Materialists......

[chriswl]

There is the crux of it all. How does one refute the claim that zombies are possible without it looking to a neutral person like there has been an assumption of the conclusion.

Easy. Zombies are just not a thinkable concept. We cannot really conceive of them, we have no "clear and distinct" idea of what a zombie is.

We can say that we know very well what a zombie is, it is a thing exactly like a human but with no mind, but that is just repeating the definition. Do we understand the definition and if we don't then how do we know that the definition makes sense?

When we try to imagine a zombie we first imagine a human being, in front of us, behaving exactly like an ordinary conscious human does. And then we say the words ".. but he has no consciousness". How exactly is that last step anything other than just words? How do we imagine his lack of consciousness?

The zombie idea presupposes that consciousness is undetectable from the outside. So we are not imagining actually seeing a lack of consciousness in our zombie. Nor can we be imagining putting ourselves in the zombie's place and discovering that we have no consciousness - this would just be silly. If we are imagining anything here we are just imagining the existence of a rule which says that imagining ourselves in this person's place is an invalid thing to do and that's what makes him a zombie. But this is just a rule about how we must behave towards him. We haven't actually imagined anything about him that sets him apart from a conscious human.

 

[Mercutio]

I belong to another school of thought entirely, one which is busy pulling the rug out from beneath the whole load of them.

Ok, that was good for a laugh.

You don't understand them, but your circular arguments are going to bring them down.

Almost worth the laughing dog, but I really don't like that particular smilie.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Do we agree that zombies are only conceivable if consciousness is an epiphenomenon?

If you don't agree, then could you explain how a zombie is going to give the same answer as a human to a question that involves knowledge obtained by feedback (causality) from conscious experience?

OK, I see where you are coming from. You are stating that zombies are only possible if minds are not causally efficacious. That is correct. However, if minds are causally efficacious, materialism is false anyway.

The zombie argument is aimed at supervenience theories. It assumes that materialism means "supervenience materialism" (which includes epiphenomenalism, unless you consider epiphenomenalism to be property dualism). So if you hold some other position, such as eliminativism or any form of non-materialism, then the zombie argument is irrelevant anyway.

 

[hammegk]

Where did I say that? Either my recall or yours is faulty. See post 2740.

Ok, so we interpret you are at 100%. My congratulations on reaching a logically coherent position. We can agree to disagree at this point.

Your 'virtually certain' response was from another thread; the question there was the same one, but worded for 100% certainty that god and/or free will does not exist.

But what? Is that guy exhibiting behavior when he thinks the cursor around the screen?

Yes, and that is as irrelevant to choice of monism as articulett spew.

Um... hammy, you were the one who pointed out, earlier, that my view is independent of monism. I don't have to make any of the assumptions you are foisting on me.

Nope. You just need to choose a monism at 100% -- as Jeff has -- or remain mired in an indefensible dualistic worldview.

Or continue to pretend you don't understand the implications of my challenge -- or assert some reason why my challenge fails in some meaningful and logical way that has yet to be pointed out to me.

 

[Mercutio]

Nope. You just need to choose a monism at 100% -- as Jeff has -- or remain mired in an indefensible dualistic worldview.

Why? If my view is independent of monism, monism is something that does not matter. No need to choose. Dualism is, as you agree, incoherent. That does not require one to choose a monism.

Or continue to pretend you don't understand the implications of my challenge -- or assert some reason why my challenge fails in some meaningful and logical way that has yet to be pointed out to me.

(erm...maybe I missed where you issued a "challenge". Was that recent? Long ago? Did I miss a post? A thread?) So far, I have asked you for what differences there are between choosing one or the other; you have supplied none that make any sense to me (some of the things you assert are differences are, I honestly believe, purely asserted on your part). In the absence of a meaningful reason to choose one monism over the other, I must disagree with you; I do not need to choose. My view does not require either monism, and is not dualist.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I didn't say anything about physicalism. It sounds as if it directly implies that mind does not have the attribute "physical."

