There is No God (And You Know It)

I never said we had free will. I said that the fact that we all feel as though we have free will is evidence that we have free will. If everyone in the world experience the same thing, that is usually pretty good evidence that it exists.

My question isn't whether or not you have a choice about getting angry, it's whether or not you think getting angry is irrational. If the other person had no choice, then your getting angry is completely irrational.

Well, not as a biological response to adversity.

Besides, from our standpoint, the presence of absence of free will doesn't make a difference, because we have no way of predicting every event by knowing all the variables. This doesn't mean it's not deterministic, but from our perspective it doesn't change the fact that if you let a murderer loose he'll continue to kill, for example.
 
Belz... said:
Oh, no. Your example of a function for God, in this case, is entirely dependent upon another theory that is completely unsupported by evidence. I don't have to lift a finger, here.

Correct, and if you want to prove that this function for God is impossible, you must prove that the existance of human souls are impossible. Of course, you cannot because it might be true.

How you can say "correct" and then follow it up with the reverse of what I said is beyond me.


What you're not getting is that reasonable doubt of the impossibility of something existing IS absolute doubt. If you want to prove that something is impossible, then you have to prove that there is no circumstance in which it could be possible. If you only want to prove that it is unlikely then you are admitting that it is still possible.

Translation: reasonably impossible. Like, relatively cold (say -20c) as opposed to ABSOLUTELY cold (-273c.) I don't see your problem with this distinction.

Then God is useless. I don't see your point at all. He might still exist.

That still would be a first, wouldn't it ? A useless actual thing ?

If God created the universe, then he's not useless. He created the universe. Let's see YOU do that!

IF God created the universe, I can only assume there's a WAY to create the universe. If that way exists, it might be possible to replicate it without God. So, maybe I will...

Name at least one piece of evidence that would confirm that God cannot have one of those functions
I can't. That's my point. God might have any of those functions.

So, no manner of evidence would convince you otherwise. That's reasonable...

If God created logic, then he wouldn't be limited by it. He might also be able to create other kinds of logic if he chose. Just because we can't imagine other types of logic because we're constrained by the logic of our universe doesn't mean that other types of logic don't or couldn't exist.

I got that the first time around. However I'd like you to explain how another logic would be possible, given that logic is not a physical thing or law, it's just the way things have to be.
 
But if the greater good consisted, as you said, of allowing us the opportunity to help, then yes, they are capable of understanding that.

The key word in that sentence is "if" since there is no way for us to know what the greater good is. I was only providing one possible greater good that might come about from that scenario. I never said it was the only one! The humans in your scenario couldn't possibly know, and therefore would be wrong most of the time.

But God had already granted free will and cannot grant it all over again (unless he first takes it away). So what greater good is being accomplished by God not helping this man? God's not helping this man does not give me any more free will than I had before and so is of no greater value than my allowing the next man the same opportunity.

I didn't say that this was giving you free will. I said that the greater good might be allowing you the opportunity to exercize your free will by saving the man or not.

But does the 'benevolence' part of omni-benevolence refer to our meaning of benevolence, or does it have a separate meaning?

It has a separate meaning in your context. Benevolence means doing good, and omni-benevolence means doing the greater good. Of course, since "greater good" is "better" than "good" then they're really the same thing, except that a human cannot know the "greater good" and couldn't accomplish it if s/he did know. You might define "benevolence" as "doing the best good that you're able to do" and both definitions would be the same.

-Bri
 
OK, put it this way:

John is approaching a fork in the road
A book exists at this time that says he will go left
There is nothing whatsoever preventing him from going right.
John has free will
Does the possibility exist that John will go right?

John can choose to go right, but will not do so. God knows that he won't do so because God saw exactly what John chose as he wrote it down in the book. Let's assume for a moment that God actually wrote the book after John made the choice, but then brought the book back in time to before John was born. To God, this is no different than the scenario you proposed because God is timeless.

Let's put forth another related possibility. If the "many worlds" model of quantum physics is correct, the timeline is shaped like a tree with many branches. Many times a second, the timeline branches, and each branch represents an alternate reality. If something has a 75% chance of happening, it happens in 75% of the branches but not in the other 25%. It is possible that God is able to traverse the timeline at will, and in fact could be everywhere on the tree at the same time. If this is the case, then God could actually write "John turns left" in one version of the book that exists on one branch, and "John turns right" in another version of the book that exists in another branch (in other words, there would be many versions of the book). John then has the ability to choose which branch he takes. If quantum physics is correct, another version of John might actually choose the other branch. Either way, the book is accurate and John has exercised his free will.

