There is No God (And You Know It)

Thanks, Bri - I shall peruse it.. well, ok, in the morning, after my first cuppa, and after the first dose of meds starts to kick in...

but thanks (copying link to desktop)
 
OK, I actually sat up and did a quick once-through - excellent article, by the way, and pretty much says many of the same things I have been saying - but it seems to me that the author of this article, while being keenly intelligent and saliently cognizant of many of the supposed issues regarding time, has missed the mark in his final analysis as regards TNP and causal assymetry... but I think that, perhaps, a deconstruction of this article might be best served in another thread - and after I've gotten a bit of rest.

Thanks again, Bri!
 
b
OK, I can see that you're going to make me waste my time going back through your posts to find an example. Fine. How about this one:
You made me go back through mine so fair's fair. But the one you found didn't even support your contention.
Your implication here is that God has the same moral obligation to help the man as you do (or better yet not place him in the situation to being with).
That is a puzzling interpretation since I am clearly saying that in this situation I should do nothing. I depicted a situation where a man is suffering but I have no moral obligation to help because there is an ethical and competent professional on hand and aware of the situation.

I make this clear here:
Robin said:
There is a greater good that I am incapable of understanding due to my lack of medical knowledge but does that make me wrong for not helping?
Under your interpretation my doctor analogy makes no sense at all.

In the post I make no mention about what God should do at all, I am discussing what I should do (or in this case not do).

And I make the purpose of my analogy explicit:
Robin said:
Now if it was the case where every single instance of suffering due to some natural cause was in fact fully justified by some greater good then my moral obligations in the matter are at an end.
Which bears out what I said before. I framed this argument in a more formal way later.

But I explicitly disavowed the "God is doing evil by allowing natural suffering" in earlier posts
Simply stating that I mischaracterized your comments would have been sufficient if in fact that was the case. Implying that I didn't read any of the posts to which I responded is not only a blatant attack which causes me to waste my time defending myself, but doesn't advance the discussion at all.
I seem to remember a time when you accused me of not following the thread - but I don't have time to chase down the reference.
 
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Bri said:
Your implication here is that God has the same moral obligation to help the man as you do (or better yet not place him in the situation to being with).

That is a puzzling interpretation since I am clearly saying that in this situation I should do nothing.

I think Bri is saying that you claim that God and you have the same moral obligation to do nothing. Perhaps not the best way to parse your original post on the matter, but I think I see what Bri's getting at.

The fault in your argument lies in the unstated premise that even if two persons are in radically different overall situations (and possibly different overall obligations), they should nonetheless make the same moral decision when faced with the same particular scenario. This is a dubious proposition even if you don't put God into the picture.
 
You made me go back through mine so fair's fair. But the one you found didn't even support your contention.

OK.

I seem to remember a time when you accused me of not following the thread - but I don't have time to chase down the reference.

I've told people when I thought they were off-topic, yes. I've never accused someone of not reading what they were responding to. If someone is incorrect in their understanding, I usually state that since it's something I can provide evidence of. Nevertheless, this bickering is certainly off-topic.

-Bri
 
OK, I actually sat up and did a quick once-through - excellent article, by the way, and pretty much says many of the same things I have been saying - but it seems to me that the author of this article, while being keenly intelligent and saliently cognizant of many of the supposed issues regarding time, has missed the mark in his final analysis as regards TNP and causal assymetry... but I think that, perhaps, a deconstruction of this article might be best served in another thread - and after I've gotten a bit of rest.

Thanks again, Bri!

Zaayr, there is a lot in that article that is beyond my understanding (at least as it's explained in the article) so I shall look forward to your comments.

-Bri
 
CEO, I had made a pretty thorough reply to you, but my browser glitched, and I lost it.
I really hate it when that happens.

zaayrdragon said:
I think we just have to agree to disagree.

