There is No God (And You Know It)

Such a God would see the universe as a fixed object with what to us appear to be events and change appearing to him as a fixed piece of the complete model. There is nothing in that concept that supports free will - in fact it is just about the most completely deterministic model that I can imagine.

Futhermore such a God would have no reason to favour one point in the time dimension of his model over another, his creation would be the entire model - up / down, left / right, past / future, flimerry / flummery.
 
Such a God would see the universe as a fixed object with what to us appear to be events and change appearing to him as a fixed piece of the complete model. There is nothing in that concept that supports free will - in fact it is just about the most completely deterministic model that I can imagine.

Can we agree that, for lack of a better way of articulating it, that such a God perceives events at all points along the timeline of the universe as a sort of eternal present - that is, in a manner not unlike the way in which you or I perceive the point which constitutes our present moment?

I have yet to read a clear explanation of why the mere perception by such a God of something that is "present" to him (that is, the basis of simple "foreknowledge") dictates that the perceived thing is necessary in a deterministic sense, whereas my direct perception of something that is present to me does not mean that it is necessary in a deterministic sense.
 
Can we agree that, for lack of a better way of articulating it, that such a God perceives events at all points along the timeline of the universe as a sort of eternal present - that is, in a manner not unlike the way in which you or I perceive the point which constitutes our present moment?

I have yet to read a clear explanation of why the mere perception by such a God of something that is "present" to him (that is, the basis of simple "foreknowledge") dictates that the perceived thing is necessary in a deterministic sense, whereas my direct perception of something that is present to me does not mean that it is necessary in a deterministic sense.
Similarly I have yet to read a clear explanation of how a God participating in the universe could do so presciently by merely percieving a future that is present to him and yet contingent on his own choices.
 
Can we agree that, for lack of a better way of articulating it, that such a God perceives events at all points along the timeline of the universe as a sort of eternal present - that is, in a manner not unlike the way in which you or I perceive the point which constitutes our present moment?

I have yet to read a clear explanation of why the mere perception by such a God of something that is "present" to him (that is, the basis of simple "foreknowledge") dictates that the perceived thing is necessary in a deterministic sense, whereas my direct perception of something that is present to me does not mean that it is necessary in a deterministic sense.

And how could a Creator God 'make' such a world, create an 'eternal present' such as this, and have ANY part of it be beyond his control, either willfully or not?

How many painters point at a feature in their painting and claim that this stroke or that one wasn't their doing, that the paint had free will?

You keep talking about 'merely perceiving' as if God were somehow detached and separate from the creation; yet this is clearly not so, as an omnipresent and timeless creator God would have formed ALL-THAT-IS (in the eternal sense) at once. I can only think that, in spite your obvious education and intelligence, for some reason you're not grasping the idea of past-present-future universe being created at-once, as-is, and are instead stuck in a temporal idea that somehow God creates the Universe, then merely looks in on it (as if from afar) at different points in time.
 
At this stage in the debate it appears that even if we are to concede every point in favour of the concept, God is still impossible.

A minimum definition should include creator of all things, omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, immanent in the world and capable of creating an entity with independent free will.

Take away any of these and you have a Deity not recognisable from most major systems of belief.

But it is clear that God cannot participate in a universe that contains free will and still retain omniscience. A being simply cannot make a free choice that is informed by an observation of the result of that choice.

Omnibenevolence is still problematical. Take the null hypothesis of the agnostic thesis mentioned earlier, that every single case of suffering due to natural causes has some consequent justifying good. How can that be possible if God is unable to guarantee the behaviour of the main players? Under such circumstances consequences of floods or diseases would not be knowable, even by an omniscient being.

And of course even if he could it would simply render our moral choices trivial.

I have never had any interest in proving God does not exist - as an atheist I am not making any particular claim which needs justification. In addition I had kind of always assumed that it was an unfalsifiable concept.

But I am surprised, from this discussion, that if I ever wanted to upsize from atheist to strong atheist that the task would seemingly be so simple.

That said, I cannot find any argument that would preclude the existence of a hands-off Deity that simply set the initial conditions and observed the result.
 
That said, I cannot find any argument that would preclude the existence of a hands-off Deity that simply set the initial conditions and observed the result.

