Romney’s Bain Yielded Private Gains, Socialized Losses

Puppycow

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In 1986, in one of its earliest deals, Bain Capital acquired Accuride Corp., a manufacturer of aluminum truck wheels. The purchase was 97.5 percent financed by debt, a high level of leverage under any circumstances. It was especially burdensome for a company that was exposed to aluminum-price volatility and cyclical automotive production.

Casino Capitalism

Forty-to-one leverage is casino capitalism that hugely magnifies gains and losses. Bain Capital wisely chose to flip the company fast: After 18 months, it sold Accuride, converting its $2.6 million sliver of equity into a $61 million capital gain. That deal, which yielded a 1,123 percent annualized return, was critical to Bain Capital’s early success and led the firm to keep maximizing the use of leverage.

Buy a company using extreme leverage, load it up with debt, cash out. That was basically the MO. Made huge profits for Bain Capital, but Bain was not on the hook to repay the debt if things didn't turn out so well, as they often didn't.

One more example:
In 1992, Bain Capital bought American Pad & Paper by financing 87 percent of the purchase price. In the next three years, Ampad borrowed to make acquisitions, repay existing debt and pay Bain Capital and its investors $60 million in dividends.

As a result, the company’s debt swelled from $11 million in 1993 to $444 million by 1995. The $14 million in annual interest expense on this debt dwarfed the company’s $4.7 million operating cash flow. The proceeds of an initial public offering in July 1996 were used to pay Bain Capital $48 million for part of its stake and to reduce the company’s debt to $270 million.

From 1993 to 1999, Bain Capital charged Ampad about $18 million in various fees. By 1999, the company’s debt was back up to $400 million. Unable to pay the interest costs and drained of cash paid to Bain Capital in fees and dividends, Ampad filed for bankruptcy the following year. Senior secured lenders got less than 50 cents on the dollar, unsecured lenders received two- tenths of a cent on the dollar, and several hundred jobs were lost. Bain Capital had reaped capital gains of $107 million on its $5.1 million investment.

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Obviously, the US government shouldn't be guaranteeing private pensions. That's the only way to insure no socialized losses.

I see you're moving the goalposts. First you claimed that there were no socialized losses, now you claim that there shouldn't have been.

Would your position be the same if it was your pension that suddenly disappeared?
 
Talk about moving goalposts.

OK all private insurance is risk pooling socialising of losses.

:rolleyes:

The U.S. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. is not a private insurance company.

It falls in the same sort of category as the FDIC or Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. If it runs out of money, the government will step in.

Participation is not voluntary either, so it is essentially funded by taxes.
 
You sure? If it is funded by the companies who benefit from it, I think it is private insurance.

FNMA and FLHMC were nationalised with public injection of funds. Until that happens to the pension insurer, it is not making any call on the state as far as I know.

I think you are struggling to find socialised losses. Maybe revise your title or look harder.
 
You sure? If it is funded by the companies who benefit from it, I think it is private insurance.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pension_Benefit_Guaranty_Corporation

The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is an independent agency of the United States government that was created by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) to encourage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary private defined benefit pension plans, provide timely and uninterrupted payment of pension benefits, and keep pension insurance premiums at the lowest level necessary to carry out its operations.
 
I see you're moving the goalposts. First you claimed that there were no socialized losses

There weren't in the part you originally quoted. A rather curious choice to omit, given that it was the central thesis of your post.

now you claim that there shouldn't have been.

Indeed I do. After all, we're in agreement that socialized losses are a bad thing. So we should act to prevent them, don't you think?

Would your position be the same if it was your pension that suddenly disappeared?

Yes, it would: I would wish that the money had been put in a defined contribution plan from the start, so that such failures would not be possible. But I note that you seem to expect hypocrisy in the name of self-interest. Is that how you operate?
 
And where is/was the call on the state (taxpayer)?

Compulsory pension scheme insurance doesn't make the losses socialised any more than compulsory vehicle insurance does.
 
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The U.S. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. is not a private insurance company.

It falls in the same sort of category as the FDIC or Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. If it runs out of money, the government will step in.

Participation is not voluntary either, so it is essentially funded by taxes.

Exactly: it enforces socialization of losses by the power of law. We obviously need to get rid of it. I'm so glad you're in agreement.
 
There weren't in the part you originally quoted. A rather curious choice to omit, given that it was the central thesis of your post.

I agree it was a big omission, and Francesca was right to ask for that part, but it does seem he has now provided it. Why is it still significant that it wasn't provided in the OP?
 

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