Materialists......

[UndercoverElephant]

Are you watching, Paul?

Which may or may not be conscious, depending on both one's definition and on the complexity of the behavior of the android.
Note that this is actually perfectly consistent.
A) I have never defined consciousness as simply brain function. B) it may be argued that a brain is a meat-based computer. Rimmer has a different sort of computer. If consciousness arises from brain computations, there is nothing about the difference between carbon and silicon that allows the former to give rise to consciousness.

Followed by.....

Once again, your assumptions about consciousness blind you.

Who is being blinded by their assumptions? Who is depending on an argument which begs the question? Me? Or Mercutio?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

This is an answer? He is a fictional character.

So are the zombies.

How do you know that a computer program could ever act in that way?

?

I never said it was impossible for a computer program to simulate the behaviour of Rimmer. I said I saw no reason why a computer program simulating Rimmer's behaviour should be conscious.

For someone to appear conscious requires motivation and emotion. Computer programs do not contain those elements.

They do if you include them in the program.

So a computer program, by itself, could never appear conscious. A computer program, therefore, fails the p-zombie test in that it could not appear conscious.

So what is it that appears concious when you are faced with Rimmer?

A computer with many different systems, one for motivation, one for the emotional aspects of love, one for the emotional aspects of fear, etc. and with cognitive systems also running concurrently might be able to look conscious. It would also necessarily be self-aware....

!!!!!!!!!

Really?

You are saying that it is impossible for a computer with all these systems concurrently running to be conscious. Why? What possible reason can you give?

I am saying I see no reason why it should be conscious and plenty of reasons why it shouldn't. "Impossible" is a bit strong but might be supportable if I could be bothered to figure out the whole argument that would lead there.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So? You are just asserting that 'no brain (in the sense of gray biological matter) means no consciousness'.

Isn't this a reasonable assumption? Or are you suggesting there can be consciousness in the abscence of a brain? :

I still don't see how p-zombie is any different from a human being, if there is no way of observing that difference...surely it is like the 'brain in vat' idea, in that if there is no practical way of knowing the difference, then it is irrelevant.

In both cases there is no way of knowing the difference. In neither case is it irrelevant from the point of view of philosophical debate. It may be irrelevant in a pragmatic sense, but that's not the same thing at all.

 

[hammegk]

.... if there is no practical way of knowing the difference, then it is irrelevant.

Your choice, as all of us must make ...

1. DreadNik is a sophisticated computer controlled only by -- in the most basic sense -- stimulus/response. Mind does not exist, so of course is not causal.

2. DreadNik is 'mind', controlling a sophisticated computer, and at least there is a chance 'mind' can be causally efficaceous.

3. Who knows or cares. Default dualism imo. goddidit.

 

[DreadNiK]

Isn't this a reasonable assumption? Or are you suggesting there can be consciousness in the abscence of a brain? :



In both cases there is no way of knowing the difference. In neither case is it irrelevant from the point of view of philosophical debate. It may be irrelevant in a pragmatic sense, but that's not the same thing at all.

The only way we can decide to ascribe this ill-defined 'consciousness' to something is by the way something acts. Therefore IF something has no 'biological brain' as we conceive of it, yet still acts conscious, we have to treat it as such. By your logic, if silicon based aliens visited Earth, we'd have to view them as non conscious because they don't have a carbon based brain.

As for the second part, if something is irrelevant, it is irrelevant. If there is no way of distinguishing something from something else, then they are the same. No amount of wordplay is ever going change that.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Only if I'm as glib about it as you are. Here, let me do it without any metaphysical terms:

OK, so it is understood that we are using the prephilosophical/everyday/normal meaning of the word mind/conciousness.

How can a zombie give the same answers as humans about questions of consciousness (whatever it is that's eliminated in a zombie)?

With difficulty.

If consciousness has any effect on the zombie's behavior at all, then I could distinguish the zombie from a human.

Agreed.

So consciousness must have no effect on behavior, either directly or indirectly.

Agreed, this is a consequence of the possibility of a zombie. If you allow that a zombie is possible, it looks like mental causality is impossible.

