There is No God (And You Know It)

I have yet to read a clear explanation of why the mere perception by such a God of something that is "present" to him (that is, the basis of simple "foreknowledge") dictates that the perceived thing is necessary in a deterministic sense, whereas my direct perception of something that is present to me does not mean that it is necessary in a deterministic sense.

If he sees the entire timeline, which is fine, then one of two things must be true:

1. Knowledge of future events implies determinism.

2. The entire time line has already happened, in which case he's not really seeing into the future.

You can't know what's going to happen with no possible way to know what's going to happen.
 
There are two broad types of argument from evil, as the Stanford article points out:
  • "[A] deductive argument for the very strong claim that it is logically impossible for both God and evil to exist (or for God and certain types, or instances, of evil to exist)[.]" This is the classic version of the problem.
  • "[A]n evidential (inductive/probabilistic) argument for the more modest claim that there are evils that actually exist in the world that make it unlikely that God exists."
Yet the article indicates that further attempts to defend the traditional version of the Problem of Evil "do not appear promising", and this is a reflection of a broad philosophical consensus. I can't think of any major atheological figures still preoccupied with arguing the logical PoE. These days they are all espousing the second (inductive/probabilistic) version of the problem. Did you notice that after the Stanford article explains the difference between incompatibility formulations (the traditional type) and evidential formulations, it devotes the entire rest of the article to discussing only the latter?

You're correct that the argument from evil is still a going philosophical concern. But it's not your father's PoE anymore. The classic problem was effectively killed and replaced with a humbler but more resistant successor.
The above pretty much proves what I said in the earlier post. I doubt that anyones father ever argued the classic PoE, or any ancestor they could trace. I also doubt that any atheist ever put forward this argument. It is really more the fodder of the 'devils advocate' position in Theology.

The probabilistic argument was never a mainstream argument either and yet theists love these two arguments.

Theist philosophers never seem to get onto the more substantive issues of the problem of evil, such as I touched on earlier in this thread.

And incidentally what is this famous argument that "defeats" the problem of evil? Well judging from the Beilby argument put earlier it is really just a restatement of the argument put in the Book of Job.
 
This doesn't sit nicely with human morality or sense of right and wrong, but it does bypass the entire problem nicely... and is highly plausible, to boot.
Except of course that this argument wins the battle by losing the war. If God is to be regarded as good then the word "good" must mean the same thing when applied to a God as it is when applied to a human being.

If God is good in some sense that is inexplicable to human morality then by what basis is he called good?

Once you accept the theist premise in the PoE it leads to the situation where God's moral obligations in a given situation would be different to ours even if our knowledge of the consequences were the same.

So the theist position on this comes down to God's good being different from our good, not because of his superior knowledge, but because of his superior power.

That God's good is the "greater good" (which we are of course incapable of understanding) and ours is the "lesser good" so our moral choices become trivial or meaningless.

In short the logical conclusion of the theist position is that God is not good at all, not in the way we use the word.
 
The above pretty much proves what I said in the earlier post. I doubt that anyones father ever argued the classic PoE, or any ancestor they could trace. I also doubt that any atheist ever put forward this argument.

...

And incidentally what is this famous argument that "defeats" the problem of evil? Well judging from the Beilby argument put earlier it is really just a restatement of the argument put in the Book of Job.

The best-known recent advocate of the logical argument from evil was the eminent and influential 20th-century atheist philosopher J.L. Mackie. Of many theist counterarguments, the one that finally and famously provoked Mackie to retract his claim of a logical inconsistency was Alvin Plantinga's so-called "Free Will Defense" (which, I should note, was not a theodicy).

I'm surprised that you'd doubt whether any atheist ever put forward a logical problem of evil. I encounter such arguments not infrequently from other atheists (not professional philosophers, though).

By the way, I'm going to revise what I said earlier; according to Infidels.org, a handful of atheologians are still promoting the traditional, logical PoE:

Ever since Alvin Plantinga refuted J.L. Mackie's logical argument from evil, the majority of contemporary philosophers of religion have come to believe that logical arguments from evil are unsuccessful. This opinion is not unanimous, however. Philosophers Richard Gale, Quentin Smith, and Howard Jordan Sobel challenge the conventional view regarding the prospects for logical arguments from evil. Indeed, Smith has formulated a new version of the logical argument from evil to avoid the pitfalls of Mackie's argument. Nevertheless, many philosophers remain highly skeptical regarding logical arguments from evil.
 
