There is No God (And You Know It)

My point is that there are two different statements. One is that John can choose between three different choices at t<30. The other is that John chooses between three different choices at t=30.
No, can and did are your words. I don't care what the agent can do. What the agent did at t=30 does not even make sense in a statement that exists at t=20. It is like saying "I did that 30 minutes from now".

My statements referred to the probability that the agent will turn left at t=30.
Inserting the statement doesn't change anything. In fact, it's not even in John's timeline (it doesn't affect John's timeline in the least since he never sees it).
Things you can't see can also be in your timeline, things that don't impact you can be in your timeline
While it is true that the statement exists "in time," the programmer being unaffected by the agent's timeline is key. The programmer can peek at what the agent will do at t=30, and insert the statement into the world at t=20 before the agent has performed the action without disrupting the timeline.
But that does not mean that the timeline is not changed.
Sure. The chances of John choosing to turn or stop are each 1/2 at t<30.
So the chances of the prediction in the safe being wrong are then 1/2 at t<30
Huh? What multiple universes are you referring to here?
So what you are saying is that if I did a complete dump of the array that holds the events relating to t<30 before the call to the free will function, and did another dump of t<30 after the programmer predicts the agents choice, then they would be absolutely identical in every way?

Are you saying that the 'LEFT' in a safe will appear in both dumps. No they will not, the programmer inserts the prediction after the call to the free will function. The free will function is called in the context of a different history to the one containing the description.

Let me put it this way, you need to do this:
Code:
God.isOmnipotent=true;
p = God.getPrediction(agent,t);
if ( p == null )
  God.isOmnipotent = null;  // cannot say one way or other
else if (p != agent.make_free_choice() )
  God.isOmnipotent = false;
Now if you can code your example in such a way as to get this part to come out with God.isOmnipotent being true, then I will believe you.
And when exactly is God (or the programmer) ever wrong?
In the above example, unless you can avoid this in coding.
There is no conflict with the three statements.
So a statement exists in the safe at time t=20 saying "At time t=30 agent turns left". There is a 50% probability that at time t=20 the agent turns right. But the statement "At time t=30 agent turns left" cannot possibly be wrong. And you can't see any conflict here?
See, that's where you got it wrong. The statement is actually that the programmer witnessed the agent having already turned at t=30. In fact, the programmer isn't predicting anything, he's observing it as it happens at t=30. He inserts his observation into the world at t=20. Even though the statement exists before the event occurs, it's not a prediction -- it's an observation of the actual event.
From my original problem:
The book has predicted he will go right
So you see it is not that I got it wrong, it is that you have changed the problem in order to give God and out.

But the problem says what it says, it is about predictions. If God chooses to peek into the future to make these predictions that is his own business, but he must phrase them as predictions, as testable statements about John's behaviour at a particular time. They will be right or they will not and if they are not then God will not be omnipotent. http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=1239967#post1239967
Correct, at t=20 it is 1/2 as I said. At t=30 it goes to 1 since the agent has already taken the action.
But the prediction by God which is in existence at t=20. So there is a 1/2 probability at t=20 that this prediction will turn out to be wrong.
There is no falsification of history at all.
Except for this:
Now at time 10, we insert a new wall on which is written the word "LEFT" completely contained inside the safe.
Which sounds like falsification to me. It would now require recalculation to be consistent.
Furthermore, this is a completely programmable simulation. You can program it yourself in a few hours and try it. There is no trick at all. You, as the programmer, can predict with 100% accuracy the agent's future movement by observing it first hand even though you cannot predict the results of the random function.
Wait, did you really say "You, as the programmer, can predict with 100% accuracy the agent's future movement"? I thought you said it was not a prediction? But now when it supports the "God can be omnipotent" part it is a prediction.

Again, you can't have it both ways. You have inserted a 100% accurate prediction into t=10 to demonstrate omniscience. Then at t=20 there exists a 100% accurate prediction that the agent will turn left. And yet at t=20 there is a 50% probability that it will turn right.

There is a contradiction.
 
Bri
Doesn't matter. First, the programmer doesn't know what decision the agent will make (which is all that matters).
and
So, the programmer knows both the possible choices that could be made at t<30 and the actual choice that is made at t=30.
Damn, you’re inconsistent.

