are not talking about a programmer that may have limited foreknowledge of his program's execution, we are talking about an omniscient God. It is not foreknowledge but omniscience that is mutually exclusive with free will.

Since free will is not possible anyway (irespective of whether there is a God or not) it is pointless to posit that God allows us free will. In fact, determinism applies to God as much as it applies to us (assuming he exists).
 
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The notion of predicting something involves an assumption of time. A timeless being should be able to "predict" any event -- including a random one -- by simply observing it.

-Bri

As I said before, to a timeless being, there would be no random events. For starters - there would be no events. Secondly, he would know that what to us appeared to be random events were just part of the multi-dimensional shape of all creation.
 
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On omniscient god knows the outcome of the random (freewill) function.

A timeless God (omniscient or not) could know the outcome of the random function by observation.

As previously stated, prediction implies a chance of being incorrect.

You're obviously using a different dictionary that I'm using. Prediction with 100% accuracy is still prediction, yet does not imply a chance of being incorrect.

Thereby removing omniscience. And once again illustrating that freewill and omniscience are mutually exclusive.

That would depend on your definition of omniscience. If it includes being able to predict that which is unpredictable, then of course God isn't omniscient. Most definitions involve simply having the ability to know all that can be known or knowing all that can be known. If a timeless God is able to observe all events at all times, then he would certainly know the results of random events in our timeline "before" they occurred.

That would make god’s knowledge dependant, also negating omniscience...

Only if you define omniscience to somehow restrict the means by which knowledge is obtained.

...assuming a one run program. Once you run the program again it is a completely deterministic model.

I don't think you understood the example judging from the rest of your post. Specifically, there aren't multiple "runs" of the program in my example.

-Bri
 
You are missing the point with your programmer analogy. We are not talking about a programmer that may have limited foreknowledge of his program's execution, we are talking about an omniscient God. It is not foreknowledge but omniscience that is mutually exclusive with free will.

That's what I've been trying to explain to Ossai, that my analogy only demonstrates that foreknowledge and free will are compatible. As you pointed out, it does not illustrate whether or not omniscience and free will are compatible.

But prior to the observation God cannot be omniscient since being so requires that he knows everything, which, at that point he doesn't (you contend). This also, of course, contradicts your timeless God who should know what he will know in the future as well as what he knew in the past.

I agree that the sort of "observation" that I described may in fact be no different than "prediction." The programmer in the example can truly predict the results of the random number function relative to the simulated timeline. With a timeless God there is no "prior to observation" and there is never a lack of knowledge at all, so God could be both omniscient and timeless.

Since free will is not possible anyway (irespective of whether there is a God or not) it is pointless to posit that God allows us free will. In fact, determinism applies to God as much as it applies to us (assuming he exists).

To say that free will is not possible is a rather bold statement without supporting evidence. Disproving dualism would go a long way toward supporting your claim, but even that cannot be disproven.

-Bri
 
As I said before, to a timeless being, there would be no random events. For starters - there would be no events.

Why would there be no events? Although not limited by it, God would surely know all about our timeline.

Secondly, he would know that what to us appeared to be random events were just part of the multi-dimensional shape of all creation.

There is no reason to believe that God could not create a device that generates truly random values without further intervention on his part. Yes, he would be able to "predict" the results relative to our timeline.

-Bri
 
Bri
A timeless God (omniscient or not) could know the outcome of the random function by observation.
After the fact, again removing foreknowledge.

You're obviously using a different dictionary that I'm using. Prediction with 100% accuracy is still prediction, yet does not imply a chance of being incorrect.
From Merriam-Webster
prediction
Function: noun
1 : an act of predicting
2 : something that is predicted : FORECAST

PREDICT commonly implies inference from facts or accepted laws of nature <astronomers predicted an eclipse>.

But getting back to the issue, prediction differs from infallible foreknowledge.

