Materialists......

[UndercoverElephant]

There's a word you might like to try out: context. My negative claim here is, in context, a response to your arguments about mind being a brain process. I was, and am, calling your argument a strawman.

And you do not grasp basic logic. Are you, or are you not, admitting that you assumed your conclusion and falsely accused me of doing the same?

Robin has been found guilty of doing it, Paul has now admitted he did not previously understand when he was doing it, and I'm not going to let you get away with it either. And don't try to lyricise your way out of it, because it won't work.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

There are no "mental behaviours" in the zombie argument.

What? P-zombies act in all ways like humans, including thinking, calculating, etc, but there are no mental behaviors in the argument? How does that follow?

We have not eliminated the possibility that these "mental behaviors" are caused, not causal.

Yes, that was poor terminology on my part. The same process that causes the mental behavior causes the physical behavior that gives the appearance of the mental behavior being causal. Its just too hard to write that every time.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

You are assuming your conclusion.

I'm sorry, but what conclusion did I assume, since all I did was show how you were introducing assumptions into your thinking? I didn't conclude anything there, so please show me how I assumed my conclusion.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

What? P-zombies act in all ways like humans, including thinking, calculating, etc, but there are no mental behaviors in the argument? How does that follow?

Because the p-zombie argument starts by fixing the definition of mental and physical via an argument about language and concepts. The definition of mental that has therefore been nailed down at this point in the argument is the one we normally use in non-philosophical conversation (which happens to be the same as the one used by idealists, dualists, neutral monists and people with no specified metaphysical position). As soon as you try to use the term "mental behaviours" you are implictly assuming that the definitions of words used by behaviourists are legitimate. Otherwise the term "mental behaviours" simply doesn't mean anything. So you are dead right. There are no "mental behaviours" in the zombie argument until behaviourists attempt to import them.

I also remind you a second time that the behaviourism being defended here is supposed to be a theory about psychology, and not a metaphysical claim.

 

[hammegk]

We have not eliminated the possibility that these "mental behaviors" are caused, not causal. That they are reactions to the same stimuli that cause other behaviors.

That's a great definition of p-zombie Mercutio, and the also the pc it types on.

Idealists do not agree. As I say, your "choice" -- or not, as the case may be.

 

[Mercutio]

There are no "mental behaviours" in the zombie argument. You're now trying to question-beg behaviourism in addition to computationalist materialism.

Are you admitting you assumed your conclusion? Are you accepting that I did no such thing?

I was addressing this to Ichneumonwasp. He understood.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I'm sorry, but what conclusion did I assume, since all I did was show how you were introducing assumptions into your thinking? I didn't conclude anything there, so please show me how I assumed my conclusion.

This time it was an implied assumption. The assumption was that other people involved in the debate are bound by questionable definitions from behaviourism. The term "mental behaviours" doesn't have any meaning within the context of the zombie debate at the time you try to use it. You are perfectly well aware that the proponents of the debate not only reject that definition but have already supplied an argument of their own which supports the normal definition of mind/consciousness/mental. As soon as you use the term "mental behaviours" you have

(a) assumed behaviourism is true/meaningful/applicable
(b) introduced a contradiction with the main line of the argument which would not be there if you had not assumed behaviourism is true.

You have tries to defend a behaviourist concept of mind from an attack by assuming a behaviourist concept of mind and claiming there is a contradiction. That is a textbook example of question-begging.

 

[Mercutio]

And you do not grasp basic logic. Are you, or are you not, admitting that you assumed your conclusion and falsely accused me of doing the same?

Where?

Robin has been found guilty of doing it, Paul has now admitted he did not previously understand when he was doing it, and I'm not going to let you get away with it either. And don't try to lyricise your way out of it, because it won't work.

Lyricise? Geoff, I have to wonder if much of your confusion comes simply from your ignorance of terms that are well-defined within behaviorism. I suppose we'll never know.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I was addressing this to Ichneumonwasp. He understood.

