Physical Laws - Best Case for ID?

If evolution plugs your hole, then it plugs your hole. I have educated myself sufficiently on the subject that I have shifted my paradigm so that I doubt. It started with the hope of finding the right missing ingredient to evolution. But why did I go to "designer"? I'll have to think about that. I'll get back with you on that.
Thanks. For me that's the main issue. It's good for people to question the theory, but I've never understood why when people feel they've find a problem, it can lead otherwise critical thinkers to a designer. Any insight?
 
Perhaps responding to a question is not a sign of [DSE EDIT: or proof of] consciousness but asking a question is.

Before you say we can program a computer to ask a question, thats not the same thing. That is the computer performing a function and in that instance we are still the conciousness behind the computer.

And it doesn't matter how far removed we are from that, ie if we program it to program another computer etc.
First off, let me just say that I agree with what you said about science, philosophy, and ID. So we're on the same page. That said, I don't think asking a question is a sign of consciousness. I agree that where we are today with AI is pretty pitiful, but I wouldn't count it out. I may take a little time, but I'm fairly confident we'll get there. I don't know your background, and if you're deep in any of the related fields it's probably too general, but I actually like Jeff Hawkins' On Intelligence critic of AI. But this is getting off topic...
 
Hmmmmm

Perhaps responding to a question is not a sign of consciousness but asking a question is.


Well, not exactly.

A computer can be programmed to ask questions as well as answer some questions and mimic some other human behaviours very closely without anything resembling consciousness as we conceive of it. Your view is somewhat too simplistic, but I understand your point.

Can you ask a question if you are unconscious ?
Can you respond to a question if you are unconscious ?

If you are a computer, the answer to both questions is 'yes'.

If you are a person, the answer to both questions is 'no'.

A computer can only do exactly what it is specifically programmed or told to do, unless some malfunction occurs, no more or less.

Even the most advanced artificial intelligence originates with a human programmer - a genuine example of intelligent design.
 
A computer can only do exactly what it is specifically programmed or told to do, unless some malfunction occurs, no more or less.
Sorry, this simply isn't true. Computers are quite capable of programming themselves, and can come up with ways of solving problems that no human programmed them for.
 
I'm no cosmologist but ... stars don't convert matter to energy (only), they convert matter to other matter, with an energy byproduct. [...] So I wonder how you be so bold as to think you know if a star is efficient - but all I got from you so far is you seemingly think stars are just EM emitters.

You misunderstand. Sure, hydrogen is converted into helium. And that's my entire point. If you want to make an energy source, and you decide the physical laws of the universe, you might as well make a star that converts hydrogen and ANTI-hydrogen into energy. But no, there's this useless by-product.

VonNeumann said:
I agree - but you miss my point. I'm repeating myself. The idea is not to prove it could happen but merely to point out to those who believe without evidence that it could happen (having spoken with many skeptics, you may be surprised that many skeptics believe it is inevitable that humans will evolve to this omega level), but also say ID is false, hold contradictory thinking in their believe system on this point.

Well, I don't believe that we will be like gods, but I do believe that, if there's a physical law, we can learn it and use it to our ends. Does that mean we can create universes ? Maybe. Can we control their physical laws ? Maybe. Will they appear to be random ? Doubtful.
 
VonNeumann said:
Accept ID in the future but not in the past. My point is if it is likely ID will evolve in the future, it may have already evolved. Paradox: simultaneous acceptance/denial.

Read my previous post. I don't believe that. So I don't fall into that imaginary category.

VonNeumann said:
Kind of. Consciousness, which is pretty well undefined, seems an unnecessary ingredient for survival - an astonishing result from mere RM/NS. Doesn't prove anything - just my observation from my view.

Right. Just like photosynthesis isn't a necessary ingredient for survival. Just very useful.
 
Interesting Ian said:
Any proof is necessarily flawed since I cannot possible be in error in my conviction I am conscious.

There there. How can you possibly believe that your perception is infaillible ? Haven't your senses ever been fooled ? Remember the pink and green dots ? Consciousness can also be an illusion, and the mere fact that you perceive it does not negate that possibility.

Interesting Ian said:
Internal processes? Not conscious processes it doesn't since by definition it is not conscious.

Depends on what consciousness is, now, doesn't it ?
 
They act in every way, both to the p-zombie and to external observers, as though they are conscious processes. That follows necessarily from the definition of the term. The p-zombie acts exactly like humans in all ways. Humans act conscious, therefore the p-zombie acts conscious. Humans believe they are conscious, therefore the p-zombie professes that same belief, and acts on it.


Try asking it. It will tell you that you are wrong, and that it definitely is conscious. And it can report in detail exactly what being conscious feels like. Either this is an illusion, or the p-zombie really is conscious.


The problem is that the concept of p-zombies is logically incoherent.

I don't want to hijack this thread, so do you want to paste in your response here in the new thread I've started?