That would depend on your definition of omniscience. If it includes being able to predict that which is unpredictable, then of course God isn't omniscient.
My basic definition of omniscience includes infallible foreknowledge.

If a timeless God is able to observe all events at all times, then he would certainly know the results of random events in our timeline "before" they occurred.
Hence a completely deterministic universe. Nothing could differ from god’s knowledge.

I don't think you understood the example judging from the rest of your post. Specifically, there aren't multiple "runs" of the program in my example.
I’m tired of pointing out where you lie. You specifically mentioned multiple runs when you posted the analogy.

That's what I've been trying to explain to Ossai, that my analogy only demonstrates that foreknowledge and free will are compatible. As you pointed out, it does not illustrate whether or not omniscience and free will are compatible.
You are practicing deception again. The first run the random number generator causes the agent to turn left or right, the programmer gains this knowledge after the fact (freewill).
The second and all subsequent runs the programmer knows (foreknowledge) which way the agent will turn.
Depending on which one you currently prefer and how the argument is going, you continually flip back and forth. Now you are trying to declare that omniscience does not include foreknowledge. This was the entire point of your earlier example.

With a timeless God there is no "prior to observation" and there is never a lack of knowledge at all, so God could be both omniscient and timeless.
With a timeless god there is no prior, during or after, in order for that god’s knowledge to be correct, nothing could change i.e. no freewill.

Ossai
 
Whatever the possibilities of foreknowledge and free will I would have thought it pretty obvious that an omniscient being cannot participate in the world if there is free will.

With God's decisions being contingent on human decision and human decision influenced by God's decisions it is pretty obviously impossible.

God can't make decisions in the world if he already knows the result of the decision.
 
Bri said:
A timeless God (omniscient or not) could know the outcome of the random function by observation.
After the fact, again removing foreknowledge.

Do you understand what "timeless" means?

From Merriam-Webster
prediction
Function: noun
1 : an act of predicting
2 : something that is predicted : FORECAST

I see nothing here about the accuracy of the forecast.

PREDICT commonly implies inference from facts or accepted laws of nature <astronomers predicted an eclipse>.

But getting back to the issue, prediction differs from infallible foreknowledge.

There is no mention in the definition you posted as to the method by which something is predicted. Foreknolwedge would certainly be one means by which one could predict something. Infallible foreknowledge would allow one to predict it with 100% certainty.

My basic definition of omniscience includes infallible foreknowledge.

Mine too.

Hence a completely deterministic universe. Nothing could differ from god’s knowledge.

True, but that is only because God has infallible foreknowledge. That does not imply that God causes everything to occur though.

I’m tired of pointing out where you lie. You specifically mentioned multiple runs when you posted the analogy.

You'll have to provide a quote from my analogy where I mentioned multiple runs as you described. I don't appreciate being called a liar without evidence.

You are practicing deception again. The first run the random number generator causes the agent to turn left or right, the programmer gains this knowledge after the fact (freewill).
The second and all subsequent runs the programmer knows (foreknowledge) which way the agent will turn.

Again, there is no mention of multiple runs, so I have no idea what you're talking about. A calculation is performed once when the simulation begins, after which the programmer knows the entire timeline, if that's what you mean. There are no subsequent runs described.

Depending on which one you currently prefer and how the argument is going, you continually flip back and forth.

Flip back and forth between what?

Now you are trying to declare that omniscience does not include foreknowledge.

Where have I ever claimed that omniscience doesn't include foreknowledge? Again, please quote a prior post where I've made this claim as you indicated.

This was the entire point of your earlier example.

Really? I never used the word "omniscience" in my example, nor did I even mention God. I certainly never assumed that a programmer was omniscient.

With a timeless god there is no prior, during or after, in order for that god’s knowledge to be correct, nothing could change i.e. no freewill.

That God has foreknowledge of something doesn't mean he controls it. It simply means that he's not limited by the timeline.

