There is No God (And You Know It)

Go away for a couple of days and look how far behind I am. :sigh:

Bri
We have foreknowledge of the agent's future but the agent has free will. As long as we're careful about how we interact with the world, we can ensure that the foreknowledge will be accurate. Even if we decide to interact with the world, as long as we do it after time 30 or in such a way that it won't affect the free agent's history at time 30, we know that the agent will always turn left at time 30. For example, we could remove one of the walls to the safe at time 40, and the agent could run into the message wall, but it won't affect the agent's past behavior at time 30. Even if we DID want to interfere with the free agent's history at time 30 by placing a new wall into the world in front of the agent, say at time 20, we would instantly know what the agent's new future is at time 30.
You’ve posted another great example of an illusionary freewill.

It is possible that God restricts his own knowledge in order to provide free will; however, I'm not sure that God's knowledge would be restricted at all in this case. First, the programmer could know exactly how the random function works without being able to predict its outcome, so God could know how the function works but restrict his knowledge of the outcome in order to provide free will.
What you are actually saying is that if god were not omniscient then people would have freewill. It negates the rest of your argument nicely.

Oh and for jmercer, I haven’t forgotten the proof, still working.

Ossai
 
As I said before, it makes no difference - a portion of the timeline being changed changes the timelines. The agent how has two histories - even if it can't find that out. The free choice was made in one timeline and then tested in another.

As I said three times now, that is simply not the case. The timeline never changed in your scenario.

I was conjecturing about what would happen if God did decide to change the timeline, since he presumably might have that power.

-Bri
 
Let's say that the safe is opened after John's death. This is OK since it does not affect his timeline. And others are free to marvel that God's predictions were right.

In fact, the safe could be opened any time after t=30, and even John could view its contents (as long as the act of opening the safe didn't interfere with anyone's history, meaning that nobody could "see" the safe being opened).

Similarly in your program other agents are free to inspect the whole timeline including the contents of the safe once the agent being predicted has terminated.

Actually, the other agents in the scenario don't have free will, but they could. If this were the case, they are not free to "inspect the whole timeline" (whatever that would mean to them), but they are free to examine the contents of the safe once opened.

So at t=40 they can see that a prediction was made at t=10 saying "LEFT" and a choice which the operator had no possibility of controlling occurred at t=30 going "LEFT" . Right so far?

If by "operator" you're referring to the programmer in my scenario, then yes.

But they also can confirm that since the prediction was made at t=10 it also exists at t=20 - right?

I don't see how they could confirm when the prediction was made, but let's pretent that they have carbon dating and know that the prediction was made at t=10. Yes, it also existed at t=20 and t=30 when the agent made the actual choice.

So by definition of free choice the probabilities for each choice at t=20 were:
Code:
agent_has_choice = {
  "0<Prob(LEFT)<1",
  "0<Prob(RIGHT)<1",
  "0<Prob(WAIT)<1" };
and by definition of omnipotence the probabilities for each choice at t=20 were
Code:
operator_is_omnipotent = {
  "Prob(LEFT)=1",
  "Prob(RIGHT)=0",
  "Prob(WAIT)=0" };
So for each of these possibilities to co-exist at t=20 the ranges have to overlap, ie agent_has_choice[x] must overlap operator_is_omnipotent[x] for x = {0,1,2}.

The first block of code are the probabilities that the agent can choose, the second is the probabilities that the agent did choose. Two different things. The second is "after the fact" (more accurately, after the calculation since the programmer isn't affected by the timeline). The same thing would happen with any choice. Before you make the choice, there is a chance that you could choose otherwise, but after you make the choice, there is no chance that you chose otherwise.

By the definitions of omnipotence and free choice this must be true.

No.

But they don't overlap at all - so again omnipotence and free will are mutually exclusive, even in your example.

No.

Not even by the manipulation of the timeline can you change this.

The timeline wasn't manipulated at all in your scenario, and your conclusions are not correct. Apples don't have to equal oranges.