In other words, you can sort of imagine a zombie, until you start thinking about what this actually means in terms of the life and behaviour of that zombie. This amounts to the recognition of two things:

a) that consciousness is sufficiently conceptually distinct from physical things for you to be able to imagine a basic zombie.

and

b) you cannot imagine a situation where something physically identical to a human but lacking conciousness actually behaved like normal human.

You are basically now committed to the claim that not only do minds exist, but they are causal with respect to physical things, from which they are also conceptually seperable. This is true based upon your own basic conceptions and understandings about the nature of human existence. At the same time, it appears to contradict materialism - and you have not assumed anti-materialism at any point in the line of reasoning.

This is in fact exactly what Nagel wants you to recognise. He suggests that this tells us there is something wrong with our current concepts. If our concepts weren't screwed up, it would be obvious why zombies are impossible and you wouldn't be able to do (a).

I'm part way through the Seager paper, and he says:

I'm supposed to accept that belief and knowledge changes are entirely nonphysical? This goes way beyond accepting that some subjective experience is nonphysical.

~~ Paul

You don't neccesarily have to accept it. The author is merely showing that this is what follows from the arguments made by Kirk.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Who is being blinded by their assumptions? Who is depending on an argument which begs the question? Me? Or Mercutio?

I don't know; you'll have to explain. Merc said "If ... then ..." Is that an assumption? If so, what is the assumption?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

OK, so it is understood that we are using the prephilosophical/everyday/normal meaning of the word mind/conciousness.

I don't think it matters. We only need to think about some supposedly missing nonphysical attribute.

Agreed, this is a consequence of the possibility of a zombie. If you allow that a zombie is possible, it looks like mental causality is impossible.

I believe that's called epiphenomenalism. Now, shall we discuss the inconceivability of epiphenomenalism?

a) that consciousness is sufficiently conceptually distinct from physical things for you to be able to imagine a basic zombie.

and

b) you cannot imagine a situation where something physically identical to a human but lacking conciousness actually behaved like normal human.

Hold on. If you break the zombie concept into subconcepts, then I might be able to imagine some of the subconcepts. So what? I still cannot conceive of a philosophical zombie.

This is in fact exactly what Nagel wants you to recognise. He suggests that this tells us there is something wrong with our current concepts. If our concepts weren't screwed up, it would be obvious why zombies are impossible and you wouldn't be able to do (a).

Yes, and one candidate for what's screwed up is that we picture mind as distinct from brain. I have just as much trouble conceiving atmospheric processes without weather.

You don't neccesarily have to accept it. The author is merely showing that this is what follows from the arguments made by Kirk.

Perhaps so. I'll have to read the paper three times, as usual. There are lawyers who write more clearly than philosophers.

~~ Paul

 

[Mercutio]

Are you watching, Paul?

Followed by.....

Who is being blinded by their assumptions? Who is depending on an argument which begs the question? Me? Or Mercutio?

Oh, please, Geoff. First you ignore option A, which is independent from B, and from which perspective B is irrelevant. Then, in B, you ignore the "it may be argued", which indicates a separate argument from the former. And note the first word of the sentences you highlighted in red. "IF". Note also that there was another C option, again independent of A or B.

Your statement about Rimmer's consciousness was ludicrous on many levels, and under many different sets of assumptions. Cherry-picking one of my statements to portray as my true view is dishonest of you.

 

[Mercutio]

3. Who knows or cares. Default dualism imo. goddidit.

Why do you default this to dualism, or to goddidit? You have been told that neither is intended. What is the chain of logic that leads to your opinion? I honestly have no idea how you get from "we cannot know" to a positive claim of an undefensible philosophy.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I don't know; you'll have to explain. Merc said "If ... then ..." Is that an assumption?
~~ Paul

It is if it isn't supported by anything else, which is true in this case because it is just introduced in an "if statement". The "If" basically means "IF I add the following proposition into the set then....."

Paul: "If so, what is the assumption?"