I’ll once again point out that you see-saw between the position without advancing your goal.

If you want freewill you limit omniscience, in some way.
If you want omniscience you limit freewill.

No, it's decidedly not middle knowledge. Middle knowledge would imply that the programmer can somehow predict the behavior of the agent by knowing all of the variables. In my example, the agent doesn't have to know all of the variables, but simply predicts the agent's behavior by simple observation.
Look another limitation on omniscience. You are now trying to diminish it to deduction based on know variables.

From the agent's point of view the programmer has perfect foreknowledge of the future. At the same time, the agent has free will.
You’ve keep proclaiming this but everything you post points otherwise.

If the programmer (P) has infallible foreknowledge of every choice that the agent (A) will make, then A cannot do otherwise.

P has infallible foreknowledge of the timeline t=0 to t=60.
A has freewill
At time t=30 A will make a choice.
P foreknows that A will choose left at t=30.
A will choose left or right at t=30.
At time t=30 A chooses left or right.
A has freewill therefore both left and right must be possible choices.
If A chooses left has P has infallible foreknowledge.
If A chooses right P does not have infallible foreknowledge.

P has infallible foreknowledge, therefore A will turn left.
Since both left and right are not possible choices then A does not have freewill.

OR

A has freewill, both left and right are possible choices.
Since right is a possible choice, P does not have infallible foreknowledge.


What you have continually done is limit A’s choices to what P already knows (i.e. eliminate freewill).
P has infallible foreknowledge of A choosing left.
A has the illusion of choice, left or right.
A goes left.
Therefore A has the freewill choice of left.

Ossai
 
No, can and did are your words. I don't care what the agent can do. What the agent did at t=30 does not even make sense in a statement that exists at t=20. It is like saying "I did that 30 minutes from now".

You're now starting to understand. It is exactly like saying that John did it 30 minutes from now. The programmer can view John's future and present simultaneously!

My statements referred to the probability that the agent will turn left at t=30.

No, one of your statements refer to the probability that the agent will turn left at t=30 (50%). The other refers to the probability that the agent did turn left at t=30 (100%).

Things you can't see can also be in your timeline, things that don't impact you can be in your timeline

No, if you cannot perceive something, it cannot affect your future decisions at all. Your decisions are completely made on your perception of the world. If something exists and you never know it's there, you will act just as you would if it wasn't there. How are you going to change your decisions if you don't know about the invisible gnome sitting on your shoulder right now?

But that does not mean that the timeline is not changed.

Actually, it does. If God can create multiple universes, there is no reason to think that our timeline would change as the result of changes in the other universe.

So what you are saying is that if I did a complete dump of the array that holds the events relating to t<30 before the call to the free will function, and did another dump of t<30 after the programmer predicts the agents choice, then they would be absolutely identical in every way?

No. The calculation is done instantly before t=0, after which the timeline never changes. The free will function is called during this calculation. You may want to re-read the post where the simulation is described if you missed this key point.

So, yes, the programmer can open windows anywhere he wants along the timeline and observe the world without changing the timeline. So, yes, dumping the timeline at t=20 and t=30 would produce the same results.

Are you saying that the 'LEFT' in a safe will appear in both dumps. No they will not, the programmer inserts the prediction after the call to the free will function. The free will function is called in the context of a different history to the one containing the description.

Again, the free agent's memory is not affected by the insertion of the message, and therefore no recalculation is necessary. I think that addresses the rest of your post.

-Bri
 
If you want freewill you limit omniscience, in some way.
If you want omniscience you limit freewill.

I'm not talking about omniscience, I'm talking about foreknowledge (only one component of omniscience). Most programmers are obviously not omniscient. My example simply illustrates that foreknowledge and free will are not mutually exclusive. That said, if you replace "God" with "programmer" in the example, there is no reason that God cannot be omniscient.

Look another limitation on omniscience. You are now trying to diminish it to deduction based on know variables.

Actually, I think I said the opposite. The programmer isn't using deduction at all (which would be middle knowledge and impossible because he cannot predict random numbers). He is using simple observation.

