My impression from Wowbagger's OP was that his intention was not to engage in a normative argument about which value cluster was 'right' - but rather, an attempt to explain why the population is clustered. I think the hope is that understanding the underlying nature of the clustering could lead to a strategy to curtail the polarization.
For me, it's important input for my model of a Skeptical Outreach program.
I think that may be missing the point... The problem may be that we're assuming people are translating their values into policy comparisons. I think the research is showing us that voting may not be very policy-oriented. That we are choosing candidates based on how they make us 'feel' they will fulfill our value goals.
Case in point... we constantly see surveys that show how point by point, Americans want every feature of a universal healthcare program. It's Americans' preferred policy. But they constantly vote against these initiatives. It's not Americans' preferred values.
I would agree there are rationalizations involved in political choices. That is not controversial. Yet, from the OP:
Both liberals and conservatives can learn something important from each other's moral values.
I do not think Moral Foundations Theory is actually a reliable depiction of values, and makes appeals to innate tendencies that are not derived at the level needed. My basic objection is that MFT does not sound like cognitive science or neuroscience to me, especially in terms of suggesting quite high level concepts that are not granular enough to make the derivation plausible. To take two critiques from other sources:
Cognitive Neuroscience. "First, innateness and modularity figure centrally in Haidt's account, but terminological and conceptual problems foster confusion and ambiguities. Second, both the theory's proposed number of moral foundations and its taxonomy of the moral domain appear contrived, ignoring equally good candidate foundations and the possibility of substantial intergroup differences in the foundations' contents. Third, the mechanisms (viz., modules) and categorical distinctions (viz., between foundations) proposed by the theory are
not consilient with discoveries in contemporary neuroscience concerning the organization, functioning, and development of the brain. In light of these difficulties, we suggest that Haidt's theory is inadequate as a scientific account of morality."
American Journal of Political Science. "MFT posits that political attitudes are rooted in instinctual evaluations generated by innate psychological modules evolved to solve social dilemmas. If this is correct, moral foundations must be relatively stable dispositional traits, changes in moral foundations should systematically predict consequent changes in political orientations, and, at least in part, moral foundations must be heritable.
We test these hypotheses and find substantial variability in individual-level moral foundations across time, and little evidence that these changes account for changes in political attitudes. We also find little evidence that moral foundations are heritable. These findings raise questions about the future of MFT as a theory of ideology.
Emphases mine. For a theory that relies on innateness, heritability should trump environment, and values should be fairly stable.
From the MFT page: "Moral Foundations Theory was created by a group of social and cultural psychologists (see us here) to understand why morality varies so much across cultures yet still shows so many similarities and recurrent themes.
In brief, the theory proposes that several innate and universally available psychological systems are the foundations of “intuitive ethics.” Each culture then constructs virtues, narratives, and institutions on top of these foundations, thereby creating the unique moralities we see around the world, and conflicting within nations too."
MFT starts out at
very high level in neurological terms. It further suggests that cultures provide the specifics to moral universals, much as a single grammar might be the local variant of a universal grammar. This claim requires datasets that are not something researchers posit at the outset, but which are truly independent. Finally, if there are moral universals that are not fully expressed or even present in a great many individuals, and heritability is a problem, the innateness theory falls apart entirely.
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Voting may very well be based more on deeper narratives that are subscribed to, and be the result of rationalization more than reason. However indirectly it may be stated, MFT contains an unfortunate backdoor suggestion that liberals have a truncated value set. If we are concerned about rationalizations, this should be the first thing to set off alarms.