Originally posted by Mercutio:

If consciousness arises from brain computations, there is nothing about the difference between carbon and silicon that allows the former to give rise to consciousness.

The assumption is "consciousness arises from brain computations". In other words it is an assumption of computationalist materialism. It completely ignores the line of reasoning which led to the usage of "mind" he is trying to refute. Mercutio, in true Robin fashion, then accuses me of being blinded by my own assumptions.

Geoff

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

So are the zombies.

Yes, as in, they could not exist because the idea is logically incoherent.

I never said it was impossible for a computer program to simulate the behaviour of Rimmer. I said I saw no reason why a computer program simulating Rimmer's behaviour should be conscious.

And I never said that you did say that. I questioned how you could think that computer program could act in a way that appears conscious in every way to a human being such that we could never tell the difference. I don't see how a program could do that. Perhaps you could enlighten me on this score. I can see how people can pretend that it could, but if it could not in reality, then your point is moot.

They do if you include them in the program.

Um, how? How do you program in computer language emotion? We have emotion because of intricate groupings of cell firings interacting with each other and with the body as a whole. I can how that might be possible analogously with a computer employing silicon in a way similar to the way our neurons work (we would need to devise some other means of creating a hormonal environment and the compartmentalization issues involved with different neurotransmitters and the ability of substances like NO and CO to cross membranes and the impact of glial cells, etc, etc), but I have no idea how a program could pull that off.

So what is it that appears concious when you are faced with Rimmer?

Well, that's what I'm asking you. I don't believe this "he appears conscious" bit would work in the real world (he is, after all, a fictional character created by a human who lives in an emotional world). What appears conscious to us is the ability to change complex behavior in the world based on changing needs, the appearance of motivation, emotion, the ability to sift through competing choices and arrive at a decision, etc. A computer program can perform some of these, but not all, and not with the breadth of behavioral choices that we demonstrate. You can postulate a super-program that might be able to do such things, but if it can do everything that a human can do, then it would fit the criterion of being conscious as well. But, again, I don't see how a program could do all that. A silicon-based computer possibly, but not a program.

Really?

Yes, really. You have a problem with that? We know many of the ways that our brains do this, but not how it all fits together. The whole issue revolves about what we mean by "self-awareness" (which is why I keep asking you to explore the meaning of that term), but we already know the locations of the cells that are involved in our body maps so that we can be aware of where we are in space. We don't know how it all fits together, but we do know that such maps exist. We know some aspects of the motivational systems that allow us to place value on certain ideas and objects. We know where we make decisions about moral issues. We know where our "will" is located and have numerous examples of folks in which this region has been damaged.

You must think about what those words "self-aware" means and not treat them as some woo object. Lacking self-awareness I don't see how anyone could possibly simulate consciousness. It would become immediately apparent that there was something wrong with the person you interacted with if they lacked self-awareness.

I am saying I see no reason why it should be conscious and plenty of reasons why it shouldn't. "Impossible" is a bit strong but might be supportable if I could be bothered to figure out the whole argument that would lead there.

"Impossible" is what your argument requires. Absent "impossible", we are left with possible. That we do not know how neurons do it is no argument that they cannot produce consciousness in and of themselves. The same is true of silicon.

If you can't be bothered to figure out the argument, then I will accept that you concede the point.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The assumption is "consciousness arises from brain computations". In other words it is an assumption of computationalist materialism. It completely ignores the line of reasoning which led to the usage of "mind" he is trying to refute. Mercutio, in true Robin fashion, then accuses me of being blinded by my own assumptions.

But his sentence was:

"If consciousness arises from brain computations, there is nothing about the difference between carbon and silicon that allows the former to give rise to consciousness."

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Oh, please, Geoff. First you ignore option A, which is independent from B, and from which perspective B is irrelevant. Then, in B, you ignore the "it may be argued", which indicates a separate argument from the former. And note the first word of the sentences you highlighted in red. "IF". Note also that there was another C option, again independent of A or B.

Your statement about Rimmer's consciousness was ludicrous on many levels, and under many different sets of assumptions. Cherry-picking one of my statements to portray as my true view is dishonest of you.