-Bri
 
How you can say "correct" and then follow it up with the reverse of what I said is beyond me.

The "correct" was in response to the "is entirely dependent on another theory" part. I'm sorry that I was unclear.

Translation: reasonably impossible. Like, relatively cold (say -20c) as opposed to ABSOLUTELY cold (-273c.) I don't see your problem with this distinction.

There is no such thing as "reasonably impossible" just as you can't be "reasonably dead." Impossible is impossible. If you mean improbable, say improbable and then concede that it is possible.

That still would be a first, wouldn't it ? A useless actual thing ?

There are many useless actual things. It's called "garbage." Sure, it was useful at one time (as God might be under this particular scenario). If garbage exists, then a no-longer useful God might exist.

IF God created the universe, I can only assume there's a WAY to create the universe. If that way exists, it might be possible to replicate it without God. So, maybe I will...

OK, so by your definition, a watchmaker is useless because other people can make watches. And when you've created a universe, get back to me!

So, no manner of evidence would convince you otherwise. That's reasonable...

You essentially asked me to prove something that I believe can't be proven (although you would like to think it can be). If you think it can be proven that it is impossible for God to perform any of these functions, then please be my guest and try to prove it, but to get upset because I won't prove it for you is a little bit silly! If you succeed in proving it, I will be convinced.

I got that the first time around. However I'd like you to explain how another logic would be possible, given that logic is not a physical thing or law, it's just the way things have to be.

Why wouldn't it be possible? Consider Plato's "Republic," specifically the Allegory of the Cave. Here Plato describes prisoners held in a cave since birth. They are bound in such a way that they can only face a wall of the cave on which shadows of various items are cast. To these people, the shadows are real, but of course there is another reality that they don't know about. They might very well ask the same question you did about how a book can exist that is different from the shadow they see on the wall. In their world, logic tells them that all objects are flat and appear on a wall. They cannot imagine anything different because they have never experienced or heard about it.

-Bri
 
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I wrote in a previous post:

Let's put forth another related possibility. If the "many worlds" model of quantum physics is correct, the timeline is shaped like a tree with many branches. Many times a second, the timeline branches, and each branch represents an alternate reality. If something has a 75% chance of happening, it happens in 75% of the branches but not in the other 25%. It is possible that God is able to traverse the timeline at will, and in fact could be everywhere on the tree at the same time. If this is the case, then God could actually write "John turns left" in one version of the book that exists on one branch, and "John turns right" in another version of the book that exists in another branch (in other words, there would be many versions of the book). John then has the ability to choose which branch he takes. If quantum physics is correct, another version of John might actually choose the other branch. Either way, the book is accurate and John has exercised his free will.

Upon re-reading my post (after the editing period expired), there are some problems with this scenario. No need to comment on them (unless you want to).

Specifically, there is no "correct" story for God to write in the book because God knows about both realities. God could place a different book into each future John's reality, but that's not really the premise of the question. If the "many worlds" theory is correct, it makes the question illogical, just like the "square circle." You are essentially asking that God be able to write two different realities into a single coherent book, when the book itself would have to list all realities since they are all equally real.

God is perfectly omniscient, because he knows about all of the realities, but because there are multiple realities (and multiple Johns) and none of them are more "real" than another, God couldn't write down just one of them as being the real future for John (he has many real futures). God could force a split in the timeline at the time he writes the book, but that would preclude each resulting John from having free will.

-Bri
 
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The "correct" was in response to the "is entirely dependent on another theory" part. I'm sorry that I was unclear.

Still. If souls don't exist, judging them is a function God cannot have. And, as I said, I don't see why I should go around debunking every woo theory out there just to satisfy your sense of the absolute.

There is no such thing as "reasonably impossible" just as you can't be "reasonably dead." Impossible is impossible. If you mean improbable, say improbable and then concede that it is possible.

Well take it as "extremely improbable to the point where believing it is real would be unreasonable." Sorry if, for me, that means impossible. Otherwise, I concede your point.

