There is No God (And You Know It)

How is treating a cancer patient evil? You're pretending as though you don't know the difference between good and evil, but I'm fairly sure that you do.
I think it is you who are pretending not to see the point. A good end does not confer good onto all the steps. Inflicting suffering on an innocent child is an evil, even if it is a necessary evil.

For example if there were two equally effective treatments and a doctor chose the the more painful one because it was more profitable to him, then his treatment would be evil, even if it resulted in a cure.

But if you were to say that the greater good cancelled out the evil of making a child suffer then the doctor would be blameless, each treatment would be morally equivalent.
Why is a natural disaster evil? Yes, perhaps it is for the greater good.
'Natural evil' was ceo_esq's terminology, so you should probably ask him.
Again, what God does is presumably for the greater good, and therefore isn't evil. So what? As humans, we cannot know what the greater good is, so we cannot pretend to do something for the greater good that we know is evil.
But we don't have to know what the greater good is we only need to know that God is morally perfect then we know that there is a greater good. So in my example of the man dying from the severe asthmatic attack I know that it must serve some greater good. So why should I prevent something I know is serving a greater good? It would be like preventing the child getting chemotherapy.
Not necessarily. Like I said, we don't know what the ultimate good is, but we do know the difference between good and evil human behavior.
Not always, but on the whole, by and large, yes. But as I said we don't need to know what the ultimate good is, we only need to know that God is impeccably good.
Perhaps God causes natural disasters in order to provide us the opportunity to help others.
But if I set fire to a house in order to provide people with the opportunity of helping others I would be doing evil.
Perhaps human suffering by itself isn't evil (when it's for the greater good), but human choices can be evil (i.e. one person causing suffering to another person is evil)
So you have answered the question you began with 'How is treating a cancer patient evil?'
... since only God can know what is for the greater good.
Which means that once the ultimate good has been acheived only God will know (since only God is capable of recognising it). An omnibevolent God may never be recognisably benevolent.
You don't know that any of these things aren't true, and therefore cannot prove that an omnibenevolent God cannot exist.
And this I agree with - but you can infer certain things about an omnibenevolent God.

It's benevolence may never benefit the human race in any way whatsoever since we will be incapable of recognising the ultimate good when we see it.

You cannot trust the word of an omnibenevolent God because if it is prepared to wish suffering on an innocent child for a greater good then it would certainly be prepared to lie. So if some omnibenevolent being promises you eternal bliss watch out - it may be a ruse!

So in the end what is the practical difference between a God that is indistinguishable from blind nature and plain blind nature?
 
It occurs to me that while your assertion is debatable even if a middle knowledge exists - that is, if there are any true counterfactuals of human freedom - the assertion appears false if middle knowledge does not exist. Assuming for the moment that a deity can have simple foreknowledge, but not middle knowledge, such deity would only know the complete timeline of a created universe upon its creation. It would be impossible for him to have selected from among multiple free-agency outcomes known to him.

Of course, Molinists argue that even if he could, human beings would still be free agents, and it is exceedingly difficult to identify beyond a doubt a mistake in their argument.

After reading about 'middle knowledge' I've got to say - WTF?

OK, so God knows how every person will choose in every situation, and sets up the situation so that man will make the appropriate choices. How is this not like saying that a physicist knows every path water will flow in every situation, and sets up a path so that water will flow in the appropriate direction? I read that as: the universe is comprised of finite variables whose relationships are knowable, and by setting up those variables in precise ways, we can cause man to do what we want man to do. Or, man has no free will, and we can control him at will.

Further, if God creates a universe knowing the future outcome of every possible action, then God willingly created a static universe as such; to claim that God could not choose to create another universe with different future outcomes lessens the concept of 'omnipotent God', and completely disperses the ideas of both free will and morality simultaneously.

I see it like this: you're claiming that God is the carpenter, and that he picks and chooses among pieces of wood to craft a chair. God cannot control what the grain of the wood is, but can select from numerous grains. But if this is so, then something other than God created the wood, and God is no longer supreme. If, however, you're saying that God also creates the wood, then God can quite clearly determine the exact pattern of grain - unless, of course, there is something superior to God that affects the course of the grain.

