There is No God (And You Know It)

The 'omnibowler' was a pretty poor scenario. Much better to compare it to a game of 'Scrabble' with an infinite tile set and infinite space on the board.
Why? For one thing, a game with an infinite board and infinite tiles is not, by definition, a game of Scrabble, just as a bowling round with unlimited frames would not correspond to the standard definition of a game of bowling.

Let me propose a compromise analogy drawn from baseball: consider a being who possesses the quality of perfection with regard to batting average. We'll call him the Omnibatter. There is no intrinsic limit to the number of at-bats or hits a batter can have - a quality which might make the analogy more palatable for you. But there is an intrinsic limit to batting averages; a batter who is perfect in this respect earns a hit each and every time he appears at bat. The Omnibatter therefore has a batting average of 1.000. (Not 2.000, and not infinity.)

Knowledge, it would also seem, is a quality that has an intrinsic upper limit: a being possessing perfection with respect to knowledge (i.e. omniscience) knows every true proposition, and believes none that are not true. It is not possible to be more omniscient than that - and note that this intrinsic limit does not depend on there being a finite or quantifiable set of true propositions. If there are any true counterfactuals of freedom, an omniscient being obviously knows them. If there are no true counterfactuals of freedom (i.e. if middle knowledge is impossible), he obviously doesn't - but this doesn't affect whether the being knows every true proposition, and believes none that are not true (i.e. whether he is omniscient). He meets the definition equally well in both cases.

Now, let us posit the nonexistence of middle knowledge. This means that the set of all true propositions does not include some propositions (true counterfactuals of freedom) which it would otherwise include if middle knowledge were a possible phenomenon. To me, this is like subtracting from the potential number of at-bats (and therefore hits) of the Omnibatter. Yet this would have no consequences whatsoever for either the Omnibatter's batting average or his innate ability to hit every time. The specific "omni-quality" of perfection that defines the Omnibatter remains intact. So why would the unavailability of non-existent truths impair God's quality of perfection with respect to knowledge (better known as his omniscience)?
 
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Why? For one thing, a game with an infinite board and infinite tiles is not, by definition, a game of Scrabble, just as a bowling round with unlimited frames would not correspond to the standard definition of a game of bowling.

Let me propose a compromise analogy drawn from baseball: consider a being who possesses the quality of perfection with regard to batting average. We'll call him the Omnibatter. There is no intrinsic limit to the number of at-bats or hits a batter can have - a quality which might make the analogy more palatable for you. But there is an intrinsic limit to batting averages; a batter who is perfect in this respect earns a hit each and every time he appears at bat. The Omnibatter therefore has a batting average of 1.000. (Not 2.000, and not infinity.)

Knowledge, it would also seem, is a quality that has an intrinsic upper limit: a being possessing perfection with respect to knowledge (i.e. omniscience) knows every true proposition, and believes none that are not true. It is not possible to be more omniscient than that - and note that this intrinsic limit does not depend on there being a finite or quantifiable set of true propositions. If there are any true counterfactuals of freedom, an omniscient being obviously knows them. If there are no true counterfactuals of freedom (i.e. if middle knowledge is impossible), he obviously doesn't - but this doesn't affect whether the being knows every true proposition, and believes none that are not true (i.e. whether he is omniscient). He meets the definition equally well in both cases.

Now, let us posit the nonexistence of middle knowledge. This means that the set of all true propositions does not include some propositions (true counterfactuals of freedom) which it would otherwise include if middle knowledge were a possible phenomenon. To me, this is like subtracting from the potential number of at-bats (and therefore hits) of the Omnibatter. Yet this would have no consequences whatsoever for either the Omnibatter's batting average or his innate ability to hit every time. The specific "omni-quality" of perfection that defines the Omnibatter remains intact. So why would the unavailability of non-existent truths impair God's quality of perfection with respect to knowledge (better known as his omniscience)?


OK - somewhere in here I completely lost track of what we were discussing.