There are many useless actual things. It's called "garbage." Sure, it was useful at one time (as God might be under this particular scenario). If garbage exists, then a no-longer useful God might exist.

Garbage is not useless. It's always used by something or is a function of something else. I agree that, if God HAD a function at one time, then that qualifies. However we are a far cry from having established a reasonable possibility of that.

And when you've created a universe, get back to me!

I sure will.

You essentially asked me to prove something that I believe can't be proven (although you would like to think it can be).

You don't "believe" it can't be prove, Bri. You're convinced that it can't.

If you think it can be proven that it is impossible for God to perform any of these functions, then please be my guest and try to prove it, but to get upset because I won't prove it for you is a little bit silly! If you succeed in proving it, I will be convinced.

Who said anything about me beign upset ? Besides, I don't think any manner of evidence could convince you of the opposite of what you're already convinced about.

Consider Plato's "Republic," specifically the Allegory of the Cave. Here Plato describes prisoners held in a cave since birth. They are bound in such a way that they can only face a wall of the cave on which shadows of various items are cast.

I love it when people quote works of fiction to show that something is possible in reality. I understand your intend, though, but violating the laws of logic would be quite a different matter. For example, how could 1+1 = 3 ?
 
Still. If souls don't exist, judging them is a function God cannot have. And, as I said, I don't see why I should go around debunking every woo theory out there just to satisfy your sense of the absolute.

Because you can't prove what you claimed (that it is impossible for God to judge people) without doing so. If you want to concede that it is possible for God's function to be to judge people, then you don't need to prove anything at all.

Well take it as "extremely improbable to the point where believing it is real would be unreasonable." Sorry if, for me, that means impossible. Otherwise, I concede your point.

Thanks for admitting that at least it's possible as I claimed. Personally, I don't think you've proven that it's extremely improbable, much less impossible, but that is just my opinion.

Garbage is not useless. It's always used by something or is a function of something else. I agree that, if God HAD a function at one time, then that qualifies. However we are a far cry from having established a reasonable possibility of that.

Of course we have. God might have at one time created the universe. Unless you can prove that this is impossible, then it's possible.

You don't "believe" it can't be prove, Bri. You're convinced that it can't.

I'm not claiming that it cannot be proven, but my opinion is that it probably cannot. I certainly cannot prove it. If you can, please share!

Who said anything about me beign upset ? Besides, I don't think any manner of evidence could convince you of the opposite of what you're already convinced about.

Oh, I must have mistaken your "that's reasonable" for sarcasm! I'm not convinced of anything, and it would not be impossible for you to convince me otherwise.

I love it when people quote works of fiction to show that something is possible in reality. I understand your intend, though, but violating the laws of logic would be quite a different matter. For example, how could 1+1 = 3 ?

In another universe where an alternate logic exists, anything is possible. And some dude named "Zleb" could at this moment be posting "how could 1+1 = 2 ?"

-Bri
 
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Thanks for admitting that at least it's possible as I claimed. Personally, I don't think you've proven that it's extremely improbable, much less impossible, but that is just my opinion.

I suppose that's a subject for another time.

Oh, I must have mistaken your "that's reasonable" for sarcasm! I'm not convinced of anything, and it would not be impossible for you to convince me otherwise.

I'm sorry, but it sure seems like it would be.

In another universe where an alternate logic exists, anything is possible. And some dude named "Zleb" could at this moment be posting "how could 1+1 = 2 ?"

Unfortunately that's circular logic. You're trying to support your idea that alternate forms of logic are possible by giving an examples that assumes that they are.
 
Unfortunately that's circular logic. You're trying to support your idea that alternate forms of logic are possible by giving an examples that assumes that they are.

My example really wasn't evidence, it was only an illustration that just because one doesn't understand how it can be true doesn't make it untrue (as with Plato's illustration that I presented in an earlier post).

Frustrating as it may be, we have no way of testing the existance of alternate realities, God, or many other things, so it would be very difficult if not impossible to prove that they don't exist (and similarly difficult if not impossible to prove that they do). That doesn't mean that they do exist, and it doesn't mean that they don't -- it means that they possibly exist.

