Same answer, probably same reasoning:
Nice twist, Lucky.
Yes, that does the job. (Couldn't fathom WLOG; had to look it up!)
Without meaning to blow my own trumpet, there was never any doubt in my mind that Tom's probability of death was still 1/3 in the original problem and I couldn't really see why anyone would think otherwise. Then it was pointed out that this problem is identical to the Monty Hall problem. The latter took me a good hour to get my head around. So I was wondering why such a difference might occur? Does it say something about my ability (or lack of) at problem solving? I first learned about the Monty Hall problem about 5 years ago but I'm struggling to believe its just experience of statistics that caused the difference.
I think that's a profound and interesting question – and I don't know the answer.
In real life, we generally tackle (what ought to be) probability and other logic problems by intuition (i.e. unconscious analogy) rather than by conscious logical manipulation and calculation. But to solve a recreational puzzle we need to abstract the logic of the situation and ignore the trappings, and some (kinds of) scenarios seem to be more difficult than others for this purpose. Whilst this isn't universal (some people have difficulty with any kind of logic problem, others find them easy), there does seem to be some quality of a scenario that invites intuition and analogy rather than abstraction - and the intuition/analogy may be false.
I think the most interesting thing about these two puzzles is why people find them so non-intuitive. Personally I wasn't confused by either, but I work with probabilities (and numbers in general) every day as a profession, so I have lots of practice thinking about these things (and am quite wary of the mental traps you can fall into).
Same here. It becomes automatic to translate these problems into context-free mathematical representations, while blocking out intuitive answers. A (sometimes annoying) corollary is that you tend to do this when intuition would actually work perfectly well; so (for example in a pub conversation) you become the last (instead of the only) person to get the right answer.
It reminds me of the following famous cog psy experiment:
The experimenter says: "Here are four cards, each with a number on one side and a letter on the other" (you look down and see four cards on a table, labeled A, F, 3, 6 respectively). "The claim is, if there's a vowel on one side of a card then there's an even number on the other. Question - which of those cards must you flip over to check whether that is true?"
This is an utterly trivial problem in formal logic (in a sense it's the most simple question you can possibly ask), and yet only a tiny fraction of people answer correctly when you do the experiment.
I read about a study where this puzzle was posed in several formally identical ways, with wildly different results (unfortunately I can't remember where I read it). As you said, most people got the card scenario wrong, but with other scenarios the success rate was far higher.
One of them went something like this:
You're bar/security staff at a social event. People have to be at least 18 to be in possession of alcohol. What do you need to check: someone ordering a whisky, someone ordering an orange juice, also a young teenager and a pensioner both carrying drinks?
Plainly, it's formally the same as the card puzzle (
if alcohol
then >=18). Yet the large majority got this one right. Why?