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ceo_esq said:
I'm surprised that you'd doubt whether any atheist ever put forward a logical problem of evil. I encounter such arguments not infrequently from other atheists (not professional philosophers, though).
I didn't say I doubted atheists ever put forward a logical problem of evil, I said doubted that the "classic" problem of evil that your referred to was ever put forward by atheists. It was a theological 'devils advocate' position, set up specifically to be knocked down. Any theists who are still countering this argument (or atheists supporting it) just aren't paying attention.

I put a logical problem of evil myself in this thread - so far nobody has been able to knock it down.

(Incidentally I hope you are not crediting Alvin Plantinga with the free will defence to the problem of evil. That is also probably a few centuries late).
 
I didn't say I doubted atheists ever put forward a logical problem of evil, I said doubted that the "classic" problem of evil that your referred to was ever put forward by atheists.

When I referred to the classic problem of evil, I was referring to all of the various formulations that express the argument in strictly logical terms. As I understand the customary usage of the term, a "logical PoE" is one that proposes "a deductive argument for the very strong claim that it is logically impossible for both God and evil to exist (or for God and certain types, or instances, of evil to exist)". That's the classic variety, which I was distinguishing from the class of evidential formulations of the PoE.


It was a theological 'devils advocate' position, set up specifically to be knocked down. Any theists who are still countering this argument (or atheists supporting it) just aren't paying attention.

I agree, more or less, with your second sentence. However, that is a relatively recent development. As late as the second half of the 20th century, refining and advocating the logical PoE was still a substantial preoccupation of atheist philosophy of religion. It was no straw man.


Robin said:
Incidentally I hope you are not crediting Alvin Plantinga with the free will defence to the problem of evil.

No, but it was Plantinga's specific FWD articulation that eventually caused Mackie (as he himself conceded) to abandon logical or incompatibilist PoE formulations, and I think it's fair to conclude that Plantinga's work has a lot to do with why inductive rather than deductive arguments from evil are now in vogue.
 
In response to evil, god, and the above

We know that over the long periods of crusades, wars, political and society changes, etc that humans have maintained the belief that we have to believe in one belief or another. Questioning our morality and values based on the principles of these beliefs. What is evil? Evil is the concept that the universe exists for free will...the ability to make a decision or take a action that thought it has consquences is a message of freedom. The universe is built on contradictions, lies, deceit, and ideologies; each with their own believers, supporters and antagonists. Since we think in equal numbers or balanced figures and concepts: everything has a opposite or some counter ideology. Humans create the problems, answers, only to end with more problems. You will never understand evil, because your subconscience instinct causes you to market drugs that help people avoid heart diesease but increases cancer. Why? We can't think of anything else, society produces individuals to balance out the chaos and peace, reforms and political structure, etc.

Evil is the concept that their exists free will, somewhere in the timeline their must be a antagonist and protagonist, which you will notice when people reply your posts. People dont have to argue anything, they just haf to start a war between two countries that are friends and then years pass and finially someone tries to make them friends again. Why? because people dont agree with any constants, it is in possible for us to have constants in our life. Our entire life is mathmatics and for a constant variable to exist, we must find it's opposite or follow the natural pattern of our actions untill we cause the opposite to occur.

I dont know how many of you know it, but everything you do is about patterns. No matter how much you try to prevent a pattern in the basic functions of crime, for the sake of the disscussion of evil; criminals kill in a pattern, that no matter how scattered and random their killings are, on a map it is equally spaced apart, from a central location. One that their subconscience mind has grown attached to by some value or importance.

So even if I kill five people in a 2 mile radius from a park, and randomly do it so i am no always 2 miles from the radius, i am still kiling maybe 6 blocks distance between each place I committ those crimes. How many of you seen the show numbers? If you understand that evil and every other concept works the same way, then you know that every story in the Bible is built on parables, which means thou the people were named after real people, their portrayal in the bible is that of a parapble or story character that at the end of their lives or story, show the consquences and rewards of following the morality guidelines that the bible has in place. it works in this order (pattern to a story):

Creation (Introduction)
Ten Commandments (Setting the Variables)
King David (Parable)*
King Solomon (Parable) *
Samson (Parable) *

Salvation (Introduction)
Jesus Christ (Parable that sets the variables and tells the story in four different books each different views too)**
Armaggedon(Conclusion)

* = this means that each refer back to the variables.
** = this means that each view of that one parable tell the same variables but point toward the introduction with emphasis.)