-Bri
 
I am suggesting that if middle knowledge does not exist - which, for purposes of the hypothetical, is true - then God can know the outcome of the choices an actual free agent makes (or, if you prefer, the choices a free agent makes in circumstances that actually come to pass), but not the outcome of choices a non-actual free agent (a hypothetical one with no real timeline) would make, because those outcomes are intrinsically uncertain.

I've always had a problem with a free agent. Couldn't god stop time, clone the entire universe, run it, see what the free agent decided, then he knows what the free agent will decide?

But that also implies determinism.

But if the free agency doesn't involve determinism, then each time god ran an identical universe, the free agent might choose differently. But how is that indistinguishible from determinism with a random influence? I.e. "free agency" is a null concept. There is only determinism, and determinism with random influences.
 
I've always had a problem with a free agent. Couldn't god stop time, clone the entire universe, run it, see what the free agent decided, then he knows what the free agent will decide?

But that also implies determinism.

But if the free agency doesn't involve determinism, then each time god ran an identical universe, the free agent might choose differently. But how is that indistinguishible from determinism with a random influence? I.e. "free agency" is a null concept. There is only determinism, and determinism with random influences.

This derives from a thought experiment I once had, wondering if these "quantum randomness" issues would repeat in identical "runs" of the universe -- thus revealing a deeper determinism that is below the level of reality that Einstein wanted to go.
 
Make sure your AC is at least 60.

Warning! In the original Dungeons and Dragons, the lower the AC, the better, and 9 was plain clothing. Looks like a puff of air would incinerate you...
 
Bri said:
John can choose to go right, but will not do so. God knows that he won't do so because God saw exactly what John chose as he wrote it down in the book. Let's assume for a moment that God actually wrote the book after John made the choice, but then brought the book back in time to before John was born. To God, this is no different than the scenario you proposed because God is timeless.
I agree it is no different, but you did not answer the question - I asked "Does the possibility exist that John will go right?". Forget quantum and timelines, I am talking about the timeline that John is aware of, if God is omniscient then he should be able to know what timeline John is aware of.

Given the premises the answer is of course no, the possibility that John would go right did not exist at any time before he made the decision.

If God is omniscient and can produce that book then there was never a possibility during John's life that he could do anything different to what he did. Generally, there was never a possibility in the entire history of the human race that any human could ever do anything other than what they did (in their own timeline if you like, if such a thing exists).

Looking back at my definition for free will this makes free will impossible. I am happy for you to disagree with that and supply your own.

But suppose we had not been talking about God and never mentioned the book. If I gave the scenario of a man that took the left fork and then stated that the possibility never existed that he would go right, I suspect that you would disagree with me quite vigorously.

I still don't see how you can get round it - if we have libertarian free will then an omniscient, interventionist God is impossible.
 
The key word in that sentence is "if" since there is no way for us to know what the greater good is. I was only providing one possible greater good that might come about from that scenario. I never said it was the only one! The humans in your scenario couldn't possibly know, and therefore would be wrong most of the time.
But as you recall I had already covered off the general case. I was responding to your conjecture that the greater good might be to allow us the opportunity of helping.
I didn't say that this was giving you free will. I said that the greater good might be allowing you the opportunity to exercize your free will by saving the man or not.
You said:
Since the three bystanders cannot grant free will, they are serving no greater good by not helping, even if they understood the greater good (which they cannot, of course).
So what is the relevance of saying the bystanders cannot grant free will? If God was only allowing the opportunity to exercise free will by not helping then he was doing no more than the other by-standers.
You might define "benevolence" as "doing the best good that you're able to do" and both definitions would be the same.
In which case God has the same moral obligations given the same knowledge of consequences.

Take the example where I am watching a patient in considerable pain and there is a competent, ethical doctor standing by. Should I go and fetch some pain-killer? Or should I trust that the doctor has done the best that can be done?

There is a greater good that I am incapable of understanding due to my lack of medical knowledge but does that make me wrong for not helping?

I would only help if I had some reason to doubt the competence or ethics of the doctor. If I don't doubt the impeccability of God then why should I help out in a situation where God is clearly not?

Now if it was the case where every single instance of suffering due to some natural cause was in fact fully justified by some greater good then my moral obligations in the matter are at an end.

On the other hand if there are real moral consequences for my actions with respect to natural evil then it must be at least possible that some instance of natural evil exists that is not specifically justified by a greater good.
 