This is my biggest problem with most concepts of God: no matter what attribute most theists offer to God, they still hold out something which remains superior to God. Free will, for example: are we to believe that free will is superior to God? Or time, for that matter? If so, then God cannot be supreme; if there is anything which constricts or constrains God in any way, then that God cannot said to be supreme over all, now can it?

Is free will the grain of wood formed by something other than God?

I haven't seen an argument yet that supports free will. Middle knowledge, in fact, buries it as much as determinism does.
 
Yes, I admit my definition of 'supreme' in this case means able to transcend logic and nature. My reasoning is simple enough: if God is creator of all, he must by definition be able to transcend his creations.

None of God's creations can do everything that is possible to do, nor can any of God's creations know everything that is possible to know. Therefore, even a God who was limited by nature and logic could be omnipotent and omniscient, and could transcend his creations.

Otherwise, there is something superior to God, something that limits God's abilities. In this case, logic and nature are supreme to God.

Logic and nature are not supreme to God because they can't do or know anything.

And, as I stated above, I have not stated that I don't think God exists. In fact, I do think God exists. I just don't think that free will can truly exist, aside from God's own will.

That might be, but then why can't free will exist if God exists? Also, it is possible for free will to exist without God, if some force allowed us to make choices which were not caused. In other words, dualism can explain free will without God.

I've read the ontological arguments link - and if you can't see the obvious failings in them, perhaps we should start another thread. I can spot them fairly easily. Heck, they're even given some fair coverage on that page.

No, actually the page says that the logical flaws are not readily apparent in many of them, but the conclusions make it fairly obvious that there are flaws. This is also the case with logical arguments that God cannot exist.

This is the biggest problem with using ontological statements: you can always redefine terms so that your statement is true.

Absolutely. The same is true of arguments against the existance of God, such as "An omnipotent God must be able to make a square circle." The same flaws exist both in logical arguments for and against the existance of God. Many of the flaws do come down to definitions, such as how one would define a "square circle."

-Bri
 
For what it's worth, I'm saying free will does not exist. Whether or not God does is irrelevant to the case.

Understood. I wasn't claiming that free will does exist, only that it's possible for it to exist if God exists. I also think it's possible for free will to exist if God doesn't exist, but not if determinism is true. The comment to which you were responding was in reference to your requesting proof of my position.

If you feel that free will is impossible, you might attempt to prove it by offering evidence that determinism is true (although a compatibilist would still argue that free will is possible with determinism). Otherwise, you'd have to provide some other evidence (logical or otherwise) that free will is impossible.

-Bri
 
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Beilby, Wykstra and Alston (quoted by ceo_esq) claim:
The atheist, in claiming that there is at least one instance of evil which has no justifying good, is undertaking an exceptionally difficult task.
I am interested - do they have a particular atheist in mind, or is it just a straw man?

More interesting is the question, given the assumption of omnibenevolence, does each instance of natural evil have a specific consequent good attached to it?

Does a particular earthquake for example have to be in that particular country, or would another country do as well? Does there have to be exactly the number of casualties that there were - would one more survivor dilute the consequent good?

This point is usually expressed as the prayer of the anguished parent "Would Satan triumph if this little one suffered just a little less?"

The only possible answer it no, in the case that person A suffers, the cause of good would be served just as well if they didn't suffer. Otherwise acts of herosim and succour would have no positive value.

Thus either there exist instances of natural evil which have no specific justifying good, or else human acts of compassion are meaningless.

But it leads to the contradiction I outlined earlier - if person A is suffering due to some natural evil, and the cause of good would be served just as well if his sufferering was alleviated then I would have a moral obligation to alleviate his suffering if I could.

But God would have the opposite moral obligation to let him continue suffering, even though God knows that his specific suffering has no consequent good, because if he alleviates person A's suffering he has to alleviate the suffering of person B, C and so on until there is no more suffering.

In this case I have as much relevant information as God - I know (if God is impeccable) that suffering in general has a positive value but some specific case of suffering does not. And yet our moral obligations would be opposite.

So this means that either benevolence has a different meaning when applied to God - in which case God is not omnibenevolent at all, he is omni something-else, to which we arbitrarily apply the same word.

Or more likely it means that there is such a thing as intrinsic moral ambiguity. So the question arises, is omnibenevolence possible if there is such a thing as an intrinsic moral ambiguity?
 
