Crisis of Civilisation

Since you posted that in response to a question regarding the ERoEI of bioethanol, I must assume that you are willing to provide some kind of summary of that study's findings. The best I can come up with is: It depends. Those guys are all over the place.

The paper is open access. A summary would be the abstract. "In this report, we summarize the agricultural energy input costs, biomass yield, estimated ethanol output, greenhouse gas emissions, and net energy results. Annual biomass yields of established fields averaged 5.2-11.1 Mg x ha(-1) with a resulting average estimated net energy yield (NEY) of 60 GJ x ha(-1) x y(-1). Switchgrass produced 540% more renewable than nonrenewable energy consumed." I am willing to discuss the paper further if you would like. I don't see where you get the impression that they are "all over the place."


The success of any bioethanol project depends on what you're growing, and how, and where, and on the weather. On how well some of the recent efforts in enzyme development succeed, and how well they scale up to industrial production levels.

To address you first points, this paper followed "10 farms across a wide precipitation and temperature gradient in the midcontinental U.S." Why would recent enzyme development matter to this study? This study is based on data from the year 2000, if anything the enzymes and processes (including nonenzymatic ones) are improved, meaning an even greater net energy today.

At present the ERoEI of ethanol from switchgrass is similar to that from corn (just barely better than break even, if that). There certainly seems to be a great deal of promise for improvement -- to 4:1, 5:1, 8:1 -- who knows? It depends -- on more things than we appear to be able to calculate at present. My earlier observation that "we're long on knowledge and short on application" does not quite apply to cellulosic ethanol from switchgrass; in this particular instance, it looks to me like we're short on both.

Why are you just making **** up now? TEN years ago the net energy was 5:1, earlier studies estimated the net energy to be around 3:1, some simulations estimated it to be >7:1 (refs in the paper). It looks to me like you are full of ****.
 
The paper is open access.
Yes. I've read it.

TEN years ago the net energy was 5:1, earlier studies estimated the net energy to be around 3:1, some simulations estimated it to be >7:1 (refs in the paper).
Like I said: all over the place (and "earlier studies" includes at least one from 2005, so I think you're being hasty in assuming a nice neat timeline).

The question was simple: what's the ERoEI of bioethanol? The answer, apparently, is not so simple. Remember, the statement "Switchgrass produced 540% more renewable than nonrenewable energy consumed" was based on data across a range of growing methods and conditions; under the most ideal conditions, the ratio should be even better than that -- and, under the least favorable conditions, worse. The authors noted:

"Switchgrass managed as a bioenergy crop in these field trials had estimated ethanol yields similar to those for corn grain (Fig. 4a) grown in the same states and years. Caution should be made in making direct ethanol yield comparisons with cellulosic sources and corn grain, because corn grain conversion technology is mature, whereas cellulosic conversion efficiency technology is based on an estimated value."

So they're estimating conversion efficiency; assuming it, really. They say so:

"Assuming an estimated conversion rate of 0.38 liter·ethanol·kg−1 harvested biomass ..."

Another interesting quote is this:

"Even with a more conservative cellulosic conversion value, switchgrass from this study is much closer to current corn grain ethanol yields than human-made prairies for this geographic region."

Like I said: all over the place.

"A previous study [the one from 2005] reported a negative energy balance for ethanol derived from switchgrass by assuming that high levels of agricultural inputs (Fig. 2) would be required, and that nonrenewable energy would be needed to generate power for a cellulosic ethanol biorefinery. Feasibility research indicates that the lignaceous portion of plant biomass remaining after saccrification and fermentation can be used to power the cellulosic ethanol biorefinery and potentially could be used to generate additional electricity to sell to the electrical grid as a byproduct."

Potential is nice, and I do think bioethanol has plenty -- but cars aren't simulations, and they don't run on potential or promise or feasibility research.

Why would recent enzyme development matter to this study? This study is based on data from the year 2000, if anything the enzymes and processes (including nonenzymatic ones) are improved, meaning an even greater net energy today.
I'd say it matters very much to the commercial viability of bioethanol (currently, it's a joke), though I don't have a clue as to how much improvement in ERoEI better enzymes would provide. If it doesn't matter much to this study, that's probably because they wanted to treat conversion efficiency as a constant (it was from hydrolysis/fermentation) so as to isolate the factors they were most interested in: agricultural inputs and crop yield.

