There is No God (And You Know It)

So 60 seconds before John makes the turn there statement are three statements
A="At time t the statement 'John turns right' can possibly be true"
B="At time t the statement 'John turns left' is true"
C="At time t the statement 'John turns right' cannot possibly be true"

Nope, B and C should read:

B="At time t+60 the statement 'John turns left' will be true"
C="At time t+60 the statement 'John turns right' will be false"

A is true because it is from the definition of free will
B is true because at that time an infallible statement from G says so
C is true because it follows from B

Yup, that pretty much sums it up, based on the corrected statements above.

But C is ~A - they are mutually exclusive statements.

They cannot be true at the same time. So if J has free will G is not omnipotent.

The corrected statements are not mutually exclusive. J is free and G is omnipotent.

-Bri
 
It is nothing even remotely like any argument I have been using. Do you read the stuff, or just assume you know what we are saying?

You've suggested on several occasions that God would be doing evil if he sits by and allows someone to suffer without helping them, just as Beerina suggested in her post to which I was responding.

Please don't waste my time to defend myself against rediculous questions like "Do you read the stuff, or just assume you know what we are saying?"

Yes, I've read all of your posts, but if I have to spend a great deal of time defending myself against silly attacks, I will stop reading or responsing to your posts.

-Bri
 
ceo:

If God 'actualizes' the timeline, and the whole of it springs into existence as-is, this automatically means there is no free will. Automatically. It's like saying the grain of wood can grow any way it will, but we form a plank instantly, as is, with the wood grain as it is set to be... meaning the grain is not free to go as it will at all, but is fixed and immutable at that point.

Only a God who moves through time as we do can be 'surprised' by choice, and only a God who is not omnipotent or omniscient could manage free will - ironically, free will is another indicator that omnipotency is simply not possible.

Free will is the square circle, in fact - think about it. Can God create an agent that God cannot directly control? That is exactly what free will suggests - that Man is responsible for Man's own choices, and God is not - meaning God is not omnipotent, after all.

What your latest example suggests is that God lacks the ability to form the whole timeline of the universe according to His will, and that parts of it form as they will without God's wishing it to be so - hereby eliminating omnipotency. Further, since omniscience would include full knowledge of past/present/future as one entity, no omniscient God could create a timeline in which free will is a factor.

Thanks for dropping the baseball thing - I never know how many baskets make a first down...
 
Free will is the square circle, in fact - think about it. Can God create an agent that God cannot directly control? That is exactly what free will suggests - that Man is responsible for Man's own choices, and God is not - meaning God is not omnipotent, after all.

Zaay, I'm surprised at you! God can be omnipotent but choose not to exercise his ability to control man in order to allow free will. In fact, God could control some decisions of man while allowing others to be free if he chose. You'll need to do better than that!

-Bri
 
You've suggested on several occasions that God would be doing evil if he sits by and allows someone to suffer without helping them, just as Beerina suggested in her post to which I was responding.
I have just gone carefully through all my posts in this topic and can't see where I have suggested this even once.

On the contrary I see that I have consistently maintained the opposite premise - that God would not be doing evil by sitting back and allowing someone to suffer (edit mistake). My point was to think about the implications of this for our moral freedom. What is the point, as CS Lewis points out, of having a game that you can't lose?

So why should I not complain when I find that you characterise my argument as diametrically opposite to what it actually has been?
 
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Zaay, I'm surprised at you! God can be omnipotent but choose not to exercise his ability to control man in order to allow free will. In fact, God could control some decisions of man while allowing others to be free if he chose. You'll need to do better than that!

-Bri

Oh, I don't deny that as a possibility, upon reflection. However, if this is true, one would never know if one was being allowed to exercise free will or not - meaning, from the human point of view, that free will would still be questionable, while from the deific point of view, free will really would be a mere illusion.

Nevertheless, free will implies that God is not timeless, which means there is at least one thing God cannot create/control - thereby meaning that God is not omnipotent.