Any of the following and any that I missed sum up all of evil, good, or anything that is questionable: (All trivial in reality, sense your subconscience is the only reason you asked the question I am trying to answer here.)
Creation Destruction
Peace Chaos
Medicine Dieases
Cures Side affects
Questions Answers
Solutions Problems
 
The boards went down as I was about to post, so this response is late.

ceo_esq
From the hypothetical perspective of God, the question makes a bit less sense. Such a God doesn't determine that you can't change your mind; he only knows (once the universe has been set in motion, anyway) whether you will or won't.
What motion? God perceives all of creation at once. To us we have the illusion of motion, change and growth, but to god it would be like viewing a random bunch of still images. From any point (image) all the others already exist.

Ossai, do you read much contemporary work on the Problem of Evil? There definitely has been progress (if you want to call it that) to the extent that almost all writers in the field now concur that the logical aspects of the problem have been defeated, and consequently the only versions anyone in the field bothers to publish or defend anymore are evidentiary or probabilistic versions. I don't think that's a development that should be overlooked.
Yes, and ********.

Alvin Plantinga's so-called "Free Will Defense"
Sorry, but the entire defense negates god’s omnipotence. It turns out to be nothing more than another straw-man.

Bri
Misunderstanding something and providing evidence against it are not equivalent. The example demonstrates compatibility between free will and foreknowledge, but does not attempt to refute the Problem of Evil, which is already accepted as defeated by nearly all theologians and philosophers.
Your willful ignorance is astounding.
Your example clearly demonstrates the incompatibility of freewill and infallible foreknowledge (i.e. omniscience).

As I stated before, if there is a specific point you do not understand, please post it and we’ll go over it again.

Ossai
 
Your example clearly demonstrates the incompatibility of freewill and infallible foreknowledge (i.e. omniscience).

I disagree with your opinion of what the example "clearly demonstrates." Infallible foreknowledge is a part of omniscience, but is not omniscience. My example doesn't assume that the programmer is omniscient, but demonstrates how the programmer has foreknowledge relative to the free agent's timeline.

As I stated before, if there is a specific point you do not understand, please post it and we’ll go over it again.

Thanks for the offer, but I posted the example so I'm satisfied that I understand it. Your posts indicate that you don't understand it (or have chosen to ignore parts of it).

-Bri
 
What motion? God perceives all of creation at once.

Yes, but logically it has to have been created already in order for him to do that. By the expression "setting the universe in motion", I was referring in figurative language to the actualization of the initial conditions of the universe. Logically, God would would not perceive the entire timeline unless it were an timeline that in fact existed by virtue of its initial conditions having been fixed. This means that, barring the possibility of middle knowledge (a qualifier we have already discussed at length), an omniscient agent can only know the following about a non-actualized universe:
  • what he can predict on the basis of knowing all causal laws and all hypothetical initial conditions
  • what he can predict from knowledge of counterfactuals of divine freedom (i.e., knowledge of how he himself would choose to respond in any possible situation)
What is obviously missing from this - because absent middle knowledge, it is intrinsically unknowable - is anything that would require knowledge of counterfactuals of creaturely freedom in order to predict. Those aspects can't be predicted; they can only be directly perceived by God in an already-actualized timeline.

Yes, and ********.

I don't catch your meaning.


Sorry, but the entire defense negates god’s omnipotence.

So far as I am aware, the best strong-atheist philosophers I know (including Mackie, whose name is practically synonymous with the logical PoE) never claimed that Plantinga's FWD logically contradicted divine omnipotence. But hey - you should be publishing your ideas. If correct, they would really shake up the current state of philosophical discourse.

Even Infidels.org acknowledges the philosophical reality; the FWD eventually succeeded in doing what it was designed to do: refute the logical PoE, which it obviously couldn't have done if philosophers had been able to determine that the FWD necessarily negated divine omnipotence in the process. You are staking out fringe territory here, Ossai, but since it's so sparsely populated I think you'll be very comfortable.

It [the Free Will Defense] turns out to be nothing more than another straw-man.

Since a straw-man argument is generally an argument that is inaccurately or misleadingly attributed to one's opponent, I fail to see how the FWD (which is, as its name suggests, a defense) could qualify - at least in the hands of its advocates. I must tentatively conclude that your understanding of the term is a little hazy.
 