It looks to me like you are full of ****.
Someone usually is. Could be it's my turn. I'm pretty sure it's been quite a while since the last time, so maybe I'm due. Here are some interesting facts, though (assuming that the sources I'm referencing here aren't full of ****):

The cellulosic ethanol industry developed some new commercial-scale plants in 2008. In the United States, plants totaling 12 million liters (3.17 million gal) per year were operational, and an additional 80 million liters (21.1 million gal.) per year of capacity—in 26 new plants—was under construction.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cellulosic_ethanol_commercialization

In 2010, the United States consumed about 137.76 billion gallons (or 3.28 billion barrels1) of gasoline, a daily average of about 377.58 million gallons (8.99 million barrels).
http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=23&t=10

So we're using 377 million gallons of gasoline per day, and we're producing 3 million gallons of ethanol per year. I don't think ramping that up to 21 million gallons per year is going to help very much. What is that, like an hour an a half's worth?
 
No.

As skeptics, we understand that it is impossible to know when peak oil (or peak anything) occurs until after that fact.

And, as a scientifically literate person, I know that science is frequently used for ex-tra-po-la-tion and that resource extraction generally observes a logistic curve.

Sorry, bro.

Re: renewable energy as a substitute for fossil fuels: you can increase the rate of extraction of coal, oil, and gas. You can't, however, increase the rate of extraction from the sun.
 
Re: renewable energy as a substitute for fossil fuels: you can increase the rate of extraction of coal, oil, and gas. You can't, however, increase the rate of extraction from the sun.

What do you mean by that? We can certainly increase the rate at which we turn solar energy into useable energy. (obviously: by putting up more solar panels, for instance). How is that different from increasing the rate at which we turn chemical energy into useable energy (by building more coal fired power plants, for instance)?
 
Oh sure, I mean it's not like we've ever seen the price of oil quadruple within a period of months, or shortages that necessitated implementation of measures like gasoline rationing, and the oil-producing nations in the middle east on whom we depend for more of our supply than ever before are enjoying an unprecedented period of peaceful relations as well as internal political stability, and the current US and EU economies are best described as "robust" and "resiliant".
Just to be clear, you're saying we don't have years? You are predicting (with some very high likelihood, I imagine) that there will be major shortages in oil (and major price volatility) within the next year?

The map is not the territory. That theoretical curve does not feature all of the zigs and zags one always sees when graphing real-world data because the model does not even attempt to encompass all of the myriad factors that would be required to predict those. I still say that the downslope is likely to see a lot of price volatility, and a lot of struggling for control over the remaining reserves, with supply becoming increasingly spotty and unreliable.
Sounds reasonable, but I don't know enough about this topic to know if it is. Do you have any citations supporting this viewpoint? Is it the general viewpoint of professionals studying the issue?
 
What do you mean by that? We can certainly increase the rate at which we turn solar energy into useable energy. (obviously: by putting up more solar panels, for instance). How is that different from increasing the rate at which we turn chemical energy into useable energy (by building more coal fired power plants, for instance)?

The sun comes to us in the form of a "fine mist" whose rate we cannot alter. If you think about it, coal and oil and gas are really "concentrated sunlight". That's why, until recently, they've been so very convenient. You can take out as much as you want on demand. With solar you can build more solar panels but past certain limits you can't alter the rate at which they generate electricity.

ps because solar panels divert energy away from the biosphere there are limits to which they can be sustainable as well.
 
Just to be clear, you're saying we don't have years?
I'm saying that we can't assume that. We've known for decades that our own production is in decline, and that solving that through increased reliance on imported oil is not only damaging to our economy in the short run but makes us increasingly vulnerable to events beyond our control (for that matter, we don't seem to have yet fully accepted that we can't control events in distant regions) -- and we've always assumed that we had years to come up with better solutions. At one time, that was true. Unfortunately, we didn't use that time to make serious and sustained efforts toward implementing those alternative solutions. If we continue to assume that we still have years, we won't implement them now. This pattern will continue until we reach the point at which we realize that we don't have years, by which time it will be too late to implement those alternative solutions. Basic human nature. I'm personally convinced that it's already too late to avoid some rather unpleasant consequences.

You are predicting (with some very high likelihood, I imagine) that there will be major shortages in oil (and major price volatility) within the next year?
I've already outlined one scenario that could severely and immediately impact price and supply of oil: Israel strikes Iran, the US gets sucked in, Iran retaliates by hitting Saudi oilfields. The first two of those I would describe as "highly likely" (yes, within the next year), and the third as "a very distinct possibility". It's impossible to predict the full ramifications of a thing like that, but I guarantee that it wouldn't result in a reduction in the price of oil.