Until you provide evidence to support your claims that I am a liar, there is no point in continuing this discussion.

-Bri
 
Hence, completely deterministic.

Perhaps I'm being obtuse here, but I don't see how this follows. If this conclusion is logically necessary, please provide a step-by-step deductive proof including definitions and premises. That's the only way I think everyone can clearly understand and evaluate your argument.


Considering that all memory and thought are based on chemical reactions which god can predict with 100% accuracy...

Another controversial assertion. I assume you arrived at this notion inductively, but the truth of this premise is not at all apparent prima facie - perhaps you'd like to share your basis for positing it.
 
You'll have to provide a quote from my analogy where I mentioned multiple runs as you described. I don't appreciate being called a liar without evidence.

Again, there is no mention of multiple runs, so I have no idea what you're talking about. A calculation is performed once when the simulation begins, after which the programmer knows the entire timeline, if that's what you mean. There are no subsequent runs described.
-Bri

OK, here is what you said:
bri said:
Now, we begin the simulation by recalculating the entire timeline from 0 to 60. We open up a window at time 30 and notice that the free agent is turning left at this time to avoid running into a wall. We then click on the timeline at time 10 and open up a new window.

Even as we watch the free agent in this second window, we already know that at time 30 the agent will turn left even though it has "free will" which is unpredictable to us. As long as we don't interact with the world before time 30, this will be true. If we interact with the world after time 30, only the free agent's future will be altered so the choice to turn left at time 30 won't be affected.

Now at time 10, we insert a new wall on which is written the word "LEFT" completely contained inside the safe. Since no agents have access this new wall cannot affect any agent. Nothing needs to be recalculated, and the free agent will turn left as expected at time 30.
So how can we 'watch the free agent in this second window' if we have already seen it turn left in the first, if there is not a second run? How can we see the free agent turn left 'as expected' without a second run? And how can you have the free agent turning left in the second window without having saved the decision from the first window, and then have it follow this path?

Feel free to show the coding that I am wrong. But in the second window the free will function is not called. It follows a pre-determined path. Because there is "infallible foreknowledge", it can have no "free will". Not even simulated free will.
 
Bri
Do you understand what "timeless" means?
Basically not affected by time.

Foreknolwedge would certainly be one means by which one could predict something. Infallible foreknowledge would allow one to predict it with 100% certainty.
Knowledge
4 a : the sum of what is known : the body of truth, information, and principles acquired by mankind

Foreknowledge
: to have previous knowledge of : know beforehand especially by paranormal means or by revelation

Why would you need to predict if you already know?

True, but that is only because God has infallible foreknowledge. That does not imply that God causes everything to occur though.
But it does mean that the universe is completely deterministic. Now throw in the creator aspect of god and it does in fact mean that god ultimately causes everything to occur.

You'll have to provide a quote from my analogy where I mentioned multiple runs as you described. I don't appreciate being called a liar without evidence.
OK, here
We can then click on any point along the timeline and open up a view to the world at that time. Nothing exciting yet, the world is completely deterministic, although it is clear that we are not constrained by the timeline for this world since we can view the past, present, and future simultaneously by opening up multiple windows.
The extra windows can only be opened and the knowledge obtained one the program has run once. The foreknowledge is gained after the first run.
and in the same post,
Now, we begin the simulation by recalculating the entire timeline from 0 to 60. We open up a window at time 30 and notice that the free agent is turning left at this time to avoid running into a wall. We then click on the timeline at time 10 and open up a new window.

Even as we watch the free agent in this second window, we already know that at time 30 the agent will turn left even though it has "free will" which is unpredictable to us. As long as we don't interact with the world before time 30, this will be true. If we interact with the world after time 30, only the free agent's future will be altered so the choice to turn left at time 30 won't be affected.