-Bri
 
ETA: I don't really know much about algorithms or programming, and I am finding some of the recent posts difficult to follow.

Your comments were very much in line with my example. In this example, the programmer (God) knows about the agent's decision because he observes it, not because he knows about the algorithm (he may or he may not know about the algorithm -- it doesn't really matter).

For those who don't know, there is not such thing as a truly random number generated by a computer. Computers generate random numbers by taking a "seed" as input (this is a number that you provide the random number generator) and then generating a string of statistically random but reproducable numbers. In other words, if I give the random number generator the same seed each time, it will generate the same list of "random" numbers. Usually, the programmer will provide a seed such as the number of microseconds since the computer was turned on, which changes so rapidly that when the seed is issued the user can't possibly know what it will be. From this point on, the numbers generated are random for all intents and purposes (but not really since the seed isn't really random). For the purposes of my example, the random number generator could be a theoretical one that is truly random or one that isn't truly random -- it doesn't matter. The important thing is that the programmer doesn't know the outcome.

-Bri
 
I really hate it when that happens.


I think you might be right about agreeing to disagree. Remember a couple of things though: the God I hypothesized knows what an actual free agent will do, he just doesn't know what a free agent would do in circumstances that are not actualized in any timeline. I think we have provisionally endorsed in this discussion a model whereby the way an omniscient, timeless God knows what free agents will do is by directly perceiving their futures. If it's not in the timeline, there's nothing there to see and know. That's no weakness of omniscience.

1. Directly perceiving the future implies determinism. That the free agent will always pick the same way, given the same situation. In computational terms, given identical inputs...

2. Alternative timelines could be explored by said deity by simulating them in His mind, or at the very most difficult, by creating said alternative timelines and running them in "fast forward" to see what happens. So any possible timeline and free agent decisions could be known to the omnipotent god in the worst case scenario.




[Edited to remove giant chunk of someone else's quote I had no plans of commenting on...]
 
Last edited:
The only other option is for God to be affected by Time, but this reduces the general omni-status of God and indicates that some things are beyond even God's control - and then it's turtles, all the way down.

I understand what you're saying, but in fact God doesn't have to determine the entire timeline -- it is possible that the agent itself determines its own timeline. God, being timeless, knows that agent's timeline, and therefore knows the future simply by observation. Difficult to understand, but logically possible.

The example I gave shows how we can do the same thing on a computer (although without true free will). We can ourselves create "agents" with a separate timeline from our own, and we can view their timeline at all times (past, present, and future) simultaneously.

I'm asking whether it's logically possible for God to create a thing which makes decisions in a non-determined, non-random mode (free will) such that God cannot know exactly, in every single available situation, how that thing will decide?

I think the answer to your question is that God can know how an agent will decide without actually affecting its decision. God doesn't have to know how it will decide in every possible situation (but this too is possible, even with a computer simulation), but can instead simply observe the choice the agent did make.

That said, it is possible for God (and programmers) to know all possible choices of an agent, even the choices the agent didn't actually make. Imagine the same computer program I described earlier where the program doesn't calculate just the decision made by the agent, but also the alternate decision that the agent might have made (i.e. the timeline branches at every decision point). God could potentially know all possible decisions (including the "real" one) without affecting those decisions.

-Bri
 
It's a bit like the rock too heavy to lift. Can God make a process so mysterious that even he can't work it out?

It's not actually a paradox at all. It's possible for us to do this in practice (see my previous post).

-Bri
 
You’ve posted another great example of an illusionary freewill.

My actual example using a computer is illusionary since there's no real free will, but is an effective illustration of how God (and programmers) can be timeless. Let's imagine that I have a special piece of hardware that looks like a black box with a USB connection on it. This piece of hardware takes an agent's memory as input and returns a truly free choice, possibly influenced by the information contained in the agent's memory. If I then plug this black box into my computer and replace the random function described in my example with the function contained in the black box, the agent would have true, full-blown, libertarian free will.