Sorry - suffering from a major cold - just hit me this morning, and it's kicking my tail.

OK, forget 'true propositions' and all the psychobabble garbage for a minute - Prior to God creating the Universe, does God know every aspect of that universe, every possible choice that every possible being will ever make, etc? If God does, God is omniscient. If God doesn't, God isn't. If 'middle knowledge' does not exist, then God is not omniscient. "Why, why, why?" you cry, shaking your fists to the Heavens. Because if middle knowledge does NOT exist, then God cannot know the future, God cannot predict the actions of free agents, and God is restricted by Time.

Again, I have to disagree with your analogy, because the two comparisons are not analogous. Here, you refer to a batting average, and the removal of 'hits'... I'm not a baseball geek, so forgive me if I have no idea what all that is about.

But it seems to me, by removing certain knowledge, you are in fact making some balls invisible to this 'omnibatter' - he cannot possibly swing at them, because he cannot see them. So while he can hit every ball he can swing, his average, in fact, would drop significantly because he's missing all the invisible balls. Or perhaps it's like this: maybe the pitcher is going to throw the ball, and maybe the pitcher is going to fake the throw, and maybe the pitcher is going to throw two balls at once. This 'omnibatter' either can hit every ball, or he cannot, and is therefore not 'omni'.

In other words - I can't wrap my head around this example at all, either - I don't see how a choice at a given, fixed point in time relates at all to bowling or batting.

I've given a few analogies of my own, to no avail, apparently... perhaps we are unable to reach a middle ground of comprehension, after all.
 
Here is the flaw in your logic. The "consequent good" is that you have the choice, not that you will make one decision or the other. In other words, it doesn't matter as far as that consequent good whether you choose to help him or not, it will still be for the consequent good because you have been given the choice. At this point, it is NOT for the good that you choose not to help him, and your logic breaks down. One can therefore assume that to try to second-guess that the "consequent good" actually is would not be for the "consequent good" in many cases.

-Bri
That does not work on a number of levels. Suppose there are three bystanders, each with the ability to save the man - they all have the obligation to do so. But there are four bystanders - there is also God. We all four held back and let him die.

Three humans had the moral obligation to help him but the morally perfect bystander has the obligation to allow an innocent man to die an agonising death because helping him would rob the three others of the chance to help.

Well it seems an unlikely scenario, but it is still possible.

But consider that the three bystanders would have the same obligation to help, no matter how well they understood the all the moral implications. So God's different moral obligation does not stem from his greater understanding of the situation, but from his position of authority.

In other words 'benevolent' means one thing when applied to humans and another when applied to a Deity. Or to put it another way God is not omni-benevolent, he is omni-something-else and we have just coincidentally used the same word.
 
Zaayrdragon,

I'll have to get back to you, and I hope you feel better, but in the meantime let me just ask you if you find any specific inadequacy in the definition of omniscience as "the property of knowing all true propositions while believing no false ones"?

ceo_esq
 
Therefore, 'free will' can only exist under idealism or dualism, because if this 'ghost' is a natural cause that we don't understand yet, then it becomes part of the mechanistic process once we do understand it - and 'free will' vanishes.

Nevertheless - it causes human decision to become unpredictable and, therefore, causes any such deity to lose omniscience as a result.

I don't see how dualism prevents human decision from becoming predictable by God. God would certainly have "middle knowledge" of both the materialistic and the ghost in the machine. If God transcends time and space, he can simply observe the past, present, and future at will and can be everywhere at will. He can therefore can observes first-hand the future behavior of the agent (or any other event).

-Bri
 
Zaayrdragon,

I'll have to get back to you, and I hope you feel better, but in the meantime let me just ask you if you find any specific inadequacy in the definition of omniscience as "the property of knowing all true propositions while believing no false ones"?

ceo_esq

Well, for one thing, belief has nothing to do with knowledge. Second, what is the definition of a 'true proposition'? Third: I think that any definition of 'omniscient' also requires knowing outcomes of hypothetical and theoretical propositions, as well.

