Why is PETA so bloody dam stupid....

In a nod to GreNME let me clear up some confusion. I'm not sure if I'm the source of it or not. My point is and has been that humans have evolved adaptive behaviors. I don't believe I used the word "instincts" but if I did then I will retract that for this discussion. I believe that "instinct" is anachronistic from an anthropological POV.

It could be. Kevin has already twice (at least) tried to twist things into things I wasn't saying. But yes, evolved adapted behaviors we definitely do have.

In any event, Kevin, you are being disengenious to, on the one hand say that natural "instincts" play no role, and then claim that Dawkins, Wright, Pinker and Wilson's arguments for sociobiology and moral adaptive behavior are beside the point.

That's downright dishonest or willful cognitive compartmentalizing.

Beside the point isn't an argument. It's an assertion.

And a faulty assertion, at that.
 
- PETA Spokesman Bruce Friedrich

Question for discussion: If every fast food restaurant, medical laboratory, and financial institution were to explode, what would be the death toll*?





*People, not animals. Animals aren't people
You know here is an interesting question that can keep this topic going on for another 10 pages. Why do you never hear about these types of whackjobs on the eastern coast of the United States? The people who primarily do the stuff that this guy quoted is in the western United States. Its probably an argument from ignorance on my part.
 
You know here is an interesting question that can keep this topic going on for another 10 pages. Why do you never hear about these types of whackjobs on the eastern coast of the United States? The people who primarily do the stuff that this guy quoted is in the western United States. Its probably an argument from ignorance on my part.

The problem there is that both PETA and the HSUS headquarters are on the East Coast.
 
Big difference depending on what time of day it happened. I'm not sure why it matters... take the lowest estimate, divide it by 10, and the guy's still advocating mass murder.

Well.. let's think about it. Let's say we leave out the medical labs and the fast food restaurants and focus on the financial institutions that lend or store their money. Instead of all of them, let's focus on a handful of the big ones. Let us again assume that our hypothetical PETA-approved terrorist is going to hit just a couple buildings containing some of the biggest financial institutions situated in a major financial center. We know that the weapon of choice for PETA agents is the molotov cocktail, but just a bottle with a cup of gasoline isn't going to do it, so we need to scale it up a little... like say 140,000 pounds?

Based on these rough estimates, I would guess PETAs attack would result in some 2,800 human casualties.

Including 343 firefighters, 37 police officers and ironically... one or more bomb-sniffing dogs.

This is what PETAs agenda looks like:
91104.jpg

...all to save a few lab rats, or some bacon.
 
No. I'm simply familiar with the facts. What's bizarre is that you could be presented with so much evidence that adaptive behavior is relevant to morality and you could simply dismiss it as beside the point.

You have shown no such evidence, because no such evidence can exist. You can't get from an is to an ought, without an additional "ought" assumption of some kind. "We ought to do what we are naturally inclined to do" is the "ought" claim you need to make adaptive behaviour relevant, and it's demonstrably false, so you're stuck.

I can't say that "reason" is the only source of moral guidance because it is demonstrably untrue. Should it be? That's the distinction that you DON'T get.

You are going to ignore this like you do everything else but I'm going to repeat it and put the salient point in red to demonstrate your rank willfulness to ignore my point.

I can't say that "reason" is the only source of moral guidance because it is demonstrably untrue. The question is Should it be? That's the distinction that you DON'T get.

What other candidate do you have? You've already admitted that reason trumps inbuilt behavioural tendencies even for you, so what's left? Other than the Bible or tossing a coin?

Reason has the benefit of consistency and coherency at the very least, which puts it above the Bible, the coin-toss and mindless instinctive behaviour.

Nice tactic. Hear no evil see no evil. What you ignore won't hurt you.

No, Kevin, it's demonstrably NOT beside the point. Asserting that something is so doesn't make it true. And, here's an idea, if it is beside the point perhaps you could explain why it is beside the point?

Why is anything beside the point? Because it has no relevance. Because the premise does not lead to the conclusion.

