From my own perspective, the last moment prior to making the choice. From the hypothetical perspective of God, the question makes a bit less sense. Such a God doesn't determine that you can't change your mind; he only knows (once the universe has been set in motion, anyway) whether you will or won't.
The question wasn't from God's perspective. I was just pointing out that the first time you know for sure of the outcome of free will is after the choice has been made.
Yes. I surmise that you and I have different views on whether this negatively impacts any of the hypotheses I've offered.
For a non-interventionist God it does not have any negative impact. For an interventionist God it seems to be a showstopper (as far as I can see at least).
Plenty of philosophers deny any logical impossibility to this. If you're suggesting that the future "changes" when God answers the prayer, so that his perception of it would not remain constant, I'd have to answer that it's not clear that that's what's going on.
First we should agree that a human being exercising free will in the world must be influencing the future, otherwise it would not be free will. As far as I can see any action God performs in the world must either also influence the future, or be ineffective. So say the following transaction occurs:
Robin prays to God for comfort
God grants comfort
Robin becomes a Christian the next day
Now let's suppose that all three are the exercise of free will. God's choice is contingent on my choice and my decision is influenced by God's choice. So my second choice cannot be said to exist without God's choice, which cannot be said to exist without my first choice.
So God observes the prayer, but can equally observe my receiving comfort and becoming a Christian. So how did God participate in this process?
God makes his decision whether or not to grant me comfort in the full knowledge that I have received the asked for comfort and become a Christian, even though these events are supposed to be contingent on or influenced by that decision.
In the circumstances could he have decided not to grant my prayer? In which case the I would have received comfort from some imaginary source and my decision to become a Christian would have been based on that (since God has observed these events).
So God can choose to do anything in the world just so long as he does what he in fact did.
So if there are philosophers that deny a logical impossibility here, I would very much like to read what they have to say.
More accurately, there appears to be no consensus on whether philosophers have been able to resolve any apparent inconsistency between free will and omniscience. Likewise, there appears to be no consensus on whether philosophers have been able to show that there is an inconsistency between free will and omniscience.
Or even more accurately there has been no consensus about what omniscience and free will are. For example "infinite knowledge" is a useless definition for omniscience since an entity might know every number between 0 and 1 and nothing else and still have infinite knowledge. Too often I see these arguments advanced without a decent definition.
I have the impression that the idea that there are no unresolved consistencies enjoys wider currency among philosophers in the relevant field, although I hasten to add that I do not take that fact (if true) to be evidence that is in any way conclusive as to the underlying question. Still, I can't help feeling that if the inconsistency were as cut-and-dried as some persons here have alleged, the landscape of modern philosophy-of-religion discourse would appear vastly different than the one we actually survey.
To tell you the truth I have never read any that have even addressed questions such as I have asked above. I would be interested in any suggestions for reading.
I'm not sure that any timeless entity could be said to be prescient, except by analogy (I realize, of course, that we have rather loosely been using the equivalent term foreknowledge in this discussion). In other words, I'm not sure how much sense it makes to speak of such an entity knowing something at a precise time. However, I do not see this as a logical bar to participating in the universe.
But this has been the main thrust of my argument, it is irrelevant that a timeless entity cannot be said to be prescient per se.
Such an entity, if able to intervene in the world, must be deemed capable of making a true statement about the world, in the world. That was the point of the book-in-a-safe.
A statement about the world, in the world also exists in time, so God must be capable of inserting a true prediction about a free choice in the future at a particular time. (or if not, why not?)
But free will says that the possibility exists that this true prediction might be wrong.
An infallibly true prediction that might be wrong is a contradiction so one or more of the premises must be wrong.
Do you agree, by the way, that my query which prompted your comment above, has not been answered in this discussion?
It has not been answered for the case of a non-interventionist God. But I believe it has been answered in the case of an interventionist God.