Easy solution to the pirate problem...

The most recent one on the database is the Qana which was hijacked on Sunday and liberated by Yemeni special forces on Monday.

I should note that the list is not a complete list of every single attack. The rates of success in my list should be regarded as much higher than reality. For example in 2008 there were a total of 111 recorded attacks, of which 42 were successful (38%) compared with the 51 in my database of which 40 were successful (78%).

Do you see a correlation between the percentage of success with the number of hijacking attempts each year? I see you've already presented a correlation between a lower success rate and active resistance, but I'd like to see the number of attacks along with the success rate as well as the progressive practice of evasion or other resistance. I'd posit that each year the rate of success for the pirates drop you also see a dramatic increase in the number of attempts. Feel free to confirm or correct my (not-so wild) guess.

I am getting at something with this point, but in case it isn't obvious I'll explain it in a separate post. I'd rather see the numbers first.
 
It actually is that simple. The pirates have a 0% success rate against ships which had armed guards on board.

They have a 100% success rate against crews which invite them aboard for a cup of tea.

Well, then. If it's THAT simple, why are we even having this conversation ? Thread over! :rolleyes:
 
There has been evidence shown that the pirates want to kill Americans.
That seems to have started immediately after Captain Philips was "rescued". It's like they learned something about what americans are.


I noticed this comment just kind of flew by without comment. But I would sure like to know what the hell you meant by it. I mean, I know it's purlely ridiculed around here, but questions like "Why do you hate America?" have a foundation in reality some of the time.

If I'm misunderstanding what you meant or said, then I apologize.
 
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GreNME said:
There's no denying that our military is practically second to none.
Man-for-man or as a whole ?

I can't really answer in those terms, but if I were forced to I would answer "somewhere in-between the two." Organizationally and resource-wise, the US military is clearly the top slot. Tactically and strategically, the US has in active and former ranks some of the best military minds (and, yes, some pretty ridiculously bad ones as well). In terms of execution of military strategy and tactics, our forces tend to have a high success rate, even if the larger goals or objectives of such missions are the type I may disagree with. Among the military forces in the world with technical training, the US is among the top nations per-soldier. Separate from the administrations who may wield the military for whatever reason, the US military itself is, as I said, second to none in general.

Now, there are some military forces who have specializations that the US military does not focus as heavily on, so it's not like our military doesn't have things to learn from time to time. To assume otherwise would be a mistake for any military, particularly one as large as ours. But when it comes to performing "to the job" in the strict sense, the US military has a remarkably high efficacy.
 
I noticed this comment just kind of flew by without comment. But I would sure like to know what the hell you meant by it. I mean, I know it's purlely ridiculed around here, but questions like "Why do you hate America?" have a foundation in reality some of the time.

No, it really doesn't.

If I'm misunderstanding what you meant or said, then I apologize.

Trust me: you're misunderstanding.
 
Do you see a correlation between the percentage of success with the number of hijacking attempts each year? I see you've already presented a correlation between a lower success rate and active resistance, but I'd like to see the number of attacks along with the success rate as well as the progressive practice of evasion or other resistance. I'd posit that each year the rate of success for the pirates drop you also see a dramatic increase in the number of attempts. Feel free to confirm or correct my (not-so wild) guess.


Sure,

Data as follows:

2005 - 2 attacks
2006 - 2 attacks
2007 - 8 attacks
2008 - 51 attacks
2009 - 38 attacks (extrapolates out to 114 for the year)

I just want to reiterate that these numbers should be taken with a grain of salt - they're only the incidents listed on Wikipedia's database, and based on the 111 attacks reported for 2008, clearly don't constitute the total. I have a suspicion that since the wikipedia sources are primarily the media, as media attention has focused more on pirate attacks the percentage of attacks that is reported increases.

They were useful enough for my purposes - learning what pirate tactics are and how effective resistance is - but less useful for determining total numbers of attacks.

I've found one article citing an International Maritime Bureau report that attributes 31 attacks in 2007, up from 10 in 2006 off the Somali coast. It also notes a marked increase in violence and use of weapons in piracy - and attributes most of that increase to Somali pirates.

Also interesting is a UN map which tracks attacks from January 2005 to December 2007. It also graphs attacks, and we can use the available data to fill in blanks.