I submit this is a philosophical corner into which god has been pushed by simple lack of any evidence besides anectdote. As such, it appears disarmingly similar to a psychic's claim that the presence of a skeptic's negative vibes cancel his powers.

For the one thing you have left out of your list of properties of this god is a peculiar and very high valuation on "belief without proof". Why is such a thing so valuable? Why are people cast into hell for not believing without proof? Sounds like an argument the Kids in the Hall would make playing their Canadian policemen skit.

"You will go to Hell. But we will give no proof of that. You only won't go to Hell if you believe you will go to Hell, with no proof."
 
I submit this is a philosophical corner into which god has been pushed by simple lack of any evidence besides anectdote. As such, it appears disarmingly similar to a psychic's claim that the presence of a skeptic's negative vibes cancel his powers.

For the one thing you have left out of your list of properties of this god is a peculiar and very high valuation on "belief without proof". Why is such a thing so valuable? Why are people cast into hell for not believing without proof? Sounds like an argument the Kids in the Hall would make playing their Canadian policemen skit.

"You will go to Hell. But we will give no proof of that. You only won't go to Hell if you believe you will go to Hell, with no proof."
As I was going for the minimum definition that could still reasonably be called God. I don't think a Hell doctine or a salvation by belief doctrine is part of that minimum set. Certainly if I am right and the God I described is impossible, this would certainly cover the "Hell" and "salvation by belief" Gods.

In any case I have long considered that any Theism that includes the Hell doctrine is internally inconsistent and self-refuting and therefore was never on my list of Theisms worth taking seriously.
 
Bri
You have yet to provide a shred of evidence that it is impossible for libertarian free will to exist with an omniscient God, much less without one.
Apparently you’ve selectively read both my and Robin’s posts.

The rest of your post illustrates that you continue to misunderstand the example.
Then explain your point again.

It is quite clear that my comment to which you were responded "I have done so several times" concerned providing evidence of the claim that omniscience and free will are incompatible. Clearly it had nothing to do with philosophers for thousands of years finding a flaw in my post.
We’ve already ripped your posts apart, in detail. Please go back an post where you do no understand this. Theologians and philosophers have been working on the Problem of Evil since Epicure first postulated it almost two millennia ago, with a marked lack of success.

It appears that this thread is finally winding down. It was lively for a few pages.

Ossai
 
Robin said:
But what would be the absolute last possible time you can change your mind?
From my own perspective, the last moment prior to making the choice. From the hypothetical perspective of God, the question makes a bit less sense. Such a God doesn't determine that you can't change your mind; he only knows (once the universe has been set in motion, anyway) whether you will or won't.


Robin said:
But I think that we have also established that a free choice must necessarily be ontologically prior to knowledge about it.

Yes. I surmise that you and I have different views on whether this negatively impacts any of the hypotheses I've offered.


Robin said:
And there is the problem of how God could possibly participate in a world where he simultaneously perceives all events. If a man prays for the wisdom to choose the correct path and God grants the prayer then how could God possibly be simultaneously perceiving the future when the prayer is made and when it is granted?

Plenty of philosophers deny any logical impossibility to this. If you're suggesting that the future "changes" when God answers the prayer, so that his perception of it would not remain constant, I'd have to answer that it's not clear that that's what's going on.


Robin said:
In fact over thousands of years philosophers have been unable to resolve the inconsistency between free will and omniscience...

More accurately, there appears to be no consensus on whether philosophers have been able to resolve any apparent inconsistency between free will and omniscience. Likewise, there appears to be no consensus on whether philosophers have been able to show that there is an inconsistency between free will and omniscience.

I have the impression that the idea that there are no unresolved consistencies enjoys wider currency among philosophers in the relevant field, although I hasten to add that I do not take that fact (if true) to be evidence that is in any way conclusive as to the underlying question. Still, I can't help feeling that if the inconsistency were as cut-and-dried as some persons here have alleged, the landscape of modern philosophy-of-religion discourse would appear vastly different than the one we actually survey.


Similarly I have yet to read a clear explanation of how a God participating in the universe could do so presciently by merely percieving a future that is present to him and yet contingent on his own choices.

I'm not sure that any timeless entity could be said to be prescient, except by analogy (I realize, of course, that we have rather loosely been using the equivalent term foreknowledge in this discussion). In other words, I'm not sure how much sense it makes to speak of such an entity knowing something at a precise time. However, I do not see this as a logical bar to participating in the universe.