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Omnipotent by Nature

God in his infinite existance is believed to be omnipresent or omnipotent (that he exists in all places, times, etc together at once). A mentor of my once questions the very same omnipotent concept that many theories of religion apply to god(s); my responce was think of the sum of all possiblities infinite to the smallest degree of change. The universe is not constant, sense the exact location of a single atom, or electron, etc anything and everything has a place, but if for a brief moment those electrons are out of place, then your universe is trivial to the infinite possible moments in which anything from subatomic size to the universe itself is questions able. If God is able to view, see all things that were, are, will be, or may be then he must view the world in this brief example:

Imagine a peach, for the sake of explaining omnipresence,

The core of the peace or center is the sum of your infinite possible universe, as stated by enstien as parrallel universes (each similar and different in all degrees).

The space between the skin of the peace and the center is the concepts of undetermined and unconstant physics, time, space, etc.

The Skin of the peach represents God, peering in on the universe and the interaction they have in different degrees of time, space, physics, etc and from this he can see all possible variables and results simaltameaously. God time, space, physics and all other things relative or trivial are constants, predetermining the result of every possible variable and it's infinite degrees. By the mercy of God, we are given the benefit of the doubt that we might choose any of these predetermined futures. Many college professors belive the contradiction of the two examples of free will and pre destination are contradictions but in this example, they are distinctly different and separate.
The free will rests in our decisions of choose the couarse of our future, each changing and switching between the infinite realities that exist; while pre destination determines that their is pre destination in the fact that their is only some any combinations of possible outcomes for each individual variable that affects our decisions. So one persons decison could only have twelve possible outcomes, and that limites how many of the infinite universe our own universe will shift into.

All things are trivial in the eyes of God...Our decisons are pre-determined and we have the power of choose the correct selection of those pre-determined futures. Evil is but a concept to describe the negative variables that affect those finial transitions into a new future.
 
When I referred to the classic problem of evil, I was referring to all of the various formulations that express the argument in strictly logical terms.

As I understand the customary usage of the term, a "logical PoE" is one that proposes "a deductive argument for the very strong claim that it is logically impossible for both God and evil to exist (or for God and certain types, or instances, of evil to exist)". That's the classic variety, which I was distinguishing from the class of evidential formulations of the PoE.
I can't help feeling you are being a tad disingenuous here. You appear to be talking about the naive reductio ad absurdum form that is fairly well known. It was probably devised by some medieval monk as practice for his young logic students.
As late as the second half of the 20th century, refining and advocating the logical PoE was still a substantial preoccupation of atheist philosophy of religion.
Who for example? Mackie? Flew? Anyone else? Two philosophers, a couple of papers and book does not comprise a substantial preoccupation - it hardly even qualifies as a casual interest.
It was no straw man.
No, well consider this - the problem of evil has been considered by Plato, Augustine, Aquinas, Leibnitz and others. There is an entire book in the Bible devoted to it. Yet theists would have us believe that it finds its ultimate expression in an obscure paper by a minor 20th century philosopher. If that is not a straw man, what is?
No, but it was Plantinga's specific FWD articulation that eventually caused Mackie (as he himself conceded) to abandon logical or incompatibilist PoE formulations, and I think it's fair to conclude that Plantinga's work has a lot to do with why inductive rather than deductive arguments from evil are now in vogue.
On the other hand it may have more to do with the renewed popularity of Bayesian forms in the last 25 years or so.

I would point out that any free will answer to this problem answers, at best, only half of it.
 
I can't help feeling you are being a tad disingenuous here. You appear to be talking about the naive reductio ad absurdum form that is fairly well known. It was probably devised by some medieval monk as practice for his young logic students.

In all sincerity, if I implied that I was limiting (unless explicitly indicated) those remarks to something other than the general class of deductive disproofs of God's existence based on the existence of one or more forms of evil, then I misspoke.


Who for example? Mackie? Flew? Anyone else? Two philosophers, a couple of papers and book does not comprise a substantial preoccupation - it hardly even qualifies as a casual interest.

Mackie and Flew are no doubt the most well-known figures in atheist philosophy of religion working on the logical PoE during the time in question. But other names do come to mind: H.J. McCloskey, Henry Aiken, Richard La Croix, Hugh LaFollette - to say nothing of their commentators. Note that I didn't say it was the sole or even the paramount preoocupation of atheologians at any point. I do not think, however, that one may fairly characterize the interest in such proofs among atheologians in the second part of the 20th century as insubstantial. Then again, I did not make this field my profession, so my assessment is that of a layman.