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?p=1459466#post1459466

Also would you like to start a thread about Lucas and explain clearly why you believe that his argument that Godel's theorem proves that minds cannot be explained as machines, is flawed? I can't be bothered at the moment but I'll certainly reply to your response.
 
There there. How can you possibly believe that your perception is infaillible ? Haven't your senses ever been fooled ? Remember the pink and green dots ? Consciousness can also be an illusion, and the mere fact that you perceive it does not negate that possibility.



Depends on what consciousness is, now, doesn't it ?

If you paste in this reply in the new thread I've started I shall respond to it. We shouldn't hijack this thread.
 
Also would you like to start a thread about Lucas and explain clearly why you believe that his argument that Godel's theorem proves that minds cannot be explained as machines, is flawed? I can't be bothered at the moment but I'll certainly reply to your response.
It's hopeless drivel.

Godel's Incompleteness Theorem proves that for any consistent and sufficiently powerful formal system, there exist statements that cannot be shown to be true or false using the rules of that system.

Now, this is not a hypothesis. This is a mathematical proof. This applies, without recourse, to any consistent and sufficiently powerful formal system.

The human mind is not a formal system. Machines are not necessarily formal systems. (Lucas claims they are; he is wrong.) Neither is necessarily consistent. So Godel's Theorem has no general applicability at all.

Which is not to say that we are not bound by Godel's Theorem. We are. Whenever we try to produce a mathematical proof, we are subject to its constraints.

Lucas argues that the human mind is consistent (naturally, this requires a lot of special pleading), sufficiently powerful, a formal system, and not bound by the Incompleteness Theorem. Three out of four of those claims are false.
 
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I dug out his paper, and he's actually talking specifically about Turing-equivalent machines, though he doesn't use the term. Those are indeed consistent, sufficiently powerful formal systems.

Now, if he constrained himself to arguing that the human brain is not a Turing machine, he might have a point. (Although if space-time is quantised, he would be wrong.)

But he wishes to argue that the human mind is consistent.

Lucas said:
A man's untutored reaction if his consistency is questioned is to affirm it vehemently: but this, in view of Gödel's second theorem, is taken by some philosophers as evidence of his actual inconsistency. Professor Putnam9 has suggested that human beings are machines, but inconsistent machines. If a machine were wired to correspond to an inconsistent system, then there would be no well-formed formula which it could not produce as true; and so in no way could it be proved to be inferior to a human being. Nor could we make its inconsistency a reproach to it---are not men inconsistent too? Certainly women are, and politicians; and {53} even male non-politicians (121) contradict themselves sometimes, and a single inconsistency is enough to make a system inconsistent.

The fact that we are all sometimes inconsistent cannot be gainsaid, but from this it does not follow that we are tantamount to inconsistent systems. Our inconsistencies are mistakes rather than set policies. They correspond to the occasional malfunctioning of a machine, not its normal scheme of operations. Witness to this that we eschew inconsistencies when we recognize them for what they are. If we really were inconsistent machines, we should remain content with our inconsistencies, and would happily affirm both halves of a contradiction. Moreover, we would be prepared to say absolutely anything---which we are not. It is easily shown10 that in an inconsistent formal system everything is provable, and the requirement of consistency turns out to be just that not everything can be proved in it---it is not the case that "anything goes." This surely is a characteristic of the mental operations of human beings: they are selective: they do discriminate between favoured---true---and unfavoured--- false---statements: when a person is prepared to say anything, and is prepared to contradict himself without any qualm or repugnance, then he is adjudged to have "lost his mind". Human beings, although not perfectly consistent, are not so much inconsistent as fallible.
He can't have it both ways. Fallibility is not a characteristic of formal systems. Inconsistency is. Either humans are inconsistent, or they are not formal systems. If they are not formal systems, then the entire argument is pointless because Godel's theorem doesn't apply.
 
Sounds like a no true Scotsman fallacy.

No more so than when a teacher says "no student who knew the correct answer would have written this gibberish on the test -- so zero marks."

I would have thought that it was a question for mathematicians rather than philosophers though.

The mathematics can be left to the mathematicians, but the philosophical implications (for example, the question of human intelligence) are of course of interest to the philosophers.

The problem is, when the philosophers get the maths wrong, and then use that as the basis for their philosophy, they get the philosophy wrong, too.

Which is exactly what happened with Lucas and Penrose. They got the basic maths wrong, and their philosophy of mind is therefore a breathtaking display of inanitity.