:D
 
If God 'actualizes' the timeline, and the whole of it springs into existence as-is, this automatically means there is no free will. Automatically. It's like saying the grain of wood can grow any way it will, but we form a plank instantly, as is, with the wood grain as it is set to be... meaning the grain is not free to go as it will at all, but is fixed and immutable at that point.
Part of the semantic difficulty arises, obviously, from speaking of how these things might appear from God's perspective out of time. But you are simply wrong about this automatically meaning there is no free will. Free agents' choices could contribute to determining the "grain" and still be known to God "before" they are known to the agents. As I said before, events at all points in the timeline (once actualized) would be perceived directly and simultaneously by God, not unlike the way we perceive events in our present moment. You still haven't explained why God's perception of your future choice amounts to determining it, whereas my perception of your present choice does not mean that I am controlling it.

zaayrdragon said:
Only a God who moves through time as we do can be 'surprised' by choice, and only a God who is not omnipotent or omniscient could manage free will - ironically, free will is another indicator that omnipotency is simply not possible.
I certainly don't see that it necessarily follows.

zaayrdragon said:
Free will is the square circle, in fact - think about it. Can God create an agent that God cannot directly control? That is exactly what free will suggests - that Man is responsible for Man's own choices, and God is not - meaning God is not omnipotent, after all.
I wouldn't put it in those terms. God would certainly be capable in theory of overriding the will of free creatures or controlling them in some other fashion, but they would thereby become unfree (of course, God already knows whether he has done so in the future). Having agents remain free and unfree simultaneously would indeed be a square circle. But an omnipotent being does not lose omnipotence by electing not to exercise the power of control.

zaayrdragon said:
What your latest example suggests is that God lacks the ability to form the whole timeline of the universe according to His will, and that parts of it form as they will without God's wishing it to be so - hereby eliminating omnipotency.
Why? How does God's choosing to actualize a universe whose timeline he does not completely control dictate that God lacks the ability to actualize a universe whose timeline he controls utterly?

Ominpotence may exclude the possibility of making a square circle, but it certainly includes the possibility of making a either a square or a circle. It may exclude the possibility of making an unfree free agent, but it certainly includes the possibility of making either a completely controlled universe or one with free agents.

robin said:
This, however, prevents him from being immanent in the universe, from my book in a safe example and also by considering that once God inspected the timeline he might be surprised, not only by what the humans do, but by what He does.
I don't think God could be surprised by what he does; counterfactuals of divine freedom are a different matter than counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. An omniscient being may not know what created free agent would do in every possible circumstance, but he could certainly know what he himself would do in every possible circumstance.

I'm not even sure that "surprise" is the right word when it comes to what human beings do. God would certainly be aware of the range of possible outcomes of his actualizing a universe with free agents. To an omniscient being, such range might appear as the range of outcomes of a coin toss appears to me (and I'm not really surprised when one of those outcomes materializes).
 
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Oh, I don't deny that as a possibility, upon reflection. However, if this is true, one would never know if one was being allowed to exercise free will or not - meaning, from the human point of view, that free will would still be questionable, while from the deific point of view, free will really would be a mere illusion.

Undoubtedly, if God exists, that is the case! If we knew that we did or did not have free will, we wouldn't be having this discussion!

Nevertheless, free will implies that God is not timeless, which means there is at least one thing God cannot create/control - thereby meaning that God is not omnipotent.

:D

If God can create/control everything that can be created/controlled, God is omnipotent. Nonetheless, I don't think you've proven that God cannot be timeless either. If anything, you may have shown that we don't fully understand the logic of time, which has nothing to do with free will. According to the Stanford article, there are other apparent paradoxes that occur when discussing time that have nothing to do with free will or God.

-Bri
 
I don't think God could be surprised by what he does; counterfactuals of divine freedom are a different matter than counterfactuals of creaturely freedom. An omniscient being may not know what created free agent would do in every possible circumstance, but he could certainly know what he himself would do in every possible circumstance.
The way counterfactuals are normally depicted are something like - 'm will do x in situation s' or something like that. But that implies that the agent will always do just one thing given the same situation. Which would seem to make sense for a God because presumably he does the absolute best thing in each circumstance.

