There is No God (And You Know It)

I posted the example, so I'm pretty sure I understand it.
I was referring (as I thought you were) to the idea that God is outside of time and knows the future because he is observing it. In which case your continued insistence that present or past tense makes any difference to an atemporal being seemed puzzling.
Again, your comments seem to reflect a misunderstanding of the example. The example never refers to omniscience at all. In fact, it never refers to God at all.

-Bri
Hmm, firstly you introduced the example quoting my challenge that nobody could get past my book in a safe example, which was clearly about omniscience, God and free will.

You brought God into the discussion over the program before I even responded to the post.

You specifically identify the programmer with God in a post:
Bri said:
In this example, the programmer (God) knows about the agent's decision because he observes it, not because he knows about the algorithm (he may or he may not know about the algorithm -- it doesn't really matter).
also:
I'm not talking about omniscience, I'm talking about foreknowledge (only one component of omniscience). Most programmers are obviously not omniscient. My example simply illustrates that foreknowledge and free will are not mutually exclusive. That said, if you replace "God" with "programmer" in the example, there is no reason that God cannot be omniscient.
So you have specifically said here again identified God with the programmer and drawn a conclusion about God and omniscience from the example.

But perhaps then you have misunderstood my 'book in a safe' example and the nub of my argument. It is not the foreknowledge itself that makes free will impossible - it is infallible foreknowledge that causes the problem.

Nobody has ever doubted that a God might be able to muck around with time - but the presence of an infallible prediction about an event that is supposed to be the result of free will causes the contradiction I pointed out.

My objections relate very much to what you have said about the program - but more generally are a solid argument that an omnipotent, interventionist God is incompatible with the existence of free will.
 
I was referring (as I thought you were) to the idea that God is outside of time and knows the future because he is observing it.

The idea of foreknowledge of the future has nothing to do with omniscience, which was what the example was illustrating. Even a human being can have foreknowledge of the future of a random or free-will behavior.

In which case your continued insistence that present or past tense makes any difference to an atemporal being seemed puzzling.

That's not at all what I was insisting.

Hmm, firstly you introduced the example quoting my challenge that nobody could get past my book in a safe example, which was clearly about omniscience, God and free will.

I was pointing out that your safe example isn't about God or omniscience at all. It's about foreknowledge and free will, and even a human being who is unquestionably not God or omniscient can do it.

You brought God into the discussion over the program before I even responded to the post.

Of course, the next step is to ask whether it is possible for God to do it if a human being can do it, but my example didn't go there. I assumed that from my example it would be obvious that foreknowledge and free will are compatible, and that your "safe" example is possible. But it is clear from your subsequent posts that you had yet to understand that. Once you do, then we can bring God and omniscience into the equation.

-Bri
 
Bri
I don't know what you mean about "activating" the decision. The results of the decision were calculated before the simulation was even started, and never change afterwards.
Completely deterministic.

I have never claimed any limitation of foreknowledge.
Wrong.
There is certainly a limitation of knowledge of the random and free-will functions (which have nothing to do with foreknowledge of the simulated timeline).
Again incorrect. If the programmer can look at any the simulation at any point t=0 to t=60, then looking at the random number is also possible.

Limitation on omniscience! Again you limit omniscience in order for freewill to function.
Again, no. Here I'm simply responding to your post. The answer to whether the programmer of my example could know the result of the random function and whether the programmer in my example is omniscient was a given (he can't, and he's not). Yet he still has foreknowledge.
And it is still deterministic. The programmer knows that the agent will turn left at t=30. No matter how many times the program is ran, the agent will turn left at t=30. Absolutely nothing the agent does (random number) will ever cause it to turn right, go straight, or pause.

The related questions that were discussed after the example was given were about whether God, in the programmer's position, could know the results of the random function and whether his not knowing somehow limits his omniscience.
The basic definition of omniscience already answers that question. God would already know the number that the random number generator would produce. By declaring that god would not know, you are limiting omniscience, again.

God to choose to limit his ability to infallably predict the results of the random function, but oddly enough this "limitation" wouldn't really limit his knowlege at all since it still results in his knowing the results of the random function by observation rather than prediction.
What, so god’s a moron now as well?