During the UIC controlled period (June to December 2006) there were only 3 report incidents of piracy. Given that we have a figure of 10 above, that means 7 occurred between January and May 2006. Further, the UN map gives us 67 incidents for the pre-UIC period from Jan 2005 to May 2005, so we know 60 of them occurred in 2005.

This then gives us some useful totals:

2005 - 60 incidents
2006 - 10 incidents
2007 - 31 incidents
2008 - 111 incidents

Further, articles such as this one report incidents are this year at about double the rate of last year, so we can predict ~230 attacks for 2009.

Also worth pointing out, the statistics above include three categories:

"Hijacking" - when a ship is captured
"Attempted Hijacking" - when pirates try but fail to capture a ship
"Suspicious vessel" - which involves ships being chased by suspected pirates, abnormally close transit, and all sorts of other incidents some of which will be genuine pirate incidents and some of which will just be accidents of navigation.

Lastly there's the IMB's live piracy map.

This is probably the most extensive and useful database, but would take a lot of work to compile, and determining where to draw the line between Somali pirates and other pirates could be difficult.

It maps all pirate incidents worldwide on a Google Map, with options to view by year. Clicking on incident markers brings up reports on the incident such as this:


Live Piracy Report

Attack ID: 2009/145

Date: 2009-04-25
Vessel Type: General cargo
Location: Gulf of Aden
Attack Type: Fired upon

Incident Details:

25.04.2009 : 0600 LT : Posn: 14:00.9N – 051:31.7E, Gulf of Aden

Two small speed boats with five persons armed with guns approached a general cargo ship underway. When the speed boats were about three cables away from the vessel they opened fire using automatic guns. Master enforced anti piracy measures and prevented the boarding.

The IMB tracks, in real time, all piracy incidents that are reported to their Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur.
 
Do you see a correlation between the percentage of success with the number of hijacking attempts each year? I see you've already presented a correlation between a lower success rate and active resistance, but I'd like to see the number of attacks along with the success rate as well as the progressive practice of evasion or other resistance. I'd posit that each year the rate of success for the pirates drop you also see a dramatic increase in the number of attempts. Feel free to confirm or correct my (not-so wild) guess.


I just noticed I didn't fully address your questions. Unfortunately the details of each incident are not uniform - often if the ship is captured no details are provided of any measures the ship may have taken to repel the boarding (obviously if the crew are still being held no one even knows at this stage). Some incidents do provide details but not all.

I think I see what you're getting at but it seems something of a circular argument; you're presuming that the rates of attacks increased dramatically because the success rate dropped. I'm not sure there's any logical reason to assume that at all. If anything it would be the other way around.

Further, if the data provided for 2008 is correct (111 attacks, 42 successful), the success rate has actually increased in 2009. Of course it's difficult to make such a claim as it's a fair assumption to make that the pool of incidents in the wikipedia database is heavy in favour of successful attacks.

I think perhaps a more pertinent question is 1) How many ships are being ransomed and 2) How big are the ransoms?

2008 saw seven ships ransomed for over $2,000,000 - one of them for $15,000,000 (out of 12 ships with reported ransom amounts and 17 ships total reported ransomed). I suspect the willingness of companies to pay big money to get their ships back in 2008 has more to do with the spike in 2009 than anything else.
 
I've requested PDF copies of both the latest Quarterly and Annual reports from the IMB. They should arrive in the next couple of days...
 
Thanks, gumboot. Excellent breakdown, and it mostly correlates with my following of the climate there since about 2005.

So, the reason I wanted to point out those numbers-- and why I'm grateful for you bringing them into play instead of me generalizing-- is that they are the reason I am not convinced that these recent events where weapons have come into play against the pirates is going to ultimately serve as a deterrent in the long run for their activities. In the past four years the pirate activity has been generally on the rise, despite the fact that more than one military presence has already moved into the area, and despite the fact that losses to the pirates have been on the rise as a result. I don't harbor any doubt that arming sailors and having the US presence there to bolster what's already present will dramatically lower the success rate of the pirates, but if based on the past four or five years alone the pirate activity continues and continues to grow, it would be fairly unreasonable to expect that this will stop the acts of piracy and it would be reasonable to predict that the rate of aggression from the pirates will increase along with the attacks.

