There is No God (And You Know It)

How is treating a cancer patient evil? You're pretending as though you don't know the difference between good and evil, but I'm fairly sure that you do.

If we can't know the ultimate good, how can we know any good at all or be sure that anything we do leads to good ?

Why is a natural disaster evil? Yes, perhaps it is for the greater good.

What's your definition of evil, anyway ?

Again, what God does is presumably for the greater good, and therefore isn't evil. So what? As humans, we cannot know what the greater good is, so we cannot pretend to do something for the greater good that we know is evil.

Odd. God does a number of things that we "aren't allowed" to do because they are evil. You'd think he'd preach by example, but then I could be wrong.

Not necessarily. Like I said, we don't know what the ultimate good is, but we do know the difference between good and evil human behavior.

Again, there are similitudes between cultures, but a great deal of differences, too. And, if you ask a number of individuals, few, if any, of them think of their own actions as evil, unlike in comic books.
 
By this line of thought, there is no action or inaction that is not prevented by God that is not ultimately good - thereby meaning that there IS no good or evil in the Universe, except that good and evil defined by man.

Funny thing is, some theists try to have it both ways: that humans have free will, but that nothing occurs without God's consent.
 
Funny thing is, some theists try to have it both ways: that humans have free will, but that nothing occurs without God's consent.

Yes - not only does an omnipotent, omniscient God preclude free will as a possibility, it also precludes morality of any form. Morality is based upon free will; so unless God is not as Omni-Powerful as most like to believe, absolute morality cannot exist. We can only create society-based morality suitable to the place and time of our existence, and do with it the best we can.
 
Indeed you provided various roles God could play. I merely explained why they didn't work. They you shifted the burden of proof, as though now I had to prove that God doesn't exist. The purpose of our discussion, at that point, was YOU trying to show that God COULD exist by providing functions for him to accomplish. So far you haven't.

Providing functions that God might serve was at your request and had nothing to do with any argument I was making. Also, I never claimed that God actually serves any of these functions, only that he might. Incidentally, you failed to show why God couldn't serve any of the functions I listed. If you wish to claim that God cannot serve these functions, the burden of proof is on you.

Showing that God could exist requires only refuting evidence that God cannot exist. It is not the same thing as proving that God does exist (which I never claimed to be able to do). If you wish to claim that God cannot or does not exist (as you claimed in a previous post), the burden of proof is on you.

Until you learn what burden of proof means, we have nothing further to discuss.

-Bri
 
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Yes - not only does an omnipotent, omniscient God preclude free will as a possibility, it also precludes morality of any form. Morality is based upon free will; so unless God is not as Omni-Powerful as most like to believe, absolute morality cannot exist. We can only create society-based morality suitable to the place and time of our existence, and do with it the best we can.

Worst of it is, if the universe is completely deterministic, then there's no free will as well. If quantum fluctuations add a chaotic element to it all, then it doesn't change anything. Still no "free will", per se. Again, of course, from our point of view it doesn't change a thing, but the point is there is no such thing as taking decisions independent of the physical factors involved.
 
Providing functions that God might serve was at your request and had nothing to do with any argument I was making. Also, I never claimed that God actually serves any of these functions, only that he might. Incidentally, you failed to show why God couldn't serve any of the functions I listed. If you wish to claim that God cannot serve these functions, the burden of proof is on you.

Okay, how were my counter-arguments to your examples inadequate ?

Showing that God could exist requires only refuting evidence that God cannot exist. It is not the same thing as proving that God does exist (which I never claimed to be able to do).

Of course, and I wouldn't claim that lack of forseeable function alone would prove that God cannot exist, but it's a step in that direction, which is why I'd like you to answer my above question.

If you wish to claim that God cannot or does not exist (as you claimed in a previous post), the burden of proof is on you.

Again, if the existence of God goes against our knowledge of the laws of physics (or logic, of course,) and if we can't think of a function (cause or effect) that God could have in existence, then would you agree that we can say that God cannot exist within reasonable doubt unless further evidence is presented ?
 