God wouldn’t know whether 0 or 1 would come up, the random number.
God knows the program and what each random number would cause it to do.
God knows that the agent is constrained by the program.
God knows what the agent will do.
Yet god cannot deduce either 0 or 1?
Oh, wait, apparently god doesn’t know something thereby rendering him non-omniscient to begin with.

Remember you already said that the programmer already knows which direction will be chosen. No matter how many times the simulation is run at t=30, the agent will turn left, there is no possibility of the agent ever turning right.
Not true at all. If the simulation is run again, the agent might very well not turn left (might stop instead).
No. You go back and reread what you originally posted. There is only one simulation. If it is run again with the agent’s reaction being variable each time then the programmer does not have foreknowledge.

I never said that the agent would always turn left and in fact specifically said that a recalculation of the timeline could result in a different outcome. However, if the programmer would have foreknowledge of either outcome that might result from either the random or the theoretical free-will function. Please re-read the example until you understand it, and if you have questions I'd be happy to answer them.
Oh look, you’ve changed your position yet again. This time you want freewill and the only way to have it is to limit foreknowledge. You’ve expressed what the programmer knows as a possibility. As I said before, foreknowledge cannot be wrong. It is not prediction, because prediction implies the possibility of incorrectness.

No. No paradox either. The random number generator would only be random to a non-omniscient entity.
It is a paradox, of course, because you didn't answer the question.
Nope, I understood the question. If you think it doesn’t ask what you intended rethink it and ask again.

I asked if an omniscient God can create a random number generator that is so random that even he cannot predict. You answered "no" which means that the God you're referring to obviously isn't omniscient (because he doesn't know how to create such a thing). So please answer the question about whether an omniscient God would be able to create a random number generator that he cannot predict.
The answer remains no. It doesn’t matter which question you apply it to either. You’re trying to use logic to support an illogical proposition.

When it comes to an omniscient God, a prediction would imply a chance of 100%.
No, semantics – omniscience eliminates prediction. God would have infallible foreknowledge. Prediction implies a chance of error. There is no chance of error.

That doesn't prevent it from being a prediction (as opposed to an observation). But if you insist, God can limit his knowledge of the results in order to allow it to be random.
So, you do admit you are wrong. Infallible foreknowledge is incompatible with freewill.

Ossai
 
Of course you can't understand the idea of 'direct knowledge' as opposed to 'observational knowledge' because we only (theoretically) have a single example of 'direct knowledge' - self-awareness (and that's debatable). God, on the other hand, has 'direct, complete, and total knowledge' of all things IFF God is omniscient. This means no perception, observation, or prediction are required or even permitted, if God is omniscient.

As such, God KNOWS what choice every single being will ever make at the very instant of creation. No 'predicts', no 'observes', but KNOWS. This is what omniscience means, and this precludes free will.

Since my definition is fully compatible with the definitions you found on the net, your conclusion doesn't follow your evidence.

Pardon my rudeness, but are you really being that dense as a matter of course, or are you just ruffling my feathers, metaphorically speaking?

You said:

One definition of "omniscient" is "having infinite awareness, understanding, and insight." That simply implies the ability to know everything, not actually knowing everything.

Of the 6 definitions of 'omniscient' found on Google, five translate roughly to 'having all knowledge'. Only the Wikipedia entry said, 'having the ABILITY to have all knowledge'.

The first does NOT imply the second, nor does the second imply the first.

The first definitions means God has all knowledge, period. No acquisition required. The second suggests that God must seek knowledge, that God must desire to obtain it, and that knowledge can remain apart from God if God does not wish to seek it. It sets knowledge apart from God, and infers that God either has a faulty memory, or is NOT the timeless creator of all-that-is.

And, as others are pointing out to you, you are failing, utterly, in making a valid point; because you are still, STILL waffling between limited knowledge and illusionary free will. I think that, whether you realize it yourself or not, you actually do know that free will and omniscience are incompatible doctrines; certainly, every example you've tried positing demonstrates this clearly.
 
Of course you can't understand the idea of 'direct knowledge' as opposed to 'observational knowledge' because we only (theoretically) have a single example of 'direct knowledge' - self-awareness (and that's debatable). God, on the other hand, has 'direct, complete, and total knowledge' of all things IFF God is omniscient. This means no perception, observation, or prediction are required or even permitted, if God is omniscient.