The only possible limitation on omniscience in this scenario is with the random and free will functions, both of which have the same problem, and both are phrased in the same manner as the rock that is so large that God cannot lift it:

Can an omniscient God create a random number generator that is so random that even he cannot predict it?​

There are at least three answers, any of which can be true and resolve the problem. 1) the question is self-contradictory and illogical, and therefore is meaningless, 2) God is beyond logic and therefore even if the question is illogical God can still accomplish it but you wouldn't be able to understand the result with your current knowledge of logic, or 3) God can limit his ability to predict the results in order to allow it to be random.

I would argue that the question has logical problems having to do with your definition of "random." Essentially, your definition of "random" is that no being, not even God, can predict it. In other words, the very definition you're using imposes a limitation on God, so you're asking "Can an unlimited God limit himself and still be unlimited?" In order to resolve this in a logical way that you can understand, God would have to limit his own power to meet your definition, which I argue he can certainly do. Alternately, he can do both at the same time in a different system of logic, but you wouldn't understand the result.

There is a fourth possibility, which has to do with the definition of the word "predict." In our scenario, the programmer obviously cannot predict the results of the random number generator, and yet does have perfect foreknowledge of those results by observation, and is then able to "predict" it within the framework of the simulated timeline. If God simply observes the result of a truly random function, he's not really predicting it, but yet he is then able to predict it as a result of the observation. If God is timeless, the observation and ability to predict occur instantaneously, outside of any timeline, and his abilities to "predict" aren't limited at all, even if the function is truly random.

-Bri
 
What is happening is that the timeline (or a portion of it) is recalculated whenever the programmer intervenes with the world (essentially what you were aluding to with your "fast forward" analogy). From this point on, however, the timeline is static. Only during the calculation does randomness/free will come into play, but after the timeline has been established it doesn't change (unless the programmer intervenes with the world again). The scenario I presented is absolutely possible to program (the fact that a computer doesn't generate truly random numbers doesn't really matter).

Ahh, but that's deterministic. When he peeks into the future, the decision has been "activated". Hence it's already happened. Hence he's not really in the past anymore with respect to the decision. If you claim he is, then when time moves forward again (from the past), and the decision point is passed a second time...exactly what happens?

If the decision is activated a second time, then either the same decision is made always, implying determinism, or he might choose differently the second time this point in time is "activated". In which case, he (might) choose differently, in which case God's previous observation is null and void.



The programmer simply isn't affected by the artificial timeline of the simulation, and can view any or all times along the timeline simultaneously.

...which implies determinism. If you can go back in time, however you want to phrase it, and then, sitting while time passed "the hard way", and if you see everything unfold exactly the same, including "free will" decisions, then that is prima facia evidence of determinism.


I am free to do whatever I decide. I am a deterministic machine that takes inputs and generates outputs based standard physical principles.
Then you're not "free" to do anything, including making decisions.

Sure you are. You are free to make your decisions based on previous inputs and your personality, all nice chemicals bouncing around inside your brain.

If this hypothetical "free agent" is making decisions that are not deterministic and are not random, then what possibly could it be? I claim this concept is nonsensical, and suggested a thought experiment that showed it was indistinguishible from determinism, or determinism + a few random tweaks.



When you understand guilt and punishment and threats of same and what-not as just more inputs to the brain/mind, then the "problem" of determinism vs. free will disappears. Of course you could choose otherwise -- in the deterministic sense. Knowledge of this capacity, plus knowledge of possible downfalls (and benefits!) are also things that enter into the calculation.
Color added by me. If determinism is true, you cannot "choose" anything

Sure you can -- that is the essence of choosing! Picking a choice based on inputs and preferences in your mind. What else could it possibly be?

, and you cannot "do otherwise" at all.

Sure you can! Just the knowledge that you could have chosen differently can affect your choice. Philosophers like to make it sound as if you are dragged, kicking and screaming, into some choice. You are absolutely free to choose as you want.

Now how "what you want" comes about, that's another issue.
 
Bri
I'm not talking about omniscience, I'm talking about foreknowledge (only one component of omniscience).
If you limit a part you are limiting the whole.

Most programmers are obviously not omniscient. My example simply illustrates that foreknowledge and free will are not mutually exclusive.
Incorrect and I’ve already explained why.

