Materialists......

[chriswl]

That is the whole problem for the anti-zombist. If the possibility of zombies could just be dismissed with a wave of the hand, they'd pose no problems for supervenience materialism.

Well Dennett, for one, does indeed claim we can dismiss zombies this easily.

Easily. We imagine an abscence of any internal awareness. As much as the materialist would like to claim that this is impossible to imagine, it is hard to see how he is going to convince a neutral of this. Imagining zombies is all too easy.

You haven't explained how you do this. I don't think you are really imagining it.

We are imagining that it lacks the awareness that we ourselves are currently experiencing. We imagine it has no consciousness.

How do you do that? What exactly are you imagining?

I can attempt to imagine that someone or something is conscious, that there is, in the phrase, something it is like to be that thing. I can sucessfully imagine consciousness in the case of other people, I struggle in the case of most animals and I fail completely if I try it with inanimate objects. I can't imagine what it would be like to be them. There are things that I assume are not conscious because I cannot imagine them as being conscious. But that doesn't mean I can directly imagine a lack of consciousness in them. All I do is try to imagine consciousness and fail.

The problem is, I don't fail when I try to imagine a p-zombie as being conscious. I succeed just in the same way I succeed when I imagine other normal humans as conscious because they are indistinguishable.

 

[chriswl]

...materialistic scientists who don't really do philosophy (of which there are a great many) and who are looking to someone who will act as a rearguard defence of their metaphysical beliefs. Dennett is famous because he is the last line of defence against the hordes of rampaging anti-materialists.

I see no rampaging hordes. Anti-materialists are invisible outside of philosophy departments and churches.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Well, as far as "Life of Pi" is concerned, the tiger can stand for any number of things, but it expressly stands for one core idea contained in a comment from relatively early in the book, "a story that will make you believe in God".

Let me ask you a question, if you don't mind....do separate human races exist?

 

[Apathia]

Hyparxis, the tiger wasn't necessarily in the boat. To conclude so is to miss the point. The story is simply better with the tiger in the boat. We need that story. Atoms smashing together has no meaning for us. We create meaning.

I got stories confused. There's a Taoist tale about an empty boat.

As someone whose hobby is writing stories, I coudn't agree more.

 

[Apathia]

I assume, then, that you refer to our emotional life here. Generally in these sorts of discussions that is what surfaces as what often stands for subjectivity though few wish to agree once it is placed in such stark terms. Or do you have a different sense for what "subjectivity" means? I always like to hear what others think of the term.

I don't think we are trying to create a "purely objective" space here to discuss "mental matters". I can certainly see how you might get the impression that some of your interlocutors are trying to suck "meaning" from the debate. That is why I made the reference to "The Life of Pi" in the first place, because I sensed that you felt that was going on. I was trying to remedy the situation in advance by mentioning that that was not anyone's intent in this discussion, at least as far as I know.

Like I said, I misunderstood the literary reference.

Nah, I don't think anyone here wants to reduce me or themselves to a zombies.
Everyone is working on their own way to express a world view that does justice to their own experience of life, Subjectively and Objectively.
Some in the process have made some very Procustian statements that deny our simple experience of our own self-consciouness. So I try to pull things away from that extream and unfortunate edge.

 

[Apathia]

Ah, OK. I wondered if the tiger and boat stuff was refering to that book. But I now have no idea what the relevance is. I saw a deep metaphor in the ending of that book, but don't really understand how it applies here. The metaphor I saw was that life was at times actually so difficult and oppresive and often so repetitive and dull that as conscious human beings, we have to make up a different narrative to make it all seem more bearable. Is somebody suggesting that we've made up the concept of mind for the same reason, or have I got the wrong end of the stick?

That would not be where I'm coming from either. making meaning is not all about escaping a boring, angst ridden existance, though some of the stories I write are esacapist.

 

[Apathia]

"a story that will make you believe in God".

I'll have to look this one up then to see if it wants me to believe in a Theistic God or affirm the divinity and sacredness of our Being.

 

[Mercutio]

Recommend me something I can pull off the net. I've already exceeded my book allowance.
[snip]

I may be misunderstanding a subtle point here, so please pass along some info on Radical Behaviorism. I might find it very Zen.

Here's a 3-part behaviorism tutorial that focuses on the difference between methodological behaviorism (the closest thing to Geoff's strawman) and radical behaviorism (the dominant current behaviorism).

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Let me ask you a question, if you don't mind....do separate human races exist?

There are different races of humans, but the are united in that they all belong to the species H. Sapiens. This is a question related to the question in evolutionary biology about how one distinguishes between species. There are at least three different ways of doing it, but none of them are immune to a counter-example.

You can look at life on earth as one giant organism or you can look at it as innumerable individual organisms. Somewhere in between there are races, sub-species, species.....etc...

"seperate human races" is a complex abstract concept.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Here's a 3-part behaviorism tutorial that focuses on the difference between methodological behaviorism (the closest thing to Geoff's strawman) and radical behaviorism (the dominant current behaviorism).

Behaviorism is generally characterized as the viewpoint holding that the appropriate subject matter for psychology is behavior and the appropriate methods for psychology are those of the natural sciences.

So William James is off limits, huh?

[edit]

f**** h**. I just looked a bit further into the "behaviourism tutorial".

It reminded me of this:

http://www.evolutionfairytale.com/cleanerf.htm

[/edit]

 

[Mercutio]

We can agree to disagree, until you can explain what a non-monist position of any kind can logically be other than dualism. Do you propose a fourth "Mercutio monism"? If so how does it differ from 'mind', 'body', or 'neutral'?