For example, I don't think a being who does not know what a free agent would do can be considered omniscient.
I think you might be right about agreeing to disagree. Remember a couple of things though: the God I hypothesized knows what an actual free agent will do, he just doesn't know what a free agent would do in circumstances that are not actualized in any timeline. I think we have provisionally endorsed in this discussion a model whereby the way an omniscient, timeless God knows what free agents will do is by directly perceiving their futures. If it's not in the timeline, there's nothing there to see and know. That's no weakness of omniscience.

The second thing to bear in mind is that a great many (though not all) people who think at length about such matters define omniscience or analyze the logical repercussions of omniscience in a way different from you. As with any term, your usage should at least be sensitive to the way in which the word is employed by others. If you want to use the term in a way that is incompatible with other common usages, identify, at the outset of a discussion, the specific concept for which you are using omniscience as shorthand. If your particular brand of omniscience requires middle knowledge, as it seems to do, that might be a good thing to clarify before we get bogged down in discussing hypotheticals that explicitly assume the non-existence of middle knowledge.

zaayrdragon said:
Consider this example: God creates a universe, and in this universe, there is a creek. God wants a tree to fall across the creek, thereby creating a bridge. But along comes a free agent, who cuts down the tree, away from the creek, for lumber. This suggests God is neither omniscient nor omnipotent, as the free agent has thwarted God's will.
You are absolutely right that this scenario leads to a problematic or absurd result, indicating that one or more of the premises were untrue or one or more steps were mistaken. Why leap to the conclusion that the error lies in the premises that God was omnipotent and omniscient? The outcome equally suggests that God's priority was not, in fact, that the tree fall, but rather that the free agent have a choice of whether to cut it down. Otherwise he could have arranged for the tree to fall before the agent arrived. Or he could abolish free will entirely. Perhaps God's preference, all other things being equal, was that the human agent not chop down the tree, but it was not logically possible for God to actualize this while simultaneously preserving a desired good of allowing the human agent to choose.

zaayrdragon said:
Now, an omniscient God would know this would occur, and would arrange matters so that this free agent could not chop down this tree - but this eliminates the free will of the agent, through some manner of control.
Our free will obviously doesn't extend to choices with which we are never presented. Still, a world in which most of us are presented with meaningful opportunities to make deliberate choices that have morally significant consequences is quite possibly superior to a world in which we aren't.
 
But I still can't see how anybody can get round the book in a safe example.

Robin, are you a programmer? No matter. Imagine a computer simulation of a simple 2D world where the agents in the world are simple dots that apply a constant force always in their direction of movement. In other words, they all move straight. There are also walls all around the edge of the screen, and a few walls as obstacles inside the screen. Imagine that if they hit each other or a wall, they bounce off and continue moving straight in the direction of the bounce. You've seen screen savers with similar behavior, so nothing new here.

Imagine that this simulation has a timeline running horizontally along the bottom, and pre-calculates the entire system from time 0 until 60 units of time. You can then click anywhere on the timeline and a window pops up showing you the world at that time. You can open up multiple windows in time in this manner by clicking on more than one spot on the timeline. Pretty simple system so far, and completely deterministic.

Now, let's give our agents some perception of their world and a memory of that perception. At each unit of time, each agent can "remember" the positions of all other agents and walls that it has a straight-line view of within a 300-pixel radius for the 30 previous units of time.

Now let's give the agents a bit of intelligence. Mind you, this is going to be completely deterministic intelligence. We will write a function that looks at the agent's memory, sees which other agents or walls it is currently on a collision course with, and if it is within, say 50 pixels of colliding with another agent or wall it will turn 90 degrees to the right. Let's provide each agent the same behavior for now.

When we start the simulation, we can give each agent a starting position, direction, and force, and then the simulation can calculate the entire 60 units of time for every agent by calling each agent's function for each unit of time from 0 to 60 (we have a very fast computer, so this happens almost instantly). We can then click on any point along the timeline and open up a view to the world at that time. Nothing exciting yet, the world is completely deterministic, although it is clear that we are not constrained by the timeline for this world since we can view the past, present, and future simultaneously by opening up multiple windows.