No, well consider this - the problem of evil has been considered by Plato, Augustine, Aquinas, Leibnitz and others. There is an entire book in the Bible devoted to it. Yet theists would have us believe that it finds its ultimate expression in an obscure paper by a minor 20th century philosopher. If that is not a straw man, what is?

Which is the strawman - the "theists would have us believe" part or the "it finds its ultimate expression" part? ;)

Seriously, though, it has been my experience in philosophical reading that, with regard to deductive proofs specifically (not philosophical ideas generally), that the latest batch are generally better than their predecessors - for obvious reasons of trial-and-error. I might go so far as to say that Mackie's articulation of the logical PoE was less vulnerable and better-defended than any prior formulation. No one (except, apparently, some unnamed "theists") is saying that it was the "ultimate expression". I, for one, hope that it wasn't. Yet when it was refuted, a lot of the vitality behind academic work on the logical PoE ebbed away, and that's just a fact.

By the way, it's a bit uncharitable to call Mackie's original essay "obscure", isn't it? Nearly every English speaker with more than a basic familiarity with modern philosophy of religion has at least heard of it, and it is still a staple of philosophy-of-religion anthologies. Plus, it was ultimately responsible for a lot of ink spilled over a two or three decade period.


On the other hand it may have more to do with the renewed popularity of Bayesian forms in the last 25 years or so.

I think one may rationally, though not necessarily, infer that the popularity of Bayesian forms in this particular area was partially occasioned by the wide perception that the future of deductive arguments from evil was no longer bright. But I don't really know.


I would point out that any free will answer to this problem answers, at best, only half of it.

If you mean that it addresses only human-inflicted evil, then no: Plantinga's defense posits the admittedly logical (albeit intellectually unsatisfying) possibility that "natural" evil is produced by nonhuman free agents other than God. If you mean that, if we reject the likelihood of that scenario, we are left in the position of having to devise theodicies to support the existence of God, then yes.
 
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I do not think, however, that one may fairly characterize the interest in such proofs among atheologians in the second part of the 20th century as insubstantial. Then again, I did not make this field my profession, so my assessment is that of a layman.
I am not familiar with those other names so I will have to take your word for this. Suffice to say that (rightly or wrongly) most atheist philosophers would regard discussing the nature of God as useful as debating the properties of phlogiston.
Which is the strawman - the "theists would have us believe" part or the "it finds its ultimate expression" part? ;)

Seriously, though, it has been my experience in philosophical reading that, with regard to deductive proofs specifically (not philosophical ideas generally), that the latest batch are generally better than their predecessors - for obvious reasons of trial-and-error.
If Mackie had attempted a proof of Fermat's last theorem and it had been found flawed, would you have then said that Fermat's last theorem had been defeated? Or merely that Mackie had been wrong?
I might go so far as to say that Mackie's articulation of the logical PoE was less vulnerable and better-defended than any prior formulation.
Clearly it was not if it was defeated by an argument that was basically a rerun of what Lewis had written 15 years before Mackie.
No one (except, apparently, some unnamed "theists") is saying that it was the "ultimate expression".
Well then the fact that it was flawed does not mean that the problem of evil has been defeated
I, for one, hope that it wasn't. Yet when it was refuted, a lot of the vitality behind academic work on the logical PoE ebbed away, and that's just a fact.
I don't see evidence of this fact - as I say academic philosophy has moved away from the syllogism in general - I don't think Plantinga can be credited with this.
By the way, it's a bit uncharitable to call Mackie's original essay "obscure", isn't it? Nearly every English speaker with more than a basic familiarity with modern philosophy of religion has at least heard of it, and it is still a staple of philosophy-of-religion anthologies. Plus, it was ultimately responsible for a lot of ink spilled over a two or three decade period.
Not uncharitable at all. If the author has disavowed the argument then obscurity is surely what he would have wanted. I can't imagine the motivations of anybody putting in anthologies a paper that the author no longer stands by.