Color added for emphasis.
The only possible limitation on omniscience in this scenario is with the random and free will functions, both of which have the same problem, and both are phrased in the same manner as the rock that is so large that God cannot lift it:
Limitation on omniscience! Again you limit omniscience in order for freewill to function. Remember you already said that the programmer already knows which direction will be chosen. No matter how many times the simulation is run at t=30, the agent will turn left, there is no possibility of the agent ever turning right.

Can an omniscient God create a random number generator that is so random that even he cannot predict it?
No. No paradox either. The random number generator would only be random to a non-omniscient entity.

There are at least three answers, any of which can be true and resolve the problem. 1) the question is self-contradictory and illogical, and therefore is meaningless,
The above question is neither illogical nor meaningless.

2) God is beyond logic and therefore even if the question is illogical God can still accomplish it but you wouldn't be able to understand the result with your current knowledge of logic, or
See above answer. The question is neither illogical nor meaningless.

3) God can limit his ability to predict the results in order to allow it to be random.
Omniscience is not predictability. Omniscience is knowledge, no change of being wrong; prediction implies a chance of incorrectness.

Ossai
 
Ahh, but that's deterministic. When he peeks into the future, the decision has been "activated". Hence it's already happened. Hence he's not really in the past anymore with respect to the decision. If you claim he is, then when time moves forward again (from the past), and the decision point is passed a second time...exactly what happens?

Perhaps you don't understand the example, or perhaps I don't understand what you're saying, but I can't make heads or tails of your above comments. Aside from the free-will generator I mentioned, what I described in my example isn't hypothetical in the least -- it's all completely real and programmable. The programmer obviously isn't "in the past" (or present or future) of the simulation at all. He's completely outside of the simulation. I don't know what you mean about "activating" the decision. The results of the decision were calculated before the simulation was even started, and never change afterwards. The programmer can look at the past, present, and future of the simulation simultaniously because he isn't affected by the timeline of the simulation at all.

Sure you are. You are free to make your decisions based on previous inputs and your personality, all nice chemicals bouncing around inside your brain.

With determinism, all of the chemicals and presumably your personality are caused by prior external events. In other words, how you will act tomorrow is completely predictable by anyone who knew all of the variables. Likewise, your behavior tomorrow was completely predictable millions of years ago for the same reasons. You have no more choice than the earth has of whether or not to revolve around the sun.

-Bri
 
If you limit a part you are limiting the whole.

I have never claimed any limitation of foreknowledge. There is certainly a limitation of knowledge of the random and free-will functions (which have nothing to do with foreknowledge of the simulated timeline). In fact, that was the whole point. Without any knowledge whatsoever of the outcome of a random number generator (which is absolutely the case in my example since the programmer is NOT omniscient) the programmer still has perfect foreknowledge of the events in the simulation. This is simply fact. I can write the program now, and even though I don't know how to predict numbers produced by a random number generator, I can still know how the agent in the example will act at any point on its timeline by simple observation.

Limitation on omniscience! Again you limit omniscience in order for freewill to function.

Again, no. Here I'm simply responding to your post. The answer to whether the programmer of my example could know the result of the random function and whether the programmer in my example is omniscient was a given (he can't, and he's not). Yet he still has foreknowledge.

The related questions that were discussed after the example was given were about whether God, in the programmer's position, could know the results of the random function and whether his not knowing somehow limits his omniscience. It is possible for God to choose to limit his ability to infallably predict the results of the random function, but oddly enough this "limitation" wouldn't really limit his knowlege at all since it still results in his knowing the results of the random function by observation rather than prediction.

Remember you already said that the programmer already knows which direction will be chosen. No matter how many times the simulation is run at t=30, the agent will turn left, there is no possibility of the agent ever turning right.

Not true at all. If the simulation is run again, the agent might very well not turn left (might stop instead). I never said that the agent would always turn left and in fact specifically said that a recalculation of the timeline could result in a different outcome. However, if the programmer would have foreknowledge of either outcome that might result from either the random or the theoretical free-will function. Please re-read the example until you understand it, and if you have questions I'd be happy to answer them.

No. No paradox either. The random number generator would only be random to a non-omniscient entity.

It is a paradox, of course, because you didn't answer the question. I asked if an omniscient God can create a random number generator that is so random that even he cannot predict. You answered "no" which means that the God you're referring to obviously isn't omniscient (because he doesn't know how to create such a thing). So please answer the question about whether an omniscient God would be able to create a random number generator that he cannot predict.