Now, imagine that we want to interact with the world by inserting a new wall into the world at time 30 (it will simply appear in the world at time 30). If we did this, we would have to recalculate all of the memories and positions of all agents from time 30 through time 60 because the new wall might affect their futures (but since the new wall didn't exist before time 30, we don't have to recalculate their past). Also, we really only have to recalculate the memory and positions of those agents who are directly or indirectly affected by the new wall. For example, if the world were divided in half by a wall so that all agents on one side of the world didn't know of the existance of the agents on the other side of the world, we would only have to recalculate the futures for the agents on the side of the world with the new wall (the others would be unaffected by the presence of this new wall). Note that if we never interact with the world, we never have to recalculate the timeline at all (it would be as if we didn't exist).

Now, imagine we want to give one of the agents free will, or at something like it. We can't give it "real" free will, but we'll give it something that meets our goal which is to make it so that we as the programmer cannot predict what the agent will choose. We replace this agent's deterministic function with a new one that is "non-deterministic." Instead of always turning right like the other agents, this "free agent" randomely "chooses" between turning left or stopping for 5 units of time. Every time this function is called, it will return one of these choices, but we have no way of knowing which.

So far so good. One more thing to do before we begin the simulation. Let's set up a "safe" of walls surrounding an empty square somewhere in the middle of the world. No agents have access to the inside of the safe.

Now, we begin the simulation by recalculating the entire timeline from 0 to 60. We open up a window at time 30 and notice that the free agent is turning left at this time to avoid running into a wall. We then click on the timeline at time 10 and open up a new window.

Even as we watch the free agent in this second window, we already know that at time 30 the agent will turn left even though it has "free will" which is unpredictable to us. As long as we don't interact with the world before time 30, this will be true. If we interact with the world after time 30, only the free agent's future will be altered so the choice to turn left at time 30 won't be affected.

Now at time 10, we insert a new wall on which is written the word "LEFT" completely contained inside the safe. Since no agents have access this new wall cannot affect any agent. Nothing needs to be recalculated, and the free agent will turn left as expected at time 30.

We have foreknowledge of the agent's future but the agent has free will. As long as we're careful about how we interact with the world, we can ensure that the foreknowledge will be accurate. Even if we decide to interact with the world, as long as we do it after time 30 or in such a way that it won't affect the free agent's history at time 30, we know that the agent will always turn left at time 30. For example, we could remove one of the walls to the safe at time 40, and the agent could run into the message wall, but it won't affect the agent's past behavior at time 30. Even if we DID want to interfere with the free agent's history at time 30 by placing a new wall into the world in front of the agent, say at time 20, we would instantly know what the agent's new future is at time 30.

-Bri
 
Robin, are you a programmer? No matter. Imagine a computer simulation of a simple 2D world where the agents in the world are simple dots that apply a constant force always in their direction of movement. In other words, they all move straight. There are also walls all around the edge of the screen, and a few walls as obstacles inside the screen. Imagine that if they hit each other or a wall, they bounce off and continue moving straight in the direction of the bounce. You've seen screen savers with similar behavior, so nothing new here.

Imagine that this simulation has a timeline running horizontally along the bottom, and pre-calculates the entire system from time 0 until 60 units of time. You can then click anywhere on the timeline and a window pops up showing you the world at that time. You can open up multiple windows in time in this manner by clicking on more than one spot on the timeline. Pretty simple system so far, and completely deterministic.

Now, let's give our agents some perception of their world and a memory of that perception. At each unit of time, each agent can "remember" the positions of all other agents and walls that it has a straight-line view of within a 300-pixel radius for the 30 previous units of time.