I assume that you're claiming that this "direct knowledge" must somehow allow God to predict a decision before it's made rather than simply observing the decision as it's made. Of course, this seems to be a distinction without a difference since God is timeless and having knowledge of a decision made is the same as having knowledge of a decision before it is made (both would occur instantly for God). In order to prove that omniscience and free will are incompatible, you would have to provide evidence of some difference between your direct knowledge and my observational knowledge, that an omniscient God must have direct knowledge rather than observational knowledge, and that direct knowledge would preclude free will.

As such, God KNOWS what choice every single being will ever make at the very instant of creation. No 'predicts', no 'observes', but KNOWS. This is what omniscience means, and this precludes free will.

Just because you keep saying it doesn't make it so. Can you provide evidence?

Pardon my rudeness, but are you really being that dense as a matter of course, or are you just ruffling my feathers, metaphorically speaking?

A little of both, I'm sure. I apologize, I am actually presenting two different possibilities at the same time, both of which would refute your argument that omniscience cannot exist if free will is true. One is that God doesn't have complete knowledge of everything (specifically, the decisions made by free agents), but has the capacity for complete knowledge. I agree that this is simply a different definition of omniscience than the one you're using, but one that would likely be perfectly compatible with some theist beliefs.

The other possibility is that in the programmer's place, God could simply choose to obtain the knowledge in a "different" way, but still maintain complete knowledge with no gaps. Rather than by predicting the outcome of the random number generator or free-will generator, he would simply obtain the knowledge by observation (perhaps direct observation of the agent's state of mind after making the decision). Perhaps differing from your definition of "direct knowledge," observational knowledge would not imply that God would be predicting the results of a decision, only that he has perfect knowledge of that decision once made.

Of the 6 definitions of 'omniscient' found on Google, five translate roughly to 'having all knowledge'. Only the Wikipedia entry said, 'having the ABILITY to have all knowledge'.

The first does NOT imply the second, nor does the second imply the first.

Agreed, and I wasn't saying that the two definitions were the same. I was simply saying that neither definition precludes free will.

And, as others are pointing out to you, you are failing, utterly, in making a valid point; because you are still, STILL waffling between limited knowledge and illusionary free will.

First of all, none of my arguments have involved illusionary free will. It is a given in our conversation that we are talking about libertarian free will. The only question was what type of knowledge is necessary if libertarian free will is true. You might argue that I'm "waffling" between limited knowledge and omniscience (since that's what we're attempting to determine) but if you argue that I'm waffling between libertarian free will and illusionary free will then you simply haven't been paying attention.

Furthermore, we've already resolved the points that Robin and Ossai are still arguing about, which concern the programmer example I gave. Robin (although he doesn't realize it) is still arguing that foreknowledge and free will are incompatible, and his argument has nothing to do with omniscience at all. He seems to be arguing that the example I gave isn't possible, even though he could probably program it himself in a day.

You and I (I thought) were discussing a second question that we can ask once we've accepted that foreknowledge doesn't preclude free will: whether or not an omniscient God can replace the programmer in the example and still retain the free will of the agent.

I think that, whether you realize it yourself or not, you actually do know that free will and omniscience are incompatible doctrines; certainly, every example you've tried positing demonstrates this clearly.

Uhhh...sure, Zaayr. Maybe I DO know that you're right without REALIZING it! That's one way to win an argument, simply insist that your opponent knows you're right even if she or he doesn't realize it!

Again, saying it's so and proving it's so are two different things.

-Bri
 
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Again incorrect. If the programmer can look at any the simulation at any point t=0 to t=60, then looking at the random number is also possible.

Ossai, what you don't seem to be getting is that the example I gave is NOT theoretical. Are you saying that everyone who can use a computer can determine the outcome of a random number generator?

-Bri
 
Ahh, but that's deterministic. When he peeks into the future, the decision has been "activated". Hence it's already happened. Hence he's not really in the past anymore with respect to the decision. If you claim he is, then when time moves forward again (from the past), and the decision point is passed a second time...exactly what happens?
Perhaps you don't understand the example, or perhaps I don't understand what you're saying, but I can't make heads or tails of your above comments. Aside from the free-will generator I mentioned, what I described in my example isn't hypothetical in the least -- it's all completely real and programmable. The programmer obviously isn't "in the past" (or present or future) of the simulation at all. He's completely outside of the simulation. I don't know what you mean about "activating" the decision. The results of the decision were calculated before the simulation was even started, and never change afterwards. The programmer can look at the past, present, and future of the simulation simultaniously because he isn't affected by the timeline of the simulation at all.