Worst of it is, if the universe is completely deterministic, then there's no free will as well. If quantum fluctuations add a chaotic element to it all, then it doesn't change anything. Still no "free will", per se. Again, of course, from our point of view it doesn't change a thing, but the point is there is no such thing as taking decisions independent of the physical factors involved.

Absolutely right. That's why I often refer to 'practical free will' versus 'absolute free will'. The latter, I think, cannot possibly exist in either an Omni-oriented theist philosophy, nor in a purely deterministic universe; the former, I think, is the best we have to work with.
 
Absolutely right. That's why I often refer to 'practical free will' versus 'absolute free will'. The latter, I think, cannot possibly exist in either an Omni-oriented theist philosophy, nor in a purely deterministic universe; the former, I think, is the best we have to work with.

ceo_esq has already addressed your assertion here and provided sources that indicate that no one has yet been able to show that omniscience and free will are mutually exclusive. Why do you insist on continuing to make such statements without providing evidence?

-Bri
 
ceo_esq has already addressed your assertion here and provided sources that indicate that no one has yet been able to show that omniscience and free will are mutually exclusive. Why do you insist on continuing to make such statements without providing evidence?

-Bri

Checked the link - and you must have linked the wrong post. I don't see where he's making any such claim.

Nor, for that matter, am I claiming the reverse - I did not say omniscience ALONE is mutually exclusive to free will - but that omniscience combined with omnipotency negates free will.

And what possible evidence can be presented on a purely logical argument, save only a series of logical arguments, Bri? Are you being willfully ignorant, or just plain stupid?

Omnipotence: Ability to make/do anything.
Omniscience: Ability to know anything.
Considering that I specifically refer to an Omni-oriented theism, we have the implication of a Creator Deity. Hence:

A Deity which is omniscient already knows EVERYTHING that any creation it ever makes will do - in fact, from the deific point of view, time doesn't exist, and as the Deity wills a thing into existence it is willing its entire history into existence as one. Hence, such a thing absolutely cannot have free will.

There really is no logical way around it - free will cannot exist in either a purely deterministic universe or in an omni-oriented theistic one. Not in a pure and absolute sense.

Why, Bri, do you insist otherwise, without providing evidence?
 
Omnipotence: Ability to make/do anything.
I think we've already shown that this characterization of omnipotence would require some qualifiers in order to express with real precision what the term is generally taken to mean.

Omniscience: Ability to know anything.
In a way, the correct understanding of omniscience is an issue that is not only trickier but also less settled (from the standpoint of philosophical tradition) than the understanding of omnipotence.

Your definition is unpromising, not least of all because omniscience indicates a state, not an ability. And although etymologically it suggests "knowledge of all", philosophers disagree about what "all" there is to know really means (a bit like our earlier discussion of omnipotence).

There are some things (and I use the term "things" loosely) that an omniscient being (e.g., hypothetically, God) clearly would not know. For example, he could not know that 2+2=5, because it's not a true statement in any possible world. Perhaps it makes more sense to say that a being can be described as omniscient at time t if, for every proposition p, such being knows at t whether p is true or false. Yet philosophers argue over whether certain kinds of propositions are instrinsically neither true nor false, or more broadly whether it is logically possible for their truth-value to be known by even an omniscient being.

Some argue that that it is intrinsically (that is, by definition) impossible to know with certainty a future state of affairs that depends on the choices of one or more free agents. Those people assert that being omniscient at time t means knowing all causal laws and all past and present circumstances at t. For them, God could know the end result of things because he knows how he would intervene to shape events in response to the choices of free agents, but he cannot know absolutely what those choices will be.

Others maintain that an omniscient being can know all states of affairs that will obtain in the future, including the choices of free agents. They insist, however, that it is intrinsically impossible to have so-called "middle knowledge", or knowledge of what free agents would have chosen under alternative circumstances in which they never actually find themselves.