The above question is neither illogical nor meaningless.

Of course it is both illogical and meaningless, which is why you cannot answer it. Any answer given would be rejected as your focus shifts back and forth between requiring the God to be able to do the illogical and demanding a logical answer to an illogical question.

Omniscience is not predictability. Omniscience is knowledge, no change of being wrong; prediction implies a chance of incorrectness.

When it comes to an omniscient God, a prediction would imply a chance of 100%. That doesn't prevent it from being a prediction (as opposed to an observation). But if you insist, God can limit his knowledge of the results in order to allow it to be random.

-Bri
 
But if you insist, God can limit his knowledge of the results in order to allow it to be random.

lifegazer used to make the same assertion. It's as wrong now as it was then.

If you limit your knowledge, you are no longer omniscient. The only way an omniscient and timeless deity could 'limit' its knowledge is to not know this thing altogether. Otherwise, a memory would exist, because at some point in the Deific timeline, this deity KNEW that fact... and if the deity removes ALL knowledge of this fact, then this deity is NO LONGER OMNISCIENT.

There's no 'temporary loss of knowledge' in a timeless and omniscient Deity.

I have to agree with Robin on this one - you keep waffling between illusionary free will, and lack of omniscience. You haven't yet shown that your example implies anything for the free will/omniscience incompatibility issue.
 
lifegazer used to make the same assertion.

Ouch! I've never actually seen an example of the Reductio ad Hitlerum fallacy before! Nice!

If you limit your knowledge, you are no longer omniscient.

I disagree, as would many others. However, in this case I especially disagree because God isn't actually limiting his knowledge at all, but rather simply changing the means by which he acquires the knowledge. At the same time he chooses not to predict the output of the free will function (otherwise you would claim that it's not free will) he is also gaining back the very knowledge he is limiting -- namely the knowledge of the results of the function. He in fact does know the results of the function by observation rather than by prediction. Different means to the same knowledge, and at the same time allowing free will.

I have to agree with Robin on this one - you keep waffling between illusionary free will, and lack of omniscience. You haven't yet shown that your example implies anything for the free will/omniscience incompatibility issue.

As I pointed out to Robin, the example with the programmer wasn't meant to resolve the free will / omniscience incompatibility issue. It was only meant to resolve the free will / foreknowledge incompatibility issue.

The question of whether God's omniscience is limited by not being able to predict a function that logically must be unpredictable is a separate issue which as ceo_esq pointed out is akin to the "can God make a rock bigger than he can lift" paradox. There is a problem with the question itself which can be resolved in a number of ways, the easiest of which would be to simply say that God is beyond logic and can do the illogical (which ironically is exactly what you're demanding with the illogical question).

-Bri
 
Last edited:
If you limit your knowledge, you are no longer omniscient.

If God chooses not to do everything that he can do, is he no longer omnipotent? Or is omnipotence simply the ability to do everything?

One definition of "omniscient" is "having infinite awareness, understanding, and insight." That simply implies the ability to know everything, not actually knowing everything.

If there are multiple means of acquiring some knowledge, does omniscience require God to choose a particular means, or only that he acquire the knowledge?

Perhaps it's a definitional thing, but I don't think that God choosing not to predict the outcome of our choices in order to allow free will would preclude him from being omniscient. Especially since he still has complete knowledge of our choices by observation and so isn't limiting his knowledge at all.

-Bri
 
Ah, see, now, the use of 'omniscient' to mean merely 'the ability to know everything' is one I had never used, for the simple reason that it leaves open a small gap for God to, on occasion, be wrong... by 'choosing' not to know something. This, in turn, shows a flaw in God's capabilities, that would be inconsistant with fundamental reasoning about God.

In other words, it undermines the intent of declaring God 'omniscient' - I mean, which sounds more intimidating: that God knows what you're doing, or that God could know what you're doing if he wanted to?

If, however, we reduce the meaning of 'omniscient' to mere ability, then there's no problem with 'free will' at all.

Not that battle by Google is worth anything, but I think it's interesting to note that a search for 'define:omniscient' turns up six results - five that define it as 'total knowledge', and one that defines it in terms of capacity for total knowledge. The odd man out, interestingly enough, is the Wikipedia entry...

