Why Wasn't Auschwitz Bombed?

I thought, based on historical data, that the bombing of London was the first deliberate targeting of civilians, and led to the all out war which included both sides bombing civilian targets.
The RAF's move towards area bombing was as much driven by technological and operational limitations as it was anything else.

Attacking in daylight obviously yields the best accuracy. But unescorted bombers get shot down in large numbers, so the switch is made to nighttime bombing. Before the war it was thought that crews wouldn't have that much difficulty finding targets at night, but in reality it proved to be very difficult. The only way a specific target like a factory complex could be spotted at night was by flying relatively low. But flying at lower altitudes meant a vastly greater chance of being shot down by flak.

So, the bombers fly as high as they can to be safer. But this consequently means the only thing you can reasonably find at night is a target the size of a city. So the city itself becomes the aiming point (and even then in 1941-42 the RAF was missing those aiming points by several miles).

Strictly speaking, from Bomber Command's point of view, it was not the civilians themselves who were the target but rather their homes and businesses. The general economic disruption caused by rendering many people homeless, filling the streets with debris to block traffic, damaging or destroying various shops, stores, and occasionally factories, and also the impact on the morale of the populace from the foregoing, these were the intent of the area bombing raids.

The U.S. preferred to fly in daylight. But without long-range escort fighters the bombers suffered heavy casualties which made deep penetration raids unsustainable. Once there were fighter escorts available, the USAAF could concentrate on hitting specific targets; but if the weather was cloudy (which it was much of the time), it meant their precision attacks became little more than area raids.

There were also mistakes and omissions made in the selection of targets. Oil was a low priority target for a long time, and the German electrical supply was never really attacked at all even though a sustained effort against it could have been decisive in crippling the German economy.

That What *is* clear is that if Goering had concentrated on taking out the RAF and only the RAF, Operation Sea Lion would have been able to go ahead. They were nearly wiped out, and only the change of focus to civilian targets at the right moment prevented that.
Actually, Fighter Command was never in serious jeopardy of collapsing during the Battle of Britain. This idea of an imminent collapse that was forestalled by the German's switch to London is mostly a myth that sprang up after the war. Yes, Fighter Command was at times hard-pressed in late August, but it was nowhere near being wiped out.

Britain was outproducing Germany in fighters throughout the battle. The RAF always had plenty of Hurricanes and Spitfires available to defend the nation (the Hurricane was the main British fighter during the battle, comprising roughly two-thirds of Fighter Command's strength). There was a shortage of pilots during the latter stages of the battle, but the RAF was able to cope. As it was, there were a good number of fighter aircraft and pilots which effectively sat out the battle in 13 Group.

Even if the Luftwaffe had been able to make the airbases in 11 Group mostly inoperable (a monumental task in itself), Fighter Command could simply have pulled its fighters back to 12 Group, beyond the range at which the Luftwaffe could conduct attacks with escorted bombers. Such a withdrawal would have meant more difficulty in intercepting German raids, but the RAF fighters would have been operating from secure bases.

Given what the Luftwaffe had available to it at the time in terms of aircraft and weaponry, it is an open question whether it was even possible for it to have won the Battle of Britain.

In terms of Operation Sea Lion, that operation itself had a very low chance for success even if the Luftwaffe had achieved complete air superiority. The German army was inexperienced in seaborne landings, and they lacked proper equipment for such an undertaking. Most of what was being used to ferry the troops were little more than river barges, woefully inadequate for crossing the Channel, and had to be towed by tugs. A single flotilla of Royal Navy destroyers getting in amongst such a transport fleet could have easily decimated it.
 
Sealion Tangent

It took years of planning, total air and naval superiority, specialized landing craft, several amphibious landings elsewhere to gain much needed operational experience, one of the biggest paratrooper assaults in history for the Allied D-Day landings to succeed (and still at a very high cost at places like Omaha Beach).