What you are actually saying is that if god were not omniscient then people would have freewill. It negates the rest of your argument nicely.

Not at all. First, you're assuming a specific definition of "omniscient" but even using the definition you're choosing to use, it is possible for agents to have libertarian free will and for God to be omniscient. I'm saying that God doesn't need to be able to tell the output of the black box based on its input in order to predict the future (the same way our programmer doesn't need to be able to predict the output of the random function). But even if God is able to predict the output of the black box given its input, it's unclear that this would affect free will in any way as long as he didn't interfere with the black box.

-Bri
 
Now, we begin the simulation by recalculating the entire timeline from 0 to 60. We open up a window at time 30 and notice that the free agent is turning left at this time to avoid running into a wall. We then click on the timeline at time 10 and open up a new window.

Even as we watch the free agent in this second window, we already know that at time 30 the agent will turn left even though it has "free will" which is unpredictable to us.

If it's truly random, each time you open the 30 window you should get a random result. If you do not, then it is not truly random.

Hence, just seeing one instance of the 30 second window does not mean the next time you open it you will see the same result.

We have foreknowledge of the agent's future but the agent has free will. As long as we're careful about how we interact with the world, we can ensure that the foreknowledge will be accurate. Even if we decide to interact with the world, as long as we do it after time 30 or in such a way that it won't affect the free agent's history at time 30, we know that the agent will always turn left at time 30. For example, we could remove one of the walls to the safe at time 40, and the agent could run into the message wall, but it won't affect the agent's past behavior at time 30. Even if we DID want to interfere with the free agent's history at time 30 by placing a new wall into the world in front of the agent, say at time 20, we would instantly know what the agent's new future is at time 30.

-Bri

If you know what he'll do, then it's deterministic, and neither random, nor this mysterious spiritual "free will", whatever that is, which, again, I challenge anyone to describe how it is different from determinism (+ possibly random influences.)

I am free to do whatever I decide. I am a deterministic machine that takes inputs and generates outputs based standard physical principles.

When you understand guilt and punishment and threats of same and what-not as just more inputs to the brain/mind, then the "problem" of determinism vs. free will disappears. Of course you could choose otherwise -- in the deterministic sense. Knowledge of this capacity, plus knowledge of possible downfalls (and benefits!) are also things that enter into the calculation.

It doesn't excuse the need for punishment -- that is vital to ensuring other people don't "choose poorly." Knowledge that one will not be punished for stealing (by the government or shopkeeper) removes that as a deterrent in the calculation on whether to steal. Hence "they could not have chosen otherwise" is false.
 
If it's truly random, each time you open the 30 window you should get a random result. If you do not, then it is not truly random.

Not true. You were very close to my scenario with your previous comment here:

2. Alternative timelines could be explored by said deity by simulating them in His mind, or at the very most difficult, by creating said alternative timelines and running them in "fast forward" to see what happens. So any possible timeline and free agent decisions could be known to the omnipotent god in the worst case scenario.

What is happening is that the timeline (or a portion of it) is recalculated whenever the programmer intervenes with the world (essentially what you were aluding to with your "fast forward" analogy). From this point on, however, the timeline is static. Only during the calculation does randomness/free will come into play, but after the timeline has been established it doesn't change (unless the programmer intervenes with the world again). The scenario I presented is absolutely possible to program (the fact that a computer doesn't generate truly random numbers doesn't really matter).

If you know what he'll do, then it's deterministic...

Not true, in my example it's random so the programmer doesn't know the outcome yet knows what he'll do, and in my theoretical example where the random function is replaced by a nondeterministic, non-random "free will" function, it would be true free will. The only reason the theoretical example cannot be programmed is because we don't know how to build the black box I described in a previous post (perhaps it would actually be impossible to build one if free will isn't true). The programmer simply isn't affected by the artificial timeline of the simulation, and can view any or all times along the timeline simultaneously.

I am free to do whatever I decide. I am a deterministic machine that takes inputs and generates outputs based standard physical principles.