Additionally, even if the number of successes sloughs off and a greater number of pirates are killed or repelled, what this will ultimately mean is a draw-down of military presence from the US and other naval units in the area. Considering the size of the Somali coast where these pirate groups are launching from and the fact that the pirate organizations are drawing their members from the local population (as opposed to an outside force), along with the perceived (even if not realized) economic benefit to those who would engage in piracy, as well as the probable lower risk-aversion in the general population, it's fair to say that the pirate groups have a sizable pool of resources from which to draw numbers to throw at the problem of increased resistance. It's not necessarily a given, but the probability is very high that this would be the case (based on past outside military interactions with Somalia).

As such, I find I keep coming back to what I perceive as a flaw in the strategy of simply arming the crews of the ships. Eventually the naval forces are going to move on or draw down, and the numbers of attacks are generally likely to increase based on the numbers so far. This is textbook escalation, and the greater the escalation of force in the situation the more risk there is of a cluster***k occurring because the source of the problem-- in this case, the pirating groups-- have not been adequately addressed. I'd be more than happy to, later on down the line, admit that my fears were ultimately overblown and/or incorrect, but that's going to require time and there's really no way to make it go faster.

Does that more contextually present my reservations about the strategy of simply arming the sailors as being a workable solution?
 
So, the reason I wanted to point out those numbers-- and why I'm grateful for you bringing them into play instead of me generalizing-- is that they are the reason I am not convinced that these recent events where weapons have come into play against the pirates is going to ultimately serve as a deterrent in the long run for their activities.

I'd agree with you on that, although I would make one amendment that the data I've looked through seems to bring into question the notion that there has been any escalation. It appears the majority of ships have been using whatever means they could to resist pirates for years, and have been succeeding. Likewise there doesn't appear to be any obvious escalation in aggression or weaponry from the pirates.

I think anyone who thinks arming crews will stop piracy is dreaming - the problems are on land, not at sea, and on land is where they will be fixed.


In the past four years the pirate activity has been generally on the rise, despite the fact that more than one military presence has already moved into the area, and despite the fact that losses to the pirates have been on the rise as a result. I don't harbor any doubt that arming sailors and having the US presence there to bolster what's already present will dramatically lower the success rate of the pirates, but if based on the past four or five years alone the pirate activity continues and continues to grow, it would be fairly unreasonable to expect that this will stop the acts of piracy and it would be reasonable to predict that the rate of aggression from the pirates will increase along with the attacks.

Additionally, even if the number of successes sloughs off and a greater number of pirates are killed or repelled, what this will ultimately mean is a draw-down of military presence from the US and other naval units in the area. Considering the size of the Somali coast where these pirate groups are launching from and the fact that the pirate organizations are drawing their members from the local population (as opposed to an outside force), along with the perceived (even if not realized) economic benefit to those who would engage in piracy, as well as the probable lower risk-aversion in the general population, it's fair to say that the pirate groups have a sizable pool of resources from which to draw numbers to throw at the problem of increased resistance. It's not necessarily a given, but the probability is very high that this would be the case (based on past outside military interactions with Somalia).

The data from organisations like the UN would support this. One particular pirate group is estimated to have thus far earned about $30 million from ransoms, and some of the pirate groups now have more resources to call on than the various groups vying for governance of the country.


As such, I find I keep coming back to what I perceive as a flaw in the strategy of simply arming the crews of the ships. Eventually the naval forces are going to move on or draw down, and the numbers of attacks are generally likely to increase based on the numbers so far. This is textbook escalation, and the greater the escalation of force in the situation the more risk there is of a cluster***k occurring because the source of the problem-- in this case, the pirating groups-- have not been adequately addressed. I'd be more than happy to, later on down the line, admit that my fears were ultimately overblown and/or incorrect, but that's going to require time and there's really no way to make it go faster.


It seems to me the most compelling piece of evidence is the reduction in piracy after the UIC took control of Somalia, and the increase once they lost control again. It's somewhat akin to the relationship between heroin and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Personally, if you ask me heroin and pirates are a small price to pay to avoid more fundamentalist Islamic states in the world.

I don't perceive arming crews as any sort of strategic plan to defeat piracy. My support of it is somewhat mundane. If crews feel endangered, and wish to arm themselves for protection, they should be allowed to. I'm not out there trying to dodge Somali pirates. Neither are you. Self defense is a fundamental right, and I don't think we should be allowed to withhold it from people who have a very legitimate reason to want it.

And if letting crews protect themselves actually does make the situation worse, that's not an argument to deny crews protection. It's an argument to actually sort out a plan for fixing the situation, instead of trying to ignore it.