That definition of yours is the strangest for 'omniscience' I've ever encountered.
 
I don't see how dualism prevents human decision from becoming predictable by God. God would certainly have "middle knowledge" of both the materialistic and the ghost in the machine. If God transcends time and space, he can simply observe the past, present, and future at will and can be everywhere at will. He can therefore can observes first-hand the future behavior of the agent (or any other event).

-Bri

It doesn't - and, once again, if an omniscient God exists, free-will does not.

I merely posit that dualism and idealism are the only possible environments in which free will can exist - and either one, only if an omni Deity does not exist.
 
No offense, but that's ridiculous. We have free will because we "feel" it ? You call that evidence ? I call that a subjective assumption. That's no evidence at all. Your example about getting angry is ludicrous. They might not have any choice but to harm us, but you don't have a choice about getting angry, either. Your anger isn't caused by their choice, per se, but by the effect of their action.

I never said we had free will. I said that the fact that we all feel as though we have free will is evidence that we have free will. If everyone in the world experience the same thing, that is usually pretty good evidence that it exists.

My question isn't whether or not you have a choice about getting angry, it's whether or not you think getting angry is irrational. If the other person had no choice, then your getting angry is completely irrational.

-Bri
 
Oh, no. Your example of a function for God, in this case, is entirely dependent upon another theory that is completely unsupported by evidence. I don't have to lift a finger, here.

Correct, and if you want to prove that this function for God is impossible, you must prove that the existance of human souls are impossible. Of course, you cannot because it might be true.

You see ? You've moved again beyond reasonable doubt to beyond any doubt. I'm certainly not going to entertain you if you keep moving from one side of the fence to the other. We are talking about reasonable doubt, here, and you're constantly placing unreasonable doubt upon everything I say.

What you're not getting is that reasonable doubt of the impossibility of something existing IS absolute doubt. If you want to prove that something is impossible, then you have to prove that there is no circumstance in which it could be possible. If you only want to prove that it is unlikely then you are admitting that it is still possible. You can't have it both ways. If you're admitting that it is possible, then I rest my case because you only asked me to give POSSIBLE functions of God.

If God is useless, it would be a good starting point to argue that he doesn't exist.

One has nothing to do with the other.

Dodge noted, as some would say.

Yes, dodge noted.

We understand the formation of life sufficiently as to NOT attribute it to the action of an extra-cosmic God (directly, anyway.)

Uh, directly or indirectly doesn't matter. We don't know enough about life to say for certain that it is impossible for life to be caused by God. Sorry.

Assume that God IS useless. Then what ?

Then God is useless. I don't see your point at all. He might still exist.

See ? Unreasonable doubt mode.

Unreasonable doubt? You said that it was IMPOSSIBLE. If there's ANY doubt, then it's not IMPOSSIBLE. If you're now saying that it's POSSIBLE then I rest my case. You were simply asking for POSSIBLE functions that God might serve.

Let's skip forward in this line of argument to my final claim and your final question, namely:

- We have a very good idea of how the universe was formed in the first place.

And:

- Prove that God didn't cause the universe.

To which I answer that God isn't necessary to the creation of the universe, and therefore pretty much useless. We're right back where we started: if God IS useless, then what ?

If God created the universe, then he's not useless. He created the universe. Let's see YOU do that!

Second dodge noted. This time, however, I won't let you slip away so easily:

Name at least one piece of evidence that would confirm that God cannot have one of those functions.

I can't. That's my point. God might have any of those functions.

That doesn't make any sense. Please explain how something could be "beyond" logic.

If God created logic, then he wouldn't be limited by it. He might also be able to create other kinds of logic if he chose. Just because we can't imagine other types of logic because we're constrained by the logic of our universe doesn't mean that other types of logic don't or couldn't exist.

-Bri
 
It doesn't - and, once again, if an omniscient God exists, free-will does not.

I merely posit that dualism and idealism are the only possible environments in which free will can exist - and either one, only if an omni Deity does not exist.