The foreknowledge is only gained after the fact. Once you have the foreknowledge the program always acts according to it on the subsequent run.
Again your example illustrates that if the agent has freewill then the programmer does not have foreknowledge. If the programmer has foreknowledge (from a previous run) then the agent cannot alter it’s choice and has no freewill.

Where have I ever claimed that omniscience doesn't include foreknowledge? Again, please quote a prior post where I've made this claim as you indicated.
Previously you stated,
That's what I've been trying to explain to Ossai, that my analogy only demonstrates that foreknowledge and free will are compatible. As you pointed out, it does not illustrate whether or not omniscience and free will are compatible.
Foreknowledge is part of omniscience, the main part in question actually. You then state that foreknowledge and freewill are compatible. Then state that freewill and omniscience may not be compatible. In order for the second to be true, foreknowledge cannot be a part of omniscience.

Flip back and forth between what?
Freewill overriding foreknowledge or foreknowledge negating freewill.

That God has foreknowledge of something doesn't mean he controls it. It simply means that he's not limited by the timeline.
Control or cause is an irrelevant argument when only dealing with foreknowledge and is nothing more than a red herring.
Not limited by the timeline means that the timeline is unchanging, else god’s knowledge is not infallible.

Until you provide evidence to support your claims that I am a liar, there is no point in continuing this discussion.
Evidence presented in this post.

ceo_esq
Perhaps I'm being obtuse here, but I don't see how this follows. If this conclusion is logically necessary, please provide a step-by-step deductive proof including definitions and premises. That's the only way I think everyone can clearly understand and evaluate your argument.
Already promised another user one, but work has been hectic for the past few weeks. I’ll try to post what I’ve got so far later tonight or this weekend.

Considering that all memory and thought are based on chemical reactions which god can predict with 100% accuracy...
Another controversial assertion. I assume you arrived at this notion inductively, but the truth of this premise is not at all apparent prima facie - perhaps you'd like to share your basis for positing it.
Which assertion is controversial? That brain activity is chemical or that god can predict with 100% accuracy.
Brain activity is chemical, consult some good neurobiologist, or psychiatrist.
God predicting chemical reactions with 100% accuracy, that is included in basic omniscience without even getting into the whole foreknowledge/outside time aspect of it.

Robin
Thanks, nice to knowl I wasn't the only one to notice it.

Ossai
 
Ossai, I only intend to address where you called me a liar in order to demonstrate that the use of such accusations is counter-productive to a discussion unless your intent is simply to end the discussion (which is what you've done).

OK, here
We can then click on any point along the timeline and open up a view to the world at that time. Nothing exciting yet, the world is completely deterministic, although it is clear that we are not constrained by the timeline for this world since we can view the past, present, and future simultaneously by opening up multiple windows.
The extra windows can only be opened and the knowledge obtained one the program has run once. The foreknowledge is gained after the first run.

I don't see anywhere in that quote where it talks about multiple runs. The entire explanation occurs during a single run of the simulation. There is no "one [sic] the program has run once" in the description.

and in the same post,
Now, we begin the simulation by recalculating the entire timeline from 0 to 60. We open up a window at time 30 and notice that the free agent is turning left at this time to avoid running into a wall. We then click on the timeline at time 10 and open up a new window.

Even as we watch the free agent in this second window, we already know that at time 30 the agent will turn left even though it has "free will" which is unpredictable to us. As long as we don't interact with the world before time 30, this will be true. If we interact with the world after time 30, only the free agent's future will be altered so the choice to turn left at time 30 won't be affected.
The foreknowledge is only gained after the fact. Once you have the foreknowledge the program always acts according to it on the subsequent run.

Again, I don't see in that quote where multiple runs are mentioned. I see only where the simulation was started and a calculation performed, but no mention of the simulation ending or of subsequent runs at all. The foreknowledge can be obtained by opening up a window immediately after the simulation has started. If by "after the fact" you mean after the timeline has been calculated, then yes. But viewing the resulting timeline doesn't require multiple runs of the simulation.

