Materialists......

[UndercoverElephant]

Does he have behavior? (yes)

So do androids.

The Idiocy Quotient of this thread is now off the meter. Chris and Mercutio can't imagine a zombie at all, but they have no trouble imagining a holographic projection being conscious.

Yes, Rimmer has plenty of behaviour. But he doesn't have a brain. He is both a slave (to Holly, the computer) and non-conscious.

LW, please come back.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

You people do realize that you are discussing a fictional character?

I agree. This is completely silly. Whoever brought this character up in the first place should be whipped, since it can have no bearing on any real discussion.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Here's a better version:

1) Evolution has been proven true by science.
2) Evolution says it took billions of years.
3) The Bible says it took 7 days.
C) Therefore the Bible is wrong.

Now, the creationist wants to deny (C). The conclusion does now follow from the premises. Can he claim that (1 & 2) involve an assumption that the Bible is false?

No, because (1) and (2) do not mention the Bible. However, (1) and (2) do involve an assumption that anything that disagrees with evolution is false. Don't they?

But where is the assumption? You are confusing question-begging with valid arguments. It is true of all valid arguments that their premises entail their conclusion. This does not mean they assume their conclusion.

Indeed, so I am confused about the difference between entail and assume.

What do you think is the essential difference between the two examples? Why do you think that one of them begs the question but the other does not?

The Bible example requires at least one step to reach the conclusion, since (1) and (2) say nothing about the Bible. These statements require no steps:

A zombie exists with a complete set of physical attributes of a human-complete-with-mind, but does not have the mind attribute.

Zombies are physically identical to humans but mindless.

They say, outright, that mind is an exception from the set of physical attributes.

Anyway, we need not belabor this point.

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

OK, I see where you are coming from. You are stating that zombies are only possible if minds are not causally efficacious. That is correct. However, if minds are causally efficacious, materialism is false anyway.

It is? Wow, that's an argument for another thread.

The zombie argument is aimed at supervenience theories. It assumes that materialism means "supervenience materialism" (which includes epiphenomenalism, unless you consider epiphenomenalism to be property dualism). So if you hold some other position, such as eliminativism or any form of non-materialism, then the zombie argument is irrelevant anyway.

So when you say that the zombie argument kills materialism, you're painting with a brush that's too broad.

I presume you mean supervenience physicalism. From Stanford:

According to (1), what this means is that if physicalism is true, there is no possible world which is identical to the actual world in every physical respect but which is not identical to it in a biological or social or psychological respect. It will be useful to have a name for physicalism so defined, so let us call it supervenience physicalism.

So I repeat my question: How can I conceive of a zombie unless epiphenomenalism is the case?

~~ Paul

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

To add to the above, on what grounds can you deny evidence of consciousness to an entity that passes the Turing test with flying colors? There must be some other sort of test to determine if an entity is conscious, so would you please share it with us?

You say that you can conceive of a p-zombie, yet the example that you have given is a waste of everyone's time. A fictional character who would never pass the p-zombie test? A p-zombie must be like a human in all respects except consciousness, including behaviors such as planning for meals, getting a job and performing all the tasks appropriately, etc. -- all tasks that we know from experience cannot be performed by folks who lack emotions or the ability to integrate emotions with cognition.

You can play ignorant as much as you like about actual human beings but some of us have experience with what can go wrong and what that means for someone's life. You can pretend that fictional characters, like Data, act without emotion; but it is, in fact, the emotion inherent in all his actions that makes him an endearing character to us. Those emotions are hidden but could never be eradicated by Brent Spiner. The same is true of all other "characters" that we see on screen. A truly emotionless entity is a PC. We easily see that a PC is different from us because of that lack of emotion. Put a motivational and emotional system in a PC and then see how people react to it.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Paul replied:

Indeed, so I am confused about the difference between entail and assume.

Yes. Just because something disagrees with the Bible, it does not follow that there have been any assumptions that the Bible is false. I think we need to be careful here about the meaning of three words.

"Assumption" is only applicable when there is an unsupported claim. The assumption is only question-begging if it specifically involves the conclusion of the argument, or its direct negation.

"Implies" and "entails" are slightly different words which are sometimes used interchangeably. "Entails" means "logically follows from" such as "The water shortage entails that we have to stop taking long showers". "Entails" can also be used to mean "implies" or "accompanies".