Do you agree, by the way, that my query which prompted your comment above, has not been answered in this discussion?
 
Theologians and philosophers have been working on the Problem of Evil since Epicure first postulated it almost two millennia ago, with a marked lack of success.

Ossai, do you read much contemporary work on the Problem of Evil? There definitely has been progress (if you want to call it that) to the extent that almost all writers in the field now concur that the logical aspects of the problem have been defeated, and consequently the only versions anyone in the field bothers to publish or defend anymore are evidentiary or probabilistic versions. I don't think that's a development that should be overlooked.
 
We’ve already ripped your posts apart, in detail. Please go back an post where you do no understand this. Theologians and philosophers have been working on the Problem of Evil since Epicure first postulated it almost two millennia ago, with a marked lack of success.

Misunderstanding something and providing evidence against it are not equivalent. The example demonstrates compatibility between free will and foreknowledge, but does not attempt to refute the Problem of Evil, which is already accepted as defeated by nearly all theologians and philosophers.

-Bri
 
From my own perspective, the last moment prior to making the choice. From the hypothetical perspective of God, the question makes a bit less sense. Such a God doesn't determine that you can't change your mind; he only knows (once the universe has been set in motion, anyway) whether you will or won't.
The question wasn't from God's perspective. I was just pointing out that the first time you know for sure of the outcome of free will is after the choice has been made.
Yes. I surmise that you and I have different views on whether this negatively impacts any of the hypotheses I've offered.
For a non-interventionist God it does not have any negative impact. For an interventionist God it seems to be a showstopper (as far as I can see at least).
Plenty of philosophers deny any logical impossibility to this. If you're suggesting that the future "changes" when God answers the prayer, so that his perception of it would not remain constant, I'd have to answer that it's not clear that that's what's going on.
First we should agree that a human being exercising free will in the world must be influencing the future, otherwise it would not be free will. As far as I can see any action God performs in the world must either also influence the future, or be ineffective. So say the following transaction occurs:

Robin prays to God for comfort
God grants comfort
Robin becomes a Christian the next day

Now let's suppose that all three are the exercise of free will. God's choice is contingent on my choice and my decision is influenced by God's choice. So my second choice cannot be said to exist without God's choice, which cannot be said to exist without my first choice.

So God observes the prayer, but can equally observe my receiving comfort and becoming a Christian. So how did God participate in this process?

God makes his decision whether or not to grant me comfort in the full knowledge that I have received the asked for comfort and become a Christian, even though these events are supposed to be contingent on or influenced by that decision.

In the circumstances could he have decided not to grant my prayer? In which case the I would have received comfort from some imaginary source and my decision to become a Christian would have been based on that (since God has observed these events).

So God can choose to do anything in the world just so long as he does what he in fact did.

So if there are philosophers that deny a logical impossibility here, I would very much like to read what they have to say.
More accurately, there appears to be no consensus on whether philosophers have been able to resolve any apparent inconsistency between free will and omniscience. Likewise, there appears to be no consensus on whether philosophers have been able to show that there is an inconsistency between free will and omniscience.
Or even more accurately there has been no consensus about what omniscience and free will are. For example "infinite knowledge" is a useless definition for omniscience since an entity might know every number between 0 and 1 and nothing else and still have infinite knowledge. Too often I see these arguments advanced without a decent definition.
I have the impression that the idea that there are no unresolved consistencies enjoys wider currency among philosophers in the relevant field, although I hasten to add that I do not take that fact (if true) to be evidence that is in any way conclusive as to the underlying question. Still, I can't help feeling that if the inconsistency were as cut-and-dried as some persons here have alleged, the landscape of modern philosophy-of-religion discourse would appear vastly different than the one we actually survey.
To tell you the truth I have never read any that have even addressed questions such as I have asked above. I would be interested in any suggestions for reading.
I'm not sure that any timeless entity could be said to be prescient, except by analogy (I realize, of course, that we have rather loosely been using the equivalent term foreknowledge in this discussion). In other words, I'm not sure how much sense it makes to speak of such an entity knowing something at a precise time. However, I do not see this as a logical bar to participating in the universe.
But this has been the main thrust of my argument, it is irrelevant that a timeless entity cannot be said to be prescient per se.