It's funny that the UN possesses the ability to easily solve every single conflict on this planet, but never wants to do anything until the member states start to feel it. The Somali pirates are the world community feeling the pain of a problem we abandoned 16 years ago because it got "too hard".

The solution is UNOSOM III.
 
Among the military forces in the world with technical training, the US is among the top nations per-soldier.

I don't know if what I'm about to say is true, because I don't know where to start looking for evidence, but everyone I know who's involved in the Canadian Armed Forces claims that military exercises between Canadians and Americans usually show a marked difference between the two, in the Canadians' favour (man for man, that is). I know it's a derail, but I was wondering how true it was.
 
I would say that, currently, the key place where the USA has a major advantage over every other military with comparable training levels is combat experience.

I think there's also lots of variation based on task. For example, the USMC is leagues ahead of anyone else as far as urban combat. Meanwhile New Zealand is generally regarded as producing the best light infantry and combat trackers in the world. The British Armed Forces are universally respected for the general high caliber of their forces, and have been for a couple of centuries (small, but highly professional was always their formula).

The USA, generally speaking, is leagues ahead of anyone else on matters of technology.

I am not familiar with the specifics of the Canadian Forces, but would expect them to produce top level alpine and snow warfare troops. And as the manufacturers of the LAV III I suspect they produce excellent mounted infantry also.
 
I don't know if what I'm about to say is true, because I don't know where to start looking for evidence, but everyone I know who's involved in the Canadian Armed Forces claims that military exercises between Canadians and Americans usually show a marked difference between the two, in the Canadians' favour (man for man, that is). I know it's a derail, but I was wondering how true it was.

The Canadian Forces are definitely very highly skilled soldiers, especially with regard to technical and tactical support skills. I have no doubt that their general forces are quite up to par with any given modern military, and the fact that Canadian Forces have a high number of specializations (that I know of) very likely puts the CF as 'above par' compared to many other First World modern military forces. They're definitely no slouches, and the CF tactical support in Afghanistan has probably been second only to the US forces over there, mostly because there has consistently been a higher number of US forces. Man-to-man, I'd say the CF soldiers are easily equal to US soldiers in general. The main differences would mostly be in available resources and numbers.
 
I'd agree with you on that, although I would make one amendment that the data I've looked through seems to bring into question the notion that there has been any escalation. It appears the majority of ships have been using whatever means they could to resist pirates for years, and have been succeeding. Likewise there doesn't appear to be any obvious escalation in aggression or weaponry from the pirates.

I think anyone who thinks arming crews will stop piracy is dreaming - the problems are on land, not at sea, and on land is where they will be fixed.

That does seem to be the general consensus from what I know watching things brew just the last few years.

The data from organisations like the UN would support this. One particular pirate group is estimated to have thus far earned about $30 million from ransoms, and some of the pirate groups now have more resources to call on than the various groups vying for governance of the country.

Which is precisely why the problem is getting worse-- they are becoming a force potentially able to not only disregard the government, but actively resist and possibly overthrow. The heads of these pirate groups are the old 'warlord' criminals anyway.

It seems to me the most compelling piece of evidence is the reduction in piracy after the UIC took control of Somalia, and the increase once they lost control again. It's somewhat akin to the relationship between heroin and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Personally, if you ask me heroin and pirates are a small price to pay to avoid more fundamentalist Islamic states in the world.

But who's to say that the groups doing the pirating won't be attempting to appeal to local fundamentalist groups for assumed legitimacy? Aren't they attempting that to some degree already?

And if letting crews protect themselves actually does make the situation worse, that's not an argument to deny crews protection. It's an argument to actually sort out a plan for fixing the situation, instead of trying to ignore it.

I agree with this, and that's a very good point to keep in mind on the topic of trying to solve the problem.

It's funny that the UN possesses the ability to easily solve every single conflict on this planet, but never wants to do anything until the member states start to feel it. The Somali pirates are the world community feeling the pain of a problem we abandoned 16 years ago because it got "too hard".

The solution is UNOSOM III.

I know what you mean about pulling out due to political support vanishing, but I'm not yet convinced that another large military push is what's best there right now. The US is strapped, and while I'm not saying that things couldn't be handled if the decision to go in was made, I do think that it would face less popularity than it did back in `94. Also, considering Somalia's political troubles with Kenya and Ethiopia, it's a good bet that marching in there with military forces could lead to problems on Somalia's borders (much like after our forces left the last time).
 