That is something which follows, yes. And that, in turn, contradicts physicalism. What is important is that the definition of mind was not arrived at by an assumption that physicalism is false, but from a conceptual analysis. You are now using the word "implies" instead of "assumes". This is a big difference. Evolution implies that the Bible is wrong. It does not assume that the Bible is wrong.

A zombie exists with a complete set of physical attributes of a human-complete-with-mind, but does not have the mind attribute.

Immediately, without need for derivation, we know that the mind attribute is not a physical attribute. It is directly implied by the statement. It appears to me to be assumed by the statement.

Yes, it does imply this. But it doesn't assume it.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

But what? Is that guy exhibiting behavior when he thinks the cursor around the screen?

~~ Paul

Yes, of course he is. The only difference is that this time the behaviour has bypassed his motor nervous system. You've replaced biological machinery with electrical/mechanical machinery.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Is not understanding Kant behavior?

Will that be a Kantian usage of the term "understanding"?

 

[Apathia]

Be careful with what you are saying. None here are banning private behavior from relevance (well, maybe Geoff and hammy); the same experiences normally labeled "subjective", with the inherent dualistic baggage, are more neutrally seen as "private", which does not make assumptions about their ontological status. It is not a matter of "science cannot work with subjective stuff, so I ban it from discussion!", but "let's look at this stuff without the unwarranted assumption that it must operate by completely different laws than experiences that can be shared by more than one person." We do not ignore any part of experience. We simply do not make up fairy tales and just-so stories to go along with the parts that only one person can observe.

You speak in terms of objective described public behavior and objectively discribed privare behavior. This covers speaking of oneself as am object. But it doesn't capture Subjectivity. it is a way of objectifying the subjective. It's not without good use, but it doesn't encompass who we are.

I save fairy tale for fair tales. Ontologically speaking I don't give any substance to Mind. There's no tiger in the boat. But I don't give any substance status to the boat either. There's no boat, there's no tiger other than the boat and tiger.

If you wish to make of being a behavior, I can't much object to that. It's an intransitive verb. But puting it into a sentance needs a subject. "I" doesn't denote a behavior, and you have to stretch it a little to say "I am." is a behavior.

Selfhood, self awareness isn't much of a doing anything. But you can say selfing is a behavior we do. It's not merely a private behavior but it's a public behavior as well. Selfhood comes from selfing makes sense to me. But selfing very much entails Subjectivity. And Subjectivity cannot be replaced by a Private Objectivity.

I don't agree that there is just behavior public and private. there is a subject that behaves, even if this subject is just a fictional byproduct of the process of selfing and having private behaviors. The sock puppet has a hand in it or there is no show.

 

[Darat]

Sorry, Darat, but.....

What's the matter JustGeoff? Not able to answer the problems this raises for your metaphysic?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Thanks for alerting me. Baum, whose "Understanding Behaviorism" is one which I have recommended to several people here (at least 4 have taken me up on it and read it), argues that Radical Behaviorism is not materialistic at all, but instead is based on the philosophy of Pragmatism. (This should come as no surprise, but I figured I'd cite someone besides me as saying it.)

Ah....so can we start discussing Richard Rorty then? Richard Rorty who was the originator of eliminativism, before abandoning it for his anti-philosophical pragmatism. Sure, pragmatism is just fine. Unless you get it confused with eliminative materialism.

I doubt that you will take the time to understand Behaviorism; why should you?

Exactly.

The version you use serves your purposes just fine, and the real version is a threat to this comfortable philosophy you have assumed. But if you do wish to enlighten yourself, just ask and I can recommend some very good reading.

Well, if it's a threat it'll come and get me, won't it?

I've got a sturdy lamp. I fear not the slavering grue.

 

[chriswl]

As I've said before, I do not think anybody actually knows what Dennetts position is on the reality of mental states. I find him incomprehensible much of the time.

Well there are two possibilities then.

1) His arguments are deliberately vague and evasive as a way of covering the basic weakness of his position and his fame is based more on the surface brilliance of his writing style and his popularity with non-philosophers.

2) He has a position that is deep and subtle and doesn't easily fit into the standard categories. He appears evasive because he wants to show us that some of the questions we want answers to are just misconceived.