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zaaydragon said:
After reading about 'middle knowledge' I've got to say - WTF?
I'd have to agree. If God can tell what a person can do in every possible situation and also presumably how matter will behave in every possible circumstance then it is just another way of saying that God knows exactly what you are going to do before you do it, and knows this before you are born.

It also implies that we will always behave in one specific way, given a particular set of circumstances so it posits determinism rather than libertarian free will.

People keep saying that there are answers to the problem of omniscience and free will and then point us to several incompatible answers.

Yes we know there are several answers to the problem - what we are asking is - are there any satisfactory answers?
 
I think it is you who are pretending not to see the point. A good end does not confer good onto all the steps. Inflicting suffering on an innocent child is an evil, even if it is a necessary evil.

Bull.

For example if there were two equally effective treatments and a doctor chose the the more painful one because it was more profitable to him, then his treatment would be evil, even if it resulted in a cure.

If it resulted in a cure then it wasn't evil. You cannot claim that giving an injection to cure a disease is evil because it cases pain. The net result is certainly good, and we all know that it's good.

But if you were to say that the greater good cancelled out the evil of making a child suffer then the doctor would be blameless, each treatment would be morally equivalent.

No, the treatment that is best for the patient is best. When two treatments are otherwise equal, then the less painful treatment is best.

So in my example of the man dying from the severe asthmatic attack I know that it must serve some greater good. So why should I prevent something I know is serving a greater good? It would be like preventing the child getting chemotherapy.

Perhaps the greater good is to provide you with the choice to help him or not. At that point, the "greater good" has been accomplished, and a "good" choice would result in more good in the world whereas an evil choice would result in more evil. Since we don't know the greater good, we must always do what we know to be morally right, which is to help him. If the greater good is served simply by killing the man, God is certainly smart enough to be able to kill him when nobody is around to help him or in such a way that he cannot be helped.

But if I set fire to a house in order to provide people with the opportunity of helping others I would be doing evil.

Absolutely. Unless you're God, you don't have enough information to know what's for the greater good. Setting fire to a house without that information would be evil. Human's aren't responsible for the "greater good" they are only responsible for the good.

Which means that once the ultimate good has been acheived only God will know (since only God is capable of recognising it). An omnibevolent God may never be recognisably benevolent.

That's correct, so? God isn't recognized by everyone as benevolent. What's your point?

And this I agree with - but you can infer certain things about an omnibenevolent God.

Awesome! That was my point, that you cannot prove that an omnibenevolent God cannot exist.

It's benevolence may never benefit the human race in any way whatsoever since we will be incapable of recognising the ultimate good when we see it.

That we may not recognize it doesn't mean it isn't a benefit. A child doesn't recognize that not eating candy for each meal or going to bed at a decent hour is to her ultimate benefit, but that doesn't mean that they aren't to her benefit.

You cannot trust the word of an omnibenevolent God because if it is prepared to wish suffering on an innocent child for a greater good then it would certainly be prepared to lie. So if some omnibenevolent being promises you eternal bliss watch out - it may be a ruse!

I don't see how one follows from the other. Should a child trust her parent? Children don't see the greater good of not eating too much candy or going to bed at a decent time.

So in the end what is the practical difference between a God that is indistinguishable from blind nature and plain blind nature?

We don't know. If God exists, the differences between God and no God could be immense. Indeed, the universe might not exist at all. If God doesn't exist, there obviously would be no difference. My point is -- my ONLY point is -- that we cannot know for certain one way or the other.

-Bri
 
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Bull.
If it resulted in a cure then it wasn't evil.
OK, let's assume that and call it A. Now:
No, the treatment that is best for the patient is best. When two treatments are otherwise equal, then the less painful treatment is best.
But remember my hypothesis was that the doctor chose the painful treatment for monetary gain. But by statement A it was not evil because it resulted in a cure, so the doctor has inflicted unnecessary pain on a child for monetary gain and it is not evil according to your statement.

So you are wrong, it might still be evil even if it resulted in a cure. The fact that the result outweighed the means or that the doctor intended to effect a cure is not enough . The means had to be the least worst means of acheiving the end. In which case it is necessary to be able to give a moral weighting to each step in the process
Perhaps the greater good is to provide you with the choice to help him or not. At that point, the "greater good" has been accomplished,
And at this point I make an equally ineffective delegation to another by-stander and the three of us watch the man die. I did my part, it is now the other man's responsibility. Or are both human by-standers guilty and the divine bystander not?