Sea Lion had a few months of planing, a "cross your fingers" sort of air superiority, contested sea, laughable landing vessels (river barges), a fairly small airborne element (that the British anticipated), without any tactical or strategic experience outside of hopping rivers.

I for one, would have welcomed Sealion. It would have shortened the war and sent many Nazis to sleep with the fishes. Which makes me all warm and fuzzy on the inside.

Further, way back to the machine gunning aircrew:

That would be a war crime. However, the act of one enraged pilot (or even enraged pilots across a theater of operations) pales in comparison to a plan to exterminate an entire people for eugenics reasons. For all the innocents consumed by fire in the Allied bombings, those bombs were dropped with the honest hope that the Germans/Japanese would surrender the very next day.

The Nazi policies towards those they considered undesirable (or the acts of the Japanese against the Chinese, and citizens of territories they occupied) are below comment, seeking neither peace nor resolution, but to reshape the world in their image, purely to their benefit.

It is that sort of evil that makes Holocaust denial "essential" for there is no excuse for those sort of actions against a population. It is only through whistling and brushing the ashes of millions under the carpet that the Nazi fan club circle jerk can sleep at night.

Millions died to end the dreams of one Austrian Corporal. It does great disservice to their memory to rewrite how and why they died to support more dead ideologies.
 
Has anybody followed the links through to a forum called COHOD Revisionist Forum :eye-poppi

For the love of Pete tell me these people are not for real!

I feel besmirched.
 
Has anybody followed the links through to a forum called COHOD Revisionist Forum :eye-poppi

For the love of Pete tell me these people are not for real!

I feel besmirched.


There is some evidence that the majority of neo-Nazis don't actually believe the Holocaust didn't happen. Denial serves at least three purposes. First, it gains notoriety for their (bowel) movement. Second, it attracts gullible anti-Semites, who are of course potential new recruits. Third, it provides a convenient vehicle for Jew-baiting.

Speaking of Nazi bowel movements, here's a picture from the Dusseldorf carnival. (WARNING: NSFW):

1706047bb6956f2bf5.jpg
NPD stands for Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, or National Democratic Party of Germany; the current neo-Nazi party in Germany.
 
On a side note, are you sure that the US had a policy of not arming air crew? I know that US naval aviators in the Pacific were armed, as I've read several accounts stating they were. Whether this was as protection against sharks, or against the Japanese (who were known not to respect the laws of war as generally recognized by the Western powers), I'm not certain.

Yup, definitely not armed. As soon as the pilot becomes armed they lose that special protection as an "airman leaving an aircraft in distress".

I suspect the arming of pilots in the Pacific was because Japan did not follow this sort of unofficial international agreement regarding shooting parachutes or downed aircrews.


With this clarified, I now re-pose my question. Did the P-51 pilot commit a war crime when he machine-gunned the German pilot, and, if so, should he have been punished, in order to avoid starting down the "slippery slope"?

No, he did not commit a war crime. For an act to be a war crime it must be an act that is prohibited by some sort of international treaty.

The pilot was, however, guilty of violating US military law, and technically probably should have been court martialed. However it simply would have have been practical to prosecute every single violation of military war in WW2.
 
That is usually how it is portrayed.

And the same thing in the FIRST WW! (Yes, long range bombing was a fact only 15 years after Kitty Hawk.)

Not certain how accurate that portrayal is, though.

What *is* clear is that if Goering had concentrated on taking out the RAF and only the RAF, Operation Sea Lion would have been able to go ahead. They were nearly wiped out, and only the change of focus to civilian targets at the right moment prevented that.

That's the mythology. The truth is, as always, a little more complicated.

Great Britain was out-producing Germany in aircraft and pilots, plus had a greater logistical support system. If things got really hairy for 11 Group the plan was to withdraw to airfields north of London, outside of German fighter range, and redeploy south when any invasion came.