Again your example illustrates that if the agent has freewill then the programmer does not have foreknowledge. If the programmer has foreknowledge (from a previous run) then the agent cannot alter it’s choice and has no freewill.

Again, there is no "previous run" and I see no mention of such in the quotes you posted.

I thought it was fairly straightforward when I explained it the first time:

Bri said:
You can then click anywhere on the timeline and a window pops up showing you the world at that time. You can open up multiple windows in time in this manner by clicking on more than one spot on the timeline.

The multiple windows have nothing to do with subsequent "runs." Rather, they simply open up multiple views of the same timeline, with each window representing a view of the simulation at a different point in time.

If you didn't understand the example, you could simply have said so rather than calling me a liar.

Foreknowledge is part of omniscience, the main part in question actually.

I agree.

You then state that foreknowledge and freewill are compatible.

Again, yes. The example illustrates that a being who is not omniscient (the programmer in the example) can have foreknowledge of choices made by a free agent.

Then state that freewill and omniscience may not be compatible. In order for the second to be true, foreknowledge cannot be a part of omniscience.

Here, I'm afraid your logic is incorrect. Yes, the example shows that foreknowledge and free will are compatible, but it is still possible that omniscience and free will are not compatible. Foreknowledge is only a part of omniscience as you indicated above. There may be another part of omniscience that is incompatible with free will.

Yes, if you prove that foreknowledge and free will are incompatible, then you can prove that omniscience and free will are also incompatible, but it does not follow that if you can prove that foreknowledge and free will are compatible that omniscience and free will are also compatible.

I have a board with two types of screws in it: a flat-head screw and a phillips-head screw. I have a phillips-head screwdriver. The screwdriver is compatible with the phillips-head screw, but not necessarily with the whole board.

Again, if you didn't understand this, you simply could have said so without claiming that I'm "practicing deception."

Of course, if your intent was to simply end our discussion, then you've succeeded.

-Bri
 
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Bri
The foreknowledge can be obtained by opening up a window immediately after the simulation has started. If by "after the fact" you mean after the timeline has been calculated, then yes. But viewing the resulting timeline doesn't require multiple runs of the simulation.
The calculations would equate to a first run.

Again, there is no "previous run" and I see no mention of such in the quotes you posted.
How could you open a window to see t=30 at time t=10 if there was not a previous run? See Robin’s post above for a more in-depth look.

The multiple windows have nothing to do with subsequent "runs." Rather, they simply open up multiple views of the same timeline, with each window representing a view of the simulation at a different point in time.
Completely deterministic.

If you didn't understand the example, you could simply have said so rather than calling me a liar.
I understand the example, I’m now wondering if you actually understand what you wrote.

Why are you having difficulties with that concept? Yes, if you prove that foreknowledge and free will are incompatible, then you can prove that omniscience and free will are also incompatible, but it does not follow that if you can prove that foreknowledge and free will are compatible that omniscience and free will are also compatible.
Omniscience must be looked at as a set, if freewill is not compatible with a part of the set, the it is not compatible with the entire set.

Ossai
 
The multiple windows have nothing to do with subsequent "runs." Rather, they simply open up multiple views of the same timeline, with each window representing a view of the simulation at a different point in time.
-Bri
You clearly state that we see the agent turn left twice. Once in the first window and once in the second window. So that will take two runs of whatever code animates the dot on the screen. But you state that the agent will turn left in the second window 'even though it has free will'.

Well I am a programmer and I am telling you that is impossible to achieve. To claim the agent has free will the underlying code must be calling this free will function.

But in order to achieve what you describe it would be necessary to save the results of the 'free will' to an array and have the agents follow that.

Whatever code animates the agent in the first window might access the free will function. But whatever code animates the agent in the second window can not.

To tie this back to my original argument if the book in the safe is not in John's timeline then clearly it does not count as foreknowledge. If it is in John's timeline then clearly there are two versions of the timeline. Your program demonstrates that the presence of foreknowledge in the amended timeline precludes free will.