When I first read Consciousness Explained ten years ago I found it a very frustrating experience and would have gone with 1 above. Now I'm more inclined towards 2.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Easy. Zombies are just not a thinkable concept. We cannot really conceive of them, we have no "clear and distinct" idea of what a zombie is.

But that is the claim that the anti-zombists can't defend. The problem is that we do indeed have a clear conceptual distinction between mental and physical. I refer you to the opening post. Provided you can clearly distinguish between brain and subjective experience, which everybody can, then you can concieve of a zombie. I understand you want to deny this. But you've got to provide an argument which can convince a neutral, and you've not done so.

The dictionary stacks the odds in favour of the zombist. The burden of proof is on you to show why zombies are conceptually impossible, and you can't just assert this to be true.

We can say that we know very well what a zombie is, it is a thing exactly like a human but with no mind, but that is just repeating the definition. Do we understand the definition and if we don't then how do we know that the definition makes sense?

The definition is easy to understand. That is the whole problem for the anti-zombist. If the possibility of zombies could just be dismissed with a wave of the hand, they'd pose no problems for supervenience materialism.

When we try to imagine a zombie we first imagine a human being, in front of us, behaving exactly like an ordinary conscious human does. And then we say the words ".. but he has no consciousness". How exactly is that last step anything other than just words? How do we imagine his lack of consciousness?

Easily. We imagine an abscence of any internal awareness. As much as the materialist would like to claim that this is impossible to imagine, it is hard to see how he is going to convince a neutral of this. Imagining zombies is all too easy.

The zombie idea presupposes that consciousness is undetectable from the outside.

The claim that consciousness is undetectable from outside is easily defended without reference to the zombie argument.

So we are not imagining actually seeing a lack of consciousness in our zombie.

Agreed. We are imagining that it lacks the awareness that we ourselves are currently experiencing. We imagine it has no consciousness.

Nor can we be imagining putting ourselves in the zombie's place and discovering that we have no consciousness - this would just be silly.

Yes, that would be silly. We cannot imagine the subtantial elements of the abscence of something because there aren't any. But how does that prevent us from imagining something which is physically identical to a human but lacks a mind?

If we are imagining anything here we are just imagining the existence of a rule......

No. When I imagine a p-zombie I am definately not imagining the existence of a rule.

Provided you have a clear conceptual distinction between a mind and a brain process, you can imagine a zombie. No problem.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Ok, that was good for a laugh.

You don't understand them, but your circular arguments are going to bring them down.

Almost worth the laughing dog, but I really don't like that particular smilie.

Isn't it great us philosophers can have a laugh together?

Sorry, Merc, I just don't care enough about either eliminativism or behaviourism to give either of them any more debating time than I already have. For me, they are both little more than potential destination points for a reductio ad absurdum.

 

[Apathia]

Thanks for alerting me. Baum, whose "Understanding Behaviorism" is one which I have recommended to several people here (at least 4 have taken me up on it and read it), argues that Radical Behaviorism is not materialistic at all, but instead is based on the philosophy of Pragmatism. (This should come as no surprise, but I figured I'd cite someone besides me as saying it.)

That your view of Behaviorism is an outdated materialistic fantasy, I will agree. Your ignorance of Radical Behaviorism allows you to argue against a straw-behaviorism that bears little or no resemblance to what is actually there.

I doubt that you will take the time to understand Behaviorism; why should you? The version you use serves your purposes just fine, and the real version is a threat to this comfortable philosophy you have assumed. But if you do wish to enlighten yourself, just ask and I can recommend some very good reading.

Recommend me something I can pull off the net. I've already exceeded my book allowance.
I see your point. The kind of behaviorist approch you are taking doesn't assume Materialism. I'm still not sure it's giving our Subjectivity due. it seems like a way to Objectify as much as possible and then some leaving the notion that you could have a well behaved zombie without a soul. But I could be mistaken here. So pass on some info to help me clarify this.

I still find it difficult to conceive of a P-Zombie perfectly human behaving but having no Subjectivity or self-awareness. And disclaimer again. I don't mean by Subjectivity some ghost in the machine. Private experiencing as opposed to public experiencing doesn't catch the difference between Subjective and Objective. Furthermore human experiencing entails the subjective in reference to both internal and external.