The British and Commonwealth forces were significantly stronger than they were in May and had a very good idea where any invasion had to occur.

The forgotten factor seems to be the Royal Navy. They would have eaten any invasion fleet alive in the Channel. Britain had about 70 destroyers in close proximity to the Channel waiting, Germany had 10 destroyers TOTAL.

And as always, logistics. Even given a landing in Kent, the mechanics of providing the fuel and artillery shells and ammunition and food were far beyond German capacity at the time, or indeed of any time.
 
Has anybody followed the links through to a forum called COHOD Revisionist Forum :eye-poppi

For the love of Pete tell me these people are not for real!

I feel besmirched.

Yes, CODOH is real, sort of. The driving force is "Hannover", AKA "Moderator 3", who banned me on a couple of occasions for asking a question.

The flip side of CODOH is RODOH, ie Real Open Debate On Holocaust. RODOH is interested in facts, you know like demography. Nick Terry is an outstanding poster there who's Phd thesis was on the actions of one of the Einsatzgruppen, and continues to do demographic research on the true cost of the Sho'ah.

CODOH jumps up and down and yells a lot- it's what they've got.
 
No, he did not commit a war crime. For an act to be a war crime it must be an act that is prohibited by some sort of international treaty.

The pilot was, however, guilty of violating US military law, and technically probably should have been court martialed. However it simply would have have been practical to prosecute every single violation of military war in WW2.


Wouldn't you say that he should have been acquitted due to extenuating circumstances, though? After all, had the German pilot survived to return to action, he would undoubtedly have continued machine-gunning Allied parachutists.
 
Can someone knock the 'Red Cross records prove only 200k Joos died!' claim out of the ballpark for me?

If the site wasn't down for a server upgrade I'd give you a direct link to Axis History Forum, Holocaust and other war crimes section and the "How many Jews died for real" thread.

I'll try to post it when they're back on line, don't have that thread bookmarked.
 
I thought, based on historical data, that the bombing of London was the first deliberate targeting of civilians, and led to the all out war which included both sides bombing civilian targets. Is that right?

Well, there was Warsaw in '39 and Rotterdam in '40.
 
That is usually how it is portrayed.

And the same thing in the FIRST WW! (Yes, long range bombing was a fact only 15 years after Kitty Hawk.)

Not certain how accurate that portrayal is, though.

What *is* clear is that if Goering had concentrated on taking out the RAF and only the RAF, Operation Sea Lion would have been able to go ahead. They were nearly wiped out, and only the change of focus to civilian targets at the right moment prevented that.


Supposedly the British raid on Berlin of 25 August 1940, and following raids (the cause of Hitler's order to switch to bombing cities) was in retaliation for a German raid on London on 24 August 1940. However there's a few problems with this theory:

One day is far too short a time to plan for a raid of that scale.
The German bombing of London on 24 August was accidental.

It seems to me that it is far, far more likely Churchill ordered the bombing of Berlin some time before the German raid, with the sole aim of enraging the Germans and causing them to shift their campaign from the RAF to urban centers.
 
The forgotten factor seems to be the Royal Navy. They would have eaten any invasion fleet alive in the Channel. Britain had about 70 destroyers in close proximity to the Channel waiting, Germany had 10 destroyers TOTAL.


I wouldn't have been entirely confident of that. The British destroyers had no effective Anti-Air defenses, and were particularly vulnerable to air attack - ten destroyers were sunk in the Channel and North Sea between May and July 1940.

The invasion was wargamed by the British in 1974 and the beachhead was cut off by the Home Fleet within a few days, but this assumed the Germans had not secured air supremacy.

Securing air supremacy and using aircraft in a close air support role was of course a vital element of Blitzkrieg, so I think it goes without saying that the invasion relied on air supremacy.

And if Germany had air supremacy I think it could have gone either way.