But I live in Mackie's home town and I have not been able to get hold of a copy of a book with the paper. Mackie (and Flew) do not even rate an index mention in the Oxford and Routledge encyclopedias of philosophy and I can't find a treatment of the subject that uses Mackie.
I think one may rationally, though not necessarily, infer that the popularity of Bayesian forms in this particular area was partially occasioned by the wide perception that the future of deductive arguments from evil was no longer bright. But I don't really know.
But this form has become popular in every area of philosophy, it hardly seems likely that Plantinga sparked it off.

I think it was more likely Monty Python that killed off the syllogism.
If you mean that it addresses only human-inflicted evil, then no: Plantinga's defense posits the admittedly logical (albeit intellectually unsatisfying) possibility that "natural" evil is produced by nonhuman free agents other than God. If you mean that, if we reject the likelihood of that scenario, we are left in the position of having to devise theodicies to support the existence of God, then yes.
Devising theodicies would be a waste of time, since the possibility of these is already implicit in the premise of the PoE.

But you would need to decide whether it is possible that each and every instance of naturally caused suffering is a specifically and individually necessary to some consequent good.

If not then the logical PoE is back in force as strong as ever. If so then moral choices are trivial.
 
I am not familiar with those other names so I will have to take your word for this. Suffice to say that (rightly or wrongly) most atheist philosophers would regard discussing the nature of God as useful as debating the properties of phlogiston.

We're speaking of atheist philosophers of religion here. What philosopher of religion disdains discussing the nature of God?


If Mackie had attempted a proof of Fermat's last theorem and it had been found flawed, would you have then said that Fermat's last theorem had been defeated? Or merely that Mackie had been wrong?

A fair point, but it is difficult for me to see how any deductive proof of the non-existence of God from evil is not going to run into FWD problems. I don't write off the theoretical possibility, however.


Clearly it was not if it was defeated by an argument that was basically a rerun of what Lewis had written 15 years before Mackie.

I realize that the central insight behind FWDs has been around for a long time. I've never compared Lewis' writing on the subject to, say, Plantinga's. On the other hand, Lewis was no analytical philosopher, and I doubt whether anything he wrote would be formally sufficient to refute a well-crafted logical PoE. Then again, I might be wrong.


Well then the fact that it was flawed does not mean that the problem of evil has been defeated

I hold out the possibility that a logical PoE will someday be shown to be correct. I realize that there remains a very small cadre of atheist philosophers of religion who continue to work on the issue. However, most in the field seem to have moved on to more promising endeavors, and in the absence of a major development herafter brought to my attention, I'm not inclined to look backward, particularly as a layperson.


Not uncharitable at all. If the author has disavowed the argument then obscurity is surely what he would have wanted.

Fair enough. Uncharitable was the wrong word. However, obscurity was not exactly what he got.


But I live in Mackie's home town and I have not been able to get hold of a copy of a book with the paper.

You could try:
  • Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings (Oxford UP, 2001)
  • God and the Problem of Evil (Blackwell, 2001)
  • Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology (Wadsworth, 1994)
  • Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford UP, 1998)
  • The Impossibility of God (Prometheus, 2003)
  • The Problem of Evil (Oxford UP, 1990)

There are probably a number of other works that anthologize either the essay "God and Omnipotence" or one of Mackie's other essays on the same subject.


Mackie (and Flew) do not even rate an index mention in the Oxford and Routledge encyclopedias of philosophy and I can't find a treatment of the subject that uses Mackie.

Hmm. My very cursory examination indicates that Mackie is indexed in both the Routledge (23 articles!) and Macmillan encyclopedias of philosophy, as well as in the Oxford Companion. I didn't bother to check on Flew.

What treatments of the logical PoE are you finding, and what figures seem to be used in that connection?
 
We're speaking of atheist philosophers of religion here. What philosopher of religion disdains discussing the nature of God?
I doubt that any atheist philosopher is a philosopher of religion as such I would be surprised if any of the guys you mentioned would welcome that soubriquet. They would probably consider themselves philosophers that deal with religion from time to time. Many atheist philosophers similarly deal with the topic of religion but without getting into any nature of God topics.
A fair point, but it is difficult for me to see how any deductive proof of the non-existence of God from evil is not going to run into FWD problems. I don't write off the theoretical possibility, however.
It is difficult for me to see how the FWD even begins to address the problem of evil in whatever form.

At best the FWD comes up with valid reasons why God can't be impecccable rather than giving any argument why he can.

In fact the free will argument can just as easily be used as an argument against the possibility of moral perfection. If non-trivial free will is a positive good then in order to actualise this good God must allow and not intervene in pointless acts of suffering. Therefore God cannot allow the first good without participating in the second evil - so God cannot be morally perfect.