Now let's give the agents a bit of intelligence. Mind you, this is going to be completely deterministic intelligence. We will write a function that looks at the agent's memory, sees which other agents or walls it is currently on a collision course with, and if it is within, say 50 pixels of colliding with another agent or wall it will turn 90 degrees to the right. Let's provide each agent the same behavior for now.

When we start the simulation, we can give each agent a starting position, direction, and force, and then the simulation can calculate the entire 60 units of time for every agent by calling each agent's function for each unit of time from 0 to 60 (we have a very fast computer, so this happens almost instantly). We can then click on any point along the timeline and open up a view to the world at that time. Nothing exciting yet, the world is completely deterministic, although it is clear that we are not constrained by the timeline for this world since we can view the past, present, and future simultaneously by opening up multiple windows.

Now, imagine that we want to interact with the world by inserting a new wall into the world at time 30 (it will simply appear in the world at time 30). If we did this, we would have to recalculate all of the memories and positions of all agents from time 30 through time 60 because the new wall might affect their futures (but since the new wall didn't exist before time 30, we don't have to recalculate their past). Also, we really only have to recalculate the memory and positions of those agents who are directly or indirectly affected by the new wall. For example, if the world were divided in half by a wall so that all agents on one side of the world didn't know of the existance of the agents on the other side of the world, we would only have to recalculate the futures for the agents on the side of the world with the new wall (the others would be unaffected by the presence of this new wall). Note that if we never interact with the world, we never have to recalculate the timeline at all (it would be as if we didn't exist).

Now, imagine we want to give one of the agents free will, or at something like it. We can't give it "real" free will, but we'll give it something that meets our goal which is to make it so that we as the programmer cannot predict what the agent will choose. We replace this agent's deterministic function with a new one that is "non-deterministic." Instead of always turning right like the other agents, this "free agent" randomely "chooses" between turning left or stopping for 5 units of time. Every time this function is called, it will return one of these choices, but we have no way of knowing which.

So far so good. One more thing to do before we begin the simulation. Let's set up a "safe" of walls surrounding an empty square somewhere in the middle of the world. No agents have access to the inside of the safe.

Now, we begin the simulation by recalculating the entire timeline from 0 to 60. We open up a window at time 30 and notice that the free agent is turning left at this time to avoid running into a wall. We then click on the timeline at time 10 and open up a new window.

Even as we watch the free agent in this second window, we already know that at time 30 the agent will turn left even though it has "free will" which is unpredictable to us. As long as we don't interact with the world before time 30, this will be true. If we interact with the world after time 30, only the free agent's future will be altered so the choice to turn left at time 30 won't be affected.

Now at time 10, we insert a new wall on which is written the word "LEFT" completely contained inside the safe. Since no agents have access this new wall cannot affect any agent. Nothing needs to be recalculated, and the free agent will turn left as expected at time 30.

We have foreknowledge of the agent's future but the agent has free will. As long as we're careful about how we interact with the world, we can ensure that the foreknowledge will be accurate. Even if we decide to interact with the world, as long as we do it after time 30 or in such a way that it won't affect the free agent's history at time 30, we know that the agent will always turn left at time 30. For example, we could remove one of the walls to the safe at time 40, and the agent could run into the message wall, but it won't affect the agent's past behavior at time 30. Even if we DID want to interfere with the free agent's history at time 30 by placing a new wall into the world in front of the agent, say at time 20, we would instantly know what the agent's new future is at time 30.

-Bri


Excellent post, and a fine example of how free will is merely an illusion!

(Sorry I haven't been up to much challenge lately, Bri)

In this case, a literal understanding of the example would demonstrate that even the 'random' choices of this 'free' agent are controlled by a 'randomizing' algorithm, which, depending on what was used as the algorithm's 'seed', could be used to determine where this so-called 'free' agent will be at all times. And someone created that algorithm, as well. Due to that algorithm, at no time could the agent EVER choose to turn right, go straight, back up, etc. at time 30, if all other factors remain the same - which they do. And if we, the Creator, have knowledge of that algorithm as well - which, being omnipotent, we must - then we KNOW every nuance of how that algorithm WILL affect the so-called 'free agent'.