Still others suggest that an omniscient being can have not only foreknowledge but middle knowledge as well.

So far as I know, there is no widespread agreement on these matters in theistic philosophy.

For that matter, there is not to my knowledge a theistic consensus on the precise sense in which God can be understood as "timeless".
 
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I think we've already shown that this characterization of omnipotence would require some qualifiers in order to express with real precision what the term is generally taken to mean.

In a way, the correct understanding of omniscience is an issue that is not only trickier but also less settled (from the standpoint of philosophical tradition) than the understanding of omnipotence.

Your definition is unpromising, not least of all because omniscience indicates a state, not an ability. And although etymologically it suggests "knowledge of all", philosophers disagree about what "all" there is to know really means (a bit like our earlier discussion of omnipotence).

There are some things (and I use the term "things" loosely) that an omniscient being (e.g., hypothetically, God) clearly would not know. For example, he could not know that 2+2=5, because it's not a true statement in any possible world. Perhaps it makes more sense to say that a being can be described as omniscient at time t if, for every proposition p, such being knows at t whether p is true or false. Yet philosophers argue over whether certain kinds of propositions are instrinsically neither true nor false, or more broadly whether it is logically possible for their truth-value to be known by even an omniscient being.

Some argue that that it is intrinsically (that is, by definition) impossible to know with certainty a future state of affairs that depends on the choices of one or more free agents. Those people assert that being omniscient at time t means knowing all causal laws and all past and present circumstances at t. For them, God could know the end result of things because he knows how he would intervene to shape events in response to the choices of free agents, but he cannot know absolutely what those choices will be.

Others maintain that an omniscient being can know all states of affairs that will obtain in the future, including the choices of free agents. They insist, however, that it is intrinsically impossible to have so-called "middle knowledge", or knowledge of what free agents would have chosen under alternative circumstances in which they never actually find themselves.

Still others suggest that an omniscient being can have not only foreknowledge but middle knowledge as well.

So far as I know, there is no widespread agreement on these matters in theistic philosophy.

For that matter, there is not to my knowledge a theistic consensus on the precise sense in which God can be understood as "timeless".

I'm afraid I remain unconvinced about your quibbling over definitions, in this case. Simply put, IF God is 'The Creator of All' - and this includes Time - then God, itself, is without time, and all of the Universe - including past, present, and future - exists simultaneously to God as it is being created. If, however, God did not create time - and I accept that as a possibility, but that instantly neutralizes claims of both omnipotence and omniscience - then there is no problem for free will or morality, for the reasons you outlined above.

All the quibbling you've posted above suggests apologetics for a less-than-omni God. And although I technically agree on the whole 'logical omnipotency' issue, if you really think about it, this so-called God also created those rules of logic, those natural definitions and relationships, and so forth. There is no reason to assume that God MUST obey these relationships - nor that God must avoid paradox. However, if we accept that God, being absolutely omnipotent, can even transcend logic and reason - then we cannot discuss God using logic and reason, and God remains solidly in the domain of pure faith.

For this reason alone I remain open to the possibility of free will - that our Creator may, in fact, be unbound by reason and can, therefore, create us past-present-and-future, yet not determine our choices for us.

I think part of the problem is most theists want to see themselves as a river, with God as the wellspring or source, and the course of their river determined by a combination of their will and God's will; but as God created not just the river, but the entire course of that river, God effectively created the choices the river will 'make' the entire way. In other words, God didn't 'create the Universe' in the past; God is having created the Universe at all times. Every moment of existence is God's creation, directly and intentionally - thereby precluding free will. This, I feel, is what omniscience implies.

You suggest that 'God cannot know an untrue thing' - but that suggests both a logical barrier to God and suggests that God did not intentionally make things the way they are. For example, God might very well know that 2+2=1, or 2, or 4, or 11, or 99... or any value whatsover. However, in creating a Universe, God simple decides that, for this universe, 2+2 shall equal 4, for all values of 2, 4, +, and = in the appropriate numerical bases. God, therefore, remains both omnipotent and omniscient... though not, necessarily, adherent to natural laws of logic or reason.

