Sorry to be getting back to you so slowly, ZD.
Well, for one thing, belief has nothing to do with knowledge.
I wouldn't say that. Belief is not the same thing as knowledge, but pretty much every philosopher to consider the question since Socrates seems to agree that you cannot know something without believing it to be true. Knowledge requires something in addition to belief, of course. But note that the definition of
omniscience I offered does not link belief to knowledge. I indicated that an omniscient being
knows the truth. Untrue things, on the other hand, obviously cannot be
known; they can only be
believed, but I hope you'll agree that it would be contradictory for an omniscient being to believe untrue things, which is why that qualification appeared in the definition.
zaayrdragon said:
Second, what is the definition of a 'true proposition'?
A statement that is true! It's the irreducible stuff of which knowledge is composed: a truth, a fact, however you want to put it. If it can't theoretically be expressed as a true proposition, it's hard to imagine how it could constitute knowledge:
- The Declaration of Independence was signed in 1776.
- Albany is the capital of New York.
- My father is six feet tall.
- Tomorrow John will have eggs for breakfast.
- If all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal.
- 2+2=4
That's a sampling of what of true propositions can look like (and let's just assume here that all of them are, in fact, true).
zaayrdragon said:
Third: I think that any definition of 'omniscient' also requires knowing outcomes of hypothetical and theoretical propositions, as well.
To the extent that there are any such propositions which are true, I agree.
If there are no true counterfactuals of freedom, then obviously omniscience doesn't need to cover those.
zaayrdragon said:
That definition of yours is the strangest for 'omniscience' I've ever encountered.
Really? I think it flows pretty logically from what it means to have knowledge. But I can't take credit for the definition; it (or something close to it) comes up with some frequency in modern philosophical writing.