He's not outside the simulation enough for what you claim to happen to happen. If he runs the simulation forward, sees what happens, then runs it backwards, he doesn't actually know what will happen because when he runs it forward again, a different choice might be made. If this is not the case (i.e. the same choice will be made) then the choice is deterministic, and not actually random (or "free will" or whatever.)

Now if you claim he views the entire timeline as a static thing, that's fine, but from that "godlike" viewpoint, the entire timeline has already happened, so looking at some point before the decision isn't really in the "past" of that decision. It's in the future -- the time from which the entire timeline has already happened.

Sure you are. You are free to make your decisions based on previous inputs and your personality, all nice chemicals bouncing around inside your brain.
With determinism, all of the chemicals and presumably your personality are caused by prior external events. In other words, how you will act tomorrow is completely predictable by anyone who knew all of the variables. Likewise, your behavior tomorrow was completely predictable millions of years ago for the same reasons. You have no more choice than the earth has of whether or not to revolve around the sun.

-Bri

Yes, that is correct. Neglecting random quantum influences (which, though negating determinism, do not imply free will) I have no problem with it all being pre-determined in that sense. If it's all like some hugely complex waterwheel rolling as water goes downhill to the end of time, so what?

Note Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem still applies, though. If I built a machine somehow to predict what I would do tomorrow -- then that knowledge will alter what I may do tomorrow, even in a fully deterministic universe. Some of our long-winded threads around here trip on this very issue over and over again, even though it is very well understood mathematically. There is no way even God could know what I would do tomorrow after he told me what I would do tomorrow. Because I could simply choose to do the opposite, obviously. Even in a deterministic universe.
 
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However, in this case I especially disagree because God isn't actually limiting his knowledge at all, but rather simply changing the means by which he acquires the knowledge. At the same time he chooses not to predict the output of the free will function (otherwise you would claim that it's not free will)

I would claim that this is not contingent on whether God makes the effort or not, but rather whether it's possible at all. That God chooses not to see what the free will generator will output in the future does not affect the fact that he could, if he wanted to, which in turn implies determinism.
 
Bri
Ossai, what you don't seem to be getting is that the example I gave is NOT theoretical. Are you saying that everyone who can use a computer can determine the outcome of a random number generator?
You are attempting to cloud the issue. The example clearly states that the programmer, not a random user.

Furthermore, we've already resolved the points that Robin and Ossai are still arguing about, which concern the programmer example I gave. Robin (although he doesn't realize it) is still arguing that foreknowledge and free will are incompatible, and his argument has nothing to do with omniscience at all. He seems to be arguing that the example I gave isn't possible, even though he could probably program it himself in a day.
Foreknowledge is part of omniscience. Sorry but you are the one that doesn’t seem to grasp the basis of what you are arguing.

You and I (I thought) were discussing a second question that we can ask once we've accepted that foreknowledge doesn't preclude free will:
Infallible foreknowledge precludes freewill. Go back and reference my explanation (Post #562) using your example.

Ossai
 
He's not outside the simulation enough for what you claim to happen to happen. If he runs the simulation forward, sees what happens, then runs it backwards, he doesn't actually know what will happen because when he runs it forward again, a different choice might be made. If this is not the case (i.e. the same choice will be made) then the choice is deterministic, and not actually random (or "free will" or whatever.)

The above is not what is described in my example, but the following is:

Now if you claim he views the entire timeline as a static thing, that's fine, but from that "godlike" viewpoint, the entire timeline has already happened, so looking at some point before the decision isn't really in the "past" of that decision. It's in the future -- the time from which the entire timeline has already happened.

Correct. The entire timeline is instantiated before the simulation begins. From the programmer's point of view, the agent's future is really the programmer's "past" (i.e. the entire timeline was calculated in the programmer's past). That's exactly the point of the example. The programmer isn't "limited" at all by the simulated timeline (only by his own timeline). The agents in the example, however, are completely limited by the simulated timeline and need not even be aware of the programmer or his timeline.