I agree it is no different, but you did not answer the question - I asked "Does the possibility exist that John will go right?". Forget quantum and timelines, I am talking about the timeline that John is aware of, if God is omniscient then he should be able to know what timeline John is aware of.

Again, that depends on your terms. It's the difference between "can" and "will." If you're asking if John can (has the ability to choose to) go right, then the answer is yes. If you're asking if it is possible that John will actually choose to go right, then the answer is no. God already observed John's choice, and he chose left, so no, John will not choose right.

Given the premises the answer is of course no, the possibility that John would go right did not exist at any time before he made the decision.

Actually, the possiblity that John would go right did exist until he made his decision to go left, which was observed by God.

If God is omniscient and can produce that book then there was never a possibility during John's life that he could do anything different to what he did. Generally, there was never a possibility in the entire history of the human race that any human could ever do anything other than what they did (in their own timeline if you like, if such a thing exists).

Not if God is timeless. God can produce the book, but as long as John never sees it, the book doesn't matter at all (it won't influence John's decision). John having foreknowledge of his own future choice would produce a paradox that we cannot understand, but the most likely result is that John would lose his free will to choose. This is true whether the universe multiplies exponentially as the "many worlds" theory predicts, or whether there is only one "real" timeline.

Looking back at my definition for free will this makes free will impossible. I am happy for you to disagree with that and supply your own.

It's possible that by some definitions of free will, free will is impossible if God is omniscient. However, libertarian free will is possible even if God is omniscient as long as 1) God is timeless, or 2) God limits his powers of omniscience in order to allow free will (i.e. he doesn't "peek" at future events involving choices of free agents).

But suppose we had not been talking about God and never mentioned the book. If I gave the scenario of a man that took the left fork and then stated that the possibility never existed that he would go right, I suspect that you would disagree with me quite vigorously.

Again, if you stated that he can never go right, I would say that he doesn't have free will. If you simply stated that he will never go right because you have foreknowledge of what he will choose, then I would disagree.

I still don't see how you can get round it - if we have libertarian free will then an omniscient, interventionist God is impossible.

Such a God would be impossible if 1) he is limited by time, and 2) he doesn't limit his powers of omniscience in order to allow for free will.

-Bri
 
But as you recall I had already covered off the general case. I was responding to your conjecture that the greater good might be to allow us the opportunity of helping.

Your conjecture assumed that the three bystanders could know the greater good. They can't. Even if they could, they don't have the power to affect the greater good. Even if they could, God already did it (by providing the choice) and at this point it would not be for the greater good to watch him die.

You said:
Since the three bystanders cannot grant free will, they are serving no greater good by not helping, even if they understood the greater good (which they cannot, of course).
So what is the relevance of saying the bystanders cannot grant free will? If God was only allowing the opportunity to exercise free will by not helping then he was doing no more than the other by-standers.

My wording was unclear. I meant that only God can offer opportunities to exercise that free will and ensure that those opportunities are for the greater good. If a human attempts to offer opportunities for others to exercise their free will, those opportunities might not be for the greater good.

In which case God has the same moral obligations given the same knowledge of consequences.

Again, not necessarily. Because it might be for the greater good to actually provide real consequences for the exercise of your free will.

Take the example where I am watching a patient in considerable pain and there is a competent, ethical doctor standing by. Should I go and fetch some pain-killer? Or should I trust that the doctor has done the best that can be done?

There is a greater good that I am incapable of understanding due to my lack of medical knowledge but does that make me wrong for not helping?

I suppose you should ask the doctor if it's OK to administer pain killers. You should do whatever is best for the patient, which sometimes means your doing nothing if someone else can do a better job. If you're not qualified to help and might do harm by attempting to help, then your obligation is to do nothing (but perhaps provide comfort to the person or find help).

I would only help if I had some reason to doubt the competence or ethics of the doctor. If I don't doubt the impeccability of God then why should I help out in a situation where God is clearly not?

You shouldn't, but God has nothing to do with that decision. You shouldn't do anything because it's better for the patient for you to let the doctor do his job.

Now if it was the case where every single instance of suffering due to some natural cause was in fact fully justified by some greater good then my moral obligations in the matter are at an end.

One has nothing at all to do with the other. One is God's domain, the other is yours. In order to maximize the good in the world, God would have to do the greater good, and you would have to do the good.