Then you're not "free" to do anything, including making decisions.

When you understand guilt and punishment and threats of same and what-not as just more inputs to the brain/mind, then the "problem" of determinism vs. free will disappears. Of course you could choose otherwise -- in the deterministic sense. Knowledge of this capacity, plus knowledge of possible downfalls (and benefits!) are also things that enter into the calculation.

Color added by me. If determinism is true, you cannot "choose" anything, and you cannot "do otherwise" at all.

It doesn't excuse the need for punishment -- that is vital to ensuring other people don't "choose poorly." Knowledge that one will not be punished for stealing (by the government or shopkeeper) removes that as a deterrent in the calculation on whether to steal. Hence "they could not have chosen otherwise" is false.

Philosophers have attempted to define a type of free will (non-libertarian free will) that solves the moral dilemma without following the "could have done otherwise" and "ultimate source of one's action" rules that comprise most models of libertarian free will. Whether or not they've succeeded, this type of free will isn't the type of free will that many (actually most) people believe that we have and that nearly all modern judicial systems assume.

-Bri
 
It's not actually a paradox at all. It's possible for us to do this in practice (see my previous post).

-Bri

Wrong... because someone, somewhere, knows the algorithm, and has the mathematical skills to be able to figure out what 'random' decision this agent will make.

And a singular Omniscient God would have all this knowledge and ability itself - so 'free will' would disappear.

Sorry, Bri, but the case definitely seems to be leaning away from your belief and toward a case of free will being a paradox for an omniscient being. So unless we're ready to accept square circles and unliftable rocks, I don't think we should be accepting free will and an omniscient deity any time soon.
 
The first block of code are the probabilities that the agent can choose, the second is the probabilities that the agent did choose. Two different things. The second is "after the fact" (more accurately, after the calculation since the programmer isn't affected by the timeline).
Well if it is "after the fact" it is not omniscience then is it? You can't have your cake and eat it.

You want to paste it in before the fact and call it omniscience. But when I point out the obvious contradiction this causes you go back to calling it "after the fact".

If it is "after the fact" then that is exactly where it should have been left. Or else the timeline should have been recalculated.

The fact is if you place something in a timeline then it must be treated as though it belonged in that place in the timeline. As such it leads to a contradiction.
Bald no's are not much use. I am not sure which part you are disagreeing with.

But yes, by definition an omniscient being can't be wrong.

So if an observation by God that the agent will turn left exists in the timeline at t=20 then the probability that the agent will go left is 1.

And yes, by definition of free will the probability that the agent would go left is not 1.

So God is obliged at t=20 to believe that the probability of the agent going left is both 1 and not 1.

Putting something in a safe does not put it outside the bounds of logic.
The timeline wasn't manipulated at all in your scenario, and your conclusions are not correct.
The timeline manipulation was taken from your example. And my conclusions are perfectly correct - they are inescapable.

If an 'omniscient' being takes an observation from the future and moves it to the wrong place in the timeline, it must also take responsibility to ensure that the opinions expressed are still valid for it's new place in the timeline.

Otherwise it causes a contradiction, as it clearly does here.
 
Bri
As I said three times now, that is simply not the case. The timeline never changed in your scenario.

I was conjecturing about what would happen if God did decide to change the timeline, since he presumably might have that power.
A timeline change as you suggested is nothing more than middle knowledge.

My actual example using a computer is illusionary since there's no real free will, but is an effective illustration of how God (and programmers) can be timeless.
Nope, it’s illusionary freewill. You programmer lacks knowledge – i.e. is not omniscient. God would not lack that knowledge. Every example you’ve posted has limited omniscience in some manner.

Not at all. First, you're assuming a specific definition of "omniscient" but even using the definition you're choosing to use, it is possible for agents to have libertarian free will and for God to be omniscient.
Nope, sorry but that’s your stance and you have yet to present any sort of evidence in support of it.