But by definition if an omnipotent being tries to do something it is done. So if the man dies then by definition God has not tried to save him. And so we know that allowing him to die was the morally correct choice, even though we do not have the details of what greater good was served.
... and a "good" choice would result in more good in the world whereas an evil choice would result in more evil.
We do not know that. Good choices might equally result in greater evil in the world - the man recovers sufficiently to detonate the bomb that he has just planted for example.
Since we don't know the greater good, we must always do what we know to be morally right, which is to help him.
And as I said we do not need to know the greater good. We only need to know that God is morally perfect to know that there was a greater good.
If the greater good is served simply by killing the man, God is certainly smart enough to be able to kill him when nobody is around to help him or in such a way that he cannot be helped.
Irrelevant what God might have done since we do not know what the greater good was. The greater good might have involved the need for witnesses. But we do know something for sure, God allowed the man to die, God did not help the man. So we know that allowing the man to die was a morally impeccable action since a morally impeccable being did it.
Absolutely. Unless you're God, you don't have enough information to know what's for the greater good.
Sure, but you had suggested the greater good might be to allow people the opportunity to help others. I was just demonstrating that as an excuse for causing suffering this reason sucks.
Human's aren't responsible for the "greater good" they are only responsible for the good.
Really - they are only responsible for the immediate good? How do you tell? Where does your responsibility end and God's begin? In fact you are responsible to the extent of any consequences that you can reasonably predict.

So in the case of the asthmatic we can reasonably predict that the man's death had morally impeccable consequences (since God did nothing effective to help) and that is all we need to know. We don't always need to know the details just whether something is right or wrong.

Also don't forget that religions have always recognised that the existence of a benevolent Deity drastically alters ethical and moral choices - hence the story of Abraham and his son.
That's correct, so? God isn't recognized by everyone as benevolent. What's your point?
You seem to have missed the key term. God may never be recognisably benevolent. God may always appear malevolent while actually being benevolent in a way that we don't understand. A benefit that is never recognised is not much of a benefit.

Also we may never actually benefit, how do we know that a benefit to the human race will necessarily increase the greater good for all of creation? Perhaps the greater good might be served by our eternal misery.
Awesome! That was my point, that you cannot prove that an omnibenevolent God cannot exist.
You keep saying that as though it meant anything - why are you trying to make a point that can never have any meaning? Tell me something that you can prove (except in the mathematical sense). I can't prove that George Bush is not in fact Zhor-Zhe-Bish, the evil alien emperor from the third moon of the second planet of the Proxima Centauran system engaged in a nefarious plan to enslave the human race. This does not mean that my belief that George is not Zhor is an item of faith, or that the belief that he is Zhor has equal value to the belief that he is not.
I don't see how one follows from the other. Should a child trust her parent? Children don't see the greater good of not eating too much candy or going to bed at a decent time.
Hardly a good example, a child has at least some chance of growing up to understand the parents' strictures.

We won't grow up to be omniscient beings. Sorry we won't.

If we don't recognise the goodness of the deity there is no reason to suppose that we ever will. So those saying "I will understand when I get to heaven" are working on a false assumption.
We don't know. If God exists, the differences between God and no God could be immense. Indeed, the universe might not exist at all. If God doesn't exist, there obviously would be no difference. My point is -- my ONLY point is -- that we cannot know for certain one way or the other.
It's not really much of a point is it? What can we know for certain? Not much really. We can certainly say a lot about what an omnibenevolent being would be like or how it would affect moral choices. And we can say a lot about the popular definitions of God that definitely can be ruled out.
 
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None of God's creations can do everything that is possible to do, nor can any of God's creations know everything that is possible to know. Therefore, even a God who was limited by nature and logic could be omnipotent and omniscient, and could transcend his creations.

Only by using a reduced definition of 'omnipotent' and 'omniscient' - or by claiming that God did not create nature and logic.. which infers that these things are superior to God.

Logic and nature are not supreme to God because they can't do or know anything.

Logic and nature are supreme because they restrict and limit God's abilities; they don't have to do or know anything to be supreme to God.

That which limits one is supreme to it. I cannot leap into the air and fly by will; I must obey laws of gravity; therefore, gravity is supreme to me. It need know or do nothing to be suchlike.