Such an entity, if able to intervene in the world, must be deemed capable of making a true statement about the world, in the world. That was the point of the book-in-a-safe.

A statement about the world, in the world also exists in time, so God must be capable of inserting a true prediction about a free choice in the future at a particular time. (or if not, why not?)

But free will says that the possibility exists that this true prediction might be wrong.

An infallibly true prediction that might be wrong is a contradiction so one or more of the premises must be wrong.
Do you agree, by the way, that my query which prompted your comment above, has not been answered in this discussion?
It has not been answered for the case of a non-interventionist God. But I believe it has been answered in the case of an interventionist God.
 
Misunderstanding something and providing evidence against it are not equivalent. The example demonstrates compatibility between free will and foreknowledge, but does not attempt to refute the Problem of Evil, which is already accepted as defeated by nearly all theologians and philosophers.

-Bri

Really? What are your sources for this claim? Because according to the Stanford website, it is still a very concurrent problem, and no solid refutation or theodicy has been forwarded that cannot be argued against.

In fact, just punching in "Problem of Evil" (in quotes) on Google shows some very respectable papers showing that this problem is FAR from defeated - that, in fact, it remains very relevant and contemporary.
 
Really? What are your sources for this claim? Because according to the Stanford website, it is still a very concurrent problem, and no solid refutation or theodicy has been forwarded that cannot be argued against.

In fact, just punching in "Problem of Evil" (in quotes) on Google shows some very respectable papers showing that this problem is FAR from defeated - that, in fact, it remains very relevant and contemporary.
When people say they have defeated the problem of evil they usually mean that they have put up some straw man version of it and defeated that. As with the Beilby article quoted earlier.
 
As I can tell...

With almost 400,000 hits for '"problem of evil"', I think this hasn't been put to rest, just yet.
 
Really? What are your sources for this claim? Because according to the Stanford website, it is still a very concurrent problem, and no solid refutation or theodicy has been forwarded that cannot be argued against.

There are two broad types of argument from evil, as the Stanford article points out:
  • "[A] deductive argument for the very strong claim that it is logically impossible for both God and evil to exist (or for God and certain types, or instances, of evil to exist)[.]" This is the classic version of the problem.
  • "[A]n evidential (inductive/probabilistic) argument for the more modest claim that there are evils that actually exist in the world that make it unlikely that God exists."
Yet the article indicates that further attempts to defend the traditional version of the Problem of Evil "do not appear promising", and this is a reflection of a broad philosophical consensus. I can't think of any major atheological figures still preoccupied with arguing the logical PoE. These days they are all espousing the second (inductive/probabilistic) version of the problem. Did you notice that after the Stanford article explains the difference between incompatibility formulations (the traditional type) and evidential formulations, it devotes the entire rest of the article to discussing only the latter?

You're correct that the argument from evil is still a going philosophical concern. But it's not your father's PoE anymore. The classic problem was effectively killed and replaced with a humbler but more resistant successor.
 
As I can tell...

With almost 400,000 hits for '"problem of evil"', I think this hasn't been put to rest, just yet.

Thanks for making my point for me. If you wish to use the Problem of Evil to prove that God does not exist, you would have to prove that God cannot exist if evil exists. As evidenced by the number of hits you've found on the topic, this has not been even close to definitely proven as Ossai implied.

As ceo_esq has pointed out, more recent attempts have changed the rules a bit, but even if proven that it is "unlikely" for God to exist alongside certain evils which exist, that still leaves the possibility for God to exist alongside those evils, and therefore wouldn't meet the criteria of the topic of the thread.

-Bri
 
Thanks for making my point for me. If you wish to use the Problem of Evil to prove that God does not exist, you would have to prove that God cannot exist if evil exists. As evidenced by the number of hits you've found on the topic, this has not been even close to definitely proven as Ossai implied.

As ceo_esq has pointed out, more recent attempts have changed the rules a bit, but even if proven that it is "unlikely" for God to exist alongside certain evils which exist, that still leaves the possibility for God to exist alongside those evils, and therefore wouldn't meet the criteria of the topic of the thread.