Sounds reasonable, but I don't know enough about this topic to know if it is. Do you have any citations supporting this viewpoint? Is it the general viewpoint of professionals studying the issue?
Hard to know how to respond to that other than with something like, "As supporting evidence, I present the History of the World". Consider our past escapades in the Middle East. Our response (in concert with Great Britain) to Iran nationalizing its oil industry in 1951 is of particular interest. Look at how control over supplies of oil (and rubber) impacted the course of World War Two. And as exhibit B, I present basic economics: When demand for oil exceeds supply, the stuff gets expensive. Economic activity declines, and with it, demand for oil. Naturally, the price of oil then comes down, and oil production is scaled back. At the lower price, economic activity begins to revive, demand increases, and the cycle repeats.
 
What about other oil derivatives besides gas ? We almost never talk about those.
Our greatest need by far for petroleum-derived products is for the liquid fuels used in transportation. Yes, the distillation process also produces a bunch of other stuff, but most of the impact of a major oil price shock would be felt in transportation sector.
 
That sounds suspiciously like Famous Last Words to me.

I can imagine the Romans of, say, about 450 CE saying that. Technically, we can do almost anything science allows. Politically, we cannot find our ass with both hands.

But so many can get their heads up their ass in a fraction of an instant!!:D:jaw-dropp
 
Our greatest need by far for petroleum-derived products is for the liquid fuels used in transportation. Yes, the distillation process also produces a bunch of other stuff, but most of the impact of a major oil price shock would be felt in transportation sector.

It's like plastic doesn't exist, right ? If we run out of petroleum, well all we have to do is find another way to make cars run, right ?
 
It's like plastic doesn't exist, right ? If we run out of petroleum, well all we have to do is find another way to make cars run, right ?
To a first approximation, yes. Or find other ways to get around. Or just quit moving around so much.

We're never going to "run out of petroleum", but total non-fuel uses account for just a few percent of our total petroleum consumption anyway. The most important compounds used in making plastics are olefins, and while these are obtained as byproducts of the oil refining process, the main source is natural gas. So it's really not the main concern.
 
As I post this, the two lead stories on the BBC news site are:

"No 10 denies causing fuel panic." and "UK economic growth revised down".

Meanwhile, back in reality...

http://www.transitionnc.org/node/53/2456#comment-2456

Rick Monroe said:
UK Oil: Plummeting production vs media inattention

This article was inspired by the disjuncture between a UK government document which reveals the stunning decline in UK oil production, as opposed to British media inattention to this worrisome development.

The website of Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) states, “Total indigenous UK production of crude oil and NGLs in the third quarter of 2011 was 22.7 per cent lower than a year…. For the first time since quarterly records began, imports of crude oil exceeded indigenous production” (p. 20).

For any modern nation, a 22% decline in oil production would be significant over the course of a decade. A 22% drop over a mere 12 months ought to be front-page news, yet this radical decline has passed relatively unnoticed.

An article in yesterday’s Telegraph examined the acute pain at the pump as “forecourt prices reached record heights.” The article points out that these record prices are “inflated by concerns surrounding Iran and Syria,” but provides no hint of the worsening situation on the UK’s own doorstep, its Continental Shelf.

Another common theme in media reports (often quoting DECC spokesmen) is to attribute recent declines to maintenance work, slowdowns, infrastructure problems, even industry frustration with government tax grabs, all of which may be correct. Such statements are often followed by reassurances that these difficulties will soon be resolved and production will return to normal.

However, it seems certain that British citizens are descending into a new and increasingly difficult “normal” which looks like this:

Yesterday’s Guardian article comes closer to addressing the reality of the situation, referring to jokes about the North Sea as the “Dead Sea” and the fact that “the precipitous decline in the domestic oil and gas industry… not only makes Britain more reliant on foreign imports but also reduces Treasury tax take.”

It states, “North Sea crude and gas production fell 17% in 2011, one of its biggest ever annual drops, while the number of exploration well drilled was down by half on 2010.”

DECC maintains an interesting section which allows us to examine the production record of individual fields. An examination of the once-mighty Forties, Brent, etc reveals what “terminal decline” actually looks like.

In many respects, Britain seems poised to lead the western world in grappling with peak oil. The UK oil and gas bonanza is nearing its end, and Britons must come to grips with what they once had and how rapidly it slipped away. In this respect, they provide a warning to nations such as Canada, which is about to repeat the same mistake (ie. a rapid international sell-off of its remaining oil and gas).