That might be, but then why can't free will exist if God exists? Also, it is possible for free will to exist without God, if some force allowed us to make choices which were not caused. In other words, dualism can explain free will without God.

Free will can exists in a theism if and only if the involved deity lacks omniscience or is subordinate to time and/or nature. I have no problem with the idea that Earth was made by some God having vast, apparently supernatural powers, and imbuing life on Earth with free will, then hiding so effectively as to appear not to exist at all; but to attribute omniscience to this being and allow for free will is a major contradiction of ideologies.

As to your second sentence - Ironically, last night, when for some reason I couldn't get back onto the board, I had just paced my kitchen coming up with just that thought - that a form of dualism - or, to be fair, idealism - could account for free will. If the 'ghost in the machine' were real, unbound by physical (or spiritual) limitations, etc, then a form of free will could, conceivably exist. This would be especially true under an atheist idealism, such as the notion that the collective consciousness is responsible for the universe...

No, actually the page says that the logical flaws are not readily apparent in many of them, but the conclusions make it fairly obvious that there are flaws. This is also the case with logical arguments that God cannot exist.

Agreed.

Absolutely. The same is true of arguments against the existance of God, such as "An omnipotent God must be able to make a square circle." The same flaws exist both in logical arguments for and against the existance of God. Many of the flaws do come down to definitions, such as how one would define a "square circle."

Agreed, as well. Though I would have to say that a truly omnipotent God would be able to create some unimaginable dimension in which 'square circle' was, by definition, true and natural. That we cannot imagine such a dimension is understandable, given that we are limited by the nature and logic that we are trapped within.
 
Understood. I wasn't claiming that free will does exist, only that it's possible for it to exist if God exists. I also think it's possible for free will to exist if God doesn't exist, but not if determinism is true. The comment to which you were responding was in reference to your requesting proof of my position.

I think free will can exist under a lesser definition of God, or under a non-deterministic, atheist universe.

If you feel that free will is impossible, you might attempt to prove it by offering evidence that determinism is true (although a compatibilist would still argue that free will is possible with determinism). Otherwise, you'd have to provide some other evidence (logical or otherwise) that free will is impossible.

I have never understood compatibilist free will - any more than the whole 'middle knowledge' nonsense.

I do feel that free will is impossible IF materialists are in the right - because I feel that materialism implies determinism (accepting randomness as a misunderstood type of determinism). However, I also feel that absolute free will is irrelevant, that the best we need is practical free will - which is that free will which, I believe, we all recognize.
 
(although a compatibilist would still argue that free will is possible with determinism).

-Bri

But of course. How could it be any other way? If your mind/soul isn't a decision maker that operates according to rules, what could it possibly be? I cannot conceive of anything other than determinism (except possible true random influences, which does not help the free will issue.)
 
OK, let's assume that and call it A.

I misunderstood the initial premise of your question. My initial statement was not assuming that there was a better or less-painful treatment. If there was a better treatment, then you are correct, that other treatment would have been better. For the doctor to choose the lesser treatment strictly for monetary gains would not be moral.

And at this point I make an equally ineffective delegation to another by-stander and the three of us watch the man die. I did my part, it is now the other man's responsibility. Or are both human by-standers guilty and the divine bystander not?

Correct, both bystanders are guilty (assuming they both are able to help the man and choose not to). An omnibenevolent God may have been providing both of you with the opportunity to help the man.

But by definition if an omnipotent being tries to do something it is done. So if the man dies then by definition God has not tried to save him. And so we know that allowing him to die was the morally correct choice, even though we do not have the details of what greater good was served.

Incorrect. For God, the morally correct choice is to do what is for the greater good. For a human (since we cannot know the greater good) the morally correct choice is to do what is good. Providing you an opportunity to do what was right was the morally correct choice for God because it was for the greater good, even if the man dies. Your allowing him to die was not for the greater good. It would be morally wrong for you pretend to know what is for the greater good when you cannot possibly know.

We do not know that. Good choices might equally result in greater evil in the world - the man recovers sufficiently to detonate the bomb that he has just planted for example.

Again, it isn't your responsibility to forsee the future or know what you cannot know. Your job is to do what is good. If the man later setting off a bomb is for the greater good, then God might very well allow it to happen.