What is happening is that the timeline (or a portion of it) is recalculated whenever the programmer intervenes with the world (essentially what you were aluding to with your "fast forward" analogy).
Middle knowledge and pure determinism again.

Not true, in my example it's random so the programmer doesn't know the outcome yet knows what he'll do, and in my theoretical example where the random function is replaced by a nondeterministic, non-random "free will" function, it would be true free will.
You state the programmer doesn’t know – hence a limitation of omniscience.
When you try promoting one you undermine the other. You just keep see-sawing back and forth without advancing your premise.

Ossai
 
But for a timeless God, creation of any 4-dimensional object is covered under omnipotency, of course. And when crafting an object or person, the being by necessity of being timeless, crafts this being with measurements in all four (and possibly more) dimensions - that is, each being possesses certain values for x, y, z, and t at the 'moment' that God creates them... that, in essence, God creates, whole-cloth and in accordance with His will, beings with attributes FIXED for x, y, z, and t - that every value for x(t), y(t), and z(t) is not variable at all, but constant and unchanging, because God exists beyond Time. In other words, God isn't just putting little Billy Cracker down in Lubbock, Texas in 1999 and 'letting rip'... God (being timeless) is putting Billy down in Lubbock, Texas in 1999, moving to California in 2005, graduating from Berkely (sp), touring Europe for three years, and dying in a plane crash on the way home... ALL AT ONCE.

I think what (a hypothetical) God might be doing is actualizing the initial conditions of the universe, and those characteristics and events of the ensuing timeline that aren't purely deterministic are being created by the decisions of free agents. Once the universe is actualized, of course, God sees everything that happens in it at each point in time. Yet unless the universe in which Billy ultimately appears is actualized (again, let's loosely call this the "Big Bang", God has no guarantee that Billy will move to California (unless you want to delve into middle knowledge again, or God overriding free will) because logically, no such guarantee exists for God to have.

zaayrdragon said:
The only other option is for God to be affected by Time, but this reduces the general omni-status of God and indicates that some things are beyond even God's control - and then it's turtles, all the way down.

No one can reasonably expect even an omnipotent being to actualize a state of affairs in which an intrinsically uncontrollable thing is, nonetheless, controllable. The possibility exists that God can intervene to control human behavior, but he can't make it so that he both controls and does not control it.

zaayrdragon said:
I'm asking whether it's logically possible for God to create a thing which makes decisions in a non-determined, non-random mode (free will) such that God cannot know exactly, in every single available situation, how that thing will decide?

There's a possible tension here between "every single available situation" and "will decide". A person will decide something not in every single possible situation, but only in the relatively limited number of situations that actually are presented to the person. It is logically possible, and probably necessary, for God to know exactly what a person will actually choose. In the absence of a Big Bang (in the special sense we defined earlier), however, there is no actual future for God to know anything about.


Robin said:
It's a bit like the rock too heavy to lift. Can God make a process so mysterious that even he can't work it out?

ZD (impliedly) and you (explicitly, now) have astutely cast this issue in terms parallel to the unliftable rock. Yet I think there is a qualitative difference. As I once ventured in an older thread, I am not sure that the very idea of a rock too heavy to be lifted by a being capable of applying unlimited lifting force makes any sense. In other words, I am skeptical of the logical coherence of an "intrinsically unliftable rock", because in theory applying sufficient force to a massive object will eventually move it. One is limited only by the available amount of force.

On the other hand, however, there are some things that are intrinsically unknowable. God could write a math problem the answer to which he could not know, for example, because some math problems have no solutions. Omniscience does not relieve this; applying ever-greater brainpower and information to a math problem with no solution is not even a step in the right direction, unlike the way in which applying additional force to a massive object is a step in the direction of moving it.
 
Well if it is "after the fact" it is not omniscience then is it? You can't have your cake and eat it.