-Bri

Oh, I agree, 100%. But I wasn't replying to that, but to this entirely erroneous statement you made:

Misunderstanding something and providing evidence against it are not equivalent. The example demonstrates compatibility between free will and foreknowledge, but does not attempt to refute the Problem of Evil, which is already accepted as defeated by nearly all theologians and philosophers.

The Problem of Evil has not already been accepted as defeated by nearly all theologians and philosophers - which means you were incorrect, Bri.

However, I agree that some form of God could exist even under all of these supposed refutations and logical constructions. It just wouldn't be the omni___ God of the Christian faith.

Amazingly, I don't see any discussion of 'omnibenevolent' being re-defined in the same manner as 'omnipotence' or 'omniscience' already has been - that is, that God does the very best that logically can be done. Well, some discussion that comes close to saying that (the 'best of all possible worlds' scenario)... curious.

As to ceo - Yes, I read the article, and found it fascinating. It still definitely demonstrates that God's reality is as uncertain as we are finding it in this thread - and clearly demonstrates that, if God exists, there is a strong possibility that the things we label as 'evil' are really not evil after all. This is the position I usually take, if I take as given that God exists: that the solution to the so-called 'problem' of evil is that evil is solely what man makes of it; that, to God's perspective, no thing is evil whatsoever.

This doesn't sit nicely with human morality or sense of right and wrong, but it does bypass the entire problem nicely... and is highly plausible, to boot.

But, then, this perspective also goes hand-in-hand, I think, with free will being a mere illusion.
 
Oh, I agree, 100%. But I wasn't replying to that, but to this entirely erroneous statement you made...

Yes, I agree that my statement was inaccurate. The version of the Problem of Evil that is no longer discussed much except by those attempting to disprove the existance of God is the incompatibility between the existance of God and the existance of evil. The "softer" version of the Problem of Evil (the one that doesn't help Ossai's argument) is still under discussion.

The Problem of Evil has not already been accepted as defeated by nearly all theologians and philosophers - which means you were incorrect, Bri.

I am fallible, and I stand corrected.

Amazingly, I don't see any discussion of 'omnibenevolent' being re-defined in the same manner as 'omnipotence' or 'omniscience' already has been - that is, that God does the very best that logically can be done. Well, some discussion that comes close to saying that (the 'best of all possible worlds' scenario)... curious.

Yes, this has been discussed. God cannot always do what we view as "good" if he is to do the "ultimate good" (for example, he doesn't always help someone who is in need). This is very similar to the dilemma posed with omnipotence and omniscience, and the same sorts of paradoxes arrise: "If God was omnibenevolent, he would be able to allow us to do evil without allowing evil."

-Bri
 
God: Entity or Myth?

Humanity's progression throughout history has dwelled upon three basic principles:

1. Having reason or purpose for everything and anything.

2. Having social communication and social relations.

3. Having common beliefs, values, etc.

In turn we have realized that all beliefs in some creator or destoryer are trivial in that both are the same. Whether it is the god of the bible, koran, torah, or even the greek, roman, viking, and egyptian gods....Al are one in the same. Look at personality of god(s) across many beliefs. In the old testament the God of the bible was referred to as a hand of authority and judgement that was very wraithfull upon people...while a complete personality change occurs when God is supposedly seperated from the third member of the trinity?: Jesus was expressed differently by his apostles: Mathew was hebrew (king), Mark was about humility(servant)
Luke was a greek (perfection), John gentile (the Son of God). Each portrayed Christ as a figure that their own people would accept, because each sent their writings of Christ and preached them to the world. LUKE targeted the greeks, whom during that time were doing the olympics...MATHEW wrote to his own people that would reject Christ as the son of god, but accept him as a moral king...MARK wrote to the lower class individuals that were in poverty and told them of Christ as a servant, one that serves the people opposite of the romans that had people serving them....JOHN wrote to the gentiles that would believe Christ was the son of a God, that was appealing to the foundation of hidden pagan values instilled in their societies. From that each wrote letters to the rest of different churches, speaking the same message, same god in ways that the people could relate, accept to believe, and comprehend. The same is true of the greek gods, that over time were stole from them by the romans, and adapted to fit the roman life styles.

God exists only in the fragment messages of characteristics, powerful interventions, etc that each belief has distorted. We dont hold the truth of God, but we hold the fragments of his truth's reflection.
 

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