And I am addressing this to you:

Are you admitting you assumed your conclusion? Are you accepting that I did no such thing?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Where?

Here:

A) I have never defined consciousness as simply brain function. B) it may be argued that a brain is a meat-based computer. Rimmer has a different sort of computer. If consciousness arises from brain computations, there is nothing about the difference between carbon and silicon that allows the former to give rise to consciousness. C) As long as we are discussing fictional characters, Rimmer is quite obviously (as portrayed) an independent program running on Holly. Rimmer orders Holly to do this and that, and they even argue. If Rimmer is a slave to Holly, you are a slave to your environment.

Lyricise? Geoff, I have to wonder if much of your confusion comes simply from your ignorance of terms that are well-defined within behaviorism. I suppose we'll never know.

I don't care what you think "mental behaviours" means. It is totally irrelevant, because I am not going to allow you to beg the question by assuming that either computationalism or behaviourism is true and then offering an argument which is critically depend on that assumption.

 

[Mercutio]

This time it was an implied assumption. The assumption was that other people involved in the debate are bound by questionable definitions from behaviourism. The term "mental behaviours" doesn't have any meaning within the context of the zombie debate at the time you try to use it. You are perfectly well aware that the proponents of the debate not only reject that definition but have already supplied an argument of their own which supports the normal definition of mind/consciousness/mental. As soon as you use the term "mental behaviours" you have

(a) assumed behaviourism is true/meaningful/applicable
(b) introduced a contradiction with the main line of the argument which would not be there if you had not assumed behaviourism is true.

You have tries to defend a behaviourist concept of mind from an attack by assuming a behaviourist concept of mind and claiming there is a contradiction. That is a textbook example of question-begging.

Actually, the term "mental behaviors" has nothing to do with behaviorism. It is not used. Private behavior is recognised, but "mental behavior" is... well, is not a term that is defined. Not something behaviorists use. So, using the term does not imply (a) at all, and thereby does not imply (b).

 

[Mercutio]

And I am addressing this to you:

Are you admitting you assumed your conclusion? Are you accepting that I did no such thing?

Well, in that case, no.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Actually, the term "mental behaviors" has nothing to do with behaviorism. It is not used. Private behavior is recognised, but "mental behavior" is... well, is not a term that is defined. Not something behaviorists use. So, using the term does not imply (a) at all, and thereby does not imply (b).

You are hair-splitting about something totally irrelevant.

Answer the question: Are you admitting you assumed your conclusion? Are you accepting that I did no such thing?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Well, in that case, no.

So what do you think THIS is:

If consciousness arises from brain computations.....

?

You've obviously not got the first idea what "question begging" means.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Paul was not working with a definition of mind which has been imported into the argument by assuming behaviourism is true. He is working with the definition of mind established by the first part of the zombie argument.

But don't consider me comfortable with our definition of mind. I couldn't restate it if I had to. I do not know which aspects of my internal experience are encompassed by mind. I do not know what consciousness is. I cannot picture a coherent way in which to divide internal experience into physical and mental sets. I'm not sure exactly what a zombie is missing.

Robin has been found guilty of doing it, Paul has now admitted he did not previously understand when he was doing it, and I'm not going to let you get away with it either. And don't try to lyricise your way out of it, because it won't work.

And yet I still do not understand which parts of our argument are supposed to be free of ontological assumptions and which are not. The articles I have read in the past few days certainly don't clarify this issue.

Because the p-zombie argument starts by fixing the definition of mental and physical via an argument about language and concepts. The definition of mental that has therefore been nailed down at this point in the argument is the one we normally use in non-philosophical conversation (which happens to be the same as the one used by idealists, dualists, neutral monists and people with no specified metaphysical position).

Come on now, Geoff.

mental
1 a : of or relating to the mind; specifically : of or relating to the total emotional and intellectual response of an individual to external reality *mental health* b : of or relating to intellectual as contrasted with emotional activity c : of, relating to, or being intellectual as contrasted with overt physical activity.

