There is No God (And You Know It)

Clearly, j's state at t is what determines his action x. If you remove all 'antecedent conditions and causal laws' you are left with a sudden (effectively random) event to produce that state (or at least the part of it that is responsible for determining whether or not J does x). Do you think it is reasonable to describe that as free will?
Who said anything about removing those conditions and laws? The point is that they are present - and they may influence (in a probabilistic way, I suppose) the outcome - but that whether or not J does X cannot be deduced with absolute certainty from even an exhaustive knowledge of those antecedents.
 
Bri said:
I have on many occasions made it clear that my example isn't about God and doesn't attempt to demonstrate that the programmer in question is omniscient, so I'm not certain how you come to the conclusion that it proves anything about an omniscient God.
You're not certain? Let me help you:

1. Infallible foreknowledge is part of the definition of omniscience.

2. If infallible foreknowledge is incompatible with free will then omniscience is incompatible with free will

3. You supplied your example into an existing discussion about the compatibility or otherwise of omniscience and free will. That discussion focussed primarily on the infallible foreknowledge component of omniscience.

4. Your example was placed in response to my "safe" example which was about the incompatibility between omniscience and free will, focussing on the infallible foreknowlege component of omniscience.

5. As I pointed out earlier in the very next post you are drawing comparisons between the example and God.

6. As I pointed out earlier you have twice explicitly compared the programmer to God.

7. As I pointed out earlier you have already drawn conclusions about omniscience from the example.

Are you still not certain? Or is it only about God when it suits you?

And if your example says nothing whatsoever about God, free will and omniscience then what is it doing here? Why didn't you start a thread in the computing forum about how programmers can change any part of allocated RAM?
 
Who said anything about removing those conditions and laws? The point is that they are present - and they may influence (in a probabilistic way, I suppose) the outcome - but that whether or not J does X cannot be deduced with absolute certainty from even an exhaustive knowledge of those antecedents.
Whether they can or not is really the question. If a choice could in principle be deduced from knowledge of the antecedents then there would not be free will. If it could not even in principle be deduced from such knowledge then it is free will - but what is it?

Here is this instantaneous event that is intrinsically impossible to understand, even by an infinite intelligence. It uses mental events such as knowledge, intelligence, emotion, skill etc, but it does not depend entirely on them. But on the other hand it is not random - so what is the criteria? Most people think of free will as involving some kind of control - but what control is involved here? By definition we never know what our choice is until after it happens.

Here is something that is not predictable by even an infinite intelligence, so it is surely unpredictable to anyone else, including ourselves.

But does it really make sense to say that free will is absolute unpredictability? When our behaviour is unpredictable we normally associate this with the opposite of free will.
 
Who said anything about removing those conditions and laws?

You did here:

Here's one definition I've come across from time to time:

J has free will if for at least one voluntary act X at time t, no antecedent conditions and/or causal laws determine that J will perform X, or that he won't perform X.

I'm not assuming that you agree with that definition but you did not qualify it in any way so I was challenging its utility.

The point is that they are present - and they may influence (in a probabilistic way, I suppose) the outcome - but that whether or not J does X cannot be deduced with absolute certainty from even an exhaustive knowledge of those antecedents.

The fact that an observer cannot predict a given decision made by j at t does not logically imply free will. It just means that oberver is not omniscient.
 
(My emphasis)
Here is this instantaneous event that is intrinsically impossible to understand, even by an infinite intelligence. It uses mental events such as knowledge, intelligence, emotion, skill etc, but it does not depend entirely on them. But on the other hand it is not random - so what is the criteria? Most people think of free will as involving some kind of control - but what control is involved here? By definition we never know what our choice is until after it happens.

No - it is random. If we could discern some pattern of events and circumstances that allowed us to predict with some degree of certainty when an event will happen then it is effectively an ordinary caused event. Our non-caused events must be random.
 
No - it is random. If we could discern some pattern of events and circumstances that allowed us to predict with some degree of certainty when an event will happen then it is effectively an ordinary caused event. Our non-caused events must be random.
I was not making any particular claim for free will. My description of free will followed on from the sentence before:
If it could not even in principle be deduced from such knowledge then it is free will - but what is it?
In other words I am attempting to describe what libertarian free will would be if it existed - so presumably a supporter of the concept would say that it is not random.

Personally I lean to the idea that mental events (and ultimately the laws of physics) comprise the main determinants of our choices.
 
I was not making any particular claim for free will. My description of free will followed on from the sentence before:

In other words I am attempting to describe what libertarian free will would be if it existed - so presumably a supporter of the concept would say that it is not random.

Personally I lean to the idea that mental events (and ultimately the laws of physics) comprise the main determinants of our choices.

I think we are essentially on the same side of the argument. I just don't see the point in describing 'what libertarian free will would be if it existed' since it logically does not exist. We may as well ask what the corners of a circle would be like if they existed.

A supporter might say it is non-random but then he is admitting causality and so contradicting his own position.
 
To summarise:

- God (of whatever religion), if he exists and irrespective of his omniscience (or lack of that quality) has no more free will than anyone else.

- If God is omniscient then random events logically do not exist. As soon as someone can predict an event it ceases to be random.

- If random events do exist then God cannot be omniscient.

- If random events do not exist then all events are caused.

- If all events are caused then the universe is a deterministic engine.

- If the universe is a deterministic engine and God is omniscient then God knows that men cannot help being non-believers in him.

- A God that punishes non-believers with eternal damnation cannot therefore be considered as merciful, loving all his children etc...

... unless ...