No I will not. I will not ever read a word of what Dennett says, no matter how much people implore me to do so on here. He's a raving lunatic who has admitted that he thinks he's a p-zombie.[/QUOTE]
 
Oh, here we go:
Lucas said:
In thus (114) relaxing the specification of our model, so that it is no longer completely determinist, though still entirely mechanistic, we shall be able to take into account a feature often proposed for mechanical models of the mind, namely that they should contain a randomizing device. One could build a machine where the choice between a number of alternatives was settled by, say, the number of radium atoms to have disintegrated in a given container in the past half- minute. It is prima facie plausible that our brains should be liable to random effects: a cosmic ray might well be enough to trigger off a neural impulse. But clearly in a machine a randomizing device could not be introduced to choose any alternative whatsoever: it can only be permitted to choose between a number of allowable alternatives. It is all right to add any number chosen at random to both sides of an equation, but not to add one number to one side and another to the other. It is all right to choose to prove one theorem of Euclid rather than another, or to use one method rather than another, but not to "prove" something which is not true, or to use a "method of proof" which is not valid. Any {46} randomizing devices must allow choices only between those operations which will not lead to inconsistency: which is exactly what the relaxed specification of our model specifies Indeed, one might put it this way: instead of considering what a completely determined machine must do, we shall consider what a machine might be able to do if it had a randomizing device that acted whenever there were two or more operations possible, none of which could lead to inconsistency.
So here he allows the expansion of the definition of the machine to include randomness - as long as the randomness does not lead to inconsistent statements. However, he has already noted that humans do produce inconsistent statements.

So his argument is that humans are not the same as machines that are not the same as humans.

Terrific.
 
Godel's Incompleteness Theorem proves that for any consistent and sufficiently powerful formal system, there exist statements that cannot be shown to be true or false using the rules of that system.

More accurately, there either exists a statement whose value cannot be shown to be either true or false, or there exists a statement that can be shown to be both true and false. Any sufficiently powerful formal system is either incomplete, in that it doesn't give us all the answers, or inconsistent, in that it sometimes gives us wrong ones. (Or, of course, both.)

The human mind is not a formal system. Machines are not necessarily formal systems. (Lucas claims they are; he is wrong.) Neither is necessarily consistent. So Godel's Theorem has no general applicability at all.

To continue this general line of argument, let's assume that both machines and human minds are formal systems. In this case, because of the Godel's theorem, we can predict that human minds, in particular, would be either incomplete or inconsistent.

Fortunately, we have ample evidence that they are, in fact, inconsistent -- and incomplete as well.
 
You misunderstand. Sure, hydrogen is converted into helium. And that's my entire point. If you want to make an energy source, and you decide the physical laws of the universe, you might as well make a star that converts hydrogen and ANTI-hydrogen into energy. But no, there's this useless by-product..
We are still out o' sync. Let's try this. Stars (cosmological systems) produced ALL the elements. The elements did not condense out of the big-bang: poof poof poof (you knew that, right?) OK? How were stars inefficient at manufacturing ALL the elements (not just helium)? Do you have a more efficient machine in mind?

Well, I don't believe that we will be like gods, but I do believe that, if there's a physical law, we can learn it and use it to our ends. Does that mean we can create universes ? Maybe. Can we control their physical laws ? Maybe. Will they appear to be random ? Doubtful.
I think the "god" euphemism got in your way. But you accepted the premise: that creative entities could evolve here (creative with a capital C), it seems to me when you said "Maybe.". Do you also give a "maybe" to whether intelligent entities, who wonder if their origins were random, could evolve in that newly created universe?
 
I understand why people FEEL that way, but we are not supposed to think with our gut.
Sure. Don't think with your gut. :)

When Planc announced his solution to the black body problem I would assume his gut told him that a quantized universe just COULDN'T be right.
 
One question...

How is this discussion of an "Intelligent Designer" of the Universe any different than a discussion of whether or not the Earth is controlled by a living sentient being by the name of "Gaia"?

Isn't it the exact same debate, just moved to a scale that we don't have the ability to explore completely?

Edit: I guess that's technically two...
 
We are still out o' sync. Let's try this. Stars (cosmological systems) produced ALL the elements. The elements did not condense out of the big-bang: poof poof poof (you knew that, right?) OK? How were stars inefficient at manufacturing ALL the elements (not just helium)? Do you have a more efficient machine in mind?

So, let me get this straight. The designer made hydrogen so it would condense into stars... stars so massive that they would collapse under their own weight and produce carbon, oxygen et al through type II supernovae, and THEN would form planetary systems on which life MAY evolve in some very specific, extremely-rare conditions ? He's incompetent, allright. Any way you look at it.

I think the "god" euphemism got in your way. But you accepted the premise: that creative entities could evolve here (creative with a capital C), it seems to me when you said "Maybe.". Do you also give a "maybe" to whether intelligent entities, who wonder if their origins were random, could evolve in that newly created universe?

That's rather idiotic. We KNOW that creative creatures exist. It's not a maybe. I just don't think we can have it both ways: if we can create a universe with random laws, chances are no life will be found there. If the laws are not random, chances are whoever evolves in that universe is going to pick that up. OUR universe seems to be the result of randomness. There doesn't seem to be any design in it.
 

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