If we replace the programmer with God, and the simulated world with our world, you can begin to see how God isn't limited by our timeline, and that our past, present, and future occur "simultaneously" to God. In addition, God might not be constrained by a timeline at all, but he may in fact be timeless.

Neglecting random quantum influences (which, though negating determinism, do not imply free will) I have no problem with it all being pre-determined in that sense. If it's all like some hugely complex waterwheel rolling as water goes downhill to the end of time, so what?

We are in agreement here. Free will may not exist, in which case it would be just as you described (either probabilistic or deterministic). My point was that free will may exist, in which case the behavior of free agents would be neither (they could actually make thier own choices not entirely determined by external causes).

-Bri
 
I would claim that this is not contingent on whether God makes the effort or not, but rather whether it's possible at all. That God chooses not to see what the free will generator will output in the future does not affect the fact that he could, if he wanted to, which in turn implies determinism.

Even if God choosing to know the output of the free will generator precluded free will, it does not follow that just the possibility of God being able to know the output of the free will generator would preclude free will. God could decide whether or not we have free will by choosing whether or not to know the results of the free will generator.

That said, even the programmer in the example I gave knows the output of the free will generator (or random number generator) by observation without affecting the agent's free will, so there's no reason to believe that God cannot do the same.

-Bri
 
You are attempting to cloud the issue. The example clearly states that the programmer, not a random user.

It's a non-issue. It can be a programmer or a random user. I specifically stated that whoever it is doesn't know the output of the random number generator. Are you saying that it's impossible for the person using the program to not know the output of a random number generator?

Foreknowledge is part of omniscience.

So? Omniscience is not necessary for foreknowledge, which means that my example has nothing to do with omniscience, only foreknowledge. I made it quite clear that the programmer is in no way omniscient.

Infallible foreknowledge precludes freewill. Go back and reference my explanation (Post #562) using your example.

The example demonstrates that the "explanation" you gave has a flaw. The example is completely real and can be demonstrated. The flaw in your logic arrises by your assumption that the simulation and programmer are both limited by the same timeline, specifically the simulated timeline. A more accurate analysis would be:

  1. P has infallible knowledge of the simulated timeline t=0 to t=60.
  2. P simultaneously knows all values of the simulated timeline.
  3. A has free will at simulated time t=30.
  4. A can choose left or right at simulated time t=30. (3)
  5. If A chose left at simulated time t=30, P knows that A chose left. (1)
  6. If A chose right at simulated time t=30, P knows that A chose right. (1)
  7. If, at simulated time t=20, P knows A's choice at simulated time t=30, P has infallible foreknowledge of A's choice.
  8. At simulated time t=20, P knows A's choice at simulated time t=30. (2,5,6)
  9. P has infallible foreknowledge of A's choice. (7,8)

-Bri
 
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Bri
Even If God choosing to know the output of the free will generator precluded free will, it does not follow that just the possibility of God being able to know the output of the free will generator would preclude free will. God could decide whether or not we have free will by choosing whether or not to know the results of the free will generator.
God’s choice at that point would be moot. Going back to the program analogy, it doesn’t matter if the programmer looks ahead, t>0. The timeline and sequence of events is already determined, pure deterministic.

Ossai
 
Furthermore, we've already resolved the points that Robin and Ossai are still arguing about, which concern the programmer example I gave.
Or to put it another way we've already resolved the points that Bri is still arguing about, but Bri appears to be the last one to realise it.
Robin (although he doesn't realize it) is still arguing that foreknowledge and free will are incompatible,...
But if you re-read my original definition of the problem I put a very precise definition of what I meant my omniscience and it included infallible foreknowledge.
... and his argument has nothing to do with omniscience at all.
If you think this then you have merely misunderstood my argument. Does the definition of omniscience not include infallible foreknowledge? My clearly stated premise was that it did. No my argument has everything to do with omniscience, but it is true to say that I am using the infallible foreknowledge component of omniscience as the main argument.