So thinking is a mental behavior, according to the folk definition of mental. Are we saying that a zombie doesn't think? Doesn't do anything that the folk definition includes?

What exactly is a zombie missing?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

By the way....

Keep going, Mercutio. Keep on digging that hole. I have spent two days explaining question-begging fallacies to Paul, and now I have a real-life question-begger displaying very nicely that he doesn't know when he's doing it and freely accuses others of doing it when they aren't.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

s soon as you try to use the term "mental behaviours" you are implictly assuming that the definitions of words used by behaviourists are legitimate.

No I'm not. I used the term in a very specific way to make a very specific point. You don't like the term, then fine jetison it. How about "mental actions"? The point is that "mind" is a specific thing that is not necessarily implied by Paul's line of thinking. He is not required by his line of thinking to accept "mind" as an integrated concept. He is required to accept mental actions. Now it may be that those mental actions are causal. It may also be that something physical that causes those mental actions (deciding to raise a hand) also causes a physical action (raising a hand). In other words, the implications that you accused him of having to accept do not follow. There are other possibilities.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

As soon as you use the term "mental behaviours" you have

(a) assumed behaviourism is true/meaningful/applicable
(b) introduced a contradiction with the main line of the argument which would not be there if you had not assumed behaviourism is true.

I think you're assuming "mental behavior" is some sort of technical term when it is not.

You are hair-splitting about something totally irrelevant.

I don't think so. What term should we use for all the things that go on inside my skull, physical or otherwise?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The folk definition of mental is not a good basis for conducting the zombie discussion.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

But don't consider me comfortable with our definition of mind.

Clearly you are uncomfortable with it. But you are aware of how it was arrived at and you know what it is supposed to mean.

I couldn't restate it if I had to.

Nagel and Seagers didn't exactly do it in three lines, did they? You aren't expected to remember all that lot by rote.

I do not know which aspects of my internal experience are encompassed by mind. I do not know what consciousness is.

Not ontologically you don't. But you know what a man in the street means when he refers to his mental life or his mind.

I cannot picture a coherent way in which to divide internal experience into physical and mental sets. I'm not sure exactly what a zombie is missing.

You mean there are all sorts of problems when you try to juggle metaphysics and zombies. We all know that. Just drop the ball called "metaphysics" and concentrate on the zombies. From YOUR point of view as a subject, you know perfectly well what "mind" means in this context. The problems start when you try and think how this translates into metaphysics.

mental
1 a : of or relating to the mind; specifically : of or relating to the total emotional and intellectual response of an individual to external reality *mental health* b : of or relating to intellectual as contrasted with emotional activity c : of, relating to, or being intellectual as contrasted with overt physical activity.

So thinking is a mental behavior, according to the folk definition of mental.

"Thinking" is one of the dual concepts, like "pain". It can have a mental meaning and a physical meaning, and sometimes the word is used to refer to both of them. This is irrelevant to the debate because you already know how to distinguish between the mental and physical aspects of "thinking". One of them (the physical one) can be compared to meat computations. The other would have to be compared to the concious experiences of a computer, the existence of which are in serious doubt.

Are we saying that a zombie doesn't think? Doesn't do anything that the folk definition includes?

I am saying the zombie doesn't m-think(mental) but it does p-think(physical).

"Think" is merely a word which straddles the objective and subjective divide by having to different meanings. It means "the experience of thinking" AND "computations in a meat machine". But the two components of the dual-concept can be taken apart very easily. They are not conceptually inter-dependent.

What exactly is a zombie missing?

~~ Paul

M-thought. It has p-thought but no m-thought. The assumptions being inserted into the argument by Wasp and Merc are designed to blur the distinction between the two of them by calling both of them "behaviour". The closet dualism pops out when they split this into "private behaviour" and "public behaviour". They then argue when you try to say that "private behaviour" is just a redefinition of "mind". It's nonsense. The reason its nonsense is that they are trying to turn a theory about best practice in psychology into an ontological claim, even though they've gone to great lengths to deny this is what they are doing.

I will be back in a few hours.