Frankly, I think theists would do well just to drop the 'omniscience' thing altogether, for the simple fact that most texts do not actually support the idea of an all-seeing God. Biblical references seem to indicate that it is possible to hide from God or occasionally lie to God; certainly, God has almost no vision of future events in the Bible, save those that God has pre-planned specifically. Neither do the Gods of other texts seem to possess any particular omniscient quality, either. Unfortunately, the idea that God might not be able to sense everything about His creation seems anathemic to the average theist, and certainly contradicts the logical conception of deity that makes the most philosophical sense.

CEO, one simple question that, for me, will settle most of the arguments you have poised: did God create spacetime as well? If the answer is 'Yes', then God necessarily must transcend spacetime itself, and this means that God automatically is aware of 'all future states', having created them all simultaneously. As such, there can be no free agents. Think of it like having a collage, and as you apply the bits and pieces, some pieces are bent one way, some another way - but as you created these pieces as well, there was no choice which way each would bend; you bent them to your will. To suggest otherwise is to suggest God is not omnipotent after all.

I'm rambling a bit - first thing in the morning, still digesting my coffee... but the point I'm trying to make is that any concept of free will in the absolute sense negates one or more of God's omni-attributes, thereby reducing God to a less-than-supreme being, and semantical and ontological quibbling - all of which takes place in a far less than supreme environment - fails utterly to make headway against this concept... IMHO.
 
So far as I know, there is no widespread agreement on these matters in theistic philosophy.

That doesn't really matter. How could a person make a decision NOT based purely on environmental/empirical/biological or random factors ? How could one possibly make a decision that is absolutely arbitrary and yet not random ?

If our decisions are purely based on physical factors, then there's no free will because there couldn't be any other decision at that time. If there are random factors involved, then it's chaos playing tricks on us, not free will. In order for "free will" to exist in the commonly used sense, we would have to have the ability to make a decision independently of these factors. I, for one, would like someone to tell me how that would work.
 
Biblical references seem to indicate that it is possible to hide from God or occasionally lie to God; certainly, God has almost no vision of future events in the Bible, save those that God has pre-planned specifically. Neither do the Gods of other texts seem to possess any particular omniscient quality, either. Unfortunately, the idea that God might not be able to sense everything about His creation seems anathemic to the average theist, and certainly contradicts the logical conception of deity that makes the most philosophical sense.

Well, does anyone here know if the Bible makes reference to omniscience at all ? Does God know everything at least at some point in the book ? Obviously, he doesn't at some other points, but I'm not even sure it's said in there that he IS omniscient.
 
You suggest that 'God cannot know an untrue thing' - but that suggests both a logical barrier to God and suggests that God did not intentionally make things the way they are. For example, God might very well know that 2+2=1, or 2, or 4, or 11, or 99... or any value whatsover. However, in creating a Universe, God simple decides that, for this universe, 2+2 shall equal 4, for all values of 2, 4, +, and = in the appropriate numerical bases.
I disagree. 2+2=4 (assuming a constant definition of those terms in base 10) in every possible universe, regardless of whether God or human beings exist in such universe. I would say that it is true regardless of whether any universe actually exists, in fact. It is a logical necessity, and for reasons discussed earlier, even an omnipotent being cannot be the cause of a logically necessary state of affairs [ETA: or a logically impossible one, naturally].
 
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Why, Bri, do you insist otherwise, without providing evidence?

If I insisted that such a God exists, the burden of proof would be on me. But I don't.

If you insist that such a God cannot exist, the burden of proof is on you. The link posted by ceo_esq gives quite a few arguments that refute your "logical argument" and indicate that in fact it is possible for an omniscient, omnipotent God and free will to both exist.

Here is the link for those who missed it.
Here is another one.