But some philosophers appear to suggest that since moral perfection is intrinsically impossible we should just take the next best thing and call that moral perfection.
You could try:
  • Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings (Oxford UP, 2001)
  • God and the Problem of Evil (Blackwell, 2001)
  • Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology (Wadsworth, 1994)
  • Introduction to Philosophy: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford UP, 1998)
  • The Impossibility of God (Prometheus, 2003)
  • The Problem of Evil (Oxford UP, 1990)

There are probably a number of other works that anthologize either the essay "God and Omnipotence" or one of Mackie's other essays on the same subject.
I stand corrected.

That is indeed a lot of reprints for a paper that has apparently been so utterly discredited. Again I wonder at the motivations. Maybe the editors don't consider it quite so utterly defeated as you suggest.
Hmm. My very cursory examination indicates that Mackie is indexed in both the Routledge (23 articles!) and Macmillan encyclopedias of philosophy, as well as in the Oxford Companion. I didn't bother to check on Flew.

What treatments of the logical PoE are you finding, and what figures seem to be used in that connection?
Admittedly I am looking at the Concise edition of the Routledge Encyclopedia but the I can only see one edition of the Oxford Companion and neither index Mackie or Flew.

Are you looking at the "Shorter" or the 10 volume set of Routledge? Or perhaps the online version (which might be supposed to contain even obscure references).
 
I doubt that any atheist philosopher is a philosopher of religion as such I would be surprised if any of the guys you mentioned would welcome that soubriquet. They would probably consider themselves philosophers that deal with religion from time to time. Many atheist philosophers similarly deal with the topic of religion but without getting into any nature of God topics.

Most academic philosophers who do work even primarily in philosophy of religion probably do not consider themselves exclusively philosophers of religion, but that wasn't really what I was suggesting. I note that one of the more celebrated names in that field, though - the atheist William Rowe of Purdue University (well-known for his work on the evidential PoE, among other things) - lists "philosophy of religion and metaphysics" as his area of specialization on his academic webpage. The page of another star figure in the field, atheist Paul Draper of Florida International University, lists "philosophy of religion" at the top of his areas of interest.

So let philosophers of religion simply designate philosophers for whom philosophy of religion (in a modern sense, per the Oxford Companion, "philosophical analyses of certain concepts or tenets central to the Western monotheistic religions and especially to Christianity") is an area of substantial interest. And let atheist philosophers of religion (or atheologians) simply designate those philosophers of religion who are atheists, or whose analyses, at any rate, tend toward the justification of an atheistic viewpoint over a theistic one.


But some philosophers appear to suggest that since moral perfection is intrinsically impossible we should just take the next best thing and call that moral perfection.

True. The same thing happens in many analyses of other divine attributes. I don't really have a problem with that argument with respect to, say, omnipotence (indeed, I have problems with contrary arguments), so I have no basis to reject the same approach with respect to moral perfection.


That is indeed a lot of reprints for a paper that has apparently been so utterly discredited. Again I wonder at the motivations. Maybe the editors don't consider it quite so utterly defeated as you suggest.

Maybe they don't; in the case of strongly atheistic compilations such as The Impossibility of God, perhaps the editors don't want to admit it. Moreover, some of those anthologies arguably have a history-of-philosophy dimension as well, and there's undeniably a basis there for including Mackie. But whatever the views of the editors, the more telling point is the dropoff in the production of recent academic work on the logical PoE. There's such a dearth of recent, well-written treatments from an atheist perspective that an editor is all but constrained to reach back several decades (and Mackie is probably the most celebrated and most accessible treatment from that period) or else not include any modern primary sources at all.

It occurs to me that perhaps I have overstated the point in this thread. Every particular formulation of the logical, deductive PoE specifically known to me is, I believe, widely considered (though not, perhaps, universally acknowledged) to have been refuted (i.e., satisfactorily shown not to prove a logical inconsistency between the existence of the God of classical theism and the existence of evil). It is also my impression that deductive proofs of the non-existence of God from evil are not pursued or examined with nearly as much interest in the literature as they were thirty or forty years ago, and that there is considerable skepticism among even atheists in the field as to whether such deductive proofs are worth pursuing in the light of prior refutations. That said, no one is in a position to assert that a novel formulation of the logical PoE will not be advanced successfully in the future. Indeed, I personally am not in a position to assert that an airtight deductive argument from evil has not already been written which has not come to my attention.