But on the other hand, a being who will do exactly the same thing given exactly the same situation would be completely deterministic.
 
But I still can't see how anybody can get round the book in a safe example.

If J does X at time t and has free will then the possibility existed before t that he would not do X.

But if there is an authoritative statement from God saying he does X at t.

So if the possibility existed at any time that he would not do X at t, then the possibility existed that God would be wrong.

But by definition omniscience means that there is never any possibility that God is wrong so there is a contradiction.

God cannot be both omniscient and participate in the world if we have free will.
 
I have just gone carefully through all my posts in this topic and can't see where I have suggested this even once.

OK, I can see that you're going to make me waste my time going back through your posts to find an example. Fine. How about this one:

Robin said:
Bri said:
You might define "benevolence" as "doing the best good that you're able to do" and both definitions would be the same.

In which case God has the same moral obligations given the same knowledge of consequences.

Take the example where I am watching a patient in considerable pain and there is a competent, ethical doctor standing by. Should I go and fetch some pain-killer? Or should I trust that the doctor has done the best that can be done?

Your implication here is that God has the same moral obligation to help the man as you do (or better yet not place him in the situation to being with). This is Beerina's argument as well. If I have mischaracterized what you or Beerina said beyond that, then I apologize.

So why should I not complain when I find that you characterise my argument as diametrically opposite to what it actually has been?

Simply stating that I mischaracterized your comments would have been sufficient if in fact that was the case. Implying that I didn't read any of the posts to which I responded is not only a blatant attack which causes me to waste my time defending myself, but doesn't advance the discussion at all.

-Bri
 
...while from the deific point of view, free will really would be a mere illusion...
Undoubtedly, if God exists, that is the case! If we knew that we did or did not have free will, we wouldn't be having this discussion!

Well thank you for agreeing with me.

If God can create/control everything that can be created/controlled, God is omnipotent. Nonetheless, I don't think you've proven that God cannot be timeless either. If anything, you may have shown that we don't fully understand the logic of time, which has nothing to do with free will. According to the Stanford article, there are other apparent paradoxes that occur when discussing time that have nothing to do with free will or God.

If God did not create nor can control time, then God is not omnipotent. And I think perhaps it is you who do not understand temporal logic, which has everything to do with free will.
 
CEO, I had made a pretty thorough reply to you, but my browser glitched, and I lost it.

I think we just have to agree to disagree.

For example, I don't think a being who does not know what a free agent would do can be considered omniscient.

Consider this example: God creates a universe, and in this universe, there is a creek. God wants a tree to fall across the creek, thereby creating a bridge. But along comes a free agent, who cuts down the tree, away from the creek, for lumber. This suggests God is neither omniscient nor omnipotent, as the free agent has thwarted God's will.

Now, an omniscient God would know this would occur, and would arrange matters so that this free agent could not chop down this tree - but this eliminates the free will of the agent, through some manner of control. This is the universe as we know it - no choice by any Man can truly said to be free, since our environment forces us into certain choices automatically. And an omnipotent God could simply take the agent's free will and make the agent do something different - which means, simply, that no 'free will' really exists at all.

In the end, we have to agree to disagree, I think, CEO - because every example you show me, every discussion you offer, only causes me to think even more intensely that free will is absolutely impossible, if God (as the Supreme Being) exists at all.
 
The way counterfactuals are normally depicted are something like - 'm will do x in situation s' or something like that.
I'd say "would do", not "will do", because in order for it to be counterfactual, there can't be an actualized timeline in which s obtains and m finds himself in s.

robin said:
But that implies that the agent will always do just one thing given the same situation. Which would seem to make sense for a God because presumably he does the absolute best thing in each circumstance.