-Bri
 
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...the point I'm trying to make is that any concept of free will in the absolute sense negates one or more of God's omni-attributes, thereby reducing God to a less-than-supreme being, and semantical and ontological quibbling - all of which takes place in a far less than supreme environment - fails utterly to make headway against this concept... IMHO.

What would "less-than-supreme" mean? If God was able to do and know everything that is possible to do or know, he would certainly be "supreme" in every sense of the word.

Of course, some also maintain that he knows that which is unknowable and can do that which is undoable since he is beyond logic and nature.

You cannot disprove either, logically or otherwise.

BTW, if you wish to prove that God doesn't exist by use of logic alone (rather than by observation), you may also be interested in these ontological arguments for the existance of God. These arguments "prove" that God exists by employing the same type of logic that you're attempting to use to prove that God doesn't exist.

-Bri
 
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A Deity which is omniscient already knows EVERYTHING that any creation it ever makes will do - in fact, from the deific point of view, time doesn't exist, and as the Deity wills a thing into existence it is willing its entire history into existence as one. Hence, such a thing absolutely cannot have free will.
It occurs to me that while your assertion is debatable even if a middle knowledge exists - that is, if there are any true counterfactuals of human freedom - the assertion appears false if middle knowledge does not exist. Assuming for the moment that a deity can have simple foreknowledge, but not middle knowledge, such deity would only know the complete timeline of a created universe upon its creation. It would be impossible for him to have selected from among multiple free-agency outcomes known to him.

Of course, Molinists argue that even if he could, human beings would still be free agents, and it is exceedingly difficult to identify beyond a doubt a mistake in their argument.
 
I disagree. 2+2=4 (assuming a constant definition of those terms in base 10) in every possible universe, regardless of whether God or human beings exist in such universe. I would say that it is true regardless of whether any universe actually exists, in fact. It is a logical necessity, and for reasons discussed earlier, even an omnipotent being cannot be the cause of a logically necessary state of affairs [ETA: or a logically impossible one, naturally].

You have personal awareness of every possible universe? Yes, I would agree it is a logical necessity within this reality; but who is to say that every possible reality is supported by our present form of logic? Who is to say that, in some fanciful universe, every time you take two apples, and set them down next to another pair, that suddenly you have six apples?

It is only a 'logical necessity' because we are creatures locked into this mode of logic. Do we expect God, as well, to be similarly bound by such logic? And if so, can God truly be said to be superior?
 
If I insisted that such a God exists, the burden of proof would be on me. But I don't.

If you insist that such a God cannot exist, the burden of proof is on you. The link posted by ceo_esq gives quite a few arguments that refute your "logical argument" and indicate that in fact it is possible for an omniscient, omnipotent God and free will to both exist.

Here is the link for those who missed it.
Here is another one.

-Bri

For what it's worth, I'm saying free will does not exist. Whether or not God does is irrelevant to the case.
 
What would "less-than-supreme" mean? If God was able to do and know everything that is possible to do or know, he would certainly be "supreme" in every sense of the word.

Of course, some also maintain that he knows that which is unknowable and can do that which is undoable since he is beyond logic and nature.

You cannot disprove either, logically or otherwise.

BTW, if you wish to prove that God doesn't exist by use of logic alone (rather than by observation), you may also be interested in these ontological arguments for the existance of God. These arguments "prove" that God exists by employing the same type of logic that you're attempting to use to prove that God doesn't exist.

-Bri

Yes, I admit my definition of 'supreme' in this case means able to transcend logic and nature. My reasoning is simple enough: if God is creator of all, he must by definition be able to transcend his creations. Otherwise, there is something superior to God, something that limits God's abilities. In this case, logic and nature are supreme to God.

And, as I stated above, I have not stated that I don't think God exists. In fact, I do think God exists. I just don't think that free will can truly exist, aside from God's own will.

I've read the ontological arguments link - and if you can't see the obvious failings in them, perhaps we should start another thread. I can spot them fairly easily. Heck, they're even given some fair coverage on that page.

This is the biggest problem with using ontological statements: you can always redefine terms so that your statement is true.
 

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