RandFan: Adaptive behavior has something to do with morality.
Kevin: Your claim is wrong.
Dawkins: Adaptive behavior has something to do with morality.
Wilson: Adaptive behavior has something to do with morality.
Wright: Adaptive behavior has something to do with morality.
Pinker: Adaptive behavior has something to do with morality.
Kevin: These claims are beside the point.
RandFan: :rolleyes:
RandFan: Are you just on autopilot now?

What's disingenuous is posting the same nonsense over and over and over again, and then expecting novel answers.

Adaptive behaviour is not a source of information about what is morally right. That's the problem.

You can post a ****ing encyclopaedia entry about adaptive human behaviour into this thread every day for the next hundred years and the answer you will get is not going to change on any of those days. Adaptive behaviour will still not be a source of information about what is morally right, no matter how much guff you bloat this thread with about it.

Asked and answered. They are the reason we are here. Since they are and they DO drive our behavior we ought to understand them and why they helped us survive.

What's that got to do with morality? Assuming they do drive our behaviour, there's no reason to think that they drive our behaviour in moral ways. In fact, we know that sometimes they do and sometimes they don't.

Knowing about them might be empirically useful in figuring out how to get humans to behave in ways that reason tells us are moral, sure, but that's utterly different.

Now you are projecting.

The fatal flaw of your thinking (not that it's wrong per se but that it applies to what I've been saying).

I'm not appealing to nature and emotion to JUSTIFY behavior. I'm making a point that nature and emotions are explanations for our behavior.

Again, I know you will ignore this so I want to repeat it.

I'm not appealing to nature and emotion to JUSTIFY behavior. I'm making a point that nature and emotions are explanations for our behavior.

What the **** does that have to do with what is actually morally right or morally wrong?

In a nod to GreNME let me clear up some confusion. I'm not sure if I'm the source of it or not. My point is and has been that humans have evolved adaptive behaviors. I don't believe I used the word "instincts" but if I did then I will retract that for this discussion. I believe that "instinct" is anachronistic from an anthropological POV.

In any event, Kevin, you are being disengenious to, on the one hand say that natural "instincts" play no role, and then claim that Dawkins, Wright, Pinker and Wilson's arguments for sociobiology and moral adaptive behavior are beside the point.

That's downright dishonest or willful cognitive compartmentalizing.

Beside the point isn't an argument. It's an assertion.

I can't extract any intelligent argument from this passage so I'm going to have to ask you to try again to convey whatever it is you mean.

It seems perfectly consistent to me to maintain that all information about adaptive behaviour is irrelevant to the question of what is actually morally right or wrong.

You can flood the thread with more name-dropping and links to videos, but frankly I think your attempt to appropriate good science to prop up an inane philosophical claim is, if anything, offensive to the good scientists whose names you are dropping and whose work you are misusing.
 
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"A ruler should not listen to those who believe in people having opinions of their own and in the importance of the individual. Such teachings cause men to withdraw to quiet places and hide away in caves or in mountains, there to rail at the prevailing government, sneer at those in authority, belittle the importance of rank and emoluments, and despise all who hold official posts."

This quote in your sig is ironically amusing given your apparent attitude towards whose who have a different "morality" than you.
 
It's also a good thing that they don't try to save animals from cruelty from other animals.


Courtesy of Futurama:

"Animals eat other animals. It's nature."
"No it's not. We taught a lion to eat tofu."
*Lion coughs sickly*
 
You have shown no such evidence, because no such evidence can exist.
Thank you.

You can't get from an is to an ought, without an additional "ought" assumption of some kind. "We ought to do what we are naturally inclined to do" is the "ought" claim you need to make adaptive behaviour relevant, and it's demonstrably false, so you're stuck.
Oh, right. Dawkins, Wright, et al are just wrong.

You ought to let them know.

You can post a ****ing encyclopaedia entry about adaptive human behaviour into this thread every day for the next hundred years and the answer you will get is not going to change on any of those days.
Because you are like any dogmatic believer.