You are confusing the agent's timeline and the programmer's timeline. The only timeline we care about is the agent's timeline. So, the programmer knows both the possible choices that could be made at t<30 and the actual choice that is made at t=30. From the agent's point of view, the programmer's knowledge is not limited by the timeline at all (the programmer knows it at all times from t=0 to t=60). So yes from the agent's point of view, the programmer does have foreknowledge of all events. Of course, from the programmer's point of view he simply realizes that he isn't limited by the artificial timeline of the simulation. Likewise God might not be limited by our timeline. Unlike the programmer, God could in fact be timeless.

You want to paste it in before the fact and call it omniscience. But when I point out the obvious contradiction this causes you go back to calling it "after the fact".

I attempted to clarify what I meant by "after the fact" but apparently you missed it. Hopefully the above clarifies it.

Bald no's are not much use. I am not sure which part you are disagreeing with.

Because of your mistaken premise (that the two blocks of code both referred to the same thing) your conclusion that there is a contradiction is false. An apple does not have to equal an orange. The rest of your post relies on the mistaken premise.

-Bri
 
Wrong... because someone, somewhere, knows the algorithm, and has the mathematical skills to be able to figure out what 'random' decision this agent will make.

Doesn't matter. First, the programmer doesn't know what decision the agent will make (which is all that matters). Second, it might be possible to create a truly random number generator that no programmer would be able to predict even if they knew how it worked (in fact, this is possible today by creating a coin-flipping machine). Third, our programmer could choose not to learn the algorithm or not perform whatever calculations are necessary in order to know what its results will be ahead of time. Fourth, the programmer actually DOES know the result of a true random number generator before it generates the number (not in his own timeline of course, but certainly in the simulated timeline) because both the programmer and the computer are unlimited by the simulated timeline. But unlike the programmer, God may not be limited by any timeline at all.

Sorry, Bri, but the case definitely seems to be leaning away from your belief and toward a case of free will being a paradox for an omniscient being. So unless we're ready to accept square circles and unliftable rocks, I don't think we should be accepting free will and an omniscient deity any time soon.

None of this is "my belief" except that I believe it's impossible to disprove the existance of God as defined by many commonly-held beliefs.

The scenario I described is completely programmable right now, aside from the "free will generator" part, so there's no paradox there at all.

The "square circle" paradox occurs because of a deficiency in our understanding and definition of "square circle." I hold that God could create a "square circle," but we would have no way of confirming if he succeeded without knowing exactly what a "square circle" would look like. Since you have no logical notion of "square circle" when you pose the question, would the result be logical to you? Of course not, and if it was logical you'd cry foul and say that it wasn't what you meant (i.e. creating a kangaroo and then adding the term "square circle" to the dictionary as a synonym of "kangaroo"). Since the question is illogical to you, the answer must also be.

My third point above would result in a paradox if you define an omnipotent/omniscient God as one who could create a function that was impossible for him to know the result of given its input, and then stipulate that limiting his knowledge of the result is cheating. You say that it's cheating because then God would no longer know everything (even though he still has the potential to know everything), but the real reason it's cheating is because it results in something logical when you are expecting an illogical answer. There are at least two possible solutions: 1) God isn't limited by logic, and therefore the answer is in fact illogical but still possible, or 2) God can in fact limit his knowledge and still be truly omniscient. We are talking about possibility (2) because we have no basis to even discuss possibility (1). Either way, the answer must be that it is possible that both an omniscient/omnipotent God exists and we have libertarian free will.

Any paradox in the fourth point above would result in assuming that God must exist in his own timeline (as the programmer does) rather than being completely timeless. Since we cannot conceive of anything being timeless, we cannot easily talk about it logically (nor can we eliminate it as a possibility).

In my example, the programmer has perfect foreknowledge of all events of the simulated world including those that are the result of randomness or free will, which already disproves the claim made in this thread that foreknowledge and free will are incompatible. If one wishes to attempt to prove that God cannot exist, one must approach the problem from a direction other than defining God as a being that has foreknowledge of free agents.

-Bri
 
A timeline change as you suggested is nothing more than middle knowledge.

