I guess I'd have to say yes, a being that has no moral responsibility is still entitled to a moral person-hood. A lack of moral responsibility doesn't justify someone who is capable of moral judgement treating that being immorally. This is why severely mentally retarded or insane persons still maintain moral rights.
Well, that's where the idea gets into some bumpy territory. However, that was a better answer than has been previously given (particularly in the older thread), and I do admit jumping directly to this point to save some rhetorical time.
The main contention I'd have is that not all non-human animals are mentally disabled or insane, and if we were to only apply moral person-hood on the basis of cognitive function (or sentience), then that leaves open the ability to deny certain people the same level of person-hood as others depending on their ability to recognize some semblance of self or to function at an acceptable cognitive function-- this goes more into play when dealing with less 'Western' cultures where the value of 'self' versus the value of 'family' or 'my people' is somewhat different than our own. I know it sounds a bit like a slippery slope in my describing it, but keep in mind that we attributed moral value like that not much greater than 150 years ago. In the end, it's no more or less arbitrary than 'human' and 'not human', it's simply using different criteria. On top of that, it still does not designate moral value on sapience
as well as sentience, because if it did we'd come right back around to it only applying to humans anyway (as far as we know, though cases could be made for limited sapience in some Great Apes).
Another contention I'd have is that those with mental disabilities, whether decreased function or insanity (or otherwise), have moral person-hood but have a legally protected status. Their moral person-hood is based on their being human (though is arguably different, like in cases where it can be argued "they don't understand what they're doing"), but their legal status is diminished because their judgment is impaired
yet they still maintain a legal liability for their actions. Non-human animals do not, except if you want to count "is a danger" and "is not a danger" as liabilities. Now, granted, this goes back to the issue of sapience, but what I'm pointing out here is that stating those with mental disabilities still have moral person-hood as an example of why animals should isn't sufficient, because animals would still lack the facilities that are still expected to a nominal degree in the mentally disabled.
Now, if you want to talk about having certain levels of protected status, I don't necessarily disagree except possibly on the levels of degree. My dogs enjoy a protected status because they are dogs that live in my home, but that doesn't necessarily mean that society should expect from them the same moral status of even the mentally disabled-- as much as I love my dogs, they are simply not capable of handling that kind of responsibility. With every increased level of right or status conferred there is an inherent level of responsibility involved, because without it the proposed right or status is meaningless unless you are talking about strictly property (which I also reject, by the way). Where I would differ on degree, for one example, is that I have no problem with the status of livestock animals to include their being put to death for food, provided conditions for their welfare while alive meets a certain standard. Those degrees about status or rights conferred may be the sticking point here, but my contention is that the level of degree is ultimately going to be arbitrarily assigned by both, based on different value systems. I don't consider a more strict value system necessarily wrong, per se, but neither to I consider it an objective thing any more than I would consider my own an objective thing. Value systems just don't work that way.
If you can at least agree with that premise, particularly the last paragraph, then we have a starting point from which to assert that our own system is somehow more beneficial than the other, and avoid a lot of rhetorical pitfalls that Kevin and Cain have thus far been stuck in.