I think we've already shown that this characterization of omnipotence would require some qualifiers in order to express with real precision what the term is generally taken to mean.
In a way, the correct understanding of omniscience is an issue that is not only trickier but also less settled (from the standpoint of philosophical tradition) than the understanding of omnipotence.
Your definition is unpromising, not least of all because omniscience indicates a state, not an ability. And although etymologically it suggests "knowledge of all", philosophers disagree about what "all" there is to know really means (a bit like our earlier discussion of omnipotence).
There are some things (and I use the term "things" loosely) that an omniscient being (e.g., hypothetically, God) clearly would not know. For example, he could not know that 2+2=5, because it's not a true statement in any possible world. Perhaps it makes more sense to say that a being can be described as omniscient at time t if, for every proposition p, such being knows at t whether p is true or false. Yet philosophers argue over whether certain kinds of propositions are instrinsically neither true nor false, or more broadly whether it is logically possible for their truth-value to be known by even an omniscient being.
Some argue that that it is intrinsically (that is, by definition) impossible to know with certainty a future state of affairs that depends on the choices of one or more free agents. Those people assert that being omniscient at time t means knowing all causal laws and all past and present circumstances at t. For them, God could know the end result of things because he knows how he would intervene to shape events in response to the choices of free agents, but he cannot know absolutely what those choices will be.
Others maintain that an omniscient being can know all states of affairs that will obtain in the future, including the choices of free agents. They insist, however, that it is intrinsically impossible to have so-called "middle knowledge", or knowledge of what free agents would have chosen under alternative circumstances in which they never actually find themselves.
Still others suggest that an omniscient being can have not only foreknowledge but middle knowledge as well.
So far as I know, there is no widespread agreement on these matters in theistic philosophy.
For that matter, there is not to my knowledge a theistic consensus on the precise sense in which God can be understood as "timeless".
I'm afraid I remain unconvinced about your quibbling over definitions, in this case. Simply put, IF God is 'The Creator of All' - and this includes Time - then God, itself, is without time, and all of the Universe - including past, present, and future - exists simultaneously to God as it is being created. If, however, God did not create time - and I accept that as a possibility, but that instantly neutralizes claims of both omnipotence and omniscience - then there is no problem for free will or morality, for the reasons you outlined above.
All the quibbling you've posted above suggests apologetics for a less-than-omni God. And although I technically agree on the whole 'logical omnipotency' issue, if you really think about it, this so-called God also created those rules of logic, those natural definitions and relationships, and so forth. There is no reason to assume that God MUST obey these relationships - nor that God must avoid paradox. However, if we accept that God, being absolutely omnipotent, can even transcend logic and reason - then we cannot discuss God using logic and reason, and God remains solidly in the domain of pure faith.
For this reason alone I remain open to the possibility of free will - that our Creator may, in fact, be unbound by reason and can, therefore, create us past-present-and-future, yet not determine our choices for us.
I think part of the problem is most theists want to see themselves as a river, with God as the wellspring or source, and the course of their river determined by a combination of their will and God's will; but as God created not just the river, but the entire course of that river, God effectively created the choices the river will 'make' the entire way. In other words, God didn't 'create the Universe' in the past; God is having created the Universe at all times. Every moment of existence is God's creation, directly and intentionally - thereby precluding free will. This, I feel, is what omniscience implies.
You suggest that 'God cannot know an untrue thing' - but that suggests both a logical barrier to God and suggests that God did not intentionally make things the way they are. For example, God might very well know that 2+2=1, or 2, or 4, or 11, or 99... or any value whatsover. However, in creating a Universe, God simple decides that, for this universe, 2+2 shall equal 4, for all values of 2, 4, +, and = in the appropriate numerical bases. God, therefore, remains both omnipotent and omniscient... though not, necessarily, adherent to natural laws of logic or reason.
Frankly, I think theists would do well just to drop the 'omniscience' thing altogether, for the simple fact that most texts do not actually support the idea of an all-seeing God. Biblical references seem to indicate that it is possible to hide from God or occasionally lie to God; certainly, God has almost no vision of future events in the Bible, save those that God has pre-planned specifically. Neither do the Gods of other texts seem to possess any particular omniscient quality, either. Unfortunately, the idea that God might not be able to sense everything about His creation seems anathemic to the average theist, and certainly contradicts the logical conception of deity that makes the most philosophical sense.
CEO, one simple question that, for me, will settle most of the arguments you have poised: did God create spacetime as well? If the answer is 'Yes', then God necessarily must transcend spacetime itself, and this means that God automatically is aware of 'all future states', having created them all simultaneously. As such, there can be no free agents. Think of it like having a collage, and as you apply the bits and pieces, some pieces are bent one way, some another way - but as you created these pieces as well, there was no choice which way each would bend; you bent them to your will. To suggest otherwise is to suggest God is not omnipotent after all.
I'm rambling a bit - first thing in the morning, still digesting my coffee... but the point I'm trying to make is that any concept of free will in the absolute sense negates one or more of God's omni-attributes, thereby reducing God to a less-than-supreme being, and semantical and ontological quibbling - all of which takes place in a far less than supreme environment - fails utterly to make headway against this concept... IMHO.