"Implies" means "not directly stated, but hinted at". For example if a Christian uses a premise "The Bible is the direct word of God", he is implying that the Bible is true, even though he hasn't quite said this. The difference between "implies" and "entails" is subtle. The difference between these pair and "assumes" is not subtle.

Geoff posted:

What do you think is the essential difference between the two examples? Why do you think that one of them begs the question but the other does not?

Paul replies:

The Bible example requires at least one step to reach the conclusion, since (1) and (2) say nothing about the Bible.


These statements require no steps:

A zombie exists with a complete set of physical attributes of a human-complete-with-mind, but does not have the mind attribute.

Zombies are physically identical to humans but mindless.

They say, outright, that mind is an exception from the set of physical attributes.

The fact that the Bible example needs an extra step before one arrives at the conclusion "The Bible is false" is a clear indication that there was no assumption in (1&2). The "extra step" involves the addition of the line: "If the Bible is true, then evolution must be false." This extra step involves the creationist assuming his conclusion.

The zombie argument also requires an extra step, somewhere or other. The line "A zombie exists with a complete set of physical attributes of a human-complete-with-mind, but does not have the mind attribute." does not itself claim that anti-physicalism is true. It needs the following:

Additional step: "If physicalism is true, minds cannot be non-physical." This extra step involves the physicalist assuming his conclusion. It is a statement which is implied by physicalism being true, in exactly the same was the "evolution is false" is implied by "The Bible is all true". In both cases you need to add an extra step before the contradiction arises. In both cases, the extra step involves an assumption of the negation of the valid conclusion of the argument.

Nearly every time I have accused somebody on this board of putting the cart before the horse, this is what had happened. Hammegk in particular has spent years trying to get the materialists here to see that their defence boiled down to "If materialism is true.....then materialism is true". If I trawled the database, how many instances do you think I'd find of an attempted rebuttal of a falsification of materialism which runs "If materialism/physicalism is true, then minds must be physical. Therefore, your argument must have assumed anti-physicalism"? In Robins case, he was so convinced he was correct that he demanded I took my logic to my lecturers, who he assured would tell me I was making a basic logical error.

Hopefully, partly thanks to LW's intervention of sanity, we have now nailed this problem. I will certainly be directing people towards this section of this thread when the problem occurs in the future.

I'd also add that quite a few philosophy students, including some of the brightest, struggled with basic logic. The ones that could do it, and weren't scared off by the symbols, got >95%. The brightest student on the course failed his logic exam but was allowed to continue on the grounds that he was rather good at everything else. What is certainly true is that unless you've had an elementary course in logic you are likely to make basic logical errors, even if you are intelligent and well-educated, and that even people who have had the elementary logic course are not immune to making basic errors either.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Consider:

(1) X contradicts Y
(2) X is true
(C) Y is false

I take it this is a valid proof that doesn't beg the question. Now:

(1) X contradicts Y
(2') Y is false
(C) Y is false

does beg the question. Yet (2') is equivalent to (2). I guess that's why I'm confused.

Edited to add: Oops, I need a premise (0) X or Y is true. Does that matter?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You people do realize that you are discussing a fictional character?

I agree. This is completely silly. Whoever brought this character up in the first place should be whipped, since it can have no bearing on any real discussion.

Not true. He's perfectly relevant because he demonstrates the ease with which we can imagine something that is indistinguisable from a human in terms of looks and behaviour, but which cannot possibly be conscious.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

"Assumption" is only applicable when there is an unsupported claim. The assumption is only question-begging if it specifically involves the conclusion of the argument, or its direct negation.

But descriptions of question begging say that the begging can be indirect.

The zombie argument also requires an extra step, somewhere or other. The line "A zombie exists with a complete set of physical attributes of a human-complete-with-mind, but does not have the mind attribute." does not itself claim that anti-physicalism is true.

Why do you keep mentioning anti-physicalism? I'm not saying anything about that. I'm asking how it is that the statement does not assume that mind (or whatever attribute I'm eliminating from zombies) is a nonphysical attribute. Whether that's related to anti-physicalism is a further problem.

Seems to me that if we've bought into the conceivability of zombies, we've bought into the conceivability of a nonphysical attribute. We've assumed our conclusion before we even get to the proof.

Which brings up this observation: Sure, I agree that mind is a nonphysical attribute. It is a conceptual attribute. What is a nonphysical attribute, exactly?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The Idiocy Quotient of this thread is now off the meter. Chris and Mercutio can't imagine a zombie at all, but they have no trouble imagining a holographic projection being conscious.