I may be misunderstanding a subtle point here, so please pass along some info on Radical Behaviorism. I might find it very Zen.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

OK, Geoff, have it your own way. If you don't care what the definition of behavior is, or how it is that we are using the word, then I don't see how we can carry on a conversation. You still have yet to engage in the discussion over the meaning of words such as "subjectivity", "subject", etc. Again, I see no reason to continue given the persistent refusals and use of definitions to suit your own purposes. If you ever wish to understand "this side" of the debate perhaps we can have a meeting of minds. Until then, have a beer for me too.

Hyparxis, the tiger wasn't necessarily in the boat. To conclude so is to miss the point. The story is simply better with the tiger in the boat. We need that story. Atoms smashing together has no meaning for us. We create meaning.

 

[hammegk]

What's the matter JustGeoff? Not able to answer the problems this raises for your metaphysic?

No problem was raised for any metaphysic. That's the only problem; i.e. why make that post ... yours, his, or this one .... ah what the hey, I will raise my post count too. So I suppose we are all happy.


No, I believe I'll post something that some will consider topical to this thread.

Why? If my view is independent of monism, monism is something that does not matter. No need to choose. Dualism is, as you agree, incoherent. That does not require one to choose a monism.

How do you separate your unchosen worldview from dualism, since that for the westerners here would be the usual default position?

erm...maybe I missed where you issued a "challenge".

I don't think you missed my "100% certain" questions.

My view does not require either monism, and is not dualist.

We can agree to disagree, until you can explain what a non-monist position of any kind can logically be other than dualism. Do you propose a fourth "Mercutio monism"? If so how does it differ from 'mind', 'body', or 'neutral'?

As yet, imo, the choice 'neutral' also just hides a refusal to take a stand, and remain a dualist in all but denial of it.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Well there are two possibilities then.

1) His arguments are deliberately vague and evasive as a way of covering the basic weakness of his position and his fame is based more on the surface brilliance of his writing style and his popularity with non-philosophers.

2) He has a position that is deep and subtle and doesn't easily fit into the standard categories. He appears evasive because he wants to show us that some of the questions we want answers to are just misconceived.

When I first read Consciousness Explained ten years ago I found it a very frustrating experience and would have gone with 1 above. Now I'm more inclined towards 2.

I'd go for a variation on (1):

His arguments are deliberately vague and evasive as a way of covering the basic weakness of his position and his fame is based on the fact that it appeals to materialistic scientists who don't really do philosophy (of which there are a great many) and who are looking to someone who will act as a rearguard defence of their metaphysical beliefs. Dennett is famous because he is the last line of defence against the hordes of rampaging anti-materialists. Most proper philosophers can't stand him. I'd tell you what my metaphysics professor said about him, but its not repeatable.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Whatever the metaphysical view or attempted scientific way of putting it, we have "Heart." we function as Heartful persons everyday.

I assume, then, that you refer to our emotional life here. Generally in these sorts of discussions that is what surfaces as what often stands for subjectivity though few wish to agree once it is placed in such stark terms. Or do you have a different sense for what "subjectivity" means? I always like to hear what others think of the term.

I don't think we are trying to create a "purely objective" space here to discuss "mental matters". I can certainly see how you might get the impression that some of your interlocutors are trying to suck "meaning" from the debate. That is why I made the reference to "The Life of Pi" in the first place, because I sensed that you felt that was going on. I was trying to remedy the situation in advance by mentioning that that was not anyone's intent in this discussion, at least as far as I know.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That is why I made the reference to "The Life of Pi" in the first place, because I sensed that you felt that was going on.

Ah, OK. I wondered if the tiger and boat stuff was refering to that book. But I now have no idea what the relevance is. I saw a deep metaphor in the ending of that book, but don't really understand how it applies here. The metaphor I saw was that life was at times actually so difficult and oppresive and often so repetitive and dull that as conscious human beings, we have to make up a different narrative to make it all seem more bearable. Is somebody suggesting that we've made up the concept of mind for the same reason, or have I got the wrong end of the stick?