No, it's decidedly not middle knowledge. Middle knowledge would imply that the programmer can somehow predict the behavior of the agent by knowing all of the variables. In my example, the agent doesn't have to know all of the variables, but simply predicts the agent's behavior by simple observation. The programmer in this case doesn't even have to be a programmer and doesn't have to have any knowledge of how the simulation works.

Nope, it’s illusionary freewill. You programmer lacks knowledge – i.e. is not omniscient. God would not lack that knowledge. Every example you’ve posted has limited omniscience in some manner.

Ummm...I never claimed that the programmer was omniscient (of course, if the programmer is God then he could be). From the agent's point of view the programmer has perfect foreknowledge of the future. At the same time, the agent has free will. That's all I'm claiming. God may very well be able to do the same thing without the shortcomings of the programmer, especially since God might be timeless (whereas the programmer is stuck in his own timeline).

Nope, sorry but that’s your stance and you have yet to present any sort of evidence in support of it.

Lucky for me, I've never stated that God exists, is omniscient, or that we have free will. I simply stated that it's possible that all of these things are true. If you wish to prove otherwise, you'll have to provide evidence that it's impossible.

You state the programmer doesn’t know – hence a limitation of omniscience.

In my scenario, the programmer isn't omniscient, but could be. Yet he has perfect foreknowledge of the future of an agent with free will, thus disproving the whole foreknowledge/free will incompatibility argument that was being made.

-Bri
 
ZD (impliedly) and you (explicitly, now) have astutely cast this issue in terms parallel to the unliftable rock.

This is exactly the case. The argument here is that if God is omniscient, then he must possess the knowledge to write a function that he cannot know the outcome of.

The answers are the same as the rock problem: 1) the question is itself self-contradictory and illogical, 2) God is beyond logic and therefore can do the illogical, or 3) God can limit his knowledge if he wishes and therefore could easily write such a function.

Zaayr, if this is what you meant by your previous post, then you are correct -- it is a paradox. Of course, just like the rock problem, that doesn't mean that God cannot be omniscient.

-Bri
 
You are confusing the agent's timeline and the programmer's timeline. The only timeline we care about is the agent's timeline.
On the contrary it is you that keeps insisting "after the fact" logic must be applied to something that is, in John's timeline, before the fact. If inserting the statement into John's timeline caused it to become untrue then there is no real point to your example.
I attempted to clarify what I meant by "after the fact" but apparently you missed it. Hopefully the above clarifies it.
They sound like obfuscations because you are still trying to avoid the central point of my example. You are still attemping the old "God is outside of time" defense when I have clearly stated in my premises that God has made a statement in time that the statement is true in time.
Because of your mistaken premise (that the two blocks of code both referred to the same thing) your conclusion that there is a contradiction is
Explain exactly which premise is wrong:
1. A statement by the programmer about an agent's action at t=30 exists in the agent's timeline at t=20
2. The statement is true in its context
3. The agent has free will

If any of these premises is wrong then you have not addressed the problem I raised.

If the premises are correct then it is clearly valid to evaluate the probability of the event at t from the statement by the programmer and the fact of the agen't free will.

An apple does not have to equal an orange.
You say that the calculations refer to different things - that is right, one refers to omniscience and the other refers to free will. Is that not what the debate is about?

Both calculations act on statements that are true from the agent's point of view at t=20 about an event at t=30 so the only incompatibility arises from the incompatibility between omniscience and free will.

On the other hand you appear to have no problem with a free choice occurring in one universe, and then the evaluation of God's omniscience being made in another universe, neatly avoiding the problem that if you evaluated God's omniscience using the same universe in which the free choice occurred God could be wrong.
The rest of your post relies on the mistaken premise.
Well I have stated them above - they are all essential if you are to address the problem I originally stated, but tell me which of the three is wrong.

No, it is still clear, if a statement by an omniscient being exists at t=20 saying the agent will turn left and that statement is true in it's context then the probability that the agent will turn left is 1.

If the agent has free will then at t=20 the probability that the agent will turn left is not 1.