Geoff, you're being too glib about the possibility of zombies. You're pulling an Ian on anyone who disagrees with their conceivability. That is why I'm discussing the epiphenomenalism issue.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

It is? Wow, that's an argument for another thread.

We can do it here if you like. Remember that at this point in the debate we have nailed down the meaning of "mind" to mean "conscious experiences". If you then claim that these things not only exist, but are causally efficacious you have the mental causality that the eliminative psychologists are so keen to remove. If materialism is true, there can be no talk of "mental causality".

So when you say that the zombie argument kills materialism, you're painting with a brush that's too broad.

I presume you mean supervenience physicalism. From Stanford:

I was quite clear about this, several times. If you are an eliminativist, the zombie argument fails. So, yes, the zombie argument is aimed directly at supervenience theories of physicalism.

So I repeat my question: How can I conceive of a zombie unless epiphenomenalism is the case?

~~ Paul

You forget about metaphysics and stop trying to feed metaphysical conclusions into the start of the zombie argument. You can concieve of a zombie with no reference to metaphysics at all.

Think about the example of the creationist. He might say "How can I entertain the idea that evolution might be true, unless it is the case that the Bible is false?" The answer is "Stop trying to feed Biblical assumptions into the start of an argument about evolution." The creationist needs to think about the claim "evolution is true" without continually putting cart before horse. If he wants to refute it, he's got to examine the line of reasoning which leads to the claim "evolution is true" all on its own. He must temporarily forget about the Bible. The same is true of the physicalist who is faced with a zombie argument. The claim that zombies are concievable makes no references to metaphysics whatsoever. All it does is establish what we mean when we normally use words and concepts like "mental" and "physical" - something which we do all the time without regard to metaphysics. Even the materialists do this, and when they say "mind" in normal conversation they mean exactly the same thing that I mean.

BTW, "supervenience physicalism" includes almost all reductive materialisms.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Not true. He's perfectly relevant because he demonstrates the ease with which we can imagine something that is indistinguisable from a human in terms of looks and behaviour, but which cannot possibly be conscious.

What it demonstrates is the ease with which you can fool yourself into believing that you have imagined someone who is indistinguishable from a human in terms of looks and behavior. You are necessarily dealing with a representation that was created by a being embued with emotion who shows you another entity embued with emotion whether or not you realize this. The behavior you see is also necessarily very limited and could never be used to determine that it is equivalent to actual human action on human terms.

How can you determine that it is impossible for this representation to have consciousness? On what grounds do you make this determination?

To pre-empt your reply to my other post, I am very well aware that there is no test to determine if a p-zombie has consciousness. That was the underlying point of the post.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Consider:

(1) X contradicts Y
(2) X is true
(C) Y is false

I take it this is a valid proof that doesn't beg the question.

Correct. As in:

(1) The Bible contradicts evolution.
(2) Evolution is true.
(C) The Bible is false

Now:

(1) X contradicts Y
(2') Y is false
(C) Y is false

does beg the question.

Also correct. As in:

(1) The Bible contradicts evolution.
(2') The Bible is false.
(C) The Bible is false.

Or what about:

(1) The Bible contradicts the Koran.
(2') The Bible is false.
(C) The Bible is false.

Yet (2') is equivalent to (2). I guess that's why I'm confused.

Incorrect. They are not equivalent.

(2) is "Evolution is true".
(2') is "The Bible is false."

(2) is based upon a further set of arguments. It does not simply assume that the Bible is false. (2') is based on nothing. It is a straightforward assertion that the Bible is false. You arrive at (C) not because you've carefully examined the evidence supporting the claim "evolution is true" but because you've declared, with no support, that the Bible is false. In your second example, you declare that evolution contradicts the Bible, but you then don't use with this premise to reach your conclusion.

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

But descriptions of question begging say that the begging can be indirect.

Why do you keep mentioning anti-physicalism?

Because that is what I am being accused of assuming. When Robin feeds "If physicalism is true...." into the argument he claims I am assuming the opposite of his assumption. The opposite of his assumption is anti-physicalism.

I'm not saying anything about that. I'm asking how it is that the statement does not assume that mind (or whatever attribute I'm eliminating from zombies) is a nonphysical attribute.