On the other hand if there are real moral consequences for my actions with respect to natural evil then it must be at least possible that some instance of natural evil exists that is not specifically justified by a greater good.

I don't understand your logic here. If there is a greater good, you can't call a natural disaster evil at all. That would make the term "natural evil" incorrect. The greater good as a result of the natural disaster has nothing to do with the good which you do by helping people. Since God always does the greater good, God has seen to it that your helping people would never cause a greater evil. If it was for the greater good that a person die, God would make sure that the person dies even if you help him. Simply by trying to help him you are doing good and thereby increasing the good in the world (assuming nobody more qualified is there to help him, in which case doing nothing is doing good).

-Bri
 
Your conjecture assumed that the three bystanders could know the greater good. They can't.
I assumed nothing of the sort and anyway it was not my conjecture, it was yours.
Even if they could, they don't have the power to affect the greater good.
In which case any efforts would be worthless. They can't effect the greater good.
Even if they could, God already did it (by providing the choice) and at this point it would not be for the greater good to watch him die.
And as you have stated the bystanders can't affect the greater good at all then they can't affect the greater good by helping him. So why do anything? As you have said, God already did it.
Again, not necessarily. Because it might be for the greater good to actually provide real consequences for the exercise of your free will.
But as you say it might not be. If we don't know what the greater good is then we have no basis for taking action at all. It works both ways.
I suppose you should ask the doctor if it's OK to administer pain killers.
But of course in this case the doctor is aware of the situation, ready and able to take action but uncontactable
You should do whatever is best for the patient, which sometimes means your doing nothing if someone else can do a better job. If you're not qualified to help and might do harm by attempting to help, then your obligation is to do nothing (but perhaps provide comfort to the person or find help).
So if you are aware of a competent ethical person who is aware of the situation and you are not qualified since you do not know the full story then you should do nothing. Which is of course what I have been saying all along.
You shouldn't, but God has nothing to do with that decision. You shouldn't do anything because it's better for the patient for you to let the doctor do his job.
I agree. So if the doctor's name is Yahweh and is the most competent ethical person possible then the situation would be no different.
One has nothing at all to do with the other. One is God's domain, the other is yours. In order to maximize the good in the world, God would have to do the greater good, and you would have to do the good.
You mean if I recognize a greater good I should just pretend it is not there?
I don't understand your logic here.
And yet you agree, because you say that we are unable to affect the greater good or the greater evil - just what I said, our actions have no real moral consequences.
If there is a greater good, you can't call a natural disaster evil at all. That would make the term "natural evil" incorrect.
So if no evil has occurred, then you can simply do nothing and you will not have done any evil. If it was not evil that the man is suffering, why would it then be good if his suffering was alleviated?
The greater good as a result of the natural disaster has nothing to do with the good which you do by helping people. Since God always does the greater good, God has seen to it that your helping people would never cause a greater evil.
Which is exactly what I said. If you can't affect the greater good and you can't affect the greater evil then your actions have no real moral consequences.
If it was for the greater good that a person die, God would make sure that the person dies even if you help him.
So why is the reverse not true? If it was for the greater good that the person survives God would make sure that the man survived even if you did not help. So you should just do nothing.
Simply by trying to help him you are doing good and thereby increasing the good in the world (assuming nobody more qualified is there to help him, in which case doing nothing is doing good).
But there is somebody more qualified there to help him - God. I can't pretend to be unaware of God any more than I can pretend to be unaware of the doctor. So if God is more qualified to help then doing nothing is good. You do not know that helping him will increase the good in the world since you can't predict the consequences of any action.
 
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I assumed nothing of the sort and anyway it was not my conjecture, it was yours.

No, it was your conjecture, but no matter.

In which case any efforts would be worthless. They can't effect the greater good.

Bingo! But they can affect the good, which would be to help the man.

And as you have stated the bystanders can't affect the greater good at all then they can't affect the greater good by helping him. So why do anything? As you have said, God already did it.

I said that God did the greater good by proving the opportunity to help him. By helping him, the bystanders can do good.

But as you say it might not be. If we don't know what the greater good is then we have no basis for taking action at all. It works both ways.

Again, incorrect. God ensures that the good performed by humans is always for the greater good.