There are two mutually exclusive truths in the agent's timeline. The programmer has simply falsified history and the contradiction is inherent in that action.
 
On the contrary it is you that keeps insisting "after the fact" logic must be applied to something that is, in John's timeline, before the fact.

My point is that there are two different statements. One is that John can choose between three different choices at t<30. The other is that John chooses between three different choices at t=30.

If inserting the statement into John's timeline caused it to become untrue then there is no real point to your example.

Inserting the statement doesn't change anything. In fact, it's not even in John's timeline (it doesn't affect John's timeline in the least since he never sees it).

They sound like obfuscations because you are still trying to avoid the central point of my example. You are still attemping the old "God is outside of time" defense when I have clearly stated in my premises that God has made a statement in time that the statement is true in time.

While it is true that the statement exists "in time," the programmer being unaffected by the agent's timeline is key. The programmer can peek at what the agent will do at t=30, and insert the statement into the world at t=20 before the agent has performed the action without disrupting the timeline.

Explain exactly which premise is wrong:
1. A statement by the programmer about an agent's action at t=30 exists in the agent's timeline at t=20
2. The statement is true in its context
3. The agent has free will

Yes, these are all true.

If any of these premises is wrong then you have not addressed the problem I raised.

They are all correct.

If the premises are correct then it is clearly valid to evaluate the probability of the event at t from the statement by the programmer and the fact of the agen't free will.

Sure. The chances of John choosing to turn or stop are each 1/2 at t<30. The chance that John choose to turn at t>=30 is 1, and the chance that John choose to stop at t>=30 is 0 (at this point he's already made his decision so there is no question).

You say that the calculations refer to different things - that is right, one refers to omniscience and the other refers to free will. Is that not what the debate is about?

No, the programmer isn't omniscient, but he does have foreknowledge of John's entire timeline. One statement refers to the chances of John performing one or the other action before actually doing it (John has a 50% chance of turning or stopping at t<30). The other statement refers to the chances of John having performed one action or the other after having already done it (it is 100% certain that John turned left at t=30).

Both calculations act on statements that are true from the agent's point of view at t=20 about an event at t=30 so the only incompatibility arises from the incompatibility between omniscience and free will.

There is only one calculation. The single calculation occurs before the simulation begins, and John's timeline never changes afterwards.

On the other hand you appear to have no problem with a free choice occurring in one universe, and then the evaluation of God's omniscience being made in another universe, neatly avoiding the problem that if you evaluated God's omniscience using the same universe in which the free choice occurred God could be wrong.

Huh? What multiple universes are you referring to here? And when exactly is God (or the programmer) ever wrong?

Well I have stated them above - they are all essential if you are to address the problem I originally stated, but tell me which of the three is wrong.

There is no conflict with the three statements.

No, it is still clear, if a statement by an omniscient being exists at t=20 saying the agent will turn left and that statement is true in it's context then the probability that the agent will turn left is 1.

See, that's where you got it wrong. The statement is actually that the programmer witnessed the agent having already turned at t=30. In fact, the programmer isn't predicting anything, he's observing it as it happens at t=30. He inserts his observation into the world at t=20. Even though the statement exists before the event occurs, it's not a prediction -- it's an observation of the actual event.

If the agent has free will then at t=20 the probability that the agent will turn left is not 1.

Correct, at t=20 it is 1/2 as I said. At t=30 it goes to 1 since the agent has already taken the action.

There are two mutually exclusive truths in the agent's timeline. The programmer has simply falsified history and the contradiction is inherent in that action.

There is no falsification of history at all. Furthermore, this is a completely programmable simulation. You can program it yourself in a few hours and try it. There is no trick at all. You, as the programmer, can predict with 100% accuracy the agent's future movement by observing it first hand even though you cannot predict the results of the random function.

-Bri
 
Last edited:

ISF - Join now!

Every member here is approved by hand. No bots, no spam, just people who care about evidence and honest debate.

Membership is free!

Create your free account

Back
Top Bottom