OK, so it's over-analysing the metaphor; but it does illustrate, nicely, the problems involved.

Of course, there is no way that WE could generate an absolutely free agent in the computer, but presumably, an omnipotent God could... but what would that mean? That God can create a mechanism for information processing whose process God cannot know?

This seems, to me, to be logically impossible, and we've already discussed, at length, that any useful description of 'omnipotent' or 'omniscient' should eliminate the logically impossible; therefore, God can only create information processing mechanisms whose processes are known by God. In other words, 'free will' is an algorithm, and God knows how that algorithm will react at every single second of time.

So if we choose to restrict the concepts of 'omnipotent' to mean 'can do anything that can logically be done', and 'omniscient' as 'to know everything that can logically be known', then free will cannot exist.

I'm sure there's holes in that logic somewhere - I promised myself to limit posting while ill, but this thought just sprung onto me, and I had to post it before it made sense... :D

Bri, CEO - comments?
 
Excellent post, and a fine example of how free will is merely an illusion!

(Sorry I haven't been up to much challenge lately, Bri)

I'm not sure how it illustrates that free will is an illusion, but otherwise I found your post as informative as always, Zaayr. I do hope you feel better soon though, that cold sounds nasty!

In this case, a literal understanding of the example would demonstrate that even the 'random' choices of this 'free' agent are controlled by a 'randomizing' algorithm, which, depending on what was used as the algorithm's 'seed', could be used to determine where this so-called 'free' agent will be at all times. And someone created that algorithm, as well. Due to that algorithm, at no time could the agent EVER choose to turn right, go straight, back up, etc. at time 30, if all other factors remain the same - which they do. And if we, the Creator, have knowledge of that algorithm as well - which, being omnipotent, we must - then we KNOW every nuance of how that algorithm WILL affect the so-called 'free agent'.

OK, so it's over-analysing the metaphor; but it does illustrate, nicely, the problems involved.

It sounds as though you're listing two problems here, both of which seem to be non-issues to me. The first is that a random number generator is obviously not truly random. While this is true (as I was careful to point out), it has no bearing on the metaphor since the point was that the programmer doesn't know the result of the function (which is true of even a crappy random number generator). If quantum theory is correct, it may be possible to create a true random number generator, but even that isn't actual free will. To have free will, we would have to substitute the random function in my example with a completely undetermined and non-random function (perhaps one that is dualistic in nature).

Your second point seems to the that the simple function I posted didn't provide the agent the opportunity to turn right or do any number of other things you listed. Of course, none of that would be necessary for free will. It isn't required that we are able to fly in order for us to have free will, only that we have free choices. So assuming the function actually produces one of the two possible results in my example in an undertermined and non-random way, it could still be libertarian free will.

Of course, there is no way that WE could generate an absolutely free agent in the computer, but presumably, an omnipotent God could... but what would that mean? That God can create a mechanism for information processing whose process God cannot know?

It is possible that God restricts his own knowledge in order to provide free will; however, I'm not sure that God's knowledge would be restricted at all in this case. First, the programmer could know exactly how the random function works without being able to predict its outcome, so God could know how the function works but restrict his knowledge of the outcome in order to provide free will. But it's unclear that even this restriction is necessary since the programmer actually IS able to predict the outcome of a random function instantly! One cannot say that he didn't know the result "beforehand" because "beforehand" is a word that refers to the timeline, not the programmer (who is not restricted by the timeline). In fact, once the outcome is calculated, the programmer knows it all ALL TIMES simultaneously, including at the beginning of time. He could open up a window at the time of the event and then another window at time 0 and indeed have perfect foreknowledge of the upcoming event.

So if we choose to restrict the concepts of 'omnipotent' to mean 'can do anything that can logically be done', and 'omniscient' as 'to know everything that can logically be known', then free will cannot exist.