Again, I don't see why dualism, free will, and an omniscient God cannot all exist. You already pointed out that dualism is likely required for libertarian free will (what you call "absolute free will"). So, we know that free will and dualism are compatible ideas. Why is free will and an omniscient God imcompatible?

If God isn't constrained by time, he can certainly observe future events exactly as they will occur. Among those events are choices made by free will. As long as God doesn't interfere with those choices, he can know what you will choose.

This sounds similar to a God who is unlimited by logic. Since we cannot rationalize anything that is not constrained by logic, we cannot even begin to speculate about such a God. The same is true of a God who is unlimited by time. Since we are constrained by time and cannot rationalize anything that is not constrained by time, we cannot speculate about a God who is unconstrained by time.

-Bri
 
Again, I don't see why dualism, free will, and an omniscient God cannot all exist. You already pointed out that dualism is likely required for libertarian free will (what you call "absolute free will"). So, we know that free will and dualism are compatible ideas. Why is free will and an omniscient God imcompatible?

If God isn't constrained by time, he can certainly observe future events exactly as they will occur. Among those events are choices made by free will. As long as God doesn't interfere with those choices, he can know what you will choose.

This sounds similar to a God who is unlimited by logic. Since we cannot rationalize anything that is not constrained by logic, we cannot even begin to speculate about such a God. The same is true of a God who is unlimited by time. Since we are constrained by time and cannot rationalize anything that is not constrained by time, we cannot speculate about a God who is unconstrained by time.

-Bri

A god who is unconstrained by time is an even greater indicator that free will does not exist. Certainly - he observes what we call 'future events' exactly as how they occur - because for a timeless God, they are 'current creations' - in other words, a God unconstrained by time IS PRESENTLY MAKING every single moment of creation exactly according to his will.
 
A god who is unconstrained by time is an even greater indicator that free will does not exist. Certainly - he observes what we call 'future events' exactly as how they occur - because for a timeless God, they are 'current creations' - in other words, a God unconstrained by time IS PRESENTLY MAKING every single moment of creation exactly according to his will.

Not necessarily. He could be allowing some or all of his creations to behave according to their own will rather than his. In fact, such a God doesn't have to interact at all with the world.

-Bri
 
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A better explanation is the belief that God is omni-temporal. In other words, since God created time, he is timeless. This meshes well with other explanations that rely on God being "outside" of logic, nature, space, etc. In other words, God is everywhen at once. In this scenario, God simply directly observes John's future as he writes it down.
But that is why I formulated my argument as I did. God may be outside of time and space, but the book in the uncrackable safe is not. The book existed at a specific point of time before John was conceived so if there is the possibility that John can go left when the book says right then the book is wrong, hence God is not omniscient. If the possibility does not exist then John does not have free will.

So if we have free will God might be able to interact with the world or infallibly know the consequences of such interactions but not both at the same time. This might have some consequences for omnibenevolence.
A third explanation is that "omniscience" means "to know all that can be known" and God simply doesn't know that which is caused by free will. He can, of course, force someone to do something and know the future, but cannot know the future where someone does something of their own free will. Even a truly omnipotent/omniscient God may be able to limit his own power in this way in order to provide free will (he still has the power if he chooses, but simply chooses not to use it in order to provide free will). To say that he should be able to do both is a logic paradox and has no meaning.
But this makes God subject to time rather than eternal or outside of time. Again that is possible but it does not tally with what most people understand as God.

The other possibility is that an aspect of God can interact with the universe while God proper sees the whole of time but does not intervene. But again this would mean that God would not be able to intervene while having infallible knowledge of the consequences of such interventions.
To answer the question about John discovering the combination...in all cases God would know that John would discover the combination beforehand since that too would be part of the future (perhaps determined) and could avoid the situation all together by not allowing it, or could make the words on the page perhaps change to match John's current state of mind.
But you are just changing the premise of the argument - I didn't say 'a book on which all John's actions appear as he did them', the argument would have been meaningless if that was the premise.