What's that got to do with morality? Assuming they do drive our behaviour, there's no reason to think that they drive our behaviour in moral ways. In fact, we know that sometimes they do and sometimes they don't.
  • You've got a contradiction in there.
  • You beg the question.
  • I never said that they necassarily "drive" our behaviour in good ways.
What the **** does that have to do with what is actually morally right or morally wrong?
There is no such thing as "acuatlly" moral.

You can flood the thread with more name-dropping and links to videos, but frankly I think your attempt to appropriate good science to prop up an inane philosophical claim is, if anything, offensive to the good scientists whose names you are dropping and whose work you are misusing.
? What philosophical claim? By your own words you admit that my claims is simply "something to do with morality".

RandFan: Darwinian evolution has something to do with morality.
Kevin: No it doesn't.
Dawkins et al: We can understand evolution through Darwinian evolution.

:rolleyes:

You are not being honest.

I've told you over and over that I'm not trying to derive an is from an ought. I'm trying to explain that morality isn't as divorced from our nature as you would suppose. It's demonstrable that Dawkins and others clearly believe that adaptive behavior can explain our sense of morality. Hell, Dawkins comes out and says it plainly and directly but you just stick your fingers in your ears and accuse me of missusing him when in fact I don't claim anything Dawkins doesn't claim.

If I did, you could state what it is. Hell, you could quote me and I would be unable to justify the quote with anything Dawkins has said.

How can I misuse them when they clearly state what I'm saying they state?
 
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Great post. :)

BTW, did you watch the Dawkins video I linked to?
Tried to, but youtube is blocked in China these days. As a big fan of both Dawkins and Pinker, my inability to open it is annoying to say the least.

As I told Kevin, I can't categoricly state that there is no connection. There is simply too much evidence that there is a link.

We know that we behave, to some degree, according to adaptive behaviors given us by evolution. That's no longer in question.
Agree, that's no longer in question. As to the link, yes, there's a link between our evolved nature and our morality: as you said, our moral instincts are evolved. I just think that those instincts are wrong, just like our evolved understanding of physics is wrong. I also think that, just as our intuitive physics manages to be correct about some things, our evolved moral instincts are also not too poor within a certain class of circumstances.

But that doesn't mean that because we evolved an instinct to, for instance, find incest disgusting, that incest is wrong. In particular, in situations and environments that are substantially different from those in which we evolved, our moral instincts become less and less useful.

But this is a side-point, as "useful" and "right" are no more synonyms than "natural" and "right".

The question becomes, how "ought" we behave given what we know about our nature and the consequences of that nature?
That is a very good question. At present I still lack the understanding to give a good general answer, though I think I have some idea of how to approach specific cases.

One of the reasons that I say this is that while I suggest that "suffering is bad" is a good moral principle, it's not the only one that I am influenced by. I think things like honesty, justice, etc. are also, in general, good. But I find it difficult to explain that from first principles and am perhaps only being influenced by that evolved nature that I was in some ways disparaging a moment ago.

I'm willing to bet we can find some agreement.
I think so too.
 
There is no such thing as "acuatlly" moral.
RandFan, I think that this here is the basic point of disagreement. I, personally, believe that there is an objective morality*. That is, a particular action, done at a particular time in particular circumstances, is either good or bad (or something in between). And if two people disagree about the morality of that particular act, one of them is wrong.

*I think that I can back that belief up to a certain degree, though not perfectly, yet.
 
RandFan, I think that this here is the basic point of disagreement. I, personally, believe that there is an objective morality*. That is, a particular action, done at a particular time in particular circumstances, is either good or bad (or something in between). And if two people disagree about the morality of that particular act, one of them is wrong.

