Bri
The first run is freewill and no omniscience – god/program does not know the outcome of freewill/random number.
The second run is omniscience and no freewill – god/programmer knows the outcome (because it’s exactly the same), but the agent does not. The agent, at best has the illusion of freewill.
1st run – no foreknowledge (meaning non-omniscience). The programmer, after the fact, gains the knowledge.
2nd run – foreknowledge, but no freewill/random function.
You have continually mixed the two. Specify which run.
Ossai
No, you’re backsliding here. On omniscient god knows the outcome of the random (freewill) function. As previously stated, prediction implies a chance of being incorrect. The omniscient god is not incorrect.The point was made that an omniscient God must be able to predict the results of the random (or free will) function.
Thereby removing omniscience. And once again illustrating that freewill and omniscience are mutually exclusive.That said, most would agree that there is no reason to assume that God couldn't limit his ability to predict a free will function in order to allow free will.
That would make god’s knowledge dependant, also negating omniscience – assuming a one run program. Once you run the program again it is a completely deterministic model.It was also pointed out that in fact God's knowledge wouldn't be limited at all in this case since he would acquire the same knowledge by observation rather than prediction, just as the programmer in the example does.
The first run is freewill and no omniscience – god/program does not know the outcome of freewill/random number.
The second run is omniscience and no freewill – god/programmer knows the outcome (because it’s exactly the same), but the agent does not. The agent, at best has the illusion of freewill.
No, again read the example and specify which run of the program to which you are referring.So the "part" to which you refer wasn't disproven (on the contrary, the example clearly showed that a less-than-omniscient human being can have foreknowledge as it relates to the simulated timeline of the free agent), so it certainly wouldn't disprove the whole. The example simply illustrates that free will and foreknowledge are not mutually exclusive.
1st run – no foreknowledge (meaning non-omniscience). The programmer, after the fact, gains the knowledge.
2nd run – foreknowledge, but no freewill/random function.
You have continually mixed the two. Specify which run.
Ossai