Admittedly I am looking at the Concise edition of the Routledge Encyclopedia but the I can only see one edition of the Oxford Companion and neither index Mackie or Flew.

Are you looking at the "Shorter" or the 10 volume set of Routledge? Or perhaps the online version (which might be supposed to contain even obscure references).

I was looking at the full, printed multivolume Routledge.

I was also consulting the single-volume, 1995 edition of the Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Honderich, ed.). "Mackie, John L." has a full entry to himself (sandwiched in between "MacIntyre, Alasdair C." and "macrocosm and microcosm"), and his index listing cross-references further mentions of Mackie in the following entries: "Australian philosophy"; "causality"; "cement of the universe"; "conditionals"; "error theory of value"; "God, arguments against the existence of"; "laws, natural or scientific"; "moral philosophy, history of"; "moral scepticism"; and "religion, history of the philosophy of". Anthony Flew does not appear therein; I didn't go back to the multivolume Routledge to see whether he is mentioned.
 
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Bri
I disagree with your opinion of what the example "clearly demonstrates." Infallible foreknowledge is a part of omniscience, but is not omniscience. My example doesn't assume that the programmer is omniscient, but demonstrates how the programmer has foreknowledge relative to the free agent's timeline.
Color added. Disprove a part and the whole falls.
As I stated before, if there is a specific point you do not understand, please post it and we’ll go over it again.

Thanks for the offer, but I posted the example so I'm satisfied that I understand it. Your posts indicate that you don't understand it (or have chosen to ignore parts of it).
You have two incompatible points, I pointed them out. If you don’t understand why they are incompatible, ask.

ceo_esq
Yes, but logically it has to have been created already in order for him to do that.
Hence, completely deterministic.

what he can predict on the basis of knowing all causal laws and all hypothetical initial conditions
Considering that all memory and thought are based on chemical reactions which god can predict with 100% accuracy, then the logical conclusion is that god, from the moment of inception, already knows the choices that will be made.

So far as I am aware, the best strong-atheist philosophers I know (including Mackie, whose name is practically synonymous with the logical PoE) never claimed that Plantinga's FWD logically contradicted divine omnipotence. But hey - you should be publishing your ideas. If correct, they would really shake up the current state of philosophical discourse.
My degree definitely isn’t philosophy.

Free will is incompatible with omniscience; they are mutually exclusive.
Omniscience is a component of omnipotence.

I hold out the possibility that a logical PoE will someday be shown to be correct. I realize that there remains a very small cadre of atheist philosophers of religion who continue to work on the issue. However, most in the field seem to have moved on to more promising endeavors,
Couldn’t that mean that the problem was indeed solved, yet in a manner to which you aren’t proposing, that either god isn’t omnibenevolent or that god isn’t omnipotent. Either answer would solve the problem nicely while retaining the concept of god, although admittedly not the standard Christian concept of the tri-omni deity. Or to put it another way, the new generation redefines what god means.

Ossai
 
Bri
Color added. Disprove a part and the whole falls.

The point was made that an omniscient God must be able to predict the results of the random (or free will) function. Even if true, this is of course untrue of the human programmer in the example who is ignorant of the results of the random function. Thus, a human programmer can perhaps do something that an omniscient God cannot do (have ignorance of a random function). That said, most would agree that there is no reason to assume that God couldn't limit his ability to predict a free will function in order to allow free will. It was also pointed out that in fact God's knowledge wouldn't be limited at all in this case since he would acquire the same knowledge by observation rather than prediction, just as the programmer in the example does.

So the "part" to which you refer wasn't disproven (on the contrary, the example clearly showed that a less-than-omniscient human being can have foreknowledge as it relates to the simulated timeline of the free agent), so it certainly wouldn't disprove the whole. The example simply illustrates that free will and foreknowledge are not mutually exclusive.

As I stated before, if there is a specific point you do not understand, please post it and we’ll go over it again.

I'll be sure to do that.

-Bri
 
The point was made that an omniscient God must be able to predict the results of the random (or free will) function.

Well, I missed out on a number of posts, here.

However, how could God, even if omniscient, predict randomness ? If randomness means that it cannot be predicted in any way, specifically because it is not related to any factor and could be different even in the same circumstances, how could he predict it ?
 

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