*I think that I can back that belief up to a certain degree, though not perfectly, yet.
  • I actually agree with this to some extent (it depends on the premises however)
  • To do so however you must rely on a number of assumption that are not a priori.
  • Otherwise What a priori yardstick would you use?
Let me ask you a hypothetical.
  1. Many birds species evolved so that one sibling often kills the other.
  2. Ornithologists have determined that it is because there is not enough time given gestation for a number of species to have a second offspring should the first one die in the crucial time after birth. So, an ESS is to have two eggs and if both survive one kills the other because the parents are not likely to gather enough food to assure the survival of both (that's pretty close as I remember anyway).
  3. What if humans had evolved like these birds so that one sibling was required to kill the other for the survival of the species?
  4. Would that be moral?
Whats interesting about this hypo is that it gets at the very evolved sense of morality that we do have. The one that Kevin denies exists (or it exists and he claims is relevant).
 
Tried to, but youtube is blocked in China these days. As a big fan of both Dawkins and Pinker, my inability to open it is annoying to say the least.

Agree, that's no longer in question. As to the link, yes, there's a link between our evolved nature and our morality: as you said, our moral instincts are evolved. I just think that those instincts are wrong, just like our evolved understanding of physics is wrong. I also think that, just as our intuitive physics manages to be correct about some things, our evolved moral instincts are also not too poor within a certain class of circumstances.

But that doesn't mean that because we evolved an instinct to, for instance, find incest disgusting, that incest is wrong. In particular, in situations and environments that are substantially different from those in which we evolved, our moral instincts become less and less useful.

But this is a side-point, as "useful" and "right" are no more synonyms than "natural" and "right".

That is a very good question. At present I still lack the understanding to give a good general answer, though I think I have some idea of how to approach specific cases.

One of the reasons that I say this is that while I suggest that "suffering is bad" is a good moral principle, it's not the only one that I am influenced by. I think things like honesty, justice, etc. are also, in general, good. But I find it difficult to explain that from first principles and am perhaps only being influenced by that evolved nature that I was in some ways disparaging a moment ago.

I think so too.
I'm sorry you are unable to view the videos.

There's a video where Dawkins interviews Peter Singer on his site. It's also a great one. I was going to post that one for Kevin since I'm reasonably sure he is a fan of Singer's. But I don't think any amount of links or evidence will sway him.

Of course I think he and I are, to some extent, talking past eachother. I should note that Dawkins makes quite clear the is/ought fallacy.
 
That's really not quite what he's (she's?) arguing. What's being proposed is to use the model of legal and moral status we attribute to the mentally handicapped for a framework of moral status given to animals. While I've explained why I don't think that works above, it was proposed in a reasonable enough and non-hostile fashion that it deserves better than to have it shifted into snide hyperbole.

...so "legally and morally," the retarded will be equal to animals... Snide, yes. Hyperbole, no.
 
an·thro·po·mor·phism
noun.
Attribution of human motivation, characteristics, or behavior to inanimate objects, animals, or natural phenomena.

Animals have no morals. That is a human characteristic that vegans and PETA people attribute to them to make the morality argument.

Comparing carnivores to murderers and rapists, farmers to slave owners, and animals to the mentally handicapped is absolutely ridiculous. :boggled:
 
Oh, get off this "caution" BS of yours, you have no authority here but the assumed self-righteous authority you continually claim arbitrarily.

The difference is two-fold, in its most basic make-up. First, the utilitarian approach described ignores any significance to the social and communal benefits of distinction between 'like' and 'not like', or more specifically the difference between a fundamentalist, unchanging approach and a heuristic, nuanced approach. For RandFan's statement, the difference is between 'family' and 'stranger', and while the utilitarian would make no differentiation between the two a more heuristic approach would acknowledge the difference in value, both philosophically and naturally. This particularly applies to the difference between the Animal Rights and Animal Welfare groups because the former ignores distinctions between different animals to make its case while the latter recognizes the distinctions in social, communal, and natural terms.

Essentially, the difference is one of a choice between a fundamentalist and a heuristic approach to things.

Utilitarianism is an empirical philosophy and possesses mechanisms to generate all sorts of heuristics (e.g., work within the law). Indeed, one argument against utilitarianism is that it can be used to support almost any course of action, which is precisely why it's silly to say the utilitarian answer. There are two-tiered approaches. However, no specific moral doctrine is necessary when it comes to justifying restrictions on human use of animals. You have some Kantian advocating animal rights, and others (indeed, utilitarians are not so big on rights at all except as useful construct).