Perhaps my example uses a less restrictive definition then. In fact, I see no restrictions to the programmer's knowledge or power except perhaps those that are self-imposed.

I'm sure there's holes in that logic somewhere - I promised myself to limit posting while ill, but this thought just sprung onto me, and I had to post it before it made sense... :D

Bri, CEO - comments?

You're doing pretty well, considering!. Perhaps ceo has something more to add.

-Bri
 
I have problems with the idea of 'self-limited omni____' - while I agree that this paradoxical situation is possible - maybe even probable - it still removes the Deific beyond the realm of (our) logic and reason.

Of course, that's the problem with just about ANY definition of God - no matter what, it seems like God lies just beyond logic and reason. Which is why I maintain faith in spite of the apparent deterministic nature of the universe.
 
I shouldn't read these long threads.
I do come across ideas that I sometimes have difficulty seeing both sides of. I came across a woman on a blog a few years ago who had been abused by a priest as a child. The purpose of her thread was not to reject God, but to encourage people to be faithful.

So ok, I was left with the image of this helpless child being abused while innocently searching for God - and yet God was silent. This is of course, a variant of the 'question of evil', but more subtle, it raised a question about the honor of God. For me to accept this woman's faith response as valid, I must assent to God's allowing the free choice of the priest to be a predator.

This creates a paradox for me, not that God is evil, but that a God as understood as supporter of free will - has no honor.

Why worship such an entity, if one existed?
 
We have foreknowledge of the agent's future but the agent has free will. As long as we're careful about how we interact with the world, we can ensure that the foreknowledge will be accurate. Even if we decide to interact with the world, as long as we do it after time 30 or in such a way that it won't affect the free agent's history at time 30, we know that the agent will always turn left at time 30. For example, we could remove one of the walls to the safe at time 40, and the agent could run into the message wall, but it won't affect the agent's past behavior at time 30. Even if we DID want to interfere with the free agent's history at time 30 by placing a new wall into the world in front of the agent, say at time 20, we would instantly know what the agent's new future is at time 30.

-Bri
Thanks Bri, it is a good and very thought provoking example.

But you cannot say that it is the same timeline if you have changed it. In effect you are saying that God can forge history in order to make himself appear omniscient in a given universe.

You are testing God's omniscience against a different historical context from the one in which the choice was made. Omniscience cannot be post hoc. It must be atomic with every choice.

Say we have

Code:
  God G;
  FreeAgent fa;
  Choice = {l,r,w};
  Universe U;
  History h;  // subclass of Universe

Choice G.predict (fa,t,U) - returns God's prediction for fa and time t in Universe U and returns one of {l,r,w}. God can do this by counterfactuals, peeking ahead at history, prerunning part of history or whatever other method is available for a Deity to tell.

History U.agentsView(t) - returns the history of the universe before time t which is accessible to a free agent.

void History.addPrediction(Choice c,FreeAgent fa, Time t,Time timeofprediction, AccessControl a) - adds a prediction about what fa will do at time t which can be protected against any FreeAgent ever seeing it.

Choice History.getPrediction(FreeAgent fa, Time t) - returns the previously saved prediction

Choice fa.free_choice(t,History(t)) - returns the free agent's choice in same universe given only a limited view of events before t and returns one of {l,r,w}

So we have

Code:
G.maybeOmniscient=true;
for (timenow=0;timenow<=Constants.ENDOFTIME;timenow++)
{
  \\ all other business of the universe conducted here ...
  if (timenow == t-30)
  {
    s=timenow;
    U.History.addPrediction(G.predict(fa,t,U),fa,t,timenow,protected);
  }
  if (timenow == t)
  {
    if ( fa.free_choice(timenow,U.agentsView(timenow) ) != 
                                         U.History.getPrediction(fa,t,s) )
      G.maybeOmniscient = false;
  }
}

Now this would be a fairer test of omniscience. So in your first window you would see the agent turn left and perhaps the Omnipotence icon turn from a green tick to a red cross.

