Materialists......

[Mercutio]

OK, I will give you a sensible answer....

It actually doesn't have any bearing on this debate. If behaviourism is a position within psychology, not philosophy, then it's not relevant. This is a debate about ontology and philosophy of mind, not pyschology. As soon as it becomes a position within philosophy, it's a sitting duck. As long as it only makes claims about psychology, it's irrelevant to this debate.

Radical Behaviorism is the underlying philosophy, Behavior Analysis is the science, and Applied Behavior Analysis (or Behavior Modification) the application. Given the subject matter of psychology, and the subject matter of this debate, I find the claim of irrelevance amusing.

[edit] That's not quite true. It may well be relevant to the debates being had between Hyparxis and various others, but it's not relevant to the ontological dispute or the dispute about possibility and modal logic. I think it's wrong-headed, but it's got nothing to do with materialism. [/edit]

It only applies to the current debate in that Materialism and ~materialism are being presented as mutually exclusive and exhaustive options; it is worth noting that the debate is not the only way to look at things.

 

[Apathia]

Here's a 3-part behaviorism tutorial that focuses on the difference between methodological behaviorism (the closest thing to Geoff's strawman) and radical behaviorism (the dominant current behaviorism).

Thanks Mercutio.
I've already been doing some homework for my self this afternoon on Radical Behaviorism. Since I read Skinner years ago, it wasn't difficult to follow.

I'm still not satidfied that Radical Behaviorism does full justice to our Subjectivity, but I saw in my reading that its most recent trends are more generous to Cognitive and Transformational Therapies and make help put some of thier aims in practical perspective. No one needs to think of themselves or their loved ones as behavior zombies.

I agree that Mind has no special Ontology setting it apart from external experiences. I just protest the Subjective aspect of who we are being reduced to the Objective. Radical Behaviorism is a correctional in that regard to Methodological Behaviorism.

As to the fine points where I'm not satisfied, that after all is Subjective.
What might give a sense of that for some would be Martin Buber's classic I And Thou ("I And You" in Kaufman's translation. Or as a Soto Zen master would tell you, "Just Sit."

Since I don't see contemporary Radical behaviorism disallowing my inner life and denying me being a soul, I don't have a quarrell with it. My issue is with anyone who would use its langauge and proceedures to denegrate my subjective life and attempt to zombize me or manipulate me with no respect to my personhood.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

It only applies to the current debate in that Materialism and ~materialism are being presented as mutually exclusive and exhaustive options; it is worth noting that the debate is not the only way to look at things.

Errr.....if behaviourism is a theory about psychology and not philosophy, then it does not offer "another way of looking at things" with respect to the mind/body problem. It is completely and utterly irrelevant.

It's not entirely irrelevant to this debate (which has been very wide-ranging indeed), as demonstrated by Hyparxis, but it's got bugger all to do with materialism, ~materialism, neutral monism, modal logic or p-zombies.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Beer. I'm drinking one right now.

Ah, so your beer is real (mine is too), but the pain I am feeling in my leg is not?

 

[Apathia]

Sorry, I should have been more explicit. That was my fault.



I don't think that many people here actually think the argument is coherent and that p-zombies exist. I, for one, agree with you that either p-zombies do not exist or we are all p-zombies. I don't think it is possible to separate behavior that exists from the working of consciousness (or what we call consciousness) from consciousness itself, as you have said.



I agree. But I think that what happens is that some folks may feel painted into a corner or may not express themselves very well. I don't think anyone wants to deny "subjective experience", only the potential origin and meaning of that experience. The experience is very real. But that does not necessarily imply a "mind". Much of this depends on how we use these words. It is undeniable that we have private experiences and that no one else can feel what they are like. How this comes about is the interesting question.

I think a very interesting literary "experiment" with some of these ideas is Connie Willis' "To Say Nothing of the Dog". While I won't fawn over the book as some reviewers have, it was an interesting idea to explore what love means in an essentially deterministic universe (even though she frequently refers to chaos theory and QM). I don't think she quite pulled it off, though. I think she was too constrained by the first person voice that she used, or just didn't write it well enough.

Ultimately, as far as meaning goes, it all boils down to love. That is whence our purpose, point and values emerge. That is why, I think, the Matrix trilogy took the turn that it did, even in all its existential glory.