As yet, imo, the choice 'neutral' also just hides a refusal to take a stand, and remain a dualist in all but denial of it.

If each monism is reducible to the other, what does it mean to choose one over the other? If neither monism offers anything the other does not, what does it mean to choose one over the other? If a choice is meaningless, why make it? What does it mean to choose among options that are the same?

And how the hell do you see that as dualism?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Like I said, I misunderstood the literary reference.

Sorry, I should have been more explicit. That was my fault.

Nah, I don't think anyone here wants to reduce me or themselves to a zombies.

I don't think that many people here actually think the argument is coherent and that p-zombies exist. I, for one, agree with you that either p-zombies do not exist or we are all p-zombies. I don't think it is possible to separate behavior that exists from the working of consciousness (or what we call consciousness) from consciousness itself, as you have said.

Everyone is working on their own way to express a world view that does justice to their own experience of life, Subjectively and Objectively.
Some in the process have made some very Procustian statements that deny our simple experience of our own self-consciouness. So I try to pull things away from that extream and unfortunate edge.

I agree. But I think that what happens is that some folks may feel painted into a corner or may not express themselves very well. I don't think anyone wants to deny "subjective experience", only the potential origin and meaning of that experience. The experience is very real. But that does not necessarily imply a "mind". Much of this depends on how we use these words. It is undeniable that we have private experiences and that no one else can feel what they are like. How this comes about is the interesting question.

I think a very interesting literary "experiment" with some of these ideas is Connie Willis' "To Say Nothing of the Dog". While I won't fawn over the book as some reviewers have, it was an interesting idea to explore what love means in an essentially deterministic universe (even though she frequently refers to chaos theory and QM). I don't think she quite pulled it off, though. I think she was too constrained by the first person voice that she used, or just didn't write it well enough.

Ultimately, as far as meaning goes, it all boils down to love. That is whence our purpose, point and values emerge. That is why, I think, the Matrix trilogy took the turn that it did, even in all its existential glory.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I'll have to look this one up then to see if it wants me to believe in a Theistic God or affirm the divinity and sacredness of our Being.

It's actually a pretty good book -- meaning that you can take it or leave it and that you can use whatever notion of God you wish. The point was simply supposed to be that our human stories are more interesting with than without God (there are no proofs for God's existence nor proofs denying it that actually work). You don't need to believe or not believe. There is no preaching. There is humor. And a tiger. Who could ask for more?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Well Dennett, for one, does indeed claim we can dismiss zombies this easily.

He would, he's Dennett.

You haven't explained how you do this. I don't think you are really imagining it.

How do you do that? What exactly are you imagining?

I'm imagining a human being, then I'm imagining they are like, um, did you ever watch red dwarf? Rimmer is a hologram, yes? Now, in the show, Rimmer is assumed to actually be conscious (I guess). But why should a hologram be conscious? He's being sustained by the computer, yes? He's just a projection. So he hasn't really got a mind, he's just programmed to behave like the real Rimmer, who is long since dead. So I am imagining something not dissimilar to a holographic Rimmer who doesn't have a mind but looks and behaves exactly as if he did have a mind. I realise Rimmer is a fictional creation, but he serves as a good example of just how easy it is to imagine something which looks and acts exactly like a human, but doesn't have a mind.

The problem is, I don't fail when I try to imagine a p-zombie as being conscious. I succeed just in the same way I succeed when I imagine other normal humans as conscious because they are indistinguishable.

Is the mindless Rimmer hologram distinguishable from a normal human?

[edit: apart from the "H" on his forehead, that is]

 

[UndercoverElephant]

It's actually a pretty good book -- meaning that you can take it or leave it and that you can use whatever notion of God you wish.

It's a lovely book, and I got no sense of theism being rammed down my throat. It is perfectly compatible with Hindu forms of theism. It is also compatible with the more sensible varieties of western theism.

The point was simply supposed to be that our human stories are more interesting with than without God (there are no proofs for God's existence nor proofs denying it that actually work). You don't need to believe or not believe. There is no preaching. There is humor. And a tiger. Who could ask for more?

Indeed.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

There are different races of humans

OK, never mind, then.

"seperate human races" is a complex abstract concept

So is "mind".

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Hey Belz, if you're still reading....

Someone's found that fossil you were talking about - the one that falsifies evolution!

http://www.evolutionfairytale.com/articles_debates/elephant.htm

"Elaphantavianicus Bigfairytalicus."

Sounds like a good screen name. I wish I'd kept "UndercoverElephant". Can I change it back please?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

OK, never mind, then.



So is "mind".

Can you name something which isn't an abstract concept?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Here's a 3-part behaviorism tutorial that focuses on the difference between methodological behaviorism (the closest thing to Geoff's strawman) and radical behaviorism (the dominant current behaviorism).

OK, I will give you a sensible answer....

It actually doesn't have any bearing on this debate. If behaviourism is a position within psychology, not philosophy, then it's not relevant. This is a debate about ontology and philosophy of mind, not pyschology. As soon as it becomes a position within philosophy, it's a sitting duck. As long as it only makes claims about psychology, it's irrelevant to this debate.

[edit] That's not quite true. It may well be relevant to the debates being had between Hyparxis and various others, but it's not relevant to the ontological dispute or the dispute about possibility and modal logic. I think it's wrong-headed, but it's got nothing to do with materialism. [/edit]

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Can you name something which isn't an abstract concept?

Beer. I'm drinking one right now.