OK, this is crucial....

Because the meanings of the words "mind" and "matter" have not, in this case, been fixed by starting at a metaphysical position. You can define mind and matter in terms of a metaphysical position:

Mind = brain process (non-eliminative materialism)
Mind = meaningless word (eliminative materialism)
Mind = mental stuff (dualism, idealism)

But you do not have to start a debate by defining "mind" in this way. Instead, you can start by an analysis of the way we actually use those words in our normal conversation and in the way we conceptualise reality in a normal day-to-day setting. So the statement doesn't assume that mind is a non-physical attribute. It actually follows from the meanings of mind and matter which have been established in the previous steps of the argument. Mind is taken to mean "my subjective experiences" for the simple reason is that is exactly what it is taken to mean in all normal conversation and in most philosophical arguments also. This has got nothing to do with any metaphysical assumption. Instead, it is based on an argument from natural language. This is an entirely legitimate means of establishing the meaning of the word "mind" without any reference to metaphysics at all.

Seems to me that if we've bought into the conceivability of zombies, we've bought into the conceivability of a nonphysical attribute. We've assumed our conclusion before we even get to the proof.

We have certainly bought into the conceivability of a nonphysical attribute, but we didn't do it by assuming the conclusion "minds are non-physical". We fixed the meanings of the words "Mind" and "physical" via an argument that didn't refer to metaphysics.

Which brings up this observation: Sure, I agree that mind is a nonphysical attribute. It is a conceptual attribute. What is a nonphysical attribute, exactly?

Are you asking that question independent of assumptions of metaphysics, or is there a metaphysical position hanging over your head when you ask the question?

Perhaps it would help if I repost the following:

http://www.utsc.utoronto.ca/~seager/zombie.html

Of course, we don't have a very clear idea of exactly what makes a property a physical versus a non-physical property. But we can use the rationale of the zombie argument itself to help us get clearer about such properties. Here is a first pass at a sufficient condition for being what I will call a radically non-physical property:

(R) if some thing, x, has a property, P, which is such that it is logically possible for something physically indistinguishable from x to lack that property then P is a radically non-physical property7.

My philosophical zombie, if it is logically possible, will reveal that there are mental properties of consciousness which are radically non-physical properties by this criterion. And that seems intuitively correct. However, some properties which intuitively present no difficulties for a physicalist outlook are hereby declared radically non-physical. Any relational property will come out as non-physical by this criterion. For example, a Canadian one dollar coin has a possible physical duplicate which is not money at all. However, it is easy to extend our criterion of non-physicality to cover relational properties thus:

(R*) if some thing, x, has a property, P, which is such that there is a possible world which is physically identical to the actual world but in which x's physical duplicate lacks P, then P is a radically non-physical property.

Note that the specification of the possible world that tests for non-physicality might have to include the total history of the world. If the actual world was in fact created five minutes ago then it may be that there is no real money in it (only lots of perfect counterfeits), if one defines money in terms of being printed by a legitimately authorized mint (as opposed to miraculously appearing out of nowhere with the rest of the world and being treated as money by the similarly newly created denizens of that world). Thus test worlds may have to be totally physically identical to the actual world. This identity might even have to extend through 'future history' as well. For example, it is conceivable that the property of inertia is a relational (and physical of course) property depending upon the total distribution of matter throughout all of space and time. So if -- as seems unlikely to me -- properties of consciousness are in fact relational properties then it will be the logical possibility of whole 'zombie worlds' that will reveal that such properties are radically non-physical.8

We might now define a rather weak form of physicalism simply as:

(P) There are no radically non-physical properties.

Now it is clear that the mere logical possibility of zombies is enough to refute physicalism insofar as it reveals the radically non-physical nature of at least some mental properties and insofar as any reasonable version of physicalism (such as (P) for example) rejects the existence of such radically non-physical properties.

Showing that philosophical zombies are logically impossible would thus make the world safer for physicalism. But on the other hand, a proof of the impossibility of zombies which rested upon a premise asserting or implying the truth of physicalism would be worthless. That would just beg the question.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

How can you determine that it is impossible for this representation to have consciousness? On what grounds do you make this determination?

He has no brain. His "brain" is a computer program.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Incorrect. They are not equivalent.

(2) is "Evolution is true".
(2') is "The Bible is false."

