What I am hearing DD, is that they might be ordered to AA and accept same on a purely financial basis. If they had real objections to AA they could seek, and presumably be given, a variation of sorts to seek their own choice of education.
Is that about right?
Maybe in some instances, but not all.
In Griffin v. Coughlin, a prison inmate was told that his eligibility for family visitation rights was conditioned on his attendance at a substance abuse program based on the AA 12 steps. The New York Court of Appeals (the highest court in that state) held that this was improper, and issued an order "prohibiting respondents from conditioning petitioner's participation in the Family Reunion Program on attendance in the subject Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment Program, as presently constituted."
In Inouye v. Kemna a parole officer ordered his parolee to attend a Salvation Army program that required attendance at AA/NA meetings. The parolee had already made his objection to AA/NA programs clear. He did not specifically ask to be placed in a different program. When he stopped attending the meetings, his parole officer had him arrested and his parole revoked. The parolee sued the parole officer for civil rights violations. There's a principle in U.S. civil rights laws that a government official may have "qualified immunity" even if he or she violated your rights, as long as the law wasn't sufficiently clear at the time. The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals held that defense was inapplicable, and in doing so cited numerous recent court decisions ruling that forced attendance at AA/NA programs is unconstitutional. The fact that so many such decisions exist is telling.
It appears that some jurisdictions have a routine practice of sending people to AA/NA. This case notes that New York's Orange County routinely required AA/NA meetings as part of probation conditions in alcohol-related cases:
The OCDP's report recommended a term of probation with six special conditions, which the department routinely recommends in cases of defendants with alcohol problems. These included that the probationer "totally abstain from the use of intoxicating beverages," avoid "establishmentwhere the primary business is the sale or consumption of alcohol," and, as the fifth condition, that he "attend Alcoholics Anonymous at the direction of [his] probation officer."
These recommended special conditions were set forth on a standard form rider which OCDP routinely provided to sentencing judges in such cases. Judge Levinson sentenced Warner to three years of probation, imposing the special conditions recommended by the OCDP. In imposing these special conditions, Judge Levinson endorsed the Probation Department's standard form.