Irrelevant what God might have done since we do not know what the greater good was. The greater good might have involved the need for witnesses. But we do know something for sure, God allowed the man to die, God did not help the man. So we know that allowing the man to die was a morally impeccable action since a morally impeccable being did it.

It might be for the greater good for God to present you with a choice (if free will is for the greater good) but your choosing to do evil instead of good would never be for the greater good.

Imagine that God giving you the choice between doing something good or evil increases the "goodness" in the world by 100 points. Once you have been presented the choice, if you choose good, it will increase "goodness" by 10 points, but if you choose bad, it will decrease "goodness" by 10 points. Once God has given you the choice, the net goodness is increased by 100 points. If you choose good, it goes up to 110 points. If you choose evil it goes down to 90 points. Clearly, God's providing you with the choice increased the net good in the world regardless of how you chose. But your choosing evil decreased the good in the world at that point.

Sure, but you had suggested the greater good might be to allow people the opportunity to help others.

If you're God, yes. As a human, no. Humans don't know what is for the greater good.

I was just demonstrating that as an excuse for causing suffering this reason sucks.

An excuse? Human suffering is undoubtedly necessary if we have free will. Many people would rather have free will and suffer than be a robot.

Really - they are only responsible for the immediate good? How do you tell? Where does your responsibility end and God's begin? In fact you are responsible to the extent of any consequences that you can reasonably predict.

Exactly, and you answered your own question. You cannot reasonably predict the greater good. Your responsibility is to do good, and God's is to do the greater good. Both are well-equipped to carry out their respective responsibilities.

You seem to have missed the key term. God may never be recognisably benevolent. God may always appear malevolent while actually being benevolent in a way that we don't understand. A benefit that is never recognised is not much of a benefit.

I don't follow your logic at all. Why must God never be recognisably benevolent? Undoubtely, God is recognised as benevolent by many, so how would that prevent him from doing the greater good?

Also we may never actually benefit, how do we know that a benefit to the human race will necessarily increase the greater good for all of creation? Perhaps the greater good might be served by our eternal misery.

Perhaps. Perhaps not. Presumably, the greater good is actually for our benefit, but it is possible that it's for the benefit of the universe rather than specifically for our benefit. So what?

You keep saying that as though it meant anything - why are you trying to make a point that can never have any meaning? Tell me something that you can prove (except in the mathematical sense).

By "proof" I mean a proponderance of evidence. You cannot provide a proponderance of evidence that an omnibenevolent God is impossible. That said, to prove that something is impossible actually requires proof beyond any doubt, which is why the burden of proof for the nonexistance of something is extremely difficult to overcome.

Hardly a good example, a child has at least some chance of growing up to understand the parents' strictures.

And so do we...presumably after we die. But even a child doesn't know that they'll understand someday, so it's a very good metaphor.

We won't grow up to be omniscient beings. Sorry we won't.

Perhaps we do, after we die. But it's not necessary for us to be omniscient to understand, only that we have a better understanding than we do. It's also not necessary for us to ever understand.

If we don't recognise the goodness of the deity there is no reason to suppose that we ever will. So those saying "I will understand when I get to heaven" are working on a false assumption.

First, you don't know that we won't understand when we get to heaven, so you cannot say that it's a false assumption. Second, I never said that we'd know when we got to heaven, only that we might. Third, so what if we never understand? Does that mean it can't be true anyway?

It's not really much of a point is it? What can we know for certain? Not much really. We can certainly say a lot about what an omnibenevolent being would be like or how it would affect moral choices. And we can say a lot about the popular definitions of God that definitely can be ruled out.

I don't know if it's much of a point, but it's one that seems to be missed on a lot of people who believe that statements such as "There is no God" are facts. If you want to know anything for certain, you're going to face a lot of disappointment in life. We can speculate about what the world might be like if God didn't exist, but that assumes that he does. We simply don't know, and probably never will know. Perhaps some definitions of God can be ruled out, but plenty (probably most) cannot, which makes the subject of this thread false. The first half of the subject of the thread is a belief based on faith, therefore the second part (the part in parentheses) is false.

-Bri
 
Only by using a reduced definition of 'omnipotent' and 'omniscient' - or by claiming that God did not create nature and logic.. which infers that these things are superior to God.

