OK, let's assume that and call it A.
I misunderstood the initial premise of your question. My initial statement was not assuming that there was a better or less-painful treatment. If there was a better treatment, then you are correct, that other treatment would have been better. For the doctor to choose the lesser treatment strictly for monetary gains would not be moral.
And at this point I make an equally ineffective delegation to another by-stander and the three of us watch the man die. I did my part, it is now the other man's responsibility. Or are both human by-standers guilty and the divine bystander not?
Correct, both bystanders are guilty (assuming they both are able to help the man and choose not to). An omnibenevolent God may have been providing both of you with the opportunity to help the man.
But by definition if an omnipotent being tries to do something it is done. So if the man dies then by definition God has not tried to save him. And so we know that allowing him to die was the morally correct choice, even though we do not have the details of what greater good was served.
Incorrect. For God, the morally correct choice is to do what is for the greater good. For a human (since we cannot know the greater good) the morally correct choice is to do what is good. Providing you an opportunity to do what was right was the morally correct choice for God because it was for the greater good, even if the man dies. Your allowing him to die was not for the greater good. It would be morally wrong for you pretend to know what is for the greater good when you cannot possibly know.
We do not know that. Good choices might equally result in greater evil in the world - the man recovers sufficiently to detonate the bomb that he has just planted for example.
Again, it isn't your responsibility to forsee the future or know what you cannot know. Your job is to do what is good. If the man later setting off a bomb is for the greater good, then God might very well allow it to happen.
Irrelevant what God might have done since we do not know what the greater good was. The greater good might have involved the need for witnesses. But we do know something for sure, God allowed the man to die, God did not help the man. So we know that allowing the man to die was a morally impeccable action since a morally impeccable being did it.
It might be for the greater good for God to present you with a choice (if free will is for the greater good) but your choosing to do evil instead of good would never be for the greater good.
Imagine that God giving you the choice between doing something good or evil increases the "goodness" in the world by 100 points. Once you have been presented the choice, if you choose good, it will increase "goodness" by 10 points, but if you choose bad, it will decrease "goodness" by 10 points. Once God has given you the choice, the net goodness is increased by 100 points. If you choose good, it goes up to 110 points. If you choose evil it goes down to 90 points. Clearly, God's providing you with the choice increased the net good in the world regardless of how you chose. But your choosing evil decreased the good in the world at that point.
Sure, but you had suggested the greater good might be to allow people the opportunity to help others.
If you're God, yes. As a human, no. Humans don't know what is for the greater good.
I was just demonstrating that as an excuse for causing suffering this reason sucks.
An excuse? Human suffering is undoubtedly necessary if we have free will. Many people would rather have free will and suffer than be a robot.
Really - they are only responsible for the immediate good? How do you tell? Where does your responsibility end and God's begin? In fact you are responsible to the extent of any consequences that you can reasonably predict.
Exactly, and you answered your own question. You cannot reasonably predict the greater good. Your responsibility is to do good, and God's is to do the greater good. Both are well-equipped to carry out their respective responsibilities.
You seem to have missed the key term. God may never be recognisably benevolent. God may always appear malevolent while actually being benevolent in a way that we don't understand. A benefit that is never recognised is not much of a benefit.
I don't follow your logic at all. Why must God never be recognisably benevolent? Undoubtely, God is recognised as benevolent by many, so how would that prevent him from doing the greater good?
Also we may never actually benefit, how do we know that a benefit to the human race will necessarily increase the greater good for all of creation? Perhaps the greater good might be served by our eternal misery.
Perhaps. Perhaps not. Presumably, the greater good is actually for our benefit, but it is possible that it's for the benefit of the universe rather than specifically for our benefit. So what?
You keep saying that as though it meant anything - why are you trying to make a point that can never have any meaning? Tell me something that you can prove (except in the mathematical sense).
By "proof" I mean a proponderance of evidence. You cannot provide a proponderance of evidence that an omnibenevolent God is impossible. That said, to prove that something is
impossible actually requires proof beyond any doubt, which is why the burden of proof for the nonexistance of something is extremely difficult to overcome.
Hardly a good example, a child has at least some chance of growing up to understand the parents' strictures.
And so do we...presumably after we die. But even a child doesn't know that they'll understand someday, so it's a very good metaphor.
We won't grow up to be omniscient beings. Sorry we won't.
Perhaps we do, after we die. But it's not necessary for us to be omniscient to understand, only that we have a better understanding than we do. It's also not necessary for us to
ever understand.
If we don't recognise the goodness of the deity there is no reason to suppose that we ever will. So those saying "I will understand when I get to heaven" are working on a false assumption.
First, you don't know that we won't understand when we get to heaven, so you cannot say that it's a false assumption. Second, I never said that we'd know when we got to heaven, only that we might. Third, so what if we never understand? Does that mean it can't be true anyway?
It's not really much of a point is it? What can we know for certain? Not much really. We can certainly say a lot about what an omnibenevolent being would be like or how it would affect moral choices. And we can say a lot about the popular definitions of God that definitely can be ruled out.
I don't know if it's much of a point, but it's one that seems to be missed on a lot of people who believe that statements such as "There is no God" are facts. If you want to know anything for certain, you're going to face a lot of disappointment in life. We can speculate about what the world might be like if God didn't exist, but that assumes that he does. We simply don't know, and probably never will know. Perhaps some definitions of God can be ruled out, but plenty (probably most) cannot, which makes the subject of this thread false. The first half of the subject of the thread is a belief based on faith, therefore the second part (the part in parentheses) is false.
-Bri