Someone called Ben Pierce, who works at the NHS as Head of Data Analytics and Partnerships has reviewed Chan and Ridley's book Viral.
He's not very impressed (This is from a Twitter thread):
Gee, not a virologist, oh my.
Last weekend, I found a copy of the book “Viral” in the library. Screenshots and references to this book are often included in some nasty replies to some of my threads on #COVIDOrigins. ...
I'm sure "nasty replies" go both ways.
A premise of the book regards how well-adapted SARS2 was to humans from Dec 2019, and how this is suspicious of lab origins. Their argument is based on how many more mutations were seen in SARS1 (certainly zoonotic) than SARS2 early samples.
There are genome analyses that support both origin hypotheses.
I have said it before, I'll say it again, genetic variables aside I watched SARS1 unfold from the first alerts we got via the ISID alert system to those last cases including the subsequent lab leaks.
The alert came via
https://promedmail.org/ that a pneumonia of unknown etiology was circulating in Guangdong, China, it was infecting the healthcare workers, and it was significantly lethal. Links to the news feed are up thread.
Alerts about unknown pathogens (sometimes it turns out to be poison) occur all the time on the ProMed newsfeed. Most of the time nothing of concern comes of these alerts except various strains of influenza that need watching.
But this was a big ******* deal. Healthcare workers were dying from an infection they were getting from patients in the hospital. And first responders were also becoming infected. My job was to develop policies and do training for police and fire departments I worked for.
The point being, genetics aside,
SARS1 emergence was nothing like SARS2. Mild cases spreading SARS2 does not account for the differences. SARS1 was clearly a spillover event. There was no debate, no question except which intermediate species was being sold in the market that was spreading it. And there were genetically related cases circulating in civet cats.
My first-hand experience is one reason I don't see the spillover evidence as you see it. SARS1 made its way to Canada and then the US. And in Canada one first responder who got infected died and spread it to a family member who also died.
This is described in this preprint (biorxiv.org/content/10.110…), co-authored by one of the book’s authors (though not peer reviewed).

What is very interesting is to read multiple papers that directly counter this claim… 4/23
Then Pierce cites two papers which undermines Chan and Ridley's claim about SARS1:
Two papers in particular (pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/16140765/; pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pn…) show that the diversity from early SARS1 human samples should be analysed alongside sample diversity in palm civets and rdogs.
Does this guy know unlike with SARS1 there currently are no palm civets or raccoon dogs with circulating SARS-like CoVs one could "sample"?
The rate of SARS1 mutation did not accelerate in humans – it had been occurring in animals for a long time prior, and the rate of mutation in civets was comparable to that seen in humans, whilst more virulent strains arose in civets alone. 6/23
Therefore, the book’s claim that “there were dozens of mutations between animal strains and human strains” for SARS1 is just like the different variants of SARS2 amongst humans around the world: mutations happen at speed in disparate populations. 7/23
I don't think this person is correct here about SARS1, seems more of the fitting the evidence to the conclusion.
I'll look up the earliest genome analyses of SARS1 in animals and humans and make a new post.
We also now know about mutations that arose in SARS2 from human spread: D614G in particular arose due to the low stability of the spike glycoprotein (science.org/doi/10.1126/sc…). 8/23
If SARS2 was well adapted particularly for humans by Dec 2019, such a mutation really wouldn’t be needed in 2020. Also, SARS2 spread to numerous other species: it's not human-specific. 9/23
Also, they are coy about the testing in the animal market...
"Coy"?
How coy is it for this book reviewer to make the straw man assumption that well adapted to human spread means perfectly adapted?
Seems to me, not a virologist speculating just a well informed observation, that adapting SARS2 spike protein via serial passages wouldn't result in a perfectly adapted variant. Not to mention if this virus escaped the lab it may not have been a perfectly polished version yet still be highly adapted to human spread.
How coy are the spillover proponents being about the significance of finding SARS2 in the same stall raccoon dogs were sold in? Because further assessments have concluded there was so little COVID RNA it was evidence the contamination came from people, not from the raccoon dogs.
And as I have noted already, regardless no animals in the market were tested, you would still expect to find at least some remnants of SARS2 in a source animal somewhere by now.
You can call it a wash, the right animals haven't been tested. I call it no evidence where one would expect to find evidence.
Back to the book: Page 3 includes a description of Alina highlighting to Matt about how no animals tested positive at the Market. As we all know by now, 0 LIVE animals were tested at the market (nature.com/articles/s4158…).
Much later in the book, sampling from carcasses of some animal species from the market is finally mentioned, though the non-susceptibility of those animals is not. 11/23
So I suppose he is saying the book is dishonestly written, and that Chan and Ridley know full well that the sampling in the market was inadequate and unlikely to find infected animals.
This is also rather a dishonest way of framing things, First dangling the possibility of a virus that could have become SARS-CoV2, then quietly offering the disclaimer that it couldn't...
Not sure what to make of this speculation. I think "dishonestly written" identifies confirmation bias but at this point, who cares?
I no longer have the book, I returned it to the library. So I can't address these comments without checking what was said after these parts in the book. Not sure it's worth getting the book again. I'll look for the testimony before the English Parliament that is online.
Much of the book focuses on the “insight” that RatG13, isolated from the Mojiang Cave in 2013, is similar to SARS2 (98.7% similarity /in their RdRp). This is presented to raise suspicion in the reader. What isn’t explained enough is how different their full genomes are. 12/23
The RaTG13 relationship to SARS2 theory first pops up on page 22, but the reader is required read on until page 315 (in the Epilogue, actually: 293 pages later), when finally clarified: “RaTG13 could not have transformed to SARS-CoV-2 and caused the COVID-19 pandemic.”
Then...
But wait! 8 other “secret” viruses were published “far too late”: there’s a whole chapter on this – but first mentioned early on (page 31), again to raise suspicion: “the WIV did not disclose more information about these other eight viruses”. 15/23
207 pages later, the reader (finally) finds the admission that these 8 genomes are more distant to SARS2 than even RaTG13 (or RmYN02). They’re published in this paper: tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.10…
We don't have the early genomes that were not put back online nor do we know if Shi or someone else has more closely related SARS1 specimens. IIRC, that published paper was done before the pandemic began.
It wasn't a paper describing their success at the WIV in creating a PPP which was Daszak's goal so he could then develop a vaccine ahead of the next spillover event. There were at least 3 reasons Shi and Daszak would have been keeping some of their research close to the vest.
Competition creating a vaccine
Competition for scientific accolades
Keeping US grant money coming when it was dodgy to be doing GoF research