Yes, some posters read a lot more into the word "mind" than the OP intended had to nuke it even though more was being oblierated than they intended.

Philosophy was originally a "Heart" endeavor.

 

[Mercutio]

Errr.....if behaviourism is a theory about psychology and not philosophy, then it does not offer "another way of looking at things" with respect to the mind/body problem. It is completely and utterly irrelevant.

Interesting claim. Psychology, recall, began as a marriage of the questions of philosophy with the methods of natural science. Half the intro psych textbooks describe psych as "the science of mind and behavior" (much to the annoyance of behaviorists). It has been the science of consciousness, the science of mind, the science of behavior... If it is utterly irrelevant to philosophy, I would suggest that philosophy ought to keep quiet about it.

Besides, your description of behaviorism and its place in psychology and philosophy comes from a proudly, if profoundly, ignorant position; I won't worry too much about your opinions on the matter.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

but the pain I am feeling in my leg is not?

As far as non-sequitors go, that one must rank up with the best.

You tell me. Is the pain you are feeling real?

Philosophy was originally a "Heart" endeavor.

Yeah, I've seen written the view that one of the big mistakes in the past was the over-emphasis on sophia over philo in philosophy. After all, without emotion we have no way of telling what is important, no way of valuing. The type of frontal lobe damage that results in a disconnect between cognition and emotion makes life extraordinarily difficult for the person afflicted and his or her family.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Interesting claim. Psychology, recall, began as a marriage of the questions of philosophy with the methods of natural science. Half the intro psych textbooks describe psych as "the science of mind and behavior" (much to the annoyance of behaviorists). It has been the science of consciousness, the science of mind, the science of behavior... If it is utterly irrelevant to philosophy......

I said it was utterly irrelevant to metaphysics, ontology, the mind body-problem and materialism. It is not irrelevant to philosophy.

I would suggest that philosophy ought to keep quiet about it.

I HAVE NO INTENTION OF KEEPING QUIET IN MY OWN THREAD ABOUT METAPHYSICS WHEN PEOPLE POST STUFF ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY IN IT AND PRETEND IT IS RELEVANT TO METAPHYSICS.

 

[chriswl]

I'm imagining a human being, then I'm imagining they are like, um, did you ever watch red dwarf? Rimmer is a hologram, yes? Now, in the show, Rimmer is assumed to actually be conscious (I guess). But why should a hologram be conscious? He's being sustained by the computer, yes? He's just a projection. So he hasn't really got a mind, he's just programmed to behave like the real Rimmer, who is long since dead. So I am imagining something not dissimilar to a holographic Rimmer who doesn't have a mind but looks and behaves exactly as if he did have a mind.

Well, in all the years I watched the program it never even crossed my mind that Rimmer wouldn't be conscious on account of his being a computer-generated hologram (though I'm not so sure whether I'd count Kryton as fully conscious). Are you saying that, as a computer simulation, Rimmer couldn't possibly be conscious and therefore provides us with a ready-made example (even if fictional) of something which behaves exactly like a human but is not conscious? Well, I don't accept that Rimmer would not be conscious. In fact I think you have exactly the same problem even imagining Rimmer as not being conscious that you have imagining a p-zombie as not being conscious.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Well, in all the years I watched the program it never even crossed my mind that Rimmer wouldn't be conscious on account of his being a computer-generated hologram (though I'm not so sure whether I'd count Kryton as fully conscious).

Then you've got two examples to play with rather than just one. It never crossed my mind about Rimmer, but you asked me what I was imagining and Rimmer came to mind.

Are you saying that, as a computer simulation, Rimmer couldn't possibly be conscious and therefore provides us with a ready-made example (even if fictional) of something which behaves exactly like a human but is not conscious?

Rimmer does not actually have a brain, remember? So why do you think he is conscious?

Well, I don't accept that Rimmer would not be conscious.

He doesn't have a brain.

In fact I think you have exactly the same problem even imagining Rimmer as not being conscious that you have imagining a p-zombie as not being conscious.

???

I give up.

 

[hammegk]

If each monism is reducible to the other, what does it mean to choose one over the other? If neither monism offers anything the other does not, what does it mean to choose one over the other? If a choice is meaningless, why make it? What does it mean to choose among options that are the same?

And how the hell do you see that as dualism?