But on the other hand, a being who will do exactly the same thing given exactly the same situation would be completely deterministic.
That raises a couple of interesting issues. Can the same agent really find himself in identical circumstances twice? And even if he could, would his freedom hinge on his choosing differently from the previous iterations? Cannot an agent freely adopt a set of criteria to guide his choices, such that for at least some situation s, the agent would always choose a certain way?

Suspending our disbelief, let us consider Saint M, a morally good human free agent who somehow unknowingly relives multiple times, in the exact same context, the exact same dilemma of choosing whether to commit or refrain from committing a particularly obvious, egregious and gratuitous act of wickedness. If Saint M truly possesses free will, ought we to suppose that he would necessarily choose the evil action sometimes? Does his free will paradoxically inhibit Saint M somehow from consistently choosing to avoid the same evil action?
 
Sorry to be getting back to you so slowly, ZD.

Well, for one thing, belief has nothing to do with knowledge.
I wouldn't say that. Belief is not the same thing as knowledge, but pretty much every philosopher to consider the question since Socrates seems to agree that you cannot know something without believing it to be true. Knowledge requires something in addition to belief, of course. But note that the definition of omniscience I offered does not link belief to knowledge. I indicated that an omniscient being knows the truth. Untrue things, on the other hand, obviously cannot be known; they can only be believed, but I hope you'll agree that it would be contradictory for an omniscient being to believe untrue things, which is why that qualification appeared in the definition.

zaayrdragon said:
Second, what is the definition of a 'true proposition'?
A statement that is true! It's the irreducible stuff of which knowledge is composed: a truth, a fact, however you want to put it. If it can't theoretically be expressed as a true proposition, it's hard to imagine how it could constitute knowledge:
  • The Declaration of Independence was signed in 1776.
  • Albany is the capital of New York.
  • My father is six feet tall.
  • Tomorrow John will have eggs for breakfast.
  • If all men are mortal, and Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal.
  • 2+2=4
That's a sampling of what of true propositions can look like (and let's just assume here that all of them are, in fact, true).

zaayrdragon said:
Third: I think that any definition of 'omniscient' also requires knowing outcomes of hypothetical and theoretical propositions, as well.
To the extent that there are any such propositions which are true, I agree.

If there are no true counterfactuals of freedom, then obviously omniscience doesn't need to cover those.

zaayrdragon said:
That definition of yours is the strangest for 'omniscience' I've ever encountered.
Really? I think it flows pretty logically from what it means to have knowledge. But I can't take credit for the definition; it (or something close to it) comes up with some frequency in modern philosophical writing.
 
Well thank you for agreeing with me.

I was more agreeing with the first part than the last part, of course, but you're welcome!

If God did not create nor can control time, then God is not omnipotent.

That is certainly a matter of opinion and definition.

And I think perhaps it is you who do not understand temporal logic, which has everything to do with free will.

You are correct that I'm not an expert in temporal logic. However, others who are experts believe that our understanding in the area is lacking. Perhaps you should call the folks at Stanford and inform them that their article is wrong and that you understand the subject perfectly!

-Bri
 
Free will is, of course, an illusion. This is as true for any hypothetical God as it is for me.
 
Hey Bri, forgive my laziness - cold meds kickin' my rump - but could you post a link (or repost, as the case may be) to the Stanford article? I seem to have either missed the link or...well whatever... head's really fuzzy today.

Thanks

(and it's pure ego-stoking, but I think I have a better grasp of temporal logic than most university 'experts' I've talked about the subject with. Pet interest of mine, and all that. I especially like the idea of nonlinear time...)
 
Hey Bri, forgive my laziness - cold meds kickin' my rump - but could you post a link (or repost, as the case may be) to the Stanford article? I seem to have either missed the link or...well whatever... head's really fuzzy today.

Thanks

(and it's pure ego-stoking, but I think I have a better grasp of temporal logic than most university 'experts' I've talked about the subject with. Pet interest of mine, and all that. I especially like the idea of nonlinear time...)

No problem. It's here.

-Bri
 

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