More interestingly your "explanation" for how "It also displays a fundamental rift between the Animal Rights groups and those who advocate Animal Welfare" is strained at best. You're basically speaking nonsense, which is why I advised caution, though perhaps I should have counseled you to withdraw your comment entirely.

This particularly applies to the difference between the Animal Rights and Animal Welfare groups because the former ignores distinctions between different animals to make its case while the latter recognizes the distinctions in social, communal, and natural terms.

You're just double-dipping in teh crazy sauce. Rather than ignoring them, animal rights philosophers confront (alleged) significant distinctions head-on. And you also still do not seem to understand what moral absolutism means.

-----------------
thaiboxerken:
Well that convinces me. I guess it's time to fight for animal suffrage. :rolleyes:

Perhaps you should sue all of your school teachers because no one in that thread advocates voting rights for animals (see for instance post #556).
-----------------
Painter:
Good for them. I can distinguish the difference between life forms too. So what. Is a mammal worth more than a carrot? worth more than a bacteria??? Without bacteria, mankind would not exist. We could not digest food without them. Hell billions of years ago they put oxygen into the atmosphere so we could breathe. Yes, Life is life. Each form serves it's own purpose. It is all intertwined.

This is still more equivocation. Is bacteria "worth more" than John Q. Smith because "without bacteria, mankind [sic] would not exist." And presumably humankind includes John Q. Smith.

Ideas about the morality of food are absurd. You chose to eat vegan, fine. You chose to eat vegetarian, fine You chose to eat meat, fine. BFD it doesn't matter. Will the world blossom into a beautiful Utopia if we don't kill our food? No it won't.

Who is saying that it will become Utopian? And besides, if we go back to the spirit of your first post -- the one setting off this exchange -- we know vegetarians/vegans do all sorts killing: we're killing plants.

PS My original comment was about pets, not food. Pay attention.

More self-parody from you. This is another instance of the equivocation fallacy.
 
Thank you.

Oh, right. Dawkins, Wright, et al are just wrong.

You ought to let them know.

Because you are like any dogmatic believer.

Yes, I'm a dogmatic believer in the fact that fallacies are fallacies, no matter how often you repeat them. In fact, I'm a complete fundamentalist about the matter, much as I'm a fundamentalist about 2+2 being 4. There's no scope for "nuance", they're just fallacies.

It looks to me like the fundamental problem is that you keep sliding back and forth between talking about "morality" in a strictly sociological sense, where "morality" is just whatever people think is moral (if you make any attempt to apply this it becomes moral relativism of some form), and talking about objectivist morality, where there are moral rules which apply to all people in relevantly similar circumstances regardless of what they think about the matter.

I'm talking purely about objectivist morality, obviously.

Now I don't think you even realise you are doing this sliding, because you haven't got a clear definition of "morality" in your head.

So you come out with these claims like "we can learn about morality by studying our adaptive behaviours, Dawkins says so!", or "there is no actual morality", which make not an iota of sense unless you're talking purely about morality as a sociological subject.

The problem, as I explained to you earlier, is that this sociological morality isn't morality in any useful sense. You seem to half-grasp this, because you're aware that societies and instincts can endorse genocide, rape and murder, and you want to appeal to reason to trump them when they do that. So you've got half a foot in the objectivist camp, or possibly you stick half a foot in there just to get out of that one argument and then slide your foot back into the moral relativist camp as soon as you think it's safe.

This sliding around seems to be preventing you from grasping these two points, however:

1. Relativism, egoism and other non-objectivist moral theories are self-defeating and hence incompatible with reason. If you're trying to use reason to get these theories out of trouble, you're already being inconsistent and hence objectively wrong.

2. Adaptive or customary behaviours are utterly irrelevant to the question of what is a consistent/useful/correct objectivist moral view on any given subject. Trying to drag any data from adaptive or customary behaviours into a discussion of objectivist morality is automatically an instance of the naturalistic fallacy and hence a waste of everyone's time.
 

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