You might change history in the second window so that God's prediction is now left but this will not alter the Omnipotence icon unless you reevaluate the free choice too.

It does not matter that God's prediction is not accessible in the U.agentsView because God's omnipotence is in context of the whole universe, not just the human race.
 
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Thanks Bri, it is a good and very thought provoking example.

But you cannot say that it is the same timeline if you have changed it. In effect you are saying that God can forge history in order to make himself appear omniscient in a given universe.

No, no. I said that the portion of the timeline in question would be unchanged UNLESS God were to change something in the world that would affect the free agent's history at the time of the event at t=30. God can certainly choose not to do anything that would affect the timeline of the free agent. Placing the wall into the safe would not affect the timeline at all, so the scenario that you asked about is completley intact.

That does leave the question, what if God does choose to do something that affects the agent's memory before the agent makes the choice? IF (if if if) God chose to (he doesn't have to, but IF he decides to) change something that affects the agent's memory after placing the wall at t=10 but before the choice at t=30 (say, he blocks the agent's path with a new wall at t=20) then the timeline containing t=30 would change, and perhaps the free agent might make a different choice (or might not even have the opportunity to make that choice). However, God instantly knows the free agent's future. From the free agent's perspective, this "new" future is simply the future, and God knows it (and in fact has known about it since the beginning of time, at t=0).

This could potentially make the wall wrong (if the agent wasn't presented the opportunity to choose, or if the agent chose to stop rather than turn left), but God could change the wall at t=10 so that it matches reality. Although this seems like "cheating," in fact any changes made to the timeline replace whatever was there before, so the wall never actually read "LEFT" at all, and was accurate the entire time since being placed at (t=10).

-Bri
 
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No, no. I said that the portion of the timeline in question would be unchanged UNLESS God were to change something in the world that would affect the free agent's history at the time of the event at t=30. God can certainly choose not to do anything that would affect the timeline of the free agent. Placing the wall into the safe would not affect the timeline at all though, so the scenario that you asked about is completley intact.
As I said before, it makes no difference - a portion of the timeline being changed changes the timelines. The agent how has two histories - even if it can't find that out. The free choice was made in one timeline and then tested in another.

Again, all you are saying is that God can go back and forge history to make himself appear omnipotent and would never get found out.

Let's say that the safe is opened after John's death. This is OK since it does not affect his timeline. And others are free to marvel that God's predictions were right.

Similarly in your program other agents are free to inspect the whole timeline including the contents of the safe once the agent being predicted has terminated.

So at t=40 they can see that a prediction was made at t=10 saying "LEFT" and a choice which the operator had no possibility of controlling occurred at t=30 going "LEFT" . Right so far?

But they also can confirm that since the prediction was made at t=10 it also exists at t=20 - right?

So by definition of free choice the probabilities for each choice at t=20 were:
Code:
agent_has_choice = {
  "0<Prob(LEFT)<1",
  "0<Prob(RIGHT)<1",
  "0<Prob(WAIT)<1" };
and by definition of omnipotence the probabilities for each choice at t=20 were
Code:
operator_is_omnipotent = {
  "Prob(LEFT)=1",
  "Prob(RIGHT)=0",
  "Prob(WAIT)=0" };
So for each of these possibilities to co-exist at t=20 the ranges have to overlap, ie agent_has_choice[x] must overlap operator_is_omnipotent[x] for x = {0,1,2}.

By the definitions of omnipotence and free choice this must be true.

But they don't overlap at all - so again omnipotence and free will are mutually exclusive, even in your example.

Not even by the manipulation of the timeline can you change this.
 
Of course, there is no way that WE could generate an absolutely free agent in the computer, but presumably, an omnipotent God could... but what would that mean? That God can create a mechanism for information processing whose process God cannot know?

