The decision by the Framers of the Constitution to create a bicameral legislature was not based solely on their notion of what would constitute a good law-making body; it was also based on practical political considerations. The Framers reasoned that a two-chamber legislature provided a significant benefit: the means of checking and controlling possible abuses of legislative power. By dividing power, the Framers believed they had created, as Madison noted, two ``different bodies of men who might watch and check each other.''3 But when the delegates met in Philadelphia in 1787, debate centered on how the national legislature should be apportioned -- whether on the basis of equal State representation, which would favor the small States; or on the basis of population, which would enhance the importance of the large States.
The debate on this question was contentious and at times threatened to deadlock the Constitutional Convention. At length, the delegates agreed on a compromise: a two-chamber legislature, one chamber structured to provide representation by State, the other to provide representation based on population. This ``Great Compromise'' removed the delegates' most significant stumbling block to completing their task, provided the means for the small and large States to reach agreement, and made secure the establishment of a bicameral legislature.
The Framers' conception of each chamber was distinct. The House of Representatives would be ``the grand repository of the democratic principle of government,'' as Madison wrote.4 Thus, the Constitution provided that tax legislation was to be the initial prerogative of the House. But the large, popularly elected House was also seen to possess qualities that were a cause for anxiety among the Framers: a tendency toward instability, impulsive behavior, unpredictability, and, as Richard Fenno notes, ``a short-run view of good public policy.''5 Alexander Hamilton expressed the concern that, should the popularly elected House exist as the sole legislative chamber, it might be ``a full match if not an overmatch for every other member of the government.''6
The Senate was created to be a stabilizing force, elected not by mass electors, but selected by the State legislators. Senators would be more knowledgeable and more deliberate -- a sort of republican nobility -- and a counter to what Madison saw as the ``fickleness and passion'' that could absorb the House. He noted further, ``The use of the Senate is to consist in its proceeding with more coolness, with more system and with more wisdom, than the popular branch.''7 Madison's argument led the Framers to grant the Senate prerogatives in foreign policy, an area where steadiness, discretion, and caution were deemed especially important.
An oft-told anecdote expresses the Founders view of the distinctive difference between House and Senate. In a conversation Thomas Jefferson, who had been in France during the Constitutional Convention, asked Washington why he had consented to a second chamber. ``Why,'' asked Washington, ``did you pour that coffee into your saucer?'' ``To cool it,'' said Jefferson. ``Even so,'' said Washington, ``we pour legislation into the senatorial saucer to cool it.'' The anecdote, notes Fenno, ``is an exemplary one not just for the Senate, but for the Congress as a whole, for what it illustrates is the importance of separate, sequential action by the two chambers.''