(2) is based upon a further set of arguments. It does not simply assume that the Bible is false. (2') is based on nothing. It is a straightforward assertion that the Bible is false. You arrive at (C) not because you've carefully examined the evidence supporting the claim "evolution is true" but because you've declared, with no support, that the Bible is false. In your second example, you declare that evolution contradicts the Bible, but you then don't use with this premise to reach your conclusion.

I wasn't talking about the Bible and evolution. I was just using two abstract claims X and Y and the premise that they contradict each other. Never mind.

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

So do androids.

Which may or may not be conscious, depending on both one's definition and on the complexity of the behavior of the android.

The Idiocy Quotient of this thread is now off the meter. Chris and Mercutio can't imagine a zombie at all, but they have no trouble imagining a holographic projection being conscious.

Note that this is actually perfectly consistent.

Yes, Rimmer has plenty of behaviour. But he doesn't have a brain. He is both a slave (to Holly, the computer) and non-conscious.

A) I have never defined consciousness as simply brain function. B) it may be argued that a brain is a meat-based computer. Rimmer has a different sort of computer. If consciousness arises from brain computations, there is nothing about the difference between carbon and silicon that allows the former to give rise to consciousness. C) As long as we are discussing fictional characters, Rimmer is quite obviously (as portrayed) an independent program running on Holly. Rimmer orders Holly to do this and that, and they even argue. If Rimmer is a slave to Holly, you are a slave to your environment.

Not true. He's perfectly relevant because he demonstrates the ease with which we can imagine something that is indistinguisable from a human in terms of looks and behaviour, but which cannot possibly be conscious.

Cannot possibly? Once again, your assumptions about consciousness blind you.

He has no brain. His "brain" is a computer program.

And? Again, no one has suggested that the form a brain takes is crucial. (remember when he switches to a "hard light hologram"? He can even feel? No one would be able to detect a difference, yet you insist there is one.)

If Rimmer is your p-zombie, it seems obvious to me that the p-zombie does not negate materialism. It simply demonstrates that some philosophers will posit a distinction that no one can detect, then argue for the critical importance of that distinction.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

He has no brain. His "brain" is a computer program.

This is an answer? He is a fictional character. How do you know that a computer program could ever act in that way?

For someone to appear conscious requires motivation and emotion. Computer programs do not contain those elements. So a computer program, by itself, could never appear conscious. A computer program, therefore, fails the p-zombie test in that it could not appear conscious.

A computer with many different systems, one for motivation, one for the emotional aspects of love, one for the emotional aspects of fear, etc. and with cognitive systems also running concurrently might be able to look conscious. It would also necessarily be self-aware since to appear conscious it must be able to look at its own actions and make alterations based on its behavior within a particular environment. Have I left anything out? Obviously I must have since I only mentioned a portion of the things that make up our brain systems.

You are saying that it is impossible for a computer with all these systems concurrently running to be conscious. Why? What possible reason can you give?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

You forget about metaphysics and stop trying to feed metaphysical conclusions into the start of the zombie argument. You can concieve of a zombie with no reference to metaphysics at all.

Only if I'm as glib about it as you are. Here, let me do it without any metaphysical terms:

How can a zombie give the same answers as humans about questions of consciousness (whatever it is that's eliminated in a zombie)? If consciousness has any effect on the zombie's behavior at all, then I could distinguish the zombie from a human. So consciousness must have no effect on behavior, either directly or indirectly. Every single bit of human experience that consciousness affects must be isolated from the physical parts of the human that give rise to the human's behavior, speech, visible emotions, measurable brain function, etc.

I find this inconceivable.

I'm part way through the Seager paper, and he says:

So what happens when, as Kirk imagines, a zombie suddenly acquires consciousness? First, the zombie is affected, but non-physically, just by gaining certain properties that it lacked before. Of course, nothing physical changes, by hypothesis. And yet the zombie's false beliefs about its own mental states suddenly become true, and they become knowledge too.

I'm supposed to accept that belief and knowledge changes are entirely nonphysical? This goes way beyond accepting that some subjective experience is nonphysical.

~~ Paul

 

[DreadNiK]

He has no brain. His "brain" is a computer program.

So? You are just asserting that 'no brain (in the sense of gray biological matter) means no consciousness'.

I still don't see how p-zombie is any different from a human being, if there is no way of observing that difference...surely it is like the 'brain in vat' idea, in that if there is no practical way of knowing the difference, then it is irrelevant.