This seems, to me, to be logically impossible, and we've already discussed, at length, that any useful description of 'omnipotent' or 'omniscient' should eliminate the logically impossible; therefore, God can only create information processing mechanisms whose processes are known by God. In other words, 'free will' is an algorithm, and God knows how that algorithm will react at every single second of time.

So if we choose to restrict the concepts of 'omnipotent' to mean 'can do anything that can logically be done', and 'omniscient' as 'to know everything that can logically be known', then free will cannot exist.

It seems to me that it is intrinsically impossible to calculate absolutely at time t the decisions of a free agent at time t + x, meaning that it is impossible to derive such decisions from an exhaustive knowledge of all causal laws and relationships as well as all circumstances existing at time t. But it does not seem likely that this is how (a hypothetically timeless) God knows what a free agent decides at any given time. He knows the decision not because the agent is following a theoretically predictable "algorithm", however complex, which gives rise in any deterministic sense to a certain decision in a certain circumstance. He simply has direct cognitive access to the decision in a way similar to the way in which I might know your present actions - not by deducing them from prior facts known to me, but rather by observing them (although I am currently observing your actions at only one point in time, God observes them all simultaneously).

So while it is perhaps not logically possible for an omniscient being to be unable to calculate the end result of an algorithm he creates, that doesn't appear to me to be what's involved either in a free human choice at a given time, or in God's awareness of the same.

ETA: I don't really know much about algorithms or programming, and I am finding some of the recent posts difficult to follow.
 
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...and I am finding some of the recent posts difficult to follow.

Me, too... but not because of programming. The harder we start twisting and turning to wedge 'omnipotence', 'omniscience', and 'free will' into the same box, the harder it is to follow the logic employed.

See, part of the problem for me, is that given God's omni-attributes, timelessness, etc., every person created - every so-called 'free agent' - has certain attributes. For the sake of argument, let's call the key attributes x, y, z, and t - length, width, height, and temporation (time-ness). Perhaps 'location' might be just as valid a term to use... but I digress.

Now, when we make a 3-dimensional object, we have a relatively high degree of control in the x, y, and z attributes, and model accordingly. The t attribute remains a problem for us, because we have no means to model something's temporal duration, short of assembly/disassembly.

But for a timeless God, creation of any 4-dimensional object is covered under omnipotency, of course. And when crafting an object or person, the being by necessity of being timeless, crafts this being with measurements in all four (and possibly more) dimensions - that is, each being possesses certain values for x, y, z, and t at the 'moment' that God creates them... that, in essence, God creates, whole-cloth and in accordance with His will, beings with attributes FIXED for x, y, z, and t - that every value for x(t), y(t), and z(t) is not variable at all, but constant and unchanging, because God exists beyond Time. In other words, God isn't just putting little Billy Cracker down in Lubbock, Texas in 1999 and 'letting rip'... God (being timeless) is putting Billy down in Lubbock, Texas in 1999, moving to California in 2005, graduating from Berkely (sp), touring Europe for three years, and dying in a plane crash on the way home... ALL AT ONCE.

The only other option is for God to be affected by Time, but this reduces the general omni-status of God and indicates that some things are beyond even God's control - and then it's turtles, all the way down.

ok now my head hurts.

So while it is perhaps not logically possible for an omniscient being to be unable to calculate the end result of an algorithm he creates, that doesn't appear to me to be what's involved either in a free human choice at a given time, or in God's awareness of the same.

And that's not what I'm asking, either...

I'm asking whether it's logically possible for God to create a thing which makes decisions in a non-determined, non-random mode (free will) such that God cannot know exactly, in every single available situation, how that thing will decide?
 
I'm asking whether it's logically possible for God to create a thing which makes decisions in a non-determined, non-random mode (free will) such that God cannot know exactly, in every single available situation, how that thing will decide?
It's a bit like the rock too heavy to lift. Can God make a process so mysterious that even he can't work it out?
 

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