Either way you look at it infallible foreknowledge precludes free will.

And it is all academic anyway, does anybody here seriously suggest that a being with a view of the entire timeline could actually participate in that timeline? Could act freely in ways that influence the timeline?

It is a property of most theisms that God is or can be active and effective in the world. This situation is clearly impossible, so God is impossible.
 
Which assertion is controversial? That brain activity is chemical or that god can predict with 100% accuracy.

Brain activity is chemical, consult some good neurobiologist, or psychiatrist.

I was referring to the first assertion. I can accept that an omniscient agent can accurately predict phenomena whose only causal antecedents are material ones.

However, neuroscience has not been able to show that mental state is entirely equivalent to brain state. We do not know whether even total neuroscientific knowledge could supply a complete account of the properties of conscious experience, and a number of arguments have been raised to the effect that it probably can't. Consult the Stanford article on the philosophy of neuroscience for an overview.

Accordingly, any logical deductive argument which incorporates that particular premise is vulnerable to reasonable objections that we don't know whether it is true.
 
To say that free will is not possible is a rather bold statement without supporting evidence. Disproving dualism would go a long way toward supporting your claim, but even that cannot be disproven.

The proof or disproof of dualism is irrelevant to my argument against free will. There has already been lots of discussion of this on this and other threads but to summarise:

- First, let's remove the irrelevant issue of material vs immaterial, soul vs brain, spiritual vs material etc.... Let's simply say that there is something that is conscious. Let us refer to this conscious thing as a 'thinker'.

- Our thinker can be said to have state. This is logically necessary to distinguish our thinker from another thing which is not a thinker (or is another thinker having different thoughts).

- Our thinker's thoughts are comprised of changes in our thinker's state. This is logically necessary to distinguish our thinker thinking thought A from our thinker thinking thought B.

- Let us refer to changes in our thinker's state as events.

- Now let's ask how these events come about - they can either be caused or not caused.

- If all of these events are caused then they are predetermined by the chain of cause and effect, the standard determinist position. Free will cannot exist in this model.

- If some or all of our thinker's events are not caused then they are random. Our thinker may or may not have some predetermined thoughts (the caused ones) and some (or all) that are just randomly occuring events. Free will cannot exist in this model.

The problem for free will is when the logic is followed through in this way there is no room to even consider free will. Without vague definitions and metaphysical sleight of intellect we cannot really even define free will. I would go so far as to say it is a contradiction in terms - 'free' requiring lack of predetermination and direction and 'will' requiring just those properties. As soon as we inquire into the 'will' we can immediately see that there is no 'free'.

This argument does not require any material foundation in physics or any other science. it does not matter whether we are floating around in an Iacchusian dreamworld or made a real flesh and blood, it rests solely upon the simple question of when a thinker makes a choice - why did he choose A rather than B?
 
This argument does not require any material foundation in physics or any other science. it does not matter whether we are floating around in an Iacchusian dreamworld or made a real flesh and blood, it rests solely upon the simple question of when a thinker makes a choice - why did he choose A rather than B?
Heck, I am free not to go to work today which, I would very much rather not do. However, I am also free to suffer the consequences of being out of work. Now, could it be that this stems from the fact that the folks at work have a collective will which is greater than mine? It's certainly the way I look at it anyway. It's just a matter of who has more energy (of which the will is derived) and the resources to back them up.
 
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I was referring to the first assertion. I can accept that an omniscient agent can accurately predict phenomena whose only causal antecedents are material ones.
What difference does does it make if the causal antecedents are material or immaterial? If there are causal antecedents then the oa can accurately predict it, material or otherwise.

We know that there is an underlying order to the mind, whatever realm(s) or domain(s) it exists in, how could the process of reasoning, remembering, calculating etc take place if it sat atop an underlying disorder?
 

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