The book is supposed to list all of John's life in detail and have existed on the day before John was born and never change. So either John will start behaving like an automaton, unable to control himself or the book will be wrong. This will be the case from John's point of view, even if the entire timeline from the day before his birth to the present is changed as he does things.

And to say that God could have chosen not to allow it implies God could have allowed it. Clearly he could not unless John is an automaton.
All of these "dilemmas" could simply be the result of our lack of understanding of the logic of time, as suggested by the Stanford article.
That might still mean that the statement 'The existence of free will may be compatible with the existence of omnipotence" can never be true.

It can be either false or meaningless.
 
But that is why I formulated my argument as I did. God may be outside of time and space, but the book in the uncrackable safe is not. The book existed at a specific point of time before John was conceived so if there is the possibility that John can go left when the book says right then the book is wrong, hence God is not omniscient. If the possibility does not exist then John does not have free will.

Or perhaps a third possibility. Although the book was written in before John was born, God is omni-temporal and can see John's future at the same time he is writing in the book. God actually sees the choice John makes of his own free will.

The only interesting question is what happens if John sees the book before making the choice -- would he be able to change his choice based on the knowledge of what he would have chosen otherwise? This seems like a paradox that we cannot answer, just like the "square circle" one. John could change his choice, but then God would be wrong. But surely God knew that John would see the book and change his choice, and God saw John's actual future choice, so God couldn't be wrong. It is possible that we simply cannot resolve this delimma because our understanding is limited by the fact that we exist in time.

So if we have free will God might be able to interact with the world or infallibly know the consequences of such interactions but not both at the same time. This might have some consequences for omnibenevolence.

It could. Of course, it is possible that God has foreknowledge only of those things that he hasn't predetermined, which would make the definition of omniscience "knowledge of everything that is knowable." It is also possible under this scenario that God CAN know everything IF he chooses to control everything, but he chooses to limit his knowledge in order to allow free will. This would make God no less omniscient or omnipotent -- he simply chooses to limit his ability in order to allow for free will to exist.

But this makes God subject to time rather than eternal or outside of time. Again that is possible but it does not tally with what most people understand as God.

Not necessarily. God can still be outside of time and limit his knowledge.

The other possibility is that an aspect of God can interact with the universe while God proper sees the whole of time but does not intervene. But again this would mean that God would not be able to intervene while having infallible knowledge of the consequences of such interventions.

I'd have to think about this one. I don't know of any notions of God that include this kind of duality.

But you are just changing the premise of the argument - I didn't say 'a book on which all John's actions appear as he did them', the argument would have been meaningless if that was the premise.

You're essentially asking whether an agent having foreknowledge of his own future choice would be able to use that knowledge to change his choice. Perhaps God is simply careful not to allow this to happen (in other word, humans are never allowed foreknowledge of anything, which would seem to mesh nicely with reality). If John never knew his future, he wouldn't be able to change his future choice, and God's observation would always be correct.

The book is supposed to list all of John's life in detail and have existed on the day before John was born and never change. So either John will start behaving like an automaton, unable to control himself or the book will be wrong. This will be the case from John's point of view, even if the entire timeline from the day before his birth to the present is changed as he does things.

Perhaps the very nature of having foreknowledge and free will but being trapped within time necessarily removes your free will. So perhaps John would indeed stop having free will if he knew his own future. That doesn't preclude others from having free will, of course, or preclude free will from existing.

And to say that God could have chosen not to allow it implies God could have allowed it. Clearly he could not unless John is an automaton.

Perhaps God chooses not to allow us to have any foreknowledge specifically so that we can have free will.

That might still mean that the statement 'The existence of free will may be compatible with the existence of omnipotence" can never be true.

It can be either false or meaningless.

No, I still think it can be true. If God never allows this situation to occur (and there's no reason to think that he would have to allow it) then we can have free will and God can still have foreknowledge of our choices.