Right after you reduce "the first-person nonphysical, nonmaterial dimension" and "the third-person physical, material dimension" to full equality, I'll agree dualism is not possible.

The fact that only what is perceived as "the physical, material dimension" (hey, let's call it body, intentless) provides behaviors and effects objectively measureable by science does not do it, imo.

If you have faith your dial readings /observations/ theories demonstrate that "the nonphysical, nonmaterial dimension" (let's call it intent) does not exist, so be it. I just don't agree, based in part on a number of scientifically obtained results that fall under the general label of 'quantum nuttiness'.

If intentless body is the 100% existent that comprises all of 'what-is' who should not be comfortable with 100% faith that god and/or freewill does not exist? Do you suggest a culture based on that theory will be viable over many generations? If so, based on what if not more (completely unjustifiable) faith?

 

[DreadNiK]

Then you've got two examples to play with rather than just one. It never crossed my mind about Rimmer, but you asked me what I was imagining and Rimmer came to mind.



Rimmer does not actually have a brain, remember? So why do you think he is conscious?




He doesn't have a brain.



???

I give up.

He is conscious because there is no way of distinguishing him from a conscious being, other than the H on his head.

I think his "brain" is just a computer that does the same job...

 

[UndercoverElephant]

He is conscious because there is no way of distinguishing him from a conscious being, other than the H on his head.

I think his "brain" is just a computer that does the same job...

So a computer program that simulates the behaviour of Rimmer is every bit as conscious as a real life Rimmer?

 

[hammegk]

For a real 100% materialist, of course. And the Rimmer hologram, the materialist, and my pc have the same amount of campatibilistic free-will.

 

[Mercutio]

Rimmer does not actually have a brain, remember? So why do you think he is conscious?

He behaves appropriately.

He doesn't have a brain.

Your strawman of materialism is brain=mind. More people in this thread have suggested behavior=mind. Does he have behavior? (yes)

???

I give up.

You really should, you know. Your strawman is not what anybody else here has proposed.

 

[Mercutio]

Right after you reduce "the first-person nonphysical, nonmaterial dimension" and "the third-person physical, material dimension" to full equality, I'll agree dualism is not possible.

Nice goalpost-moving. You don't ordinarily use all those adjectives. Nor do I.

The fact that only what is perceived as "the physical, material dimension" (hey, let's call it body, intentless) provides behaviors and effects objectively measureable by science does not do it, imo.

Not what I would have chosen...

If you have faith your dial readings /observations/ theories demonstrate that "the nonphysical, nonmaterial dimension" (let's call it intent) does not exist, so be it. I just don't agree, based in part on a number of scientifically obtained results that fall under the general label of 'quantum nuttiness'.

I have never said it does not exist. I cannot know, nor can you. Nor does it matter.

If intentless body is the 100% existent that comprises all of 'what-is' who should not be comfortable with 100% faith that god and/or freewill does not exist? Do you suggest a culture based on that theory will be viable over many generations? If so, based on what if not more (completely unjustifiable) faith?

"Intentless" is silly; that which we see as intent is independent of monism. And "who should not..." in the abstract ignores centuries of culture; only a fool would suggest that centuries of culture are irrelevant. How many generations did it take for heliocentrism to overtake geocentrism? What percentage "do not believe in evolution" even today? What percentage continue with their parents' religion, no matter what it is?

I teach a course on applying behaviorism to cultural issues; I think it has more potential than most culture-change attempts. That said, I do not have blinders on. If your goalpost is "a culture based on that theory", I think it is highly unlikely. On the other hand, a culture based on any ideology is highly unlikely. Most ideologies are consigned to history's circular file.

 

[Jeff Corey]

For a real 100% materialist, of course. And the Rimmer hologram, the materialist, and my pc have the same amount of compatibilistic free-will.

As do you.

I had to say it.

 

[Mercutio]

As do you.

I had to say it.

How predictable.

 

[Jeff Corey]

Prediction and control is the goal.

 

[President Bush]

Will that be a Kantian usage of the term "understanding"?

Not locally.

He behaves appropriately.

I'm not familiar with "Red Dwarf". But I wonder: as a computer-generated hologram, wouldn't Rimmer be monitored?

And being conscious, wouldn't Rimmer have wants and needs? If so, wouldn't the content of his subjectivity be externalized by the technical operation of the monitoring?

If conscious, Rimmer sounds like a slave to me.