(Incidentally my count is about 18 or 19 destroyers in the Kriegsmarine in 1940)
 
As an aside: My grandfather would, in his youth, find himself involved in knife fights with members of the Hitler Youth. The perils of being a Jew in Germany at the time. He got out in time (not many of his family did), and if he were alive today, I'm sure he'd love to meet A-Train and MaGZ in person...
 
One of the problems with warcrimes is they rely on mutual adherence. As we saw in WW2 with the restriction on unrestricted submarine warfare, once by sides of a conflict are breaching the law as a matter of course the law becomes null and void.

The most common mistake that normal civilians make when looking at the laws of war is to think of them like civil law. They are not. They should be thought of more as an international treaty, and as soon as both sides cease to recognise the treaty, it becomes non existent.

This is probably the strongest argument in favour of complying with the laws of war, funnily enough. Once you breach the laws as a matter of course, you immediately give your enemy free reign to breach them as well. You will never be able to prosecute them for their breaches, as your own breaches will become their defense.
 
I wouldn't have been entirely confident of that. The British destroyers had no effective Anti-Air defenses, and were particularly vulnerable to air attack - ten destroyers were sunk in the Channel and North Sea between May and July 1940.

The invasion was wargamed by the British in 1974 and the beachhead was cut off by the Home Fleet within a few days, but this assumed the Germans had not secured air supremacy.

Securing air supremacy and using aircraft in a close air support role was of course a vital element of Blitzkrieg, so I think it goes without saying that the invasion relied on air supremacy.

And if Germany had air supremacy I think it could have gone either way.

(Incidentally my count is about 18 or 19 destroyers in the Kriegsmarine in 1940)

If you are speaking of the Sandhurst wargame, they stipulated that the Germans managed to land and they stipulated that the Home Fleet was not committed. The landing force still surrendered.

Of the destroyers with which German entered the war, 4-1934, 12-1934A and 6 1936, 22 in total roughly half had been sunk at Narvik.

http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/destroyer/zerstorer1936a/index.html

Although 9 destroyers were lost in the Channel in 1940, the majority were at Dunkirk, i.e. at either very slow or no speeds. While the Stuka may have been useful against stationary targets its margin of error against destroyers moving at speed would have made its effect negligible. And of course level bombers only do worse.

Add to that the day and night ability of the RN, the Luftwaffe is much less active then.

The RAF would have fought a Luftwaffe with too much on its plate, while Fighter Command of the RAF could concentrate on shooting down planes. Bomber and CCoastal Command could do their parts as well.

:)
 
You seem to suggest your Holocaust is something sacred to you.

How sick.

Nice try. He is actually saying that he can not believe that someone could hate Jews so much that they would be prepared to blind themselves to the truth.

I on the other hand know that you are just following in the footsteps of your heroes in the Third Reich. Except, your heroes had the balls to put their lives on the line for their beliefs (no matter how evil and ultimately stupid they were). While you merely hide behind an anonymous user name on the internet.
 
If you are speaking of the Sandhurst wargame, they stipulated that the Germans managed to land and they stipulated that the Home Fleet was not committed. The landing force still surrendered.

That's incorrect. In the Sandhurst wargame the Home Fleet were moved down from Scarpa Flow and within a few days cut off the German forces, forcing surrender.


Of the destroyers with which German entered the war, 4-1934, 12-1934A and 6 1936, 22 in total roughly half had been sunk at Narvik.

http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/destroyer/zerstorer1936a/index.html

By my count 10 of the 21 destroyers in the Kriegsmarine at the beginning of WW2 had been sunk by the end of 1940.

A further 8 destroyers were commissioned between the start of the war and February 1942 (when German forces allocated to Sealion were released for other duties). Between the end of 1940 and February 1942 the Kriegsmarine lost one destroyer.


Although 9 destroyers were lost in the Channel in 1940, the majority were at Dunkirk, i.e. at either very slow or no speeds. While the Stuka may have been useful against stationary targets its margin of error against destroyers moving at speed would have made its effect negligible. And of course level bombers only do worse.