-Bri
 
Three humans had the moral obligation to help him but the morally perfect bystander has the obligation to allow an innocent man to die an agonising death because helping him would rob the three others of the chance to help.

Yes. Only one of the bystanders has any knowledge of the greater good.

Well it seems an unlikely scenario, but it is still possible.

It seems like the most likely scenario to me, if God exists.

But consider that the three bystanders would have the same obligation to help, no matter how well they understood the all the moral implications.

Yes and no. Since the three bystanders cannot grant free will, they are serving no greater good by not helping, even if they understood the greater good (which they cannot, of course).

So God's different moral obligation does not stem from his greater understanding of the situation, but from his position of authority.

No, it stems from his greater power to actually cause the greater good to occur. Even if the people in this scenario knew the greater good, they cannot grant free will or the opportunity to exercise it to other humans. No greater good is accomplished by their failure to act to help the man.

In other words 'benevolent' means one thing when applied to humans and another when applied to a Deity. Or to put it another way God is not omni-benevolent, he is omni-something-else and we have just coincidentally used the same word.

No, benevolent means one thing and omni-benevolent means another. Humans might be benevolent, but only God can be omni-benevolent.

-Bri
 
Or perhaps a third possibility. Although the book was written in before John was born, God is omni-temporal and can see John's future at the same time he is writing in the book. God actually sees the choice John makes of his own free will.
But it does not matter that God is omni-temporal.

John is approaching a fork in the road
A book exists at this time that says he will go left
There is nothing whatsoever preventing him from going right.
John has free will
Is John able to go right?
 
But it does not matter that God is omni-temporal.

John is approaching a fork in the road
A book exists at this time that says he will go left
There is nothing whatsoever preventing him from going right.
John has free will
Is John able to go right?

Of course he has the freedom to go right since he has free will, but he won't. How do I know? Because God actually observed John choosing to go left when he wrote the book. The only thing that can affect this is if John actually sees the book before making the choice and therefore has foreknowledge of his own future. If this were to happen, perhaps John would lose his free will, but God could ensure that humans never possess foreknowledge if he wants us to have free will.

-Bri
 
But it does not matter that God is omni-temporal.

John is approaching a fork in the road
A book exists at this time that says he will go left
There is nothing whatsoever preventing him from going right.
John has free will
Is John able to go right?

Yes, because we all know not every book can be trusted. :D

Sorry...
 
Yes. Only one of the bystanders has any knowledge of the greater good.
But if the greater good consisted, as you said, of allowing us the opportunity to help, then yes, they are capable of understanding that.
Yes and no. Since the three bystanders cannot grant free will, they are serving no greater good by not helping, even if they understood the greater good (which they cannot, of course).
Did we not have free will until this man's asthmatic attack started? Did the asthmatic attack spark off our free will?
No, it stems from his greater power to actually cause the greater good to occur. Even if the people in this scenario knew the greater good, they cannot grant free will or the opportunity to exercise it to other humans. No greater good is accomplished by their failure to act to help the man.
But God had already granted free will and cannot grant it all over again (unless he first takes it away). So what greater good is being accomplished by God not helping this man? God's not helping this man does not give me any more free will than I had before and so is of no greater value than my allowing the next man the same opportunity.
No, benevolent means one thing and omni-benevolent means another. Humans might be benevolent, but only God can be omni-benevolent.
But does the 'benevolence' part of omni-benevolence refer to our meaning of benevolence, or does it have a separate meaning?
 
Of course he has the freedom to go right since he has free will, but he won't. How do I know? Because God actually observed John choosing to go left when he wrote the book. The only thing that can affect this is if John actually sees the book before making the choice and therefore has foreknowledge of his own future. If this were to happen, perhaps John would lose his free will, but God could ensure that humans never possess foreknowledge if he wants us to have free will.

-Bri
OK, put it this way:

John is approaching a fork in the road
A book exists at this time that says he will go left
There is nothing whatsoever preventing him from going right.
John has free will
Does the possibility exist that John will go right?
 

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