'define:omniscience' turns up twice as many results, and again, the odd man out appears to be Wikipedia - and is the only one relating capacity for total knowledge, rather than actually having total knowledge. It would seem that google-fu insists on the more rigid definition of 'omniscient', in general.

Oddly enough, the passage quoted in one definition (Isaiah 40:14) would have to be rather loosely interpreted, IMHO, to reach any definition of 'omniscience'...

Maybe you have access to philosophy references that redefines omniscience from the common usage of 'having all knowledge' to the somewhat more obscure 'ability to have all knowledge'? I'm fresh out - since my personal interests deal with limited, temporally constrained deities with limited knowledge, I don't have much material dealing with the monotheistic omni-all God. And Google-fu doesn't seem to support your opinion...

ETA: It seems that I should probably leave a small space when I write 'define: omniscience' - since : o (compacted) is a smilie...
 
Ah, see, now, the use of 'omniscient' to mean merely 'the ability to know everything' is one I had never used, for the simple reason that it leaves open a small gap for God to, on occasion, be wrong... by 'choosing' not to know something. This, in turn, shows a flaw in God's capabilities, that would be inconsistant with fundamental reasoning about God.

I think that assigning God infallability would take care of God being wrong (if someone was concerned about that implication).

Also, in this case, there is no lack of knowledge at all. God is simply choosing how he comes to that knowledge (using observation rather than prediction), so it seems that even your definition of omniscience is compatible with free will.

Not that battle by Google is worth anything, but I think it's interesting to note that a search for 'define:omniscient' turns up six results - five that define it as 'total knowledge', and one that defines it in terms of capacity for total knowledge. The odd man out, interestingly enough, is the Wikipedia entry...

Webster (the first one I checked) lists both, so you can count that as another source that at least confirms that the ability to have all knowledge is supported by some definitions.

And Google-fu doesn't seem to support your opinion...

I'm simply pointing out possibilities, one of which is that omniscience can be defined differently than you do. That said, it would still seem that even with your definition of omniscience, it is possible to have free will.

-Bri
 
Not at all. Claiming that God comes through the knowledge by 'observation' rather than foreknowledge still insists that there is something God either did not know or did not create. God wouldn't HAVE to look to know what decision was made; God already created that part of reality, including the decision being made, as is.

Omniscience is absolutely incompatible with free will. In fact, I'm starting to think that free will is absolutely incompatible with any philosophy other than an atheistic idealism or dualism, period.

And your arguments, rather than serving to steer me away from this opinion, have only sharpened my conviction all the more for this opinion.

In fact, if you get right down to it, with an omniscient and timeless God, there is neither prediction (since God is timeless) nor 'observation' - but, rather, direct perception and simultaneous creation. In fact, it really couldn't be any other way, really.
 
Not at all. Claiming that God comes through the knowledge by 'observation' rather than foreknowledge still insists that there is something God either did not know or did not create. God wouldn't HAVE to look to know what decision was made; God already created that part of reality, including the decision being made, as is.

You are assuming two things here. Let's look at the statement in blue first. You are assuming that God cannot know the result of the free will function, but I am claiming that he can but chooses not to. In other words, he doesn't HAVE to look, he CHOOSES to look. You then say that by choosing not to know something he is causing a deficiency in his knowledge, which I say is not the case since the knowledge is simply acquired through a different means.

Your second assumption hilighted in red is that God is limited by time. There is no time when God didn't know something if God is unlimited by time. His choosing not to predict the result of the free will function and his acquisition of the knowledge by observation occur simultaneously.

Omniscience is absolutely incompatible with free will. In fact, I'm starting to think that free will is absolutely incompatible with any philosophy other than an atheistic idealism or dualism, period.

You still have to prove this if you want to prove that a God with your definition of omniscience cannot exist with free will (although I would argue that very few theists would have a problem with the more "restricted" versions of omniscience you claim ceo_esq and I have presented).

And your arguments, rather than serving to steer me away from this opinion, have only sharpened my conviction all the more for this opinion.

Excellent, then perhaps you will share your epiphany with the rest of us.