No, Mercutio. I understand logic. Apparently you don't. Here is what you wrote:

A) I have never defined consciousness as simply brain function.

This is a negative claim. It is a statement about a definition you are claiming NOT to have made. Therefore the statement is logically irrelevant, regardless of whether or not it is true.

B) it may be argued that a brain is a meat-based computer. Rimmer has a different sort of computer

Indeed it may. However this also has no logical impact on the zombie argument because the zombie and the human have the same meat-based computer and because at this point nobody has equated computations with consciousness.

Then you assume your conclusion, based upon nothing but a brute assertion that computationalist materialism is true:

If consciousness arises from brain computations.......

This is not supported by anything you said in (A) or (B). It isn't supported by anything else you've supplied either. IMO, it isn't supportable at all - so you really do need to support it. But you don't. You just say "What if I add this assumption into the argument?" That is putting the cart before the horse. That is question begging. That is assuming your conclusion.

You then compound your mistake by accusing me of doing what you just did, even though I have done no such thing.

If you want a tutorial on what constitutes question-begging I suggest you play close attention to the exchange I have been having with Paul.

C) As long as we are discussing fictional characters, Rimmer is quite obviously (as portrayed) an independent program running on Holly. Rimmer orders Holly to do this and that, and they even argue. If Rimmer is a slave to Holly, you are a slave to your environment.

This also doesn't have any logical relevance to the p-zombie argument.

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

But his sentence was:

"If consciousness arises from brain computations, there is nothing about the difference between carbon and silicon that allows the former to give rise to consciousness."

~~ Paul

It doesn't matter. The assumption of the conclusion has taken place, and has been fed into the argument. The logical consequences of this question-begging then end up contradicting the main line of the argument, and Mercutio uses this contradiction to claim that it was me who assumed my conclusion.

Logically, it is exactly what Robin did and exactly what the creationist in the example does.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

You are basically now committed to the claim that not only do minds exist

How does this follow from what Paul said? Are you allowed to make such unwarranted leaps so readily in your philosophy program?

What follows is that mental behaviors exist, not that there is some putative entity "mind". There are mental behaviors and those behaviors have causal power. Yes. I think we all agree on that.

 

[Mercutio]

There are mental behaviors and those behaviors have causal power. Yes. I think we all agree on that.

We have not eliminated the possibility that these "mental behaviors" are caused, not causal. That they are reactions to the same stimuli that cause other behaviors.

Just sayin'...

 

[Mercutio]

This is a negative claim. It is a statement about a definition you are claiming NOT to have made. Therefore the statement is logically irrelevant, regardless of whether or not it is true.

There's a word you might like to try out: context. My negative claim here is, in context, a response to your arguments about mind being a brain process. I was, and am, calling your argument a strawman.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

We have not eliminated the possibility that these "mental behaviors" are caused, not causal.

There are no "mental behaviours" in the zombie argument. You're now trying to question-beg behaviourism in addition to computationalist materialism.

That they are reactions to the same stimuli that cause other behaviors.

Just sayin'...

Are you admitting you assumed your conclusion? Are you accepting that I did no such thing?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

How does this follow from what Paul said? Are you allowed to make such unwarranted leaps so readily in your philosophy program?

What follows is that mental behaviors exist......

You also just did what mercutio has done. You have now implictly assumed that behaviourism is true (because there is no such thing as "mental behaviours" in the zombie argument).

, not that there is some putative entity "mind". There are mental behaviors and those behaviors have causal power. Yes. I think we all agree on that.

NO. You are assuming your conclusion.

Paul was not working with a definition of mind which has been imported into the argument by assuming behaviourism is true. He is working with the definition of mind established by the first part of the zombie argument.

And not only are you question-begging, but you are also doing it on the basis of an assumption of a position which is about methodology in psychology, not metaphysics. In other words, if behaviourism is a theory about what is legitimate in psychology, then it's irrelevant to this debate. If it is relevant then you are talking about the good old fashioned behaviourism which made ontological claims.