Lastly there's the IMB's live piracy map.

This is probably the most extensive and useful database, but would take a lot of work to compile, and determining where to draw the line between Somali pirates and other pirates could be difficult.


I grabbed that data last night and put it in a spreadsheet this morning. No trouble at all.
 
But who's to say that the groups doing the pirating won't be attempting to appeal to local fundamentalist groups for assumed legitimacy? Aren't they attempting that to some degree already?

Oh I'm sure they are. But when you have anarchy you have a free-for-all. When you have a single powerful group in control you'll have a single group harassing your shipping. Much easier to deal with (and they have much more to lose if they piss you off too much).


I know what you mean about pulling out due to political support vanishing, but I'm not yet convinced that another large military push is what's best there right now. The US is strapped, and while I'm not saying that things couldn't be handled if the decision to go in was made, I do think that it would face less popularity than it did back in `94. Also, considering Somalia's political troubles with Kenya and Ethiopia, it's a good bet that marching in there with military forces could lead to problems on Somalia's borders (much like after our forces left the last time).

You're right about the practical realities that will prevent it happening, but it's nice to occasionally wistfully dream about a world in which the UN does its job properly.

The main issued with Kenya and Ethiopia are instability, and if you had a serious UN force in country instability simply wouldn't be an issue. It would probably go a long way to deterring the illegal shipping off the Somali coast as well - it seems for some odd reason that the Somalis don't like Iranian fishing ships coming in and intentionally destroying their own nets and boats. That seems to have a lot to do with the pirates - in fact two of the four major pirate groups are basically national coastguards that went off the reservation.

I can sympathise with them somewhat - New Zealand has to deal with a lot of illegal fishing in our waters as well, but unlike the Somalis we have a government with a functioning military which keeps them in check.
 
Oh I'm sure they are. But when you have anarchy you have a free-for-all. When you have a single powerful group in control you'll have a single group harassing your shipping. Much easier to deal with (and they have much more to lose if they piss you off too much).

That's true. It's easier to act with impunity when there's less likelihood of triggering an all-out attack on your mainland.

You're right about the practical realities that will prevent it happening, but it's nice to occasionally wistfully dream about a world in which the UN does its job properly.

I'd sooner wistfully dream of a UN that didn't tolerate obstructionist member states that used their membership as just another vector for causing international trouble. The UN just doesn't work as an organization unless the member states buy into the goal of maintaining as much stability around the world as possible.

The main issued with Kenya and Ethiopia are instability, and if you had a serious UN force in country instability simply wouldn't be an issue. It would probably go a long way to deterring the illegal shipping off the Somali coast as well - it seems for some odd reason that the Somalis don't like Iranian fishing ships coming in and intentionally destroying their own nets and boats. That seems to have a lot to do with the pirates - in fact two of the four major pirate groups are basically national coastguards that went off the reservation.

Yeah, I've read about the coast guards. I'm just growing more convinced that Somalia alone is at the root of the instability there. It seems to be a nexus for unstable states.

I can sympathise with them somewhat - New Zealand has to deal with a lot of illegal fishing in our waters as well, but unlike the Somalis we have a government with a functioning military which keeps them in check.

It's funny, because one of the ridiculously misquoting/quote-mining articles from InfoWars cited an article about Somalia by someone who was presumably a Somali, and the article (besides contradicting what the InfoWars article claimed) basically was an appeal for a stronger government in Somalia in order to use the greater UN legitimacy it could garner to handle the problems like the illegal fishing and the problems with the trash dumping.
 
I don't know if what I'm about to say is true, because I don't know where to start looking for evidence, but everyone I know who's involved in the Canadian Armed Forces claims that military exercises between Canadians and Americans usually show a marked difference between the two, in the Canadians' favour (man for man, that is). I know it's a derail, but I was wondering how true it was.

Here is a great website to compare military forces:
www.globalfirepower.com

If you notice, Canada is nowhere near the top in any category whatsoever whereas the United States is in the top three for almost every single category (Comparing Canada and the United States for military is like comparing an NFL football team to a peewee team). One thing to take note of is the United States overwhelming supremacy in air power and sea power. Then on the home page if you look at the overall top list, the United States is number one.
 

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