In fact, if you get right down to it, with an omniscient and timeless God, there is neither prediction (since God is timeless) nor 'observation' - but, rather, direct perception and simultaneous creation. In fact, it really couldn't be any other way, really.

You'll have to explain the difference between perception and observation.

-Bri
 
You are assuming two things here. Let's look at the statement in blue first. You are assuming that God cannot know the result of the free will function, but I am claiming that he can but chooses not to. In other words, he doesn't HAVE to look, he CHOOSES to look. You then say that by choosing not to know something he is causing a deficiency in his knowledge, which I say is not the case since the knowledge is simply acquired through a different means.

If he can know the result of a free will function, then the function is deterministic.

And the point is, there is no acquiring of knowledge; omniscience means HAVING all knowledge. Already. From the beginning, to the end, with no gaps. That's why I differentiate between perception and observation - the first word should probably be, simply, 'knowing'.

Your second assumption hilighted in red is that God is limited by time. There is no time when God didn't know something if God is unlimited by time. His choosing not to predict the result of the free will function and his acquisition of the knowledge by observation occur simultaneously.

In which case, neither happens. He KNOWS immediately and instantly, the result. In other words, there is neither prediction NOR observation involved. Especially if God is unlimited by time. This, in term, means that free will is purely an illusion.

You still have to prove this if you want to prove that a God with your definition of omniscience cannot exist with free will (although I would argue that very few theists would have a problem with the more "restricted" versions of omniscience you claim ceo_esq and I have presented).

Hmmm.... must not be many theists on the net then... or else they all post on Wikipedia.

:D

But I'm not arguing that an omniscient god can't exist - only that free will can't exist. Omniscient Gods can certainly exist, but their existance negates free will, by virtue of their omniscient and timeless nature.

Of course, IMHO, Gods of this type don't exist anyway - the O/FWI issue is just a single straw in the huge pile that negates God's existence, IMO.

Excellent, then perhaps you will share your epiphany with the rest of us.

Nah, my mind is too bizarre in how it functions for me to put that into writing.

But all the info is here, on these threads - and most of the argument has been supplied by you, Bri. I leave it as an exercise in insanity for others to figure it out.

You'll have to explain the difference between perception and observation.

Yeah, perception was the wrong word. I think direct knowledge would have been more accurate.
 
Bri said:
You're now starting to understand. It is exactly like saying that John did it 30 minutes from now. The programmer can view John's future and present simultaneously!
Actually I understood it years ago, you are yet to understand it, you keep insisting that there is a difference between "will" and "did" from the point of view of a timeless being.

But God is timeless so so from his point of view there is no difference - "did" is no better than "will" to refer to these observations.

However once the observation is inserted as a proposition in the timeline it gains a time value.

If the event occurred at t=30 and the observation of it is placed at t=40 it becomes a description about the past.

If the same observation is placed at t=20 it becomes a prediction about the future.

The problem I posed specifically asks for such a prediction to be made and placed in a safe.
No, one of your statements refer to the probability that the agent will turn left at t=30 (50%). The other refers to the probability that the agent did turn left at t=30 (100%).
No, both statements refer to exactly the same question - the probability that the agent will turn left. By placing the statement at any time before t=30 it becomes a statement about whether the event will occur.

And as you have agreed the programmer in your example has placed a 100% accurate prediction about the future at t=10. At precisely the same time by free will that prediction is possibly wrong. So it is a 100% accurate and possibly wrong prediction. Quibbling about the grammar won't change that.

You might ask the question as "Does the possibility exist that the statement 'John turned right at t=30' is true when t>30?"

If there is a 100% accurate prediction that he turns left then the answer is no.

If John has free will then the answer is yes.

Precisely the same question, different answers.