There are different definitions of "omnipotent" and "omniscient" and I don't personally think that "able to do all that is possible to do" or "able to know all that is possible to know" are reduced definitions. That said, some would agree, and some believe that God can, in fact, do that which is logically impossible and to know that which is logically unknowable.

Logic and nature are supreme because they restrict and limit God's abilities; they don't have to do or know anything to be supreme to God.

I disagree with your definition of "supreme." I don't consider a wall to be supreme to me, even though it restricts me. That said, some believe that God is indeed unrestricted, even by logic. Most theists believe that God is unrestricted by nature.

That which limits one is supreme to it. I cannot leap into the air and fly by will; I must obey laws of gravity; therefore, gravity is supreme to me. It need know or do nothing to be suchlike.

See my comment about the wall above. Nearly everything can restrict you in some way, but that doesn't make everything supreme to you. Also, by your definition object A can be "supreme" to object B and object B can be "supreme" to object A at the same time.

Free will can exists in a theism if and only if the involved deity lacks omniscience or is subordinate to time and/or nature.

I think that has been shown to be far from certain by the links previously provided.

Ironically, last night, when for some reason I couldn't get back onto the board, I had just paced my kitchen coming up with just that thought - that a form of dualism - or, to be fair, idealism - could account for free will.

Absolutely. On the other hand, if it's ever proven, someone will call it "God."

Though I would have to say that a truly omnipotent God would be able to create some unimaginable dimension in which 'square circle' was, by definition, true and natural. That we cannot imagine such a dimension is understandable, given that we are limited by the nature and logic that we are trapped within.

True, that is possible and some believe it to be the case. I was simply saying that it wasn't necessary to consider God omnipotent by many definitions of the word (i.e. "being able to do anything that is possible").

-Bri
 
I think free will can exist under a lesser definition of God, or under a non-deterministic, atheist universe.

I think that free will can exist under almost any definition of God, but I will agree that I don't think it can exist if determinism is true, at least not with the same meaning that most people attribute to it (so-called libertarian free will).

I do feel that free will is impossible IF materialists are in the right - because I feel that materialism implies determinism (accepting randomness as a misunderstood type of determinism). However, I also feel that absolute free will is irrelevant, that the best we need is practical free will - which is that free will which, I believe, we all recognize.

I'm not sure how you differentiate between "practical" and "absolute" free will.

-Bri
 
But of course. How could it be any other way? If your mind/soul isn't a decision maker that operates according to rules, what could it possibly be? I cannot conceive of anything other than determinism (except possible true random influences, which does not help the free will issue.)

This is a bit off-topic, but free will could exist as long as the universe isn't completely determined (that doesn't mean that there is no cause and effect, just that some things don't have external causes).

Your decisions could be influenced by all sorts of things, both internal and external, but could still be undetermined (i.e. not completely determined) by external causes.

When you place an order at McDonald's, do you really feel as though your decision whether or not to get a chocolate or a vanilla shake was determined millions of years before you were born? Do you feel that getting angry at someone for harming you is irrational?

-Bri
 
Bri:

Have you been ignoring my last few posts ?

Not exactly. I've been pressed for time lately, and it has become increasingly time-consuming to defend myself against random and unsupported accusations of logical fallacy.

Also, when I respond to your arguments, my responses seem to lead to tangential questions, which if I answer I'm later accused of circular logic because you assume that these answers are part of my argument, and if I don't answer I'm accused of refusing to answer.

So I will try to get to your posts when I have more time to defend myself against the accusations which will invariably follow.

-Bri
 
I'm not sure how you differentiate between "practical" and "absolute" free will.

Absolute free will means being capable of making a decision or choice or having a thought that in no way, whatsoever, is constrained or caused by other conditions. Think of it this way: you are offered two choices, say, between your favorite foods (mine are lasagna and chili, for example). With absolute free will, there is no factor involved in my decision which I would select aside from my own free will.

But I don't see us having this sort of free will, so we move to practical free will. In practical free will, the decisions you make are your own, but understood to have underlying reasons for making those decisions: for example, do I want to maintain a various diet, and had just eaten chili the night before last? Would spice cause my mouth to hurt today for some reason? Am I particularly hungry, and know lasagna takes too long to bake? These are some, but certainly not all, of the factors that constrain the decision which food I shall select.