I never stated there was any incompatibility between foreknowledge and free will. There isn't. I freely choose my newspaper but my newsagent knows as soon as I walk into the shop which one I will choose. No, it has to be infallible foreknowledge, which is why it is about omniscience and not just foreknowledge.
He seems to be arguing that the example I gave isn't possible, even though he could probably program it himself in a day.
I could probably code it in half an hour, but as you are probably aware the time-consuming part of software engineering is requirements definition. In order that the program was just what you specified I would need to get some clarifications. For example you say:
Since no agents have access this new wall cannot affect any agent. Nothing needs to be recalculated, and the free agent will turn left as expected at time 30.
Question 1 : How would the free agent's left turn be coded in this new window? Presumably when the original calculation is made any turns are stored to an array. Then when window 2 is opened up the behaviour of the agent is read from this array. Would this be a valid way of programming it?
Question 2 : Normally when somebody says "Nothing needs to be recalculated" they mean "It could be recalculated, but this is unnecessary because nothing affecting the calculation has changed". Is this what you mean? Could it be recalculated? When I code it can I include the superfluous calculation? Even though it is not necessary but since you say that the new wall cannot affect any agent then it should not matter if the timeline is recalculated. Right?
 
Bri
So? Omniscience is not necessary for foreknowledge, which means that my example has nothing to do with omniscience, only foreknowledge. I made it quite clear that the programmer is in no way omniscient.
You example clearly limited foreknowledge in order to allow freewill.
Foreknowledge is part of omniscience.
A limitation of foreknowledge is a limitation of omniscience.

Foreknowledge and freewill are incompatible, therefore omniscience and freewill are incompatible.

Let me express it this way:
Omniscience = set{A-Z}
Foreknowledge = F from set{A-Z}
Omniscience != (set{A-Z} – F)
Freewill != Foreknowledge
Therefore freewill != Omniscience

The flaw in your logic arrises by your assumption that the simulation and programmer are both limited by the same timeline, specifically the simulated timeline.
Never part of my example and not a likely assumption.

1. P has infallible knowledge of the simulated timeline t=0 to t=60.
2. P simultaneously knows all values of the simulated timeline.
3. A has free will at simulated time t=30.
4. A can choose left or right at simulated time t=30. (3)
5. If A chose left at simulated time t=30, P knows that A chose left. (1)
6. If A chose right at simulated time t=30, P knows that A chose right. (1)
7. If, at simulated time t=20, P knows A's choice at simulated time t=30, P has infallible foreknowledge of A's choice.
8. At simulated time t=20, P knows A's choice at simulated time t=30. (2,5,6)
9. P has infallible foreknowledge of A's choice. (7,8)

What idiocy is this? :jaw-dropp

Lines 5 and 6 invalidate line 1. Line 1 is foreknowledge, both 5 and 6 are dependant knowledge, they rely on A’s action at time t=30.

Ossai
 
God’s choice at that point would be moot. Going back to the program analogy, it doesn’t matter if the programmer looks ahead, t>0. The timeline and sequence of events is already determined, pure deterministic.

Incorrect, and you are overloading the term "determined." Just because the timeline is calculated before the simulation begins relative to the programmer's timeline, that doesn't mean that it was calculated deterministically. If the random function is used, it is calculated randomely. If the free will function is used, it is non-deterministic and non-random.

You are again confusing the simulation's timeline and the programmer's timeline.

-Bri
 
There are no random functions in computing. Only pseudo-random functions.
This is understood, but for the purposes of the example it only needs to be unpredictable from the point of view of the person running the program.
 
No no, hodgy; no posting raw opinion without discourse or evidence, if you please.

Sorry, I can't help myself (particularly when I think that the statement is pretty much self-evident).

We can start with a determinist notion that all events are caused. If we accept this then there is clearly no free will since the thought events that I am having now would have causes that stretch back into a past that predates my existence.

The only alternative that we can posit against this is that not all events are caused - in which case we could say that some events are random. Random events do not, however, support the notion of free will.

I do not think that there is a logically definable concept of 'free-will'.
 
This is understood, but for the purposes of the example it only needs to be unpredictable from the point of view of the person running the program.

Actually I think it doesn't accurately model things. The use of an OS analogy would be more accurate since that is a system that has to deal with the randomness of a user. You can't program something with a predefined end-state - which is what is being proposed here if I follow correctly.
 

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