Kevin_Lowe
Unregistered
- Joined
- Feb 10, 2003
- Messages
- 12,221
Please note bolded text.
Come on Kevin, that's a bit disengenous.
Something to do with what is moral is not the equivelant of X is natural therefore it is moral.
Okay, I think I'm about done banging my head on this particular brick wall.
You're gripped by this conviction that instincts are in some way relevant to morality. You don't have any argument for why this should be except that you can't conceive of anything different, nor do you have any response whatsoever to the real elephant in the room: the fact that many of our instincts are counterproductive, selfish, stupid or evil.
Validity means a logically valid argument
In that case, yes, that too is necessary (but not sufficient). If your argument relies on fallacies to get off the ground it's a bad argument and it too goes out with window without any further discussion.
I'm not trying to appeal to emotion. I'm trying to get you to see the role emotions play in morality. Without feelings or emotion there is no morality.
Nope. That's just your assertion.
Ok, fine, make a compelling moral argument stripped of any and all emotion. BTW, "suffering" involves emotions so don't use that term. And don't use the term "care". Caring is an emotion.
Golden rule? What does that mean? I want to be treated with kindness, dignity and respect. I don't want anyone to cause me unnecassary suffering. All these things are emotions. I don't think the golden rule is going to work here.
Since when are these emotions? Now it looks like you're trying to redefine "emotions" incredibly broadly so as to make your original dumb claim into a tautology. Your argument was that moral instincts are important, but now you seem bent on moving and stretching those goalposts.
You're also engaging in a significant bit of sleight of hand by trying to reframe suffering as an instinctive moral intuition, probably because you have some fuzzy awareness that utilitarian moral philosophy exists and you think you're trying to head me off from bringing it up.
The problem is, in utilitarian moral philosophy everyone's suffering counts as morally bad regardless of how any individual feels about it. Utilitarianism doesn't start from the premise that suffering is wrong because your mirror neurons make you feel bad when you perceive others suffering, or anything resembling that kind of appeal to the naturalistic fallacy. It starts from the premise that suffering is undesirable and should be minimised everywhere and at all times, and that happiness (or preference satisfaction, or welfare, or whatever) should be maximised in the same way. If you happen to feel good when someone's suffering is relieved that's just a bonus bit of utility.
You don't need to wrap yourself in a flag, jump on a soapbox and give an Oscar-hound speech to get to the basic premise that suffering is bad, you just have to observe that you personally prefer to avoid it and that other living creatures count morally too and are overwhelmingly likely to share that preference.
Well, go ahead. Give it to us.
I NEVER said emotions, in and of themselves were!
This is somewhat disengenous of you Kevin as I have taken pains to note that feelings alone are not reliable guids.
Yet you keep trying to drag them back in as both necessary and semi-reliable, which is why I have to keep calling you on it in post after post. Your feelings about what is moral are neither necessary nor semi-reliable, they are irrelevant.
Your feelings in general (as opposed to your feelings about what is moral, and damn right I'm going to keep that distinction clear if you try to blur it some more) are relevant from a utilitarian perspective only as one, non-determinative factor in the overall utilitarian calculation.