- God really does intend to pardon you for not believing but knows that the best way to save you during your life is to threaten you with eternal damnation :)
 
How many times do i have to post on this thread to proove i exist? Jesus Christ! You all are pissin me off!
 
You did here:
...
I'm not assuming that you agree with that definition but you did not qualify it in any way so I was challenging its utility.
I referred to causal laws and antecedent conditions, yes, but not to imply their absence or removal, merely their non-determinative or non-disposive influence on the choice of a free agent.


]The fact that an observer cannot predict a given decision made by j at t does not logically imply free will. It just means that oberver is not omniscient.

Yet nothing in the definition I offered logically prevents an observer from knowing the decision "before" the agent makes it. He simply would not know it by "prediction" in the narrow sense of being able to pre-calculate it on the basis of knowing all causal laws and antecedent conditions, the way one can pre-calculate deterministic events. We've already covered why a timeless God would arguably know such things not by prior calculation but direct simultaneous perception of events that are still in the future from the human subject's point of view.
 
I have done so several times.

Not even once. But if you had, we would all agree you are the greatest philosopher who ever lived. But then there's the pesky fact that philosophers greater than you haven't been able to for thousands of years, and neither have you.

The rest of your post illustrates that you continue to misunderstand the example.

-Bri
 
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I referred to causal laws and antecedent conditions, yes, but not to imply their absence or removal, merely their non-determinative or non-disposive influence on the choice of a free agent.

Your causal laws and antecedents either act upon the event in question or they don't. If they don't then they are entirely irrelevant. My point was simply that the possibility of an event that has no causes (a random event) is not a great argument for free will. It does not really undermine determinism it just forces the determinist to state that some events may be completely unpredictable under any circumstances.


Yet nothing in the definition I offered logically prevents an observer from knowing the decision "before" the agent makes it.

Agreed - I'm not claiming it does.

He simply would not know it by "prediction" in the narrow sense of being able to pre-calculate it on the basis of knowing all causal laws and antecedent conditions, the way one can pre-calculate deterministic events. We've already covered why a timeless God would arguably know such things not by prior calculation but direct simultaneous perception of events that are still in the future from the human subject's point of view.

Ok, my point concerned the illogic of free will.
 
Not even once. But if you had, we would all agree you are the greatest philosopher who ever lived. But then there's the pesky fact that philosophers greater than you haven't been able to for thousands of years, and neither have you.

The rest of your post illustrates that you continue to misunderstand the example.

-Bri
Philosophers for thousands of years have never been able to find the flaw in your post? I can't find a suitably dumbfounded icon for that one.
 
I think we are essentially on the same side of the argument. I just don't see the point in describing 'what libertarian free will would be if it existed' since it logically does not exist. We may as well ask what the corners of a circle would be like if they existed.

A supporter might say it is non-random but then he is admitting causality and so contradicting his own position.
Or asking what the smallest rational number would be like if it existed.
 
YOU are the one who has given us this brilliant proof which demonstrates, rather clearly, that free will cannot exist with an omniscient, timeless creator God.

Again, if you claim that my example demonstrates this rather clearly, you should have no problem proving it.

I have on many occasions made it clear that my example isn't about God and doesn't attempt to demonstrate that the programmer in question is omniscient, so I'm not certain how you come to the conclusion that it proves anything about an omniscient God.

If my example is all you've got, then it's no wonder you're not able to provide evidence of your claim.

-Bri

I have done so several times.

Not even once. But if you had, we would all agree you are the greatest philosopher who ever lived. But then there's the pesky fact that philosophers greater than you haven't been able to for thousands of years, and neither have you.

The rest of your post illustrates that you continue to misunderstand the example.

Philosophers for thousands of years have never been able to find the flaw in your post? I can't find a suitably dumbfounded icon for that one.

Your avatar would do nicely, if you had one.

It is quite clear that my comment to which you were responded "I have done so several times" concerned providing evidence of the claim that omniscience and free will are incompatible. Clearly it had nothing to do with philosophers for thousands of years finding a flaw in my post.

This conversation, as far as I'm concerned, is over. Thanks once again for the lively discussion.

-Bri
 
Yet nothing in the definition I offered logically prevents an observer from knowing the decision "before" the agent makes it.
But what would be the absolute last possible time you can change your mind?
We've already covered why a timeless God would arguably know such things not by prior calculation but direct simultaneous perception of events that are still in the future from the human subject's point of view.
But I think that we have also established that a free choice must necessarily be ontologically prior to knowledge about it.

And there is the problem of how God could possibly participate in a world where he simultaneously perceives all events. If a man prays for the wisdom to choose the correct path and God grants the prayer then how could God possibly be simultaneously perceiving the future when the prayer is made and when it is granted?
 
Your avatar would do nicely, if you had one.

It is quite clear that my comment to which you were responded "I have done so several times" concerned providing evidence of the claim that omniscience and free will are incompatible. Clearly it had nothing to do with philosophers for thousands of years finding a flaw in my post.
Bri said:
Again, if you claim that my example demonstrates this rather clearly, you should have no problem proving it.
And as I have said so, I have done so several times.

In fact over thousands of years philosophers have been unable to resolve the inconsistency between free will and omniscience, and your example did not either, in fact it illustrated that inconsistency.
 
We've already covered why a timeless God would arguably know such things not by prior calculation but direct simultaneous perception of events that are still in the future from the human subject's point of view.

Such a God would see the universe as a fixed object with what to us appear to be events and change appearing to him as a fixed piece of the complete model. There is nothing in that concept that supports free will - in fact it is just about the most completely deterministic model that I can imagine.
 

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