But of course in this case the doctor is aware of the situation, ready and able to take action but uncontactable

Then you should comfort the patient and assume the doctor knows what he's doing. But you already knew that. You do whatever is best for the patient.

So if you are aware of a competent ethical person who is aware of the situation and you are not qualified since you do not know the full story then you should do nothing. Which is of course what I have been saying all along.

I never disagreed. I said that you are ethically responsible for helping the person when it will do good.

I agree. So if the doctor's name is Yahweh and is the most competent ethical person possible then the situation would be no different.

If Yahweh is a person, yes. If Yahweh is God, then you must assume responsibility for helping him if you can because it's not God's responsibility to do so. God already did his responsibility, which was for the greater good, possibly by allowing you the opportunity to do yours, and possibly by allowing you to accept the consequences of your inaction if you choose not to help him.

You mean if I recognize a greater good I should just pretend it is not there?

You can't recognize the greater good. It's impossible.

And yet you agree, because you say that we are unable to affect the greater good or the greater evil - just what I said, our actions have no real moral consequences.

Huh? Where do you get this from? Good/evil do have moral consequences! God ensures that the good done by humans IS for the greater good.

So if no evil has occurred, then you can simply do nothing and you will not have done any evil.

Again incorrect. The natural disaster is not evil (indeed, there is no such thing as "greater evil" since everything God does is for the greater good), but your helping or not helping is a separate event entirely. If a greater good has occurred by creating the disaster, you can still do more good by helping, or do evil by doing nothing.

If it was not evil that the man is suffering, why would it then be good if his suffering was alleviated?

Because the man's suffering (if caused by God) is for the greater good. If caused by a person, it may not be for the greater good (and might in fact cause an incredible amount of harm since a person cannot determine what is for the greater good). It is for the good for a person to alleviate the suffering of another person.

Which is exactly what I said. If you can't affect the greater good and you can't affect the greater evil then your actions have no real moral consequences.

Still incorrect, no matter how many times you state it.

So why is the reverse not true? If it was for the greater good that the person survives God would make sure that the man survived even if you did not help. So you should just do nothing.

Because it is for the greater good for you to have the opportunity to help him. And it is for the greater good for there to be consequences for not helping him. But it is not for the good for you to not help him.

But there is somebody more qualified there to help him - God.

Again, God isn't responsible for helping him -- you are. God is doing the greater good by not helping him, therefore he can't be doing the greater good by helping him. You can do good by helping him though. You're not responsible for the greater good, only the good.

I can't pretend to be unaware of God any more than I can pretend to be unaware of the doctor. So if God is more qualified to help then doing nothing is good. You do not know that helping him will increase the good in the world since you can't predict the consequences of any action.

God cannot help in this case because the greater good is better served by him not helping. The greater good is served by allowing you to accept the consequences of your actions or lack thereof. Yes you do know that helping your fellow person is for the good, and yes you do know the consequences of your actions.

This is really not that difficult of a concept. Imagine that the good in the world increases by 100 points for God providing you the opportunity to do good and another 100 points for God allowing you to accept the consequences of the choice. If God makes a dude get hit by a bus in front of you -- 100 points for the world. Now you can help him (10 points) or not help him (-10 points). Whatever your choice is, if God doesn't intervene and help the dude, it's a bonus 100 points for the world for allowing your action to have consequences. God knows that pushing the dude in front of the bus will have no other affect on the net good in the world. What actions on God's part increases the net good in the world the most? What action on your part increases the net good in the world the most?

Now, imagine that you decide to play God, so you push someone in front of a bus in front of a third person. But alas, even though the third person saves him, he still ends up in the hospital, and you didn't realize that the person you pushed in front of the bus would have increased the good in the world by 1000 points that day if you hadn't sent him to the hospital. Furthermore, as you're placed into an overcrowded prison, another minor offender is released to make room for you, and ends up committing a murder of opportunity as he leaves the prison, reducing the good in the world by an additional 2000 points. The person murdered would have increased good in the world by 1,000,000 points during the rest of their life. You get the idea. This is why you cannot play God, because you cannot understand what is for the greater good and what isn't.

-Bri
 
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Actually, the possiblity that John would go right did exist until he made his decision to go left, which was observed by God.
Until he made the decision. But not when he made the decision.

So I am free to do anything I want until I actually want to do it.
 

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