Nothing could be clearer - a contradiction exists between omniscience and free will.
How are you going to change your decisions if you don't know about the invisible gnome sitting on your shoulder right now?
But we are not talking about my decisions. We are talking about God's omniscience. That concerns all of history, not just the part I can see. You have created two histories, the first without the prediction the second with. The choice occurred wrt the first history, the omniscience with the second. You are comparing apples to quasars.
If God can create multiple universes, there is no reason to think that our timeline would change as the result of changes in the other universe.
Which is irrelevant since the inside of a safe is not another universe.
No. The calculation is done instantly before t=0, after which the timeline never changes. The free will function is called during this calculation. You may want to re-read the post where the simulation is described if you missed this key point.
If the choice occurred before t=0 then the agent does not have free choice by definition. But let's see what you actually said:
... and then the simulation can calculate the entire 60 units of time for every agent by calling each agent's function for each unit of time from 0 to 60
So the agent's function is called sequentially for each unit of time. So the when the free will function for the agent is called at t=30 then t[0] to t[29] had already been calculated. OK, so we take a dump of the entire timeline from 0 to 29 including the parts the agent can't see at this point and call it "dumphist1".
Now at time 10, we insert a new wall on which is written the word "LEFT" completely contained inside the safe. Since no agents have access this new wall cannot affect any agent. Nothing needs to be recalculated, and the free agent will turn left as expected at time 30.
At this stage we take another dump of the the entire timeline from 0 to 29 including the parts that the agent can't see and call it "dumphist2".

"dumphist1" is not the same as "dumphist2". This is what I mean by different universes. The agent has free will in the first, but the programmer is not omniscient. The programmer is omniscient in the second, but the agent does not have free will (since the function has never been called in this universe).
 
If he can know the result of a free will function, then the function is deterministic.

God may very well know the results of things that are the result of free will or randomness by observation. Even WE could do that, as demonstrated with the programmer example. The only question is whether or not this would somehow limit God's knowledge.

And the point is, there is no acquiring of knowledge; omniscience means HAVING all knowledge. Already. From the beginning, to the end, with no gaps. That's why I differentiate between perception and observation - the first word should probably be, simply, 'knowing'.

Of course, and a God who is unlimited by time does know everything at ALL times without any gaps, through observation. Of course, I'm using the term "observation" not to mean only visual observation, as it could mean actually observing the agent's state of mind. If that's what you mean by "perception," then there is no distinction at all.

In which case, neither happens. He KNOWS immediately and instantly, the result. In other words, there is neither prediction NOR observation involved. Especially if God is unlimited by time. This, in term, means that free will is purely an illusion.

No, if God allows free will, he knows the result by observing it. There is nothing preventing God from allowing the choice to be made by the agent's own free will and God knowing about it.

Hmmm.... must not be many theists on the net then... or else they all post on Wikipedia.

Since my definition is fully compatible with the definitions you found on the net, your conclusion doesn't follow your evidence. But even if you're saying that God must not be omniscient because he chooses to know something by observation rather than prediction, then I don't think this is something that most theists would have a problem with.

You haven't really stated what the problem might be either, other than it "sounds more intimidating" that "God knows what you're doing" rather than "God could know what you're doing if he wanted to." Your second statement is inaccurate anyway since God knows what you're doing whether by prediction or observation. Personally, I find it no less intimidating that God knows what you're doing by observation rather than by prediction.

But I'm not arguing that an omniscient god can't exist - only that free will can't exist. Omniscient Gods can certainly exist, but their existance negates free will, by virtue of their omniscient and timeless nature.

So you say, but you haven't proven it, nor disproven the several possibilities ceo_esq and I have provided to the contrary.

Of course, IMHO, Gods of this type don't exist anyway - the O/FWI issue is just a single straw in the huge pile that negates God's existence, IMO.

Again, so far nobody on this thread has shown that it is impossible for any commonly-held notion of God to exist, much less all of them.

Nah, my mind is too bizarre in how it functions for me to put that into writing. But all the info is here, on these threads - and most of the argument has been supplied by you, Bri. I leave it as an exercise in insanity for others to figure it out.

Well, I'll just have to take your word on that. I must say that I'm disappointed, but we'll just have to live with it!

Yeah, perception was the wrong word. I think direct knowledge would have been more accurate.

What could be more direct than observation? I still don't see the distinction, nor now it precludes the possibility of free will.

-Bri
 
Actually I understood it years ago, you are yet to understand it...

I posted the example, so I'm pretty sure I understand it.

Again, your comments seem to reflect a misunderstanding of the example. The example never refers to omniscience at all. In fact, it never refers to God at all.

-Bri
 

ISF - Join now!

Every member here is approved by hand. No bots, no spam, just people who care about evidence and honest debate.

Membership is free!

Create your free account

Back
Top Bottom