Corsair 115
Penultimate Amazing
- Joined
- Apr 18, 2007
- Messages
- 14,519
The RAF's move towards area bombing was as much driven by technological and operational limitations as it was anything else.I thought, based on historical data, that the bombing of London was the first deliberate targeting of civilians, and led to the all out war which included both sides bombing civilian targets.
Attacking in daylight obviously yields the best accuracy. But unescorted bombers get shot down in large numbers, so the switch is made to nighttime bombing. Before the war it was thought that crews wouldn't have that much difficulty finding targets at night, but in reality it proved to be very difficult. The only way a specific target like a factory complex could be spotted at night was by flying relatively low. But flying at lower altitudes meant a vastly greater chance of being shot down by flak.
So, the bombers fly as high as they can to be safer. But this consequently means the only thing you can reasonably find at night is a target the size of a city. So the city itself becomes the aiming point (and even then in 1941-42 the RAF was missing those aiming points by several miles).
Strictly speaking, from Bomber Command's point of view, it was not the civilians themselves who were the target but rather their homes and businesses. The general economic disruption caused by rendering many people homeless, filling the streets with debris to block traffic, damaging or destroying various shops, stores, and occasionally factories, and also the impact on the morale of the populace from the foregoing, these were the intent of the area bombing raids.
The U.S. preferred to fly in daylight. But without long-range escort fighters the bombers suffered heavy casualties which made deep penetration raids unsustainable. Once there were fighter escorts available, the USAAF could concentrate on hitting specific targets; but if the weather was cloudy (which it was much of the time), it meant their precision attacks became little more than area raids.
There were also mistakes and omissions made in the selection of targets. Oil was a low priority target for a long time, and the German electrical supply was never really attacked at all even though a sustained effort against it could have been decisive in crippling the German economy.
Actually, Fighter Command was never in serious jeopardy of collapsing during the Battle of Britain. This idea of an imminent collapse that was forestalled by the German's switch to London is mostly a myth that sprang up after the war. Yes, Fighter Command was at times hard-pressed in late August, but it was nowhere near being wiped out.That What *is* clear is that if Goering had concentrated on taking out the RAF and only the RAF, Operation Sea Lion would have been able to go ahead. They were nearly wiped out, and only the change of focus to civilian targets at the right moment prevented that.
Britain was outproducing Germany in fighters throughout the battle. The RAF always had plenty of Hurricanes and Spitfires available to defend the nation (the Hurricane was the main British fighter during the battle, comprising roughly two-thirds of Fighter Command's strength). There was a shortage of pilots during the latter stages of the battle, but the RAF was able to cope. As it was, there were a good number of fighter aircraft and pilots which effectively sat out the battle in 13 Group.
Even if the Luftwaffe had been able to make the airbases in 11 Group mostly inoperable (a monumental task in itself), Fighter Command could simply have pulled its fighters back to 12 Group, beyond the range at which the Luftwaffe could conduct attacks with escorted bombers. Such a withdrawal would have meant more difficulty in intercepting German raids, but the RAF fighters would have been operating from secure bases.
Given what the Luftwaffe had available to it at the time in terms of aircraft and weaponry, it is an open question whether it was even possible for it to have won the Battle of Britain.
In terms of Operation Sea Lion, that operation itself had a very low chance for success even if the Luftwaffe had achieved complete air superiority. The German army was inexperienced in seaborne landings, and they lacked proper equipment for such an undertaking. Most of what was being used to ferry the troops were little more than river barges, woefully inadequate for crossing the Channel, and had to be towed by tugs. A single flotilla of Royal Navy destroyers getting in amongst such a transport fleet could have easily decimated it.