The Royal Navy lost seven destroyers in Norway, six destroyers at Dunkirk and a further ten destroyers in the North Sea and the Channel, all in the first half of 1940. In total between April and July 1940 the Royal Navy lost twenty four destroyers and the Royal Canadian Navy lost one.

Losses became so heavy that Royal Navy ships were prohibited from traveling through the English Channel at all. Churchill made one of his first acts a request for a loan of 50 obsolete destroyers from the USA in order to cover depleted RN ranks (the "Destroyers For Bases" agreement). The first of these arrived in September 1940


The RAF would have fought a Luftwaffe with too much on its plate, while Fighter Command of the RAF could concentrate on shooting down planes. Bomber and CCoastal Command could do their parts as well.

Don't get me wrong, I think any German invasion of the UK would have struggled to succeed - and I think the Germans knew this, which is why they tried to get the UK to settle for peace.

I just think it's inaccurate to completely dismiss the invasion as a failure before it began.

I also think a comparison to D-Day to prove that an amphibious landing required enormous logistics is misleading. Firstly it's a matter of scale - the allied invasion was intended to capture all of Europe - the German invasion only had to capture the United Kingdom.

Secondly, this comparison fails to take into account the fact that the forces used in the Normandy Landings were significantly in excess of what was needed. With the exception of Omaha Beach the landings were virtually unopposed. Consider:

Gold - 24,970 ashore, 400 casualties (1.6%)
Juno - 14,000 ashore, 1079 casualties (7.7%)
Sword - 28,845 ashore, 630 casualties (2.1%)
Omaha - 34,000 ashore, 3,000 casualties (8.8%)
Utah - 23,250 ashore, 200 casualties (0.8%)

Numbers were also overwhelmingly in favour of the allies (1.5 million troops versus 300,000, 12,000 aircraft versus 300, and a 4:1 numerical advantage in armour). German forces had been severely depleted by campaigns in Russia and North Africa prior to the invasion - 80,000 of the German soldiers were Russian POWs who had offered to fight against Stalin and surrendered en masse to the allies - while the allies were enjoying the full military and industrial power of the United States.

Despite all of this the Germans inflicted severe casualties on the allies in the post-landing phase - a detail that reflects not the difficulties of an amphibious assault but the capabilities of the German army.

I wonder about the effectiveness of the GHQ line in stopping the German advance. This was a WWI-era static fortification concept, which that Wehrmacht had demonstrated it was able to decimate with ease. The regular British Army's only exposure to Blitzkrieg had ended in unmitigated disaster. I find it hard to believe the untrained, poorly equipped and poorly armed Home Guard would have faired any better.

The phrase "Shock and Awe" is something of a parody now thanks to the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, but the German Army of 1939 - 1941 was a master of executing it. I think you could argue that the psychological impact of the Blitzkrieg was as responsible for the Fall of France as the actual tactical advantage it offered - the speed and severity of the initial assault led to almost a complete collapse of the French command structure - at one point the commander of the British Expeditionary Force reported that his French superior had not issued him a single order in 8 days.

The psychological impact of an attack is something that is seldom considered in wargaming, partly because it is so difficult to calculate and partly because until very recently little study had been done into it. By the 1970's when the Sandhurst wargame was conducted the western armies had only just got a handle on how to get their soldiers to overcome their natural resistance to killing.

Of course you could point to the stalwart nature of the British people - citing for example their indomitable character in surviving the Blitz (my own Grandmother is an archetypal example of that character) however resisting the impersonal bombing of your city is very, very different to resisting German soldiers storming through your streets and killing people before your very eyes.

I think an invasion of the UK by Germany could have succeeded, but not because of any sort of military advantage. Germany's greatest advantage was their psychological advantage. Fortunately for us Allies, Germany itself did not even appreciate the significance of that advantage at the time.
 

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