It is my opinion that, under a materialist monism, there is no such thing as absolute - i.e. unconstrained - free will. You don't just choose things without some determining factors involved. But the fact that you do make choices whose constraints are, perhaps, subconscious allows you to act and react as if you had free will - a practical free will, that recognized as such, causes us each to be responsible for our behaviors. Even though, in the truest sense, we are no more responsible for those behaviors than our DNA or our environment are, by creating an environment where reward and punishment exist, we add compulsions and constraints to our behavior to make free will amenable to social survival and comfort.

To claim we had 'no free will whatsoever' would be akin to excusing every malignant behavior and every harmful decision on the grounds that these choices were 'inevitable' or 'natural' - which, of course, they were; but the addition of factors such as fear, pressure, anticipation, etc. can effectively work to increase the potential for positive behavior while decreasing the potential for negative behavior.

I hope that clarifies the difference between 'absolute' and 'practical' free will, as I name them.
 
Not exactly. I've been pressed for time lately, and it has become increasingly time-consuming to defend myself against random and unsupported accusations of logical fallacy.

Also, when I respond to your arguments, my responses seem to lead to tangential questions, which if I answer I'm later accused of circular logic because you assume that these answers are part of my argument, and if I don't answer I'm accused of refusing to answer.

So I will try to get to your posts when I have more time to defend myself against the accusations which will invariably follow.

-Bri

I'm sorry if they seem like accusations. I'm merely reporting how things seem to me. If something seems like a fallacy, I'll call it. Besides, you keep doing that to me too. It's nothing personnal.
 
Regarding God, determinism, and free will: Methinks you gentlemen need to learn how, in the words of Doc Brown, "to think fourth-dimensionally."

Actually, I'm convinced that four dimensions are not enough. I lean towards a minimum of seven spatial dimensions and two time dimensions, but I would not be heartbroken to find that even more are required. Regardless, I believe that time as we experience it--linear time--is the last of howevermany dimensions are truly out there.

With that in mind, picture this: An entity capable of creating universes who is also able to "reach back" through time and create a duplicate of any universe as it existed at that time while also adding in any changes he or she thought best. This new universe would be inhabited by the same people, and they would be free to react to the newly (although unbeknownst to them) changed conditions.

I submit that if these changes were major then many people would, of their own free will, choose to react differently. However, if the changes were minor or imperceptible, then the inhabitants would, by and large, make the same choices as they did in the original iteration--one of my beliefs is that personalities tend to react consistently when presented with consistent conditions and stimuli. So our hypothetical universe creator has something to go on in judging what conditions to change and what to keep consistent, and by repeating the process over and over again he would be able to sculpt a final timeline which provides the maximum positive impact upon the lives of every person in his universe. And this is what I believe happens in Heaven.

Obviously, however, we do not see that here on Earth. Why not? I believe the joker in the deck is the presence of Satan, whom the Bible refers to as "the god of this world." He wasn't, I believe, "born" with it (so to speak), but I believe that in the process of the conflict between himself and God he has also acquired the ability to "reach back" through time and create a new and altered timeline. So you now have two opposed forces, hostile to each other, who are simultaneously "working" the space-time continuum to their own advantage.

Given such a scenario, where does it end? In the absence of one of these combatants subduing the other by main force, I submit that it ends when the losing party finds that there is nothing more within his power that he can do to shift events in his favor, and the winning party sees that there is nothing more which he needs to do in order to improve the ultimate end from his perspective. In other words, the loser stands there hitting the "Undo!" button over and over and over as the walls close in around him while the winner benignly watches with arms folded. And this is, I believe, consistent with the observed conditions around us in the world. Why do we live in a world with juvenile cancer patients and unexploded land mines? Because they are byproducts of Satan's attempts to twist the ending in his favor. Why has there been no clear word from God in nineteen hundred years? Because God knows that, for the time being, no more words are necessary in order to improve the eventual outcome.

So how does God know your actions while you retain free will? Because he has seen you make your choices before under similar circumstances. Yes, I believe that there was once an initial iteration in which God had no prior knowledge of how you would act, and in which you might have genuinely surprised him. But as the space-time continuum has taken shape, he has seen you in that same situation a million times or more; you retain absolute free will in each iteration but as the situation crystallizes your responses to it become clearer and clearer.

More later, perhaps; got stuff to do.
 

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