As for the future, Britain has its unique All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPGOPO), ITPOES, UKERC, Global Witness, Transition Towns, the Soil Association and a multitude of other progressive organizations which are well aware of how profoundly serious the emerging situation is. These groups are committed to finding effective ways to manage the unprecedented difficulties that lie ahead. Other countries do not have Parliamentary groups, nor a proactive industry organization, nor a thorough analysis such at that conducted by UKERC.

The rest of the world may find that there is much that can be learned from the British experience.

Do not trust the mainstream media to keep you accurately informed.
 
He wasn't mocked very dang far into the '70s, because it became clearer with each passing day that his model had quite accurately predicted the 1970 peak of US production, and had done it fifteen years in advance.

Hubbert was a thoroughly credentialled geologist who worked for Shell oil for more than twenty years, and as a senior research geophysicist for the USGS for another twelve. The Hubbert Curve and Peak Oil theory is only one among several important contributions he made to geology, geophysics, and petroleum geology. You want to dismiss him as a crackpot because you don't like the message, that's fine, but know this: most geologists and petroleum experts do not.

Hubbert's theory is based on the realities of geology and petroleum engineering. By itself, it says nothing whatsoever about economic impacts.

Perhaps you missed the point, which Julian Simon puts out quite clearly -- the physical scientists become de facto crackpots when they take their scientific observations of the world and then extrapolate Gloom and Doom from it.

This guy does this. Ergo he is a crackpot.

Don't take my word for it! Watch as history unfolds, again, and guys like this and their crackpot economic extrapolations are proven wrong, again.



Actually, you should take my word for it, if taking his word for it leads you to want to have government intervention in the economy based on those crackpot economic doom claims.

I no more want asinine economic doom claims to rule the world than I do Jesus is coming doom claims.
 
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Perhaps you missed the point, which Julian Simon puts out quite clearly -- the physical scientists become de facto crackpots when they take their scientific observations of the world and then extrapolate Gloom and Doom from it.

This guy does this. Ergo he is a crackpot.
I'm not quite clear on whether you accept Hubbert's model as adequately based in physical science, nor on whether it is Hubbert you're referring to as "This guy", or someone else. Again, Hubbert was a petroleum geologist, not an economist, and I don't know that he ever engaged in a lot of extrapolating to socioeconomic consequences; his main focus was providing advice to the oil industry -- and, again, he is not viewed as a crackpot by experts in that industry.

Scientific findings are often used as the basis for crackpot extrapolation, but it usually turns out to be someone other than the scientists themselves doing the extrapolating (reporters are probably the most frequent offenders). Maybe you consider that an indictment against the scientists, but I don't. A lot of the consequences seem to pretty much speak for themselves anyway, on the simplest of logic.

I'm not inclined to go wading through all the reams of (poorly formatted) text you linked to, not the least reason being that the portions I have sampled look to me like the ravings of... well, a crackpot. If somewhere in that mess are some passages that you find particularly compelling as arguments against the potential seriousness of the peak oil issue, you might quote a few paragraphs. I doubt if you will, though. You seem to favor the occasional drive-by style of argument.
 
Perhaps you missed the point, which Julian Simon puts out quite clearly -- the physical scientists become de facto crackpots when they take their scientific observations of the world and then extrapolate Gloom and Doom from it.

You've got it exactly backwards. The physical scientists are dealing with reality. The "extrapolation" you refer to is merely applying what they've learned about the real physical world to the less-real world of human politics and economics. This looks to the people who are looking at political reality and forgetting about real reality like "crackpot doom and gloom." It's not the scientists who are the crackpots. It's the economists and politicians who think that infinite growth is possible on a finite planet because human economics and politics demands that it be so.
 
As far as I know, diesel engines can still be converted to run on vegetable oil without damage to the diesel engine so peak oil is overrated. Natural gas and ethanol will pick up slack eventually and so will hybrids. We need cars that can take multiple fuel sources reliably.

Financial meltdowns happen all of the time and civilization goes on. Natural disasters like supervolcanic eruptions could happen and I don't think there's much we can do about them.

We need thorough monitoring of the power grid to shield for solar flares and a strong emergency electronics supply in case of EMP from attacks, but neither of these are likely to collapse civilization.

For better and worse, civilization is amazingly resilient.

There's a guy in our village who runs his car on vegetable oil. He collects the used oil from the local frituurs. Every time he passes the street stinks like a chip shop for about ten minutes. Still, that's a small price to pay, I suppose.
 
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I'm afraid that doesn't count for much, given that the JREF operates on "mob mentality."

The JREF operates on evidence. You may have missed that. I am not part of any mob. I am a skeptic, which means show me irrefutable